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EDITORIAL 
of the International Journal for Education Law and Policy 
and the Pázmány Law Review
Educational rights may be approached from any direction, however the common 
element in every model is the justiciability and the awareness and knowledge of 
enforceability of this prior right. This is especially important for the more vulnerable 
groups of society, since there are specifi c needs may arise, which are necessary to 
refl ect. 
The International Conference on ‘The Justiciability of the Prior Right to Education 
– The Role of Civil Society for the Awareness, Advocacy and Accountability of the 
Right to Education’, organized by the European Association for Education Rights 
and Policy (ELA) in cooperation with the Ereky Public Law Research Center at the 
Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Budapest on 20-22 October 2016 was devoted to 
the launch of a dialogue between representatives of science, jurisdiction, and civil 
society ,–  inviting them to exchange their experience in this fi eld. The conference 
examined primarily the role of civil society in the protection of education rights for 
the more defenceless people and groups. 
We are proud to submit for your interest most of the lectures, rewritten for the 
special occasion of this volume, – a very special volume indeed: both Journals 
worked together in a complementary way. The target groups of IJELP and PLR is 
quite diff erent and followed a similar peer review.  We consider this initiative as a 
truly European concept of cooperation, to be followed by international and national 
THEMATIC FOCUS:
Educational Rights in Global and Comparative perspective
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On Saturday the 22 October the Global Education Law Forum (GELF) - Committed 
to Good Governance, Human Dignity and Eff ective Policies in Education, was also 
offi  cially launched.
 The right to education and rights in education are essential in dealing with student 
and school diversity, but expertise on these fundamental concepts is relatively rare 
and scattered. In 2015, a group of concerned individuals, active in education, research 
and public administration, decided to join forces and provide a concerted helping 
hand to all those who want to formulate and implement sound education principles, 
policies, codes, rules and regulations. 
      Prof. Jan de Groof   Balázs Sz. Gerencsér PhD
      President of ELA   Director of PPKE Ereky RC
      (Bruges, Tilburg)   (Budapest)
7The Justiciability of the Prior Right to Education
Pázmány Law Review
4. 2016. • 7–11.
THE JUSTICIABILITY OF THE PRIOR RIGHT 
TO EDUCATION 
Summary of an International Conference held at the PPCU, 2016
Balázs Szabolcs G  – Kata G
(PPCU)
1. The aims of the conference
The series of conferences, which has been organized annually by European 
Association for Education Rights and Policy (ELA) in various research locations 
around the world for decades, are more than valuable. The purpose of these 
conferences and all the related scientifi c eff orts is to try to fi nd answers to all 
the emerging and sometimes alarming questions of educational law, mainly on a 
comparative legal basis. This work is particularly eff ective if, besides science, it gives 
input to legislation and jurisdiction too. In 2016 the ELA held its Annual Conference 
at the Pázmány Péter Catholic University Faculty of Law and Political Sciences.
On 20-22 October 2016 the ELA in cooperation with the Ereky Public Law 
Research Center at the Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Budapest, organized 
an international conference on the Justiciability of the Prior Right to Education. 
The conference was devoted to launch a dialogue where representatives of science, 
jurisdiction and civil society can exchange their experience in this fi eld. The subtitle 
of the conference explained its focus: “The Role of Civil Society for the Awareness, 
Advocacy and Accountability of the Right to Education”. The conference examined 
primarily the role of civil society in the protection of education rights especially for 
the most defenseless people and groups such as minorities and special linguistic or 
religious communities. 
2. Organizing in co-operation
The ELA, founded in 1993, is an independent and worldwide NGO, with its head 
offi  ce in Antwerp. According to the motto of ELA, education has the potential to 
unlock the door to equality and participation, it constitutes the basis necessary for 
empowerment of each individual, and for the promotion of all human rights. Education 
law means constructing, block by block, the foundation that will support educational 
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rights in all nations and for all peoples and individuals. The importance of the law 
not with standing, its members are aware of the relative value of each legal principle, 
whether it is founded on a convention or on some other legal source. ELA aims to 
encourage progress in educational rights by promoting the right to education as a 
right, by elaborating education law as a discipline and by actively supporting every 
serious eff ort made toward the gradual and progressive codifi cation of educational 
rights and educational legislation. See more at: http://www.lawandeducation.com.
The co-organizer of this conference is the Ereky Public Law Research Center 
that was founded in 2011 within the PPCU Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, 
Budapest. Its founder’s aim was to develop an independent think tank, which is 
actively involved in the current trends and development of public administration and 
policy. The research center conducts joint and individual research projects, in search 
for answers to the pressing questions. This way the research group can participate 
in central and local (governmental) development projects, where knowledge 
management, scientifi c basis or international comparison is essential. Research 
topics are related to human rights, the exercise of state power, central and local public 
administration, and the control mechanisms of public administration. The team is led 
by Andras Zs. Varga, professor of law, Head of Department at PPCU and judge of 
the Constitutional Court of Hungary. The director of the Research Center is Balázs 
Gerencsér associate professor, while its members are professors, senior researchers 
and doctoral students, and sometimes even graduate students. See more at: 
http://ereky.jak.ppke.hu.
The importance of the topic was acknowledged by the supporters as well. It 
was the organizers’ honor that the conference was fi nanced by multiple sources 
who considered this issue important. Such was the PPCU K.A.P.; the Institute for 
Minority Rights Protection (KJI, Budapest); State Secretary of the Prime Minister’s 
Offi  ce (Hungary); the Rákóczi Alliance (Hungary) and the Research Institute for 
Hungarian Communities Abroad (NPKI, Budapest). 
3. Sessions of the conference
The conference had seven sessions, splitting by the main cornerstones of the topic. 
By this method it had an opening keynote session, which was followed by sessions 
dealing with issues of constitutional law and jurisdiction. These two sessions was 
devoted to general issues of justiciability of educational rights, as well as the courts’ 
and ombudsman’s experience. The second day focused more on the experiences of the 
civil society in a comparative approach. The comparison had a special attention on the 
Central and Eastern European region as well as on the enforcement of international 
and domestic obligations. Lecturers came from thirteen diff erent countries from 
Russia to the United States.
In the fi rst, opening session keynotes were presented by prof. Jan de Groof, 
president of ELA, who highlighted the need of judicial case law that can be referred to 
later on. Prof. Szabolcs Szuromi rector of PPCU in his keynote emphasized the close 
relation of educational and religious rights on the basis of human dignity. He proved 
that denominations improves values of the society through their own educational and 
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other services. Lajos Aáry-Tamás, ombudsman of Educational Rights of Hungary, 
underlined the importance of forums that are able to solve problems related to 
educational rights. He presented the best practices that his offi  ce gained in the past 
decades, which is quite unique in Europe. All the keynotes highlighted the need for 
justiciability of these rights, and the importance of both hard and soft law in domestic 
and international law. 
The second session was about the concerns of constitutional law. Prof. András Zs. 
Varga, who is also a member of the Venice Commission, exposed the human dignity 
as the ultimate basis for educational rights. Professor Schanda, Head of Department 
of Constitutional Law at PPCU, mentioned that not only the state but primarily the 
family has to educate. The crisis of traditional families has a strong eff ect on the 
state’s educational role. He highlighted that the way out of the problems is to go back 
to the family and the children. Renáta Uitz, Chair of the Comparative Constitutional 
Law Program, Head of Department of Legal Studies at Central European University, 
dealt with the meaning of justiciability form a comparative legal point of view. Pablo 
Meix Cereceda, professor of Administrative Law at the University of Castilla-La 
Mancha, highlighted the importance of EU law in educational rights. The debate was 
about whether the forum was more important than the rights to be exercised. The 
second session fi nished with Krisztina Rozsnyai, associate professor at ELTE Faculty 
of Law, who talked about the present system of remedies and the administrative 
jurisdiction as a special legal procedure.
In the third session Elisabeth Sándor-Szalay, the ombudsman for minority rights, 
underlined that there is a real signifi cant case law at the ombudsman offi  ces all 
around Europe. She detailed the Hungarian case of minority aff airs. Maria Smirnova, 
researcher of Manchester International Law Centre at The University of Manchester, 
presented the 2012 Russian law of education. Lilla Berkes, researcher assistant at 
PPCU, presented a true story from a Canadian school about the freedom of religion 
versus rights and freedom of other public order. Dragos Efrim, young Romanian 
scholar at University of Craiova, talked about the Romanian new legislation in 
connection with the religious education in public schools.
The next day, Friday, prof. Charles Glenn, Boston University, opened the fourth 
session. He presented his paper on the strengthening of the civil society, mainly from 
a US perspective. Following, Ingo Richter, Professor at Irmgard Coninx Stiftung 
and University of Tübingen, dealt with the German case of thousands of immigrants 
and their relation to education. He expressed that if the state is not able to solve a 
problem, than the civil society has to. He thinks that the language pre-training of 
immigrant people is a kind of segregation and civil organizations should keep an eye 
on these segregated classes and promote the transfer of the children into the regular 
classes. He underlined the importance of the ELA-type umbrella organizations 
to raise civil society. Roberto Toniatti, Professor of Constitutional Law at Trento 
University, talked about a multicultural citizenship that is in close relation with a 
political and social notion of citizenship. This is the main character of minority rights 
in Europe. He believes that a “hidden hand” can be a rule making in civil sphere 
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just like in the economics.1 Prof. Charles Russo from Dayton University analyzed 
the perspectives from the US according to the Justiciability of the Prior Right to 
Education. He presented a broad overview on the case law on educational rights in 
a historical perspective with a special attention to equality. He concluded that the 
that litigation will continue as the US continues to seek to provide equal educational 
opportunities for all Americans.
In the next session a great amount of good practices of single cases were presented. 
Here we have heard about a Jesuit educational initiative presented by P. Tamás Forrai 
SJ. He conferred their roma education and refugee integrated education programs, 
which are successfully led in the previous years. Later, individual cases of minority 
civil associations were presented from Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia and Romania. 
Lecturers came from this Central European region representing civil actors in the 
fi eld of education. At last, Balázs Gerencsér talked about the most recent fi ndings of 
the Council of Europe of educational systems in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The fi fth session was on the rethinking of the A4 scheme (adequacy, accountability, 
awareness and advocacy). Prof. de Groof’s said the most important keywords on this 
topic were respect, protect, promote, fulfi ll and facilitate. All these are concentrating 
to implement the right to education. Merilin Kiviorg, professor at the Estonian 
University of Tartu, underlined the importance of building the environment of 
acceptance instead of breaking the rules of living together. She said that “freedom 
had a price”. Gábor Kardos, member of Committee of Experts of the European 
Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, and professor of international law at 
ELTE, Budapest, presented in-depth the CoE’s language charter and its fi nding and 
tendencies in implementing educational rights. 
4. Summaries
The sixth was the closing of the plenary sessions. Prof de Groof, summarizing the 
conference, said there were good practices in the world regarding educational rights, 
which were called “best interest of the child”. In his opinion we need a sustainable 
development in the quality of education. In this regard the United Nations have 
documents and valuable knowledge. The role of ELA is to promote the best ways 
of implementation of this fundamental right. Educational rights are very close to 
educational policy, which are in connection with political systems. In his summary 
he highlighted there was a valuable role of the extra-judicial systems (like the 
ombudsman) that were need to be developed.  Finally he talked about the importance 
of interculturality. The Brugge document of the early ELA years can be renewed. 
Politics and research are both needed for future development of these rights. 
Balázs Gerencsér in his summary highlighted the importance of focusing on 
the human being and its dignity. The human rights cannot be treated only as legal 
elements or mosaics of normative rules. If just some of the elements of dignity is 
1   The „religionclause.blogspot.com” blog was mentioned in the debate as a source of cases.
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focused on, we lose the real content: the humanity. He urged to keep always close to 
the real unchangeable values. As an outcome of this Conference organizers agreed 
on a continuous collection of best practices in Europe that can be a basis for future 
researches and policy making.
At the end of the Conference, as a separate event, the Global Education Law 
Forum (GELF) as an independent initiative was offi  cially launched by its founders 
(Peter Van der Hijden, Marco Matthijsen) on the 22th October 2016. GELF will be a 
nonprofi t consortium that will address the issue of a broader and a more equal access 
to education both from a practical and a scholarly perspective. GELF will aim thus to 
add an education rights’ perspective to the implementation of the newly adopted UN 
Sustainable Development Goal 4: ‘Ensure inclusive and quality education for all and 
promote lifelong learning’ and the UNESCO Education 2030 Framework for Action.

Pázmány Law Review
4. 2016. • 11–22.
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION AND JUSTICIABILITY 
OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION
Jan De G *
President of the European Association for Education Law and Policy
1. Ratio behind the implementation and the justiciability of the right to education
International human rights treaties grant everyone the right to education. States, 
upon ratifi cation of these treaties, have the primary responsibility to guarantee 
that individuals subject to their jurisdiction enjoy this right and to ensure that their 
national educational systems meet the requirements assigned to human rights as 
proscribed by international human rights conventions.1 To fulfi l their obligation and 
to fully realise the right to education, it is not suffi  cient that the right to education 
merely exists in their national legal order but it is of the utmost importance that 
national states undertake additional steps.2 
Contracting parties must eff ectively implement the right to education into their 
national legal system in order to create the necessary setting for ensuring the enjoyment 
of the right to education. Upon ratifi cation concrete and eff ective measures, such as 
the adoption of constitutional provisions, legislation and policies or the abolishment 
of existing inconsistent laws or policies, must be taken by contracting parties.3 
Most of the states have created such settings and abided by their legal obligations 
to implement international treaties into their national legal order. Still this is not 
suffi  cient for guaranteeing the eff ective and full protection of the right to education. 
*   Professor at the College of Europe (Bruges, Belgium) and at the University of Tilburg (the 
Netherlands), Government Commissioner for Universities (Belgium, Flemish Community), 
UNESCO Chair for the Right to Education and former UNESCO Chargé de Mission.
1   Jan De G : No Person shall be denied the Right to Education. Nijmegen, 2004. 725.
2   Jan De G  – Gracienne L  – Kishore S : The Right to Education and Rights in 
Education. Nijmegen, 2006. 426.; Kishore S : Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to 
education, justiciability on the right to education. A/HRC/23/35, (2013) para 17.
3   Justiciability, Right to Education Project, promoting mobilisation and accountability. <www.right-to-
education.org/issue-page/justiciability>   
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1.1. “Justiciability” 
Having a legal right and its mere incorporation into a domestic legal order is not 
enough; enforcement mechanisms must also be available. Indeed, ‘for rights to 
have meaning, eff ective remedies must be available to redress violations’.4 It is not 
conceivable to have a right without a remedy.5 One of the options to enforce a right 
is to render it justiciable. Justiciability refers to ‘the ability to claim a remedy before 
an independent and impartial body when a violation of a right has occurred or is 
likely to occur’.6 The right to education is justiciable in all its dimensions since it 
is internationally recognised as demonstrated by the enshrinement of this right 
in various international and regional treaties as well as its implementation in the 
national constitutions.7 
However, this latter statement is contested as the justiciability of economic, social 
and cultural rights has encountered some opposition based on two main arguments 
namely: the ‘specifi c nature’ of these rights and the doctrine of the separation of 
powers. The former argument stipulates that since social and economic rights are 
vague, show a lack of precision and demand the adoption of positive measures for 
its implementation, the justiciability of such rights is not possible, contrary to civil 
and political rights which are clearer and impose a negative obligation. The second 
argument, believes that the doctrine of separation of powers is undermined since 
by adjudicating on matters related to the right to education the judges step into the 
executive’s sphere of competence. As was said in the case R v Cambridge Health 
Authority ex parte B ‘Diffi  cult judgments on how a limited budget is best allocated 
to the maximum advantage of the maximum number […] is not a judgement a court 
can make.’8 However, these arguments can be counter argued.9 With regards to the 
fi rst argument, ‘[t]he nature of the rights themselves is not a legitimate basis for 
rejecting their justiciability’.10 The unwillingness to recognise economic, social and 
cultural rights often stems from political and ideological ideas as well as the cultural 
and political history of the state.11 Indeed, political and ideological ideas rather than 
scientifi c ones are often behind the non-recognition of economic, social and cultural 
4   General comment No. 5 (2003) General measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child. CRC/GC/2003/5, para 24.
5   F.C  : The Justiciability of economic social and cultural rights. In: E. H  – F. A  
– W. V  B  – S. T  – R. Van S  – A. N -F  – K. H : The 
justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights. Erasmus Law Review, 2009/2. 427.
6   I  C   J : Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights – Comparative Experiences of Justiciability. 2008.
7   S  op. cit. para 27.
8   R v Cambridge Health Authority ex parte, B [1995] 2 All ER 129 (CA).
9   A. P. J : The forgotten Rights: the case for the legal enforcement of Socio-economic rights in UK 
national Law. Opticon, 1826, (2) 1.
10   E. C. C : Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic Rights and the South 
African Constitutional Court. Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev., Vol. 38, (2006–2007) 347.
11   J  op. cit. 1.
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rights12 and non-justiciability of these rights are simply ‘a perception’.13 As to the 
second argument, the separation of powers does not exclude the possibility that the 
judges may play a role in the enforcement of the right to education, especially since the 
separation of powers is currently described as the ”dynamic and ongoing interaction 
between the diff erent branches of government’ where the courts engage not only 
‘in an exacting examination of state policies with respect to socio-economic rights’, 
but also in the ‘normative development of the content [… thereof], drawing where 
appropriate on international and comparative standards’.14 Besides, the principles of 
equality and fair hearing, including access to court, would be undermined if some 
executive decisions would not be entitled to be subject to review. The paradigms of the 
rule of law or the Rechtstaat, to name only two diff erent but celebrated models, rather 
require the existence of judicial review of administrative and governmental decisions 
as a guarantee for the individual. Indeed, scholars specializing in administrative law 
have devoted substantial work to establishing when and how policy decisions may be 
subject to judicial review.15 If the allocation of a state’s fi nancial resources is certainly 
a political decision, there are nevertheless certain constitutional goods (among these, 
the social state clause) that not even a legislating body can overlook, as the theory of 
the “essential core” of fundamental rights has explained.16
This entails that individuals can have recourse to courts to challenge states’ 
compliance with their obligations to protect the right at stake. And it means that 
international, regional and national judicial and quasi-judicial bodies can review 
state parties’ actions, omissions, provisions and policies, related to education. 17
12   F. P : The Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practices and Experiences. 
In: B. K. G  – A. C. B  – P. C. C  (eds.): Dignity and Human Rights: the 
Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Antwerp–New York, Intersentia, 2002. 
113.
13  D. M : The Normative Development of Socioeconomic Rights through Supranational 
Adjudication. Stan. J. Int’l L., 2006/42. 53., 101.
14  P. O’C : Vindicating Socio-Economic Rights: International Standards and Comparative 
Experience. Abingdon–New York, Routledge, 2012. 201.; I  C   J : 
Courts and the legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural rights- comparative experiences 
of justiciability. 2008. 75.
15  Studies on judicial review tend to base on national law, and therefore it is diffi  cult to cite an 
internationally valid reference. In English language: P. C : Competing models of judicial review. 
Public Law, Autumn, 1999. 428–447.
16  P. H : Die Wesensgehaltgarantie des Art. 19 Abs. 2 Grundgesetz. Zugleich ein Beitrag zum 
institutionellen Verständnis der Grundrechte und zur Lehre vom Gesetzesvorbehalt. Heidelberg, 
Müller, 1983. 43.
17  F. C : In search of the Core Content of the Right to Education. In: A. C  – S. R  
(eds.): Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Hart 
Publishing, 2002. 220. Antwerp, Intersentia,
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1.2. Why is justiciability important? 
The role of the court in the enforcement of the human right is crucial. It guarantees that 
the right is respected, protected and fulfi lled. Judicial and quasi-judicial bodies not 
only protect but also promote the right to education in guaranteeing and enforcing this 
right. The justiciability of a right renders the state accountable for action or inaction 
according to international, regional and national legal norms. Judicial enforcement 
has a role in granting remedies in cases of violation of the right to education. A fi nding 
of violation of the right to education in an individual case may have a large impact 
and lead to systematic institutional change consequently benefi t to other victims of 
the state behaviour which was challenged and it may simultaneously prevent future 
violations of the right at stake. Besides, judicial bodies play an important role in 
the clarifi cation of the scope and the content of the right to education and in the 
specifi cation of the diff erent rights available to individuals.18 The court’s role is also 
important as it gives a voice to the marginalised group in a democratic society which 
often neglects their interests. Indeed, the distinctive nature of the Court’s approach 
is that it is respectful of democratic prerogatives and of the limited nature of public 
resources, while also requiring special deliberative attention to those whose minimal 
needs are not being met.19 Moreover, a judgment of an adjudicating body may bring 
a state’s violation of a right in the public eye and potentially attract the media’s 
attention. In turn, this will enhance a state’s accountability and the possibility of 
change. With regards to the quasi-judicial mechanisms, such as an ombudsman and 
domestic human rights establishments, the political and legal pressure put on states 
subsequent to the decision of quasi-judicial mechanisms illustrates their importance 
despite the non-binding nature of their decision. Moreover, such mechanisms may, 
on the basis of their fi ndings, lodge a complaint in domestic courts. 20  
Justiciability of the right to education is also necessary for socio-economic reasons. 
Besides the fact that education alleviates poverty, persons immigrate in order to 
obtain better education for their children and better opportunities in other countries. 
If countries universally implement and realize the right to education, immigration 
might not be necessary since there will be education everywhere.21  
18  I  C   J  (ICJ): Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. Comparative Experiences of Justiciability, 2008. Human Rights and Rule 
of Law Series, No. 2, 75.; Key concepts on ESCRs – Can economic, social and cultural rights be 
litigated at courts? http://www.ohchr.org/EN/issues/ESCR/Pages/CanESCRbelitigatedatcourts.aspx 
19  C. S : Social and economic rights? Lessons from South Africa. Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Paper No. 12, University of Chicago; see also C. S : Design Democracy, What 
constitutions Do. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 221–237.
20  S  op. cit.
21  For a discussion of this issue see Christian D  – Albrecht G : Migration and Education. 
Nordface Migration, Discussion Paper, No. 2011–11.; E. A. H  – S. M  – L. W  
(eds.): Handbook of the Economics of Education. Vol. 4., Amsterdam, North Holland, 2014.
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2. Examples of justiciability of the right to education via judicial and quasi-
judicial mechanisms at national and international level
The right to education is and has been justiciable in many jurisdictions.22 This section 
will provide some of the many examples illustrating the justiciability facets of the 
right to education. It will illustrate how the right to education is widely recognised 
as enforceable in international and national courts. The chosen national case law 
relates to countries that have ratifi ed the relevant human rights treaties.23 These 
countries, although several human rights violations still exist in them and the right 
to education has not necessarily been fully realized, present models of justiciability. 
These countries have ratifi ed human rights treaties containing the right to education 
and incorporated it in the domestic law in attempts towards justiciability. 
The Supreme Court of the United States stresses the state’s responsibility by 
stating that ‘providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a 
state’.24 Another case in this regard, is the Campaign For Fiscal Equity v. State of 
New York case where the Supreme Court of New York held that the State funding of 
public education did not meet the minimum constitutional requirements in order to 
comply with the duty to provide a “sound basic education”. On appeal, the decision 
was upheld.25 In Brown v. Board of Education, the US Supreme Court adjudicated on 
discrimination and ruled that distinct educational infrastructure for black and white 
children are “inherently unequal” and it recognised education as an element of the 
foundations of a democratic society.26 
The South African Constitution, 1996 is famous for its extensive provisions on 
economic and social rights, which was drafted with the ICESCR in mind.27 Section 
38 of the South African Constitution, dealing with the enforcement right of the 
Constitution, states that ‘anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a 
competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or 
threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of 
rights’. The court has given a broad interpretation to this provision requiring that 
the claimant seeking for a remedy demonstrates suffi  cient interest in receiving the 
sought relief.28 Besides, through amicus curiae (friends of the court) action has 
22  F. C : The Justiciability of economic social and cultural rights. In: E. H  – F. A  
– W. V  B  – S. T  – R. V  S  – A. N -F  – K. H : The 
justiciability of economic, esocial and cultural rights. 2009. 427.
23  C  op. cit. 428.
24  Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), 406 U.S 205, 213, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15.
25  State Supreme Court of New York, Campaign For Fiscal Equity v. State of New York et al., 710 N.Y.S. 
2d 475, January 9, 2001; see also New York Court of Appeals, Campaign For Fiscal Equity v. State 
of New York et al., 100 N. Y. 2d 893, June 26, 2003; New York Appellate Division, First Department, 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, 2006 NYSlipOp 02284, March 23, 2006.
26  US Supreme Court of Justice, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 US 483 (1954).
27  C  op.cit. 429.
28  S. L : South Africa adjudicating Social Rights Under a Transformative Constitution. In: M. 
L  (ed.): Social Rights Jurisprudence, Emerging Trends in International and Comparative 
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been made possible for individuals and organisations to take part in human rights 
court’s litigation by proving that their contribution will be useful for the court and 
distinct from those of the disputing parties. In practice, South African jurisprudence 
demonstrates how the courts are developing a model for judicial review of socio-
economic rights which supports the constitution’s provisions.29
In Colombia, the constitutional court has developed a pile of case law concerning 
the right to education.30 Its jurisprudence, based on article 27 of the constitution, 
clarifi es that the constitution recognises the right to education as a fundamental 
right directly enforceable by courts via writ of protection, even in the case where the 
education provided has been privatised.31 The writ of protection is enshrined in article 
86 which provides that every person has the right to fi l a write of protection before 
a judge, at any time or place, through a preferential and summary proceeding, for 
himself/herself or by whomever acts in his/her name for the immediate protection of 
his/her fundamental constitutional rights when that person fears the latter may send 
it to the Constitutional Court for possible revision. The Court found a violation of the 
right to education when a private school stopped to carry on providing education to 
a child with attention defi cit disorder and it ordered all schools to provide education 
for such children even if they are not specialised to educate them.32 
In O’Donoghue v. Minister for Health, the Irish High court adjudicated on the 
subject of the right to education for children having disabilities and held contrary to 
the defendant (the state) that a severely mentally disabled child is not uneducable.33 It 
based its decision on the defi nition of education clarifi ed by the Supreme Court in the 
case of Ryan v. AG which defi nes it as ‘the teaching and training of a child to make the 
best possible use of inherent and potential capacities, physical, mental and moral’.34 It 
also considered the advance made internationally in the fi eld of education for children 
with disabilities. Thus, the court made it clear that the constitution obliges the state to 
provide for free primary education to all children, including disabled ones, and that 
special measures must be undertaken for those children whose handicap prevented 
them from enjoying the conventional education.
In Israel, the Supreme Court decided that the right to education for children 
with disabilities includes the right to free education not only in respect of special 
education, but also in integrated educative settings. In this case, the government was 
ordered to arrange its budgetary provisions to cover these services.35 
Law. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009. 80.
29  L  op. cit. 80.
30  M. S : Colombia: The Constitutional Court‟s Role in Addressing Social Injustice. In: 
L  (ed., 2009) op. cit. 155.
31  Sentencia T-534/97.
32  T-255/01.
33  O’Donoghue v. Minister for Health & Ors [1993] IECH 2.
34  Ryan v. A.G. [1965] IR294, O’ Dalaigh C.J.
35  Supreme Court of Israel, Yated and others v. the Ministry of Education, HCJ 2599/00, August 14, 
2002.
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The right to education has also been recognised as justiciable by international 
court.36 In the Belgian Linguistics Case No. 2, the European Court of Human Rights 
held that despite the negative formation of the fi rst sentence of article 2 protocol No.1 
stating ‘no person shall be denied the right to education’, this article secures this 
right.37
The right of people with disabilities was also protected by the European Committee 
on Social Rights who held in a collective complaint by Autism-Europe that the 
European Social Charter was infringed by the French government’s general lack 
of progress.38 Likewise, the advisory opinions of the French National Consultative 
Commission defended the right for such children.39
Even when the right of education was not mentioned in the constitution, legal 
recourse has been available for this right as it constitutes an essential element for the 
exercise of other rights. The Supreme Court of India held that the right to education 
formed part of an element of the right to life and thus it is enforceable even though it 
was at that time not identifi ed in the Indian constitution.40 In India, any individual can 
directly go to the Supreme Court when there is a violation of the right to education 
since fundamental rights are considered as primordial element of the constitution. 
The Inter-American Court of Human rights took a similar approach and underlined 
in several cases that a violation of the right to life may occur when there is a lack of 
educational facilities for vulnerable groups.41 The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights has held in a number of cases that the special measures of protection aff orded 
to children by the State (Article 19 of the American Convention on Human Rights) 
includes the provision of education.42 Another example of the justiciability of the 
right to education in India is the following; the Commission for Protection of Child 
Rights in accomplishing its task to protect the enjoyment of the right to education 
had examined complaints about the imposition of school fees for primary education 
when there should not be any. The fi ndings of this Commission led court actions and 
resulted into parents having their fee reimbursed.43
36  L. C  – A. S : European Court of Human Rights. In: L  (ed., 2009) op. cit. 424. 
37  Belgian Linguistics Case (No 2 (1968) 1) EHRR 252.
38  International Association Autism Europe vs. France, Complaint No. 13/2002. European Committee 
on Social Rights, 4 November 2003. 
39  Avis sur la scolarisation des enfants handicapés http://www.cncdh.fr/fr/publications/avis-sur-la-
scolarisation-des-enfants-handicapes 
40  Unni Krishnan, J.P. v State of A.P. (1993 I.SCC 645).
41  Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Juvenile Re-education Institute v. Paraguay, 
Judgment of 2 September 2004, Series C, No. 112; Case of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa 
v. Paraguay, Judgment of 17 June 2005, Series C, No. 125; Case of Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of 29 March 2006, Series C, No. 146.
42  See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Instituto de Reeducación del Menor v. Paraguay, 
September 2, 2004, paras. 149, 161 and 174.
43  S  op. cit. para 17.
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As already mentioned, most of the states have abided by their legal obligations 
to implement international treaties into their national legal order. Still this is not 
suffi  cient for guaranteeing the eff ective and full protection of the right to education. 
3. Status quo of the right to education with regards to its implementation
Human rights entail both rights and obligations. Thus, the various international and 
regional conventions containing the right to education not only grant this right but 
also impose an obligation on the state parties to guarantee the exercise of this right. 
As the Limburg principles on the implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the Limburg Principles) specifi es, contracting 
parties are accountable to their individuals as well as to the international community 
for their compliance to these obligations.44 There exist diff erent guidelines clarifying 
the states’ duties with regards to the implementation of human rights, including the 
right to education. This section will expose the main obligations so far imposed on 
states with regards to the right to education.
The states, when implementing all human rights, must respect three landmark 
obligations namely: the obligation to respect, protect and fulfi l. The obligation to 
respect prevents the states from interfering with the exercise of human rights. The 
obligation to protect requires the states to prevent third parties, such as private entities 
or, individuals or international organisation, from interfering with the enjoyment of 
the rights. The last obligation requires the states to use all appropriate measures, inter 
alia, judicial, administrative, and budgetary measures to ensure the total realisation 
of human rights.45    
The General Comment of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (CESCR) number 3 clarifi es the state obligation with regards to, 
amongst other rights, the right to education provided in the International Convention 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).46 The nature of a state’s obligation 
is provided in article 2 of the ICESCR providing for an obligation of conduct and an 
obligation of result. The Maastricht guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social 
and Cultural rights (Maastricht Guidelines) specifi es that the former obliges the state 
to take actions aiming to realise the right and the latter requires the state to realise 
44  Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, para 10. <http://www.escr-net.org/docs/i/425445> 
45  Fernandez A  – Zachariev Z : Bibliographie choisie sur le doit à l’éducation. 2011. 
7. www.oidel.org/doc/Bibliographiedroiteduc/Biblio%202012%202.pdf; Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Maastricht, January 22–26, 1997, para 10.; 18–
19. ; UN Human Rights Offi  ce of the High Commissioner for Human rights, http://www.ohchr.org/en/
issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx. 
46  CESCR, General Comment No.3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, para.1, of the 
Covenant), Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and cultural rights 
(contained in Document E/1991/23).
21On the Implementation and Justiciability of the Right to Education
a specifi c objective to ‘satisfi es a substantive standards’.47 According to this article 
contracting parties must ensure that the rights present in the Convention will be 
exercised without discrimination and it must ‘undertake steps with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant’. 
To this end, state parties must use all appropriate means, including particularly 
the adoption of legislative measures in order to satisfy the obligations to take steps 
(article 2(1) ICESCR). Otherwise said contracting parties must incorporate the right 
to education into their legislation and policies at all levels.48 The failure to eff ectively 
enforce legislation aiming to implement the ICESCR violates this Convention.49 The 
Committee underlines that the adoption of legislative measures does not exhaust the 
obligations of contracting parties and it states that the ultimate word as to whether 
appropriate means have been undertaken by the states is reserved for the Committee 
itself.50 Concerning the measures to be taken, the committee of the right of the child 
stipulates that ‘each state party must respect and implement the right of the child to 
have his or her best interests assessed and taken as a primary consideration, and is 
under the obligation to take all necessary, deliberate and concrete measures for the 
full implementation of this right.51
Other measures than legislative measures must be taken for states to fulfi l their 
obligations under the ICESCR.52 The provision of judicial remedies with regards to 
rights that can be considered justiciable belongs to the means which are considered 
appropriate.53 The Limburg principles provide that economic, social and cultural 
rights can be justiciable.54 The committee stipulates that article 13(2)(a),(3)(4) ICESRC, 
providing the right to education, seems to be ‘capable of immediate application by 
judicial and other organs in many national legal systems. Any suggestion that the 
provisions indicated are inherently non-self-executing would seem to be diffi  cult to 
sustain’.55 The Maastricht guidelines and the Limburg principles stipulate that access 
47  Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Maastricht, January 
22–26, 1997, para 7.
48  CRC, General Comment No. 1 (2001), article 29 (1): the aims of education, CRC/GC/2001/1., para 17.
49  Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights., Maastricht, January 
22–26, 1997, para 15.
50  CESCR, General Comment No.3 (1991): The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, para. 1, of 
the Covenant), Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and cultural rights 
(contained in Document E/1991/23) para 1–4.
51  CRC, General comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken 
as a primary consideration (art. 3, para. 1).
52  Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, para 17.
53  CESCR, General Comment No.3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, para. 1, of the 
Covenant), Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and cultural rights 
(contained in Document E/1991/23) para 5.
54  Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights; para 8.
55  CESCR, General Comment No.3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, para. 1, of the 
Covenant), Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and cultural rights 
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to eff ective judicial or other remedies and adequate reparation should be available to 
any victims of a violation of an economic, social or cultural right.56. Jurisprudence 
in the area of economic and social rights is also encouraged by the Committee via 
the General Comment adopted in 1998 as it states that ‘the Covenant norms must be 
recognised in appropriate ways within the domestic legal order, appropriate means 
of redress, or remedies, must be available to any aggrieved individual or group, and 
appropriate means of ensuring government accountability must be put into place.57 
Besides this measure administrative, fi nancial and social measures are an example 
of other appropriate measures. Moreover, impunity of any violations of the rights at 
stake should be prohibited.58
Article 2 ICESRC uses the term ‘progressive realisation’ of the right to education. 
This term must be read in the context of the general objective of the conventions 
meaning that it imposes an obligation on the states to realise the right at stake as 
quickly as possible. Any retrogressive measures must be justifi ed. 
Every contracting party must ensure a minimum core of obligation in order to 
guarantee the enjoyment of ‘minimum essential levels’ of each rights which states 
parties have the obligation to guarantee;59 a failure to satisfy this ‘minimum core 
obligations’ amounts to a violation of the ICESR.60 The assessment as to whether a 
state has fulfi lled this obligation must take into consideration resource constraints. 
However, to be able to justify failure to comply with minimum core obligations the 
state will have to proof that it did its best to use all available resources in order to be 
in line with these obligations. This entails that a lack of resources does not de facto 
relieve the states from guaranteeing some minimum core obligations.61 In education, 
the universal minimum corresponds to primary education. When a state is unable to 
provide free and compulsory education, it should create strategies to do so and seek 
(contained in Document E/1991/23) para 5.
56  Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, January 
22–26, 1997, para 22–23.; Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural, para 19.
57  CESCR, General Comment No.9: The domestic application of the Covenant, UN E/C.12/1998/24, para 
2.: See O. D  S : Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Right: An introduction. 
CRIDHIO Working paper, 2013. 7.
58  Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, para 72; Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Maastricht, January 22–26, 1997, para 27.
59  Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, para 25; CESCR, General Comment No.3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations 
(Art. 2, para. 1, of the Conventant), Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and cultural rights (contained in Document E/1991/23).
60  Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, January 
22–26, 1997, para 9.
61  Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, January 
22–26, 1997, para 10.
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assistance from the international community.62 In general, international cooperation 
in implementing the right to education is strongly encouraged.
More specifi c to the right to education, is that it has a social aspect and a freedom 
aspect. The former aspect implies that the realisation of this right demands a positive 
obligation from the part of the state. As providing access to education and making 
it available to all, demands the states to get involved and to put some eff orts. The 
second aspect refers to the freedom of individuals to choose whether to receive 
education from a private or a public institution. From this arise, the freedom of legal 
entities and natural persons to institute their own educational establishment.  This 
aspect implies a negative obligation and demands the states to not-interfere with this 
freedom.63
Four criteria are contained in the General comment No. 13 on the right to education 
which on the one hand can be used as a tool to analyse the content of the right to 
education provided an on the other hand these criteria impose general obligations 
resulting from them.64 The four features of the right to education are (1) availability 
(2) accessibility (3) acceptability (4) adaptability. In my report as Chargé de Mission: 
adequacy, accountability, awareness, advocacy.65
However, when rating the success of the Millennium Development Goals 2015, 
and more specifi cally Goal 2, it is to be determined whether the measures concerning 
the justiciability of the right to education have been eff ective.
4. Failure to achieve the millennium goals
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are eight international development 
goals that were established following the Millennium Summit of the United Nations 
in 2000, following the adoption of the United Nations Millennium Declaration. Goal 
2 aims to achieve universal primary education. More specifi cally, target 2A hopes to 
ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls, will be able to complete 
a full course of primary schooling. However, the UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
found that progress in reducing the number of children out of school has come to 
a virtual standstill just as international aid to basic education falls for the fi rst time 
since 2002. More than 57 million children continue to be denied the right to primary 
education, and many of them will probably never enter a classroom.66
Clearly, eff ective means of justiciability regarding the right to education is 
necessary.
62  K. T : Human Rights and Poverty Reduction. Strengthening pro-poor law: legal enforcement 
of economic and social rights. ODI, 2005. 5.
63  C  op. cit. 220.
64  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 13: The 
Right to Education (Art. 13 of the Covenant), 8 December 1999, E/C.12/1999/10.
65  J. De G : Report Fulfi lling the Right to Education. 2009. 25.
66  UNESCO I   S : Schooling for millions of children jeopardised by reductions in 
aid. June 2013, Number 25.
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5. Remedial actions
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights67 is an international treaty establishing complaint and inquiry 
mechanisms for the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. Another remedial action that can be taken is the example of the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities68. The Optional 
Protocol establishes an individual complaints mechanism Parties agree to recognise 
the competence of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to 
consider complaints from individuals or groups who claim their rights under the 
Convention have been violated.69 The Committee can request information from and 
make recommendations to a party.70
67  Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 2008 and opened for signature on 24 
September 2009.
68  Adopted on 13 December 2006, and entered into force at the same time as its parent Convention on 
3 May 2008. 
69  Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Article 1.
70  Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Articles 3 and 5.
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RELATION BETWEEN THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
AND RIGHT TO EDUCATION ON THE BASIS 
OF HUMAN DIGNITY
Szabolcs Anzelm S , O.Praem.*
Pázmány Péter Catholic University
1. Introduction
The existence of religion is coeval with the mankind. The religious conviction of 
the diff erent human communities have defi ned their culture on the day to day basis 
since the beginning of history. Therefore, this essential characteristic has made a 
strong infl uence not only on the daily life, mentality, on the social relations and 
structures in general, but particularly on the education at home and even on its 
institutionalized system.1 Hence, the personal attitude toward the ‘Saint’ is a natural 
feature of every human being, which feature is rooted in his/her own conscience. 
It is not accidental therefore, that the religious freedom has become one of the fi rst 
generation human rights in the 18th century.2 The organized form of European public 
education has started by the Catholic schools which dominated this fi eld until the 
16th century, when we could see the transformation of this system in Europe into a 
Christian education. Naturally, the Virginia Declaration (1776), Constitution of the 
United States of America (1787), the French Constitutions – based on the results 
of the French revolution (1789-1799) – (1791, 1792, 1795)3, the German Imperial 
Constitution (1849), constitutional laws of December 1867 of the Austrian Empire, 
or the Constitution of Weimar (1919), moreover ecclesiastical decrees of which were 
adopted by the Fundamental Law of Bonn, show precisely  the gradual secularization 
*  Rector of Pázmány Péter Catholic University.
1   S , S . A.: Bevezetés a katolikus hit rendszerébe (Introduction into the system of the Catholic 
Faith). Budapest, 2014.7 13.
2   S , S . A. – F , R.: Kérdések az állami egyházjog köréből (Question about the 
ecclesiastical law). [Bibliotheca Instituti Postgradualis Iuris Canonici Universitatis Catholicae de 
Petro Pázmány nominatae III/17] Budapest, 2014. 5., 45. [S  (2014a)]
3   J-L. T : Introduction historique au droit. Paris 2001. 270–277.
Szabolcs Anzelm S26
process of state laws and of the society.4 Through this process have been crystalized 
not only diff erent models of state and church relationship, but also a strong basis 
for religious freedom as one of the most emblematic expression of the human 
dignity. This new social and legal situation have needed new concept to protect the 
citizens’ rights for education based on their own religious conviction, without the 
intervention of the state  into religious aff airs.5 Peter Card. Erdő points out, that even 
if a state does not follow in institutionalized form one particular religion or religious 
ideology, it does not mean necessarily that it makes the state automatically atheist.6 
Nevertheless, the above described brief overview supports well, that within a 
secularized society every religious educational system has become more vulnerable 
than before, therefore the ecclesiastical education carries minority characters 
nowadays, as compared with neutral state- or private schools. Therefore, we cannot 
neglect to make remarks here regarding the principle and legal basis of the religious 
communities’ right to the teaching of their own faith, in order to educate trough that 
their children. The II Catholic – Orthodox Forum on October 22nd 2010 underlined 
in its closing Communiqué, that “The participants in the Forum believe that the role 
as dominating Church or State Church should not result in a legal discrimination for 
the other Churches and the members of minority religious groups, whose religious 
freedom should be fully guaranteed, including the right to profess their faith using 
any means respecting personal freedom.”7
2. The religious school
When we are talking about the religious schools in Eastern Europe, within former 
communist countries, we cannot forget that the suppression of the religious 
educational system represents in these countries the loss of their religious freedom 
during the time of the communist dictatorship. Like in Hungary, when on June 16th 
1948 the Hungarian Parliament accepted the secularization of the entire educational 
system by Act 33/1948. István Barankovics (†1974) – who represented the minority 
opinion – concluded his parliamentary speech: “This prepared new law certainly will 
get the majority sympathy of the Parliament; however it will never get the volitional 
and emotional acceptance of the majority of the Hungarian Nation.”8 Therefore, it 
4   S . A. S : The Changes of Modern Era Relation of Church and State in Europe. Folia 
Canonica, 8, (2005) 65–77.
5   A. M. R  V : El derecho a la educación, ¿de nuevo a debate? In: A. M. R  V : 
Ecclesia et Ius. Escritos de derecho canónico y concordatario. [Studia Canonica Matritensia 1]
Madrid, 2014. 389–409.
6   E , P.: Az Európai Unió és az Egyház (The European Union and the Church). In: E , P.: Egyház, 
kultúra, társadalom (Church, Culture and Society). Budapest, 2011. 273–277., especially 273–274.
7   II C  – O  F : Communiqué. In: Church and State relations: from Historical and 
Theological Perspectives. (Atti del II Forum Europeo Cattolico – Ortodosso, Rodi, Grecia, 18–22 
ottobre 2010) Bologna, 2011. 215–221., especially 217. (n. 3).
8   M , I.: Mindszenty és Ortutay. Iskolatörténeti vázlat: 1945–1948 (Mindszenty and Ortutay. 
An outline of School-history: 1945–1948). Budapest, 1989. 175.
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must be underlined that the religious educational system does not only depend on 
emotions, but a clear element of the really existing liberty, justice, solidarity and 
peace in the particular country. This testifi es the acceptance of the cultural values, 
the religions, and the natural characteristic of the citizens.9  
Already Pope Pius XI (1922–1939) dedicated an Encyclical letter Divini illius 
magistri (December 31st 1929) to the right of parents to educate their children in 
ecclesiastical school, following freely their own faith, which is recognized by the 
state.10 The pope explicitly argues in this document, Art. 8: “[…] From this we see 
the supreme importance of Christian education, not merely for each individual, 
but for families and for the whole of human society, whose perfection comes from 
the perfection of the elements that compose it. From these same principles, the 
excellence, we may well call it the unsurpassed excellence, of the work of Christian 
education becomes manifest and clear; for after all it aims at securing the Supreme 
Good, that is, God, for the souls of those who are being educated, and the maximum 
of well-being possible here below for human society […]”.11 Pius XI points out also, 
that: “[…] Besides every Christian child or youth has a strict right to instruction 
in harmony with the teaching of the Church, the pillar and ground of truth. And 
whoever disturbs the pupil’s Faith in any way, does him grave wrong, inasmuch as 
he abuses the trust which children place in their teachers, and takes unfair advantage 
of their inexperience and of their natural craving for unrestrained liberty, at once 
illusory and false […].”12 
Obviously, beside the cited document are those particular social, political, even 
legal transformations which had happened between the two wars. Nevertheless, the 
cited papal description – because the argumentation proceeds from the basis of human 
dignity – is applicable to any denomination. If we take a glance into the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (December 10th 1948) which was composed after the 
tragedy of the Second World War, we can fi nd the summary of the afore-mentioned 
concept in general, that the education has to be observant of all characteristics of 
the human personality (Art. 26,2). The Spanish Constitution (December 27th 1978) 
– based on the documents of international human rights – in Art. 27 (6) – which 
was inserted into the Fundamental Law of Spain in 198513, and was specifi ed in 
200614) expressively declares the principle of the freedom to create educational 
centers with respect for constitutional principles. The description makes clear that 
this legal basis is in force for every type of educational categories, mean private-, 
religious-, or other convictions, as it is explained well by Javier Martínez-Torrón, 
9   R  V  (2014) op. cit. 339–365., especially 340.
10  P  XI: Litt. Enc. Divini illius magistri (31 dec. 1929). AAS 22 (1930) 49–86.
11  Ibid. 49.
12  Ibid. 52.
13  Ley Orgánica 8/1985 (3 jul. 1985).
14  Ley Orgánica 2/2006 (3 mai. 2006). Cf. S , S . A.: Spanyol állami egyházjog – új hangsúlyok 
(Spanish Ecclesiastical Law – New Emphases). Iustum Aequum Salutare, X., 2014/2. 155–171., 
especially 156–157. [S  (2014b)]
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professor of the Complutense University of Madrid.15 I would like to add to Prof. 
Martínez-Torrón’s note, that Art. 27 of the Spanish Constitution deals in detailed the 
freedom of education within the Spanish Kingdom. The state gives guarantee the 
free moral and religious educational right of the parents regarding their children.16 
It is supplemented with the principles of the concordat between the Holy See and 
Spain (January 3rd 1979) which contains the introduction into the Catholic faith even 
for the universities.17 Recently, the legal regulation of the teaching in public schools 
– concerning primary schools – (ECI/2211/2007)18 and also about the high schools 
(ECI/2200/2007)19 have been modifi ed by the order ECD/7/2013.20 The new rule – 
based on the recommendations of the United Nation, of the European Council, and 
of the European Union – touches upon the respect of the entire human person and the 
unique value of his/her life, but contains also the respect of human dignity, religious 
belief – including the right for the studies on the basis of his own faith –, the value of 
the family and the teaching for that.21
3. Catholic education and its regulation by the Catholic Church
The Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) regulated in general by the Declaration 
Gravissimum Educationis the fi eld of the independent – without state infl uence – 
Catholic education.22 The fi rst chapter defi ned the legal basis of this independent 
educational system: “[…] All men of every race, condition and age, since they enjoy 
the dignity of a human being, have an inalienable right to an education that is in 
keeping with their ultimate goal, their ability, their sex, and the culture and tradition 
of their country, and also in harmony with their fraternal association with other 
peoples in the fostering of true unity and peace on earth. For a true education aims 
at the formation of the human person in the pursuit of his ultimate end and of the 
good of the societies of which, as man, he is a member, and in whose obligations, 
as an adult, he will share […].” Antonio María Card. Rouco Varela establishes well 
15  J. M -T : Religion and Law in Spain. New York, NY., 2014. 138.
16  Art. 27 (3) Los poderes públicos garantizan el derecho que asiste a los padres para que sus hijos 
reciban la formación religiosa y moral que esté de acuerdo con sus proprias convicciones. A. M  
– M. E. O  – J. L. C  (ed.): Legislación eclesiástica (Civitas Biblioteca de Legislación). 
Madrid, 2007. 55.
17  AAS 72 (1980) 38–39. 
18  ECI/2211/2007 (July 12th 2007).
19  ECI/2200/2007 (July 12th 2007).
20  ECD/7/2013 (January 9th 2013); Cf. S  (2014b) op. cit. 157.
21  Cf. Orden ECD/7/2013, de 9 de enero, por la que se modifi ca la Orden ECI/2211/2007, de julio, 
por la que se astablece el currículo y se regula la ordenación de la Educación Primaria, y la Orden 
ECI/2220/2007, de 12 de julio, por la que se establece el currículo y se regula la ordinación de la 
Educación Secundaria Obligatoria. A. M  – M. E. O  – J. L. C  (ed.): Legislación 
eclesiástica (Civitas Biblioteca de Legislación). Madrid, 2013. §§. 154–155.
22  Conc. Vaticanum II (1962–1965), Sessio VII (28 oct. 1965), Declaratio de educatione christiana: 
Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta, Bologna, 31973.  959–968, Art. 1: 960.
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regarding this introductory chapter that its contents is in harmony with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 26,1) and also with the Additional Protocol to 
the European Convention (May 30th 1952; Art. 2).23 The cited conciliar document 
is also an important source of how the parents should fulfi ll their duties and rights 
based on their religious conviction within the educational system. In Art. 6 of the 
Gravissimum Educationis we can clearly read: “[…] Parents who have the primary 
and inalienable right and duty to educate their children must enjoy true liberty in 
their choice of schools. Consequently, the public power, which has the obligation to 
protect and defend the rights of citizens, must see to it, in its concern for distributive 
justice, that public subsidies are paid out in such a way that parents are truly free to 
choose according to their conscience the schools they want for their children […].”24
The Catholic Church, in particular Saint John Paul II (1978–2005) and the 
Congregation for Catholic Education have published several times such documents 
which intended to enlighten more precisely the importance of the own schools and 
educational system of a certain denomination, because within the new secularized 
society the faithfully committed and institutionalized religious education is the most 
important instrument to keep the religious attitude, beside the public activity and 
the teaching- and personal example in the family. This situation shows the minority 
characteristics of the religious groups which could be easily discriminated, if the 
state forgets the consequence of its own citizens’ right for religious freedom.25 In 
order to applicate the directives of the Second Vatican Council, the Congregation for 
Catholic Education composed a guideline about the religious dimension of education 
on April 7th 1988. The congregational document testifi es well the realism of the Holy 
See regarding the status of the religious schools within the contemporary society. 
Already in the introduction is noticed: “[…] Not all students in Catholic schools are 
members of the Catholic Church; not all are Christians. There are, in fact, countries 
in which the vast majority of the students are not Catholics – a reality which the 
Council called attention to. The religious freedom and the personal conscience of 
individual students and their families must be respected, and this freedom is explicitly 
recognized by the Church. On the other hand, a Catholic school cannot relinquish its 
own freedom to proclaim the Gospel and to off er a formation based on the values 
to be found in a Christian education; this is its right and its duty. To proclaim or to 
off er is not to impose, however; the latter suggests a moral violence which is strictly 
forbidden, both by the Gospel and by Church law […].”26 The Holy See was prepared 
therefore to give proper answer based on the contemporary circumstances to the 
current problems, confl icts and questions in the fi eld of education. It is quite clear 
23  R  V  (2014) op. cit. 342.
24  Conc. Vaticanum II (1962–1965), Sessio VII (28 oct. 1965), Declaratio de educatione christiana: 
Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta, 963.
25  Cf. E , P.: A vallási közösségek és jogi kezelésük (Religious Communities and their Legal Status). 
In: E  (2011) op. cit. 253–261, especially 261.
26  C   I  C : Lineamenta. Dimensione religiosa dell’educazione 
nella scuola cattolica (7 apr. 1988), Introduzione, art. 6.
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from that precise overview which dealt with the coming century, and was edited 
on December 28th 1997, under the title:  The Catholic school on the threshold of 
the third millennium. The instruction emphasized that “[…] The phe nomena of 
multiculturalism and an increasingly multi-ethnic and multi-religious society is at 
the same time an enrichment and a source of further problems. To this we must 
add, in countries of long-standing evangelization, a growing marginalization of the 
Christian faith as a reference point and a source of light for an eff ective and convincing 
interpretation of existence […].”27 Also in the same introduction, the legislator calls 
attention for that misleading idea, which comes from the domination of the state 
education. As compared with that, the religious education is in minor position, 
even those which have wide and large organization. Therefore, those initiatives 
and theories – ignoring the principle of religious freedom and the free choice of the 
citizens to educate their children on the basis of their own traditional belief – can 
destroy many values. The document describes: “[…] in recent years there has been an 
increased interest and a greater sensitivity on the part of public opinion, international 
organizations and governments with regard to schooling and education, there has also 
been a noticeable tendency to reduce education to its purely technical and practical 
aspects […] There is a tendency to forget that education always presupposes and 
involves a defi nite concept of man and life. To claim neutrality for schools signifi es 
in practice, more times than not, banning all reference to religion from the cultural 
and educational fi eld, whereas a correct pedagogical approach ought to be open to 
the more decisive sphere of ultimate objectives, attending not only to “how”, but 
also to “why” […].”28 If we compare this stand point with the most recent working 
document of the same Congregation, which analyzes the entire fi eld of education 
from the kindergarten to the university, can be seen the most relevant stresses, and 
every single one derives from the human dignity and from the primary principle of 
religious freedom. The well detailed text was composed on April 7th 2014 and really 
considerable in particular concerning the challenge of identity of religious schools 
and also on the legal challenges. Regarding these the document fi xes that the “[…] 
Contemporary educators have a renewed mission, which has the ambitious aim of 
off ering young people an integral education as well as assistance in discovering their 
personal freedom, which is a gift from God […]”.29 Concerning the legal problems 
the document gives a clear refl ection on the grievous reality: “[…] Some governments 
are quite keen on marginalizing Catholic schools through a number of rules and laws 
that, sometimes, trample over Catholic schools’ pedagogical freedom. In some cases, 
governments hide their animosity by using lack of resources as an excuse […]. Under 
the guise of a questionable “secularism”, there is hostility against an education that 
27  C   I  C : The Catholic school on the threshold of the third 
millennium (28 dec. 1997). Introduction, art. 1.
28  Ibid. Introduction, art. 10.
29  C   I  C : Instrumentum laboris. Educare oggi e domani. Una 
passione che si rinnova (7 apr. 2014) III, 1, a.
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is openly based on religious values and which, therefore, has to be confi ned to the 
“private” sphere.”30
4. Conclusion: Denominations improves values of the society through their 
own educational and other services
The religious communities – particularly the historical churches and denominations – 
make considerable contribution to the general culture, to the development of 
humanity and to improving of morality in the society. This unique value which 
originates from the natural religious feature of the human nature – the relation to 
God, person, and society – gives proper responsibility for the states and even for 
the denominations in the common work and cooperation for the moral and cultural 
value of the human society which naturally has civil and religious aspects. The state 
cannot neglect the fact that the religious beliefs are part of most of its citizens’ natural 
characteristics, and from the exercise of which obligations devolve on the state.31 This 
basic concept can be demonstrated well by § 10 (1) Act CCVI/2011 of Hungary which 
clearly expresses, that the state in order to promote the common goals of the society 
can cooperate with the Churches. This is eminently true regarding the educational, 
medical, and social activity of the diff erent denominations.32 Joseph Schweitzer 
(†2015; former Chief-Rabbi of whole Hungary) emphasized in 2006 that even an 
economical or basically political organization needs to manifest ethical values if we 
liked to speak seriously about a real respect of human rights and religious freedom.33 
Similar clear conviction follows from Joseph Ratzinger’s comments (published in 
1987)34 and from statements of representatives of the Hungarian Reformed Church, 
which analyze values in our contemporary society, in which the family should have 
an eminent place in social and religious context.35 Therefore, the religious sphere 
and the faithful activity of the churches, denominations, etc. have a fundamental 
impact on the formation of the human values of the concrete society as a community 
30  Ibid. III, 1, l.
31  S . A. S : Legislazione successiva alla transformazione dei rapporti tra Chiesa e Stato 
nell’Europa centro-orientale. Ius Missionale, 9, (2015) 213–224., especially 221–224.
32  Cf. S , B.: Állami egyházjog. Vallásszabadság és vallási közösségek a mai magyar jogban 
(Ecclesiastical Law. Religious Freedom and Religious Communities in the Hungarian Law). Budapest, 
2012. 78–84.; S  (2014a) op. cit. 36–38., 45–46.
33  J. S : Jewish values in the European Union in The Epoch of Crisis of the Classical 
Categories. In: E. S. V  – T. G. K  (ed.): Europe in a World in Transformation (Conference at 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 14th–16th December 2006). Budapest, 2008. 129–134., especially 
129.
34  J. R : Chiesa, ecumenismo e politica. Nuovi saggi di ecclesiologia. [Saggi Teologici 1] 
Cinisello Balsamo, 1987. 202–204.
35  L , A.: A Dunántúli Református Egyházkerület és az EU csatlakozás. In: Egyházakkal az 
Európai Unióba (A 2003. április 28-án Esztergomban tartott konferencia előadásai; Párbeszéd I). 
25–30., especially 28.; cf. S , I.: Reformation and Transformation. In: V –K  op. cit. 
135–138.
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of people, which aspects support the needy of their special protection.36 This idea 
shows well the essential diff erence between the “laicism” and the “neutral” concepts, 
the latter of which is ready for cooperation with denominations in order to fulfi ll the 
basic human right for religious freedom of the state own citizens.
36  Cf. B. M  M : Le bien commun et la diaconie: service de l’Église dans la société. 
Possobles formes de coopération en vue d’un bien-être intégral de la personne humaine. In: II 
C  – O  F  op. cit. 191–198.
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 STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY
Charles L. G *
Boston University
After an overview of the importance of voluntary associations and other civil society 
institutions, especially those with a religious character, for the social and political 
health of liberal democracies, we will consider how well-meaning public policies can 
do grave damage to the viability of civil society and thus to democratic freedoms, 
while wiser policies can help to strengthen both.
1. Civil Society as a Limitation on Tyranny
Mary Ann Glendon of Harvard Law School reminded us, a quarter-century ago, that 
“the institutions of civil society help to sustain a democratic order, by relativizing the 
power of both the market and the state, and by helping to counter both consumerist 
and totalitarian tendencies”.1 As we will see, this is not all that they do, but it is 
crucially important. 
This is not to say that what the state does, when it acts appropriately, is not 
vitally important. “The public sector tends to be better […] at policy management, 
regulation, ensuring equity, preventing discrimination or exploitation, ensuring 
continuity and stability of services, and ensuring social cohesion”.2 An argument for 
the independence of civil society is not an argument against this oversight role of the 
state; indeed, Osborne and Gaebler argue that the state becomes more eff ective as it 
focuses on ‘steering the boat’ while leaving it up to civil society to pull on the oars.
One classic summary of the purposes of government in a free society is found in 
the Preamble to the United States Constitution, adopted in 1787: “We the People of 
the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure 
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, 
*  Professor.
1   Mary Ann G : Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse. New York, Free Press, 
1991. 137.
2   David O  – Ted G : Reinventing Government. Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 1992. 45.
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and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” This Constitution, 
and its subsequent amendments, was concerned not only to defi ne the authority and 
functioning of the national government, but also to state clearly the limits on that 
authority, and to defi ne the rights of the people.
But no constitution is self-enforcing. With respect to the tendency of government 
to encroach upon the freedom of citizens, it is surely not necessary to point out that 
constitutional and statutory limitations upon governments have proved again and 
again insuffi  cient. Only a strong countervailing force in the form of a variety of civil 
society institutions can resist the temptation of legislators and government offi  cials to 
continually expand their interventions into the lives of citizens. These interventions 
are especially insidious because they are so often motivated by the conviction that 
those exercising governmental authority, like Plato’s Guardians, possess a superior 
wisdom about what is in the best interest of citizens.
We should not overlook the other power to be resisted, in Glendon’s formulation: 
that of the market. She is not referring, I think, to what French writers are fond 
of calling “Anglo-Saxon savage capitalism,” but rather to the insidiously seductive 
power of consumerism and the market’s continual generation of new temptations to 
fi ll one’s life with diversions.
Kept in their place, markets (like government) are a very good thing, as the dismal 
failure of ‘planned economies’ has shown again and again, but, as with government, 
there is danger that markets will undermine the ability of men and women to live lives 
of steady purpose informed by moral conviction, and to do so in trustful cooperation 
to meet their common needs and those of others. Markets depend upon, but do not 
foster, trust. 
But markets and government are not the only alternatives. Much of the policy 
debate in the European Union and in North America over recent decades has been 
about how to balance the roles of government and the market, debates over “public 
goods” and privatization. This public/private dichotomy is over-simplifi ed; it misses 
the essential role, in a free society, of what has been called the “third sector” of 
voluntary associations, which “tends to be best at performing tasks that generate 
little or no profi t, demand compassion and commitment to individuals, require 
extensive trust on the part of customers or clients, need hands-on, personal attention 
[…] and involve the enforcement of moral codes and individual responsibility for 
behavior”.3
Or, to put it another way, such “mediating structures are the value-generating and 
value-maintaining agencies in society”.4 Governments can prescribe what is legal 
and illegal, but not what is good and what is evil and how we should seek to live 
3   O –G  op. cit. 46.
4   Peter L. B  – Richard John N : To Empower People (1977). In: Michael N  (ed.): To 
Empower People: From State to Civil Society. Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute, 1996. 
163.
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decent and purposeful lives. Simple compliance with laws is not enough to sustain a 
healthy society.
There are many diff erent types of associations and institutions making up a healthy 
civil society, derived from the common concerns of citizens. Few are explicitly 
intended to limit the power of governments or the infl uence of markets, but many in 
fact have this eff ect. The degree to which this is the case tends to refl ect the reason 
for the existence of the association: those formed to promote a hobby or sport may be 
quite susceptible to market incentives or government regulation, while those based 
on a shared religious faith and worldview may be highly resistant to both. This is a 
reason why religious liberty is one of the most basic of human rights, and is indeed 
the fi rst freedom protected by the Bill of Rights in the American Constitution. 
Religious liberty is important not only as a protection for the conscience of 
the believer, but also as a limit on the intrusions of the state into civil society. As 
sociologist Peter Berger has pointed out, “it can be argued that it is the single most 
Important right and liberty.” In fact, “religious liberty is fundamental because it 
posits the ultimate limit on the power of the state. The status of religious liberty in 
a society is a very good empirical measure of the general condition of rights and 
liberties in that society”.5 
This is because “religion ipso facto relativizes, puts in their proper place, all 
the realities of this world, including all institutions. This proper place, of course, 
is an inferior place – mundane, profane, penultimate.” Thus, “the state that 
guarantees religious liberty does more than acknowledge yet another human right: it 
acknowledges, perhaps without knowing it, that its power is less than ultimate”.6 José 
Casanova makes a similar point, that “religion has often served […] as a protector 
of human rights and humanist values against the secular spheres and their absolute 
claims to internal functional autonomy”.7 Today, Berger and Casanova are saying, 
it is not – at least in the West – religion which is making hegemonic claims, but 
secularism as a militant and intolerant faith, often in alliance with government, that 
seeks to marginalize or suppress contrasting views. Vibrant religions serve to keep 
open a sphere of freedom of conscience and of action.
Attempts by the state to intrude upon the sphere of religious freedom has been 
one of the most common – and bitter – sources of social confl ict throughout recorded 
history. As law professor Douglas Laycock has pointed out, the violence and 
bloodshed, the ‘religious wars,’ that we associate with the Reformation in Europe 
were primarily the result of actions by government rather than by churches. He 
asks, “what was the dominant evil of these confl icts? Was it that people suff ered for 
religion, or that religions imposed suff ering? Is the dominant lesson that religion has 
a ‘dark side’ that is ‘inherently intolerant and prosecutory’ or that eff orts to coerce 
5   Peter L. B : The Serendipity of Liberties. In: Richard John N  (ed.): The Structure of 
Freedom: Correlations, Causes, and Cautions. Grand Rapids, MI, Eerdmans, 1991. 14.
6   B  op. cit. 14.
7   José C : Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 
1994. 39.
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religious belief or practice cause great human suff ering?” Even today, “[m]uch has 
changed since the Reformation, but one constant is that the State punishes people for 
disapproved religious practices”.8
On the other hand, the insistence of religious individuals and associations on living 
out their convictions, in public as well as in private, helps to sustain a vibrant civil 
society. The legal, political, and social arrangements crafted to accommodate the 
non-negotiable concerns of religious groups serve also to shelter forms of association 
with less ultimate agendas, and thus allow a rich pluralism to fl ourish. 
2. Voluntary Associations Nurturing Trust
Strongly-held religious convictions can help to create the fi rm foundation upon which 
an ordered liberty must rest.  Tocqueville famously concluded that “[r]eligion, which 
never intervenes directly in the government of American society, should therefore 
be considered as the fi rst of their political institutions, for although it does not give 
them the taste for liberty, it singularly facilitates their use thereof”.9 A recent author, 
seeking to answer the secularist charge that religion is dangerous, has made the point 
more universally: “[i]t is fairly clear to any unbiased observer that in most societies, 
most of the time, religion is one of the forces making both for social stability and for 
morally serious debate and reform”.10 Religion and faith-based associations do this 
through their power to build communities of trust and to imbue them with shared 
purpose and moral order.  
Trust is a quality without which a democratic society cannot fl ourish: it is the 
indispensable inclination of citizens to have confi dence that most of their fellow-
citizens will behave honestly and reliably. Francis Fukuyama has pointed out that 
“while contract and self-interest are important sources of association, the most 
eff ective organizations are based on communities of shared ethical values. These 
communities do not require extensive contract and legal regulation of their relations 
because prior moral consensus gives members of the group a basis for mutual 
trust”.11
In my study of education before and after the collapse of Communism in Eastern 
Europe, I noted the signifi cance of trust for a healthy civil society and democratic 
political order, and that this had been damaged much more profoundly in the Soviet 
Union than in Poland and other Central European countries where, despite decades of 
communist rule, the habits of trust and cooperation had been preserved at the grass 
8   Douglas L : Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty: The Reformation Era 
and the Late Twentieth Century (1996). In: Religious Liberty, Volume One: Overviews and History. 
Grand Rapids, MI, Eerdmans, 2010. 652–653.
9   Alexis T : Democracy in America. [J. P. Mayer (ed.); George Lawrence (trans.)] New York, 
Harper & Row, 1988. 292.
10  Keith W : Is Religion Dangerous? Grand Rapids, MI, Eerdmans, 2006. 55.
11  Francis F : Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. In: Don E. E  (ed.): 
The Essential Civil Society Reader: The Classic Essays. Lanham, Rowman and Littlefi eld, 2000. 259.
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roots within Catholic and other religious organizations.12 The eff ort of Communist 
regimes to eliminate all forms of social organization not directly subordinated to 
the State and Party did profound damage to the ability of the successor states of 
the Soviet Union – which were under such a regime for a generation longer than 
were the other members of the Warsaw Bloc, and most before that under a tsarist 
autocracy – to the demands of freedom. What Christopher Lasch noted in a Western 
context, that “[t]he replacement of informal types of association by formal systems 
of socialization and control weakens social trust, undermines the willingness 
both to assume responsibility for oneself and to hold other accountable for their 
actions, destroys respect for authority, and thus turns out to be self-defeating” 13, 
was even more universally true under a totalitarian system. The result was “that 
hypertrophy of central authority which became so very characteristic of Communist 
society, and with the achievement of the erosion or total destruction of rival centres 
of countervailing power”.14 A comparison of the vigorous progress of democracy 
and the economy in Poland – where even under Communism the Catholic Church 
sustained alternative forms of association – with the stagnation of both in Ukraine 
and Belarus as well as in Russia over the past post-Soviet quarter-century suggests 
that these fears were well-founded.
Of course, religious associations and loyalties are not the only source of such trust, 
but “democracy requires extra-democratic virtues associated with the commitment 
to some reasonable comprehensive account of the good, secular or religious. For 
without the deeper groundings (and I emphasize “groundings” in the plural), the 
political cooperation is placed at unacceptable risk”.15 What churches and other 
religious associations provide is the expectation and thus the habit of gathering 
regularly, often several times a week, for worship and instruction that help to 
reinforce this grounding, repairing the damage done to it in other settings through 
encounters with the dominant culture of materialism. In addition, these regular 
gatherings solidify the bonds and the trust among the members of the local religious 
fellowship; it has been suggested that “any observant coreligionist, at least in a 
demanding faith, is [considered] naturally trustworthy”.16 The importance of regular 
gathering to “spur one another on toward love and good deeds […] encouraging one 
another”17 is emphasized in the Christian scriptures and has become an essential 
feature of non-Christian religious traditions as well as they adapt to American life. 
12  Charles L. G : Educational Freedom in Eastern Europe. Washington, DC, Cato Institute, 1995.
13  Christopher L : The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy. New York, W. W. Norton, 
1995. 98.
14  E. G : Civil society in historical context. International Social Science Journal, vol. 43, 1991/3. 
495.
15  David B : Civic Friendship and Democratic Education. In: Kevin M D  – Walter 
F  (ed.): Citizenship and Education in Liberal-Democratic Societies. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2003. 238.
16  Nicholas W : The Faith Instinct: How Religion Evolved and Why It Endures. New York, Penguin 
Books, 2009. 203.
17  Hebrews 10:24f (NIV).
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3. Prophetic Challenges to Societal Norms
In addition, communities based upon strongly-held religious faith usually nurture 
worldviews that are to some degree – sometimes to a very large degree – at odds 
with that prevalent in the majority culture. They off er an alternative understanding of 
what really matters, and thus the possibility of a critical stance toward the dominant 
system or culture, one that is not simply idiosyncratic but rooted in a tradition and a 
supportive community. 
It is common for individuals with strong religious convictions, whether Christians 
or Muslims (or adherents to any other religion) to perceive confl icts between those 
convictions and elements of the surrounding culture. This may, in fact, make them 
better citizens, since they are more likely to press for positive changes than those 
who are complacent about the culture, the economic system, or the political order.
While in earlier generations the role of prophetic minorities was often to challenge 
conventional morality in the name of authenticity or of justice, today they are more 
likely to assert that a healthy society cannot function without shared norms, even if 
those are sometimes violated. Hypocrisy, it has been said, is the tribute that vice pays 
to virtue. The fact that, in recent years, hypocrisy has been judged by many a greater 
evil than vice is but another sign of what Hunter has called “the loss of the languages 
of public morality in American society”.18 In fact, the change American society is 
experiencing goes much deeper than simple diff erences over, for example, what are 
often called ‘life-style choices’ or behavioral preferences.  
What is ultimately at issue are not just disagreements about ‘values’ or ‘opinions’. 
Such language misconstrues the nature of moral commitment. Such language in the 
end reduces morality to preferences and cultural whim. What is ultimately at issue 
are deeply rooted and fundamentally diff erent understandings of being and purpose.19 
Religious perspectives and value-judgments, at least for the adherents of what 
we are calling ‘strong religion’, are foundational. Of course, they may change on 
particular issues as a result of further instruction or refl ection, but it is of their 
essence that they ‘go all the way down’. In this they are closely related to and indeed 
often associated with deeply-held cultural norms of the sort that the superfi cial 
multiculturalism purveyed in public schools, the multiculturalism of foods, fashions, 
and fi estas, cannot do justice to. 
What do we mean by ‘strong religion’? We use this term, not to distinguish among 
the usual denominational identifi ers, but to describe those individuals and groups 
who seek to live by the specifi c requirements of their religious tradition, and do so in 
a manner which to some extent set them at odds with the surrounding society.
The fi rst thing to note is that strong religions tend to challenge the norms of the 
surrounding culture, often in ways that make others quite uncomfortable. This may 
indeed be part of their attraction for those who fi nd the culture either hopelessly 
perverse or empty of transcendent meanings and assurances.  Legal scholar Stephen 
18  James Davison H : Culture Wars. New York, Basic Books, 1991. 316.
19  H  op. cit. 131.
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Carter points out that, “[a]t its best, religion in its subversive mode provides the 
believer with a transcendent reason to question the power of the state and the messages 
of the culture.” This in turn leads to government eff orts to ‘domesticate religion’, to 
seduce or compel religious leaders and their followers to become supporters of the 
status quo and to stop questioning it on the basis of their scriptures or traditions.20
David Wells, writing from an Evangelical perspective, off ers a characteristic 
statement of such disruptive ‘strong religion’: “[u]ntil we acknowledge God’s 
holiness, we will not be able to deny the authority of modernity. What has most been 
lost needs most to be recovered - namely, the unsettling, disconcerting fact that God 
is holy and we place ourselves in great peril if we seek to render him a plaything of 
our piety, an ornamental decoration on the religious life, a product to answer our 
inward dissatisfactions. God off ers himself on his own terms or not at all”.21 
Sometimes it is observers from another religious tradition who recognize, perhaps 
a little enviously, the power of such strong religion. Thus Cardinal Ratzinger, later 
Pope Benedict, recognized the attractiveness of the evangelical and pentecostal 
churches that, especially in Latin America, are challenging the Catholicism that, 
for centuries, has been in a monopoly position. These churches, he wrote, are “able 
to attract thousands of people in search of a solid foundation for their lives […] 
the more churches adapt themselves to the standards of secularization, the more 
followers they lose. They become attractive, instead, when they indicate a solid point 
of reference and a clear orientation”.22 
A similar acknowledgment, in this case in a publication by a Church of England 
organization, is that English converts to Islam “say that they fi nd in Islam all the 
things that 150 years ago converts said they found in Christianity. These include 
clear guidance on living; a sense of community or family; a sense of God at the 
centre of life; meaning and purpose for everyday living; an unequivocal moral code; 
authoritative scriptures to live by”.23 
Keith Ward makes the case that strong religion serves to keep raising issues that 
contemporary Western culture would rather forget, questions of the signifi cance of 
human life and of the right way to live. It keeps alive questions of whether there is 
a supreme human goal, and of how to attain it. And it keeps alive the question of 
whether there is an absolute standard of truth, beauty and goodness that underlies the 
ambiguities and confl icts of human life.24 
For adherents to strong religion, living a moral life is not a matter of adhering 
to rules nor of consulting one’s values, but of “a living relationship to a personal 
20  Stephen L. C : God’s Name in Vain: The Wrongs and Rights cf Religion in Politics. New York, 
Basic Books, 2000. 30.
21  W  (1994) op. cit. 145.
22  Joseph R : Letter to Marcello Pera. In: Without Roots: The West, Relativism, Christianity, 
Islam. New York, Basic Books, 2006. 119.
23  C  (2005) op. cit. xv.
24  W  op. cit. 196.
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God of supreme goodness”.25 The believer’s behavior is based in gratitude and in 
a desire to express it through concrete actions.  By contrast, “if there really is no 
transcendent source of the good to which the will is naturally drawn, but only the 
power of the will to decide what ends it desires”,26 then there is no reliable basis on 
which to overcome the selfi shness of the consumerist culture that prevails in North 
America and Western Europe. Appeals to common purpose grow increasingly faint, 
and it is with a sense of nostalgic regret that many look back to the social movements 
or national crises of the past.
Societies cannot maintain shared norms for behavior or appeal to their members 
to make sacrifi ces for the common good unless those members recognize authority 
beyond their individual interests and impulses. Sociologist David Martin points out 
that “religion acts as a repository of human values and transcendental reference 
which can be activated in the realm of civil society”.27 Philip Rieff  made the same 
point more starkly in The Triumph of the Therapeutic: “The question is no longer 
as Dostoevski put it: ‘Can civilized man believe?’ Rather: Can unbelieving man be 
civilized?”.28 Stephen Macedo, no particular friend of religion, writes that religions 
“often challenge the materialism, hedonism, and this-worldliness that is so dominant 
in our time. And religions provide sources of meaning outside of politics that should 
help keep alive the intellectual arguments by which truth is supposedly approached 
in a liberal polity”.29 
It is perhaps ironical that the Voltaires and the David Humes of our post-secular 
age, challenging the prevailing conventions and pieties, may well be those who speak 
with the authority of strong religion – Christians, no doubt, but also Muslims and 
adherents of other faith-traditions, as indeed the Dalai Lama has exemplifi ed. They 
will of course have to learn how to speak with authority in a way that can be heard 
beyond the circles of those already convinced (and Muslims in particular will need to 
learn a Western idiom), but there seems little doubt that the complacency of secular 
materialism will be challenged in ways that, in the general disarray of Western 
culture, cannot readily be dismissed.
4. Civil Society as the Nursery of Citizenship
A pluralistic civil society based upon voluntary associations thus nurtures the habits 
of trust and cooperation essential to a democratic political order, while encouraging 
the challenges to injustice and vice that keep it healthy. Alexis de Tocqueville was 
particularly impressed, on his visit in the early 1830s, by the propensity of Americans 
25  Ibid. 137.
26  Ibid. 227.
27  David M : On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory. Famham (England), Ashgate, 
2005. 24.
28  Philip R : The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith after Freud. New York, Harper 
Torchbooks, 1968. 4.
29  M  (2000) op. cit. 220
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to form voluntary associations to meet needs and to carry out functions that in France 
would be left to the government, and how the habits thus formed contributed to the 
success of democracy on all levels.  “How can liberty be preserved in great matters,” 
he asked, “among a multitude that has never learned to use it in small ones?”.30
“Where do citizens acquire the capacity to care about the common good?” Mary 
Ann Glendon asks. “Where do people learn to view others with respect and concern, 
rather than to regard them as objects, means, or obstacles?”.31 She expresses her 
concern that “neglect of the social dimension of personhood has made it extremely 
diffi  cult for us to develop an adequate conceptual apparatus for taking into account 
the sorts of groups within which human character, competence, and capacity for 
citizenship are formed.” As a result, these “seedbeds of civic virtue – families, 
neighborhoods, religious associations, and other communities – can no longer be 
taken for granted”.32
There was indeed much discussion, a few years ago, about the alleged decline 
of organizational life in the United States, as argued in Robert Putnam’s best-seller 
Bowling Alone (2000). But if there has been a decline in bowling leagues and Parent-
Teacher associations, below the surface there may be more happening than is reported 
by formal associations. After all “existing surveys are unlikely to have captured all 
recent changes in U. S. associational life – for example, the proliferation of faith-
based informal »small groups«.”33 
Putnam recognizes the continuing signifi cance of informal as well as more formal 
organizations with a religious basis.
“Faith communities in which people worship together are arguably the single most 
important repository of social capital in America. […] nearly half of all associational 
memberships in America are church related, half of all personal philanthropy is 
religious in character, and half of all volunteering occurs in a religious context.  […] 
Churches provide an important incubator for civic skills, civic norms, community 
interests, and civic recruitment. […] churchgoers are substantially more likely to be 
involved in secular organizations, to vote and participate politically in other ways, 
and to have deeper informal social connections”.34
Political scientist Sidney Verba and his colleagues found, in their massive study 
of the extent to which Americans volunteer for community-building and other civic 
activities, that participation in churches – especially African-American and white 
Evangelical congregations – has a strong positive infl uence on involvement in the 
wider community as well. 
Religious institutions are the source of signifi cant civic skills which, in turn, foster 
political activity. The acquisition of such civic skills is not a function of SES but 
30  T  op. cit. 96.
31  G  op. cit. 129.
32  G  op. cit. 109.
33  G –L  (1998) op. cit. 31.
34  Robert D. P : Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York, 
Simon & Schuster, 2000. 66.
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depends on frequency of church attendance and the denomination of the church one 
attends.  As we shall see, individuals with low SES may acquire civic skills if they 
attend church-and if the church is the right denomination. Conversely, individuals 
who are otherwise well endowed with resources because of their high socioeconomic 
status will be lower in civic skills if they do not attend church regularly – or if the 
church they attend is the wrong denomination35.
This positive outcome occurs because “[t]he domain of equal access to opportunities 
to learn civic skills is the church. Not only is religious affi  liation not stratifi ed by 
income, race or ethnicity, or gender, but churches apportion opportunities for 
skill development relatively equally among members. Among church members, the 
less well off  are at less of a disadvantage, and African-Americans are at an actual 
advantage, when it comes to opportunities to practice civic skills in church”.36  
This fi nding is consistent with the results of a study of adults nationwide who 
had graduated some years before from various types of high schools: those who had 
attended “Christian” (that is, Evangelical) schools were especially well-integrated 
into and active in their local communities though rather less involved politically than 
graduates of other types of schools.  The data showed that in contrast to the popular 
stereotype of Protestant Christian schools producing socially fragmented, anti-
intellectual, politically radical, and militantly right-wing graduates, our data reveal a 
very diff erent picture of the Protestant Christian school graduate. Compared to their 
public school, Catholic school, and non-religious private school peers, Protestant 
Christian school graduates have been found to be uniquely compliant, generous 
individuals who stabilize their communities by their uncommon and distinctive 
commitment to their families, their churches, and their communities, and by their 
unique hope and optimism about their lives and the future. In contrast to the popular 
idea that Protestant Christians are engaged in a ‘culture war’, on the off ensive in their 
communities and against the government, Protestant Christian school graduates are 
committed to progress in their communities even while they feel outside the cultural 
mainstream. In many ways, the average Protestant Christian school graduate is a 
foundational member of society.37 
Even with a signifi cant decline in participation in religious services, as has 
occurred in France, anthropologist John Bowen points out that there has been “a 
fl ourishing of religion-based associations. Catholic youth movements […] grew 
steadily in numbers in both urban and rural areas after 1945”.38 
This community-building and civic-education role of religious congregations 
is attested by a study of patterns of charitable giving and of volunteering. Arthur 
35  Sidney V  – Kay L  S  – Henry E. B : Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism 
in American Politics. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1995. 282–283.
36  Ibid.
37  Cardus Education Survey: Do the Motivations for Private Religious Catholic and Protestant 
Schooling in North America Align with Graduate Outcomes? Hamilton, Ontario, 2011. 13.
38  John R. B : Can Islam Be French? Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State. Princeton, 
NJ, Princeton University Press, 2011. 181.
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Brooks found that, in 2000, “religious people – who, per family, earned exactly the 
same amount as secular people, $49,000 – gave about 3.5 times more money per year 
(an average of $2,210 versus $642). They also volunteered more than twice as often 
(12 times per year, versus 5.8 times).” Nor is this giving directed only to their own 
churches and related institutions; Brooks found that “religious conservatives are 
more likely to give to secular charities than the overall population”.39 
The fi ndings of this study are especially critical of the stinginess of secular liberals, 
who are 19 percentage points less likely to give each year than religious conservatives, 
and 9 points less likely than the population in general. They are even slightly less 
likely to give to specifi cally secular charities than religious conservatives. They give 
away less than a third as much money as religious conservatives, and about half as 
much as the population in general, despite having higher average incomes than either 
group. They are 12 points less likely to volunteer than religious conservatives, and 
they volunteer only about half as often.40  
Brooks found that the same pattern prevails in Europe. In France in 1998, “73 percent 
of the population were secularists. The […] French churchgoer was 54 percentage 
points more likely than a demographically identical secularist to volunteer, and 
25 points more likely to volunteer for secular causes. Similarly, a religious British 
person would be 43 points more likely to volunteer than a demographically identical 
British secularist (and 24 points more likely for nonreligious causes)”.41 
It appears that being part of a voluntary association or community whose guiding 
ethos emphasizes trust and mutual support is a good preparation for engaged civic 
life beyond that association, contrary to the charge advanced by secular elites that 
it tends toward selfi shness and hostility toward outsiders. Thus “religion matters to 
public life because it is an important teacher of moral virtues such as self-sacrifi ce 
and altruism. The transmission of religious beliefs to one’s children can be thought 
of as instilling a valuable moral resource that contributes to participatory attitudes.” 
As a result, “on average, those growing up in homes with religious instruction and 
practice will be better socialized to contribute to society than those who do not, and 
a solid body of social science research can be mustered to support this contention”.42
A word of caution is necessary at this point: the fact that religious associations 
and religiously-motivated individuals make important contributions to civil society 
and thus to liberal democracy should not be seen as the primary argument for 
religious freedom. Religious freedom is important above all because it respects 
the essential humanity, at its deepest level, of every individual in a free society. As 
political scientist William Galston reminds us, “religion is valuable, not only for the 
39  Arthur C. B : Who Really Cares: The Surprising Truth About Compassionate Conservatism. 
New York, Basic Books, 2006. 34., 47.
40  Ibid. 49.
41  Ibid. 126.
42  James G. G  – J. Celeste L  – Jason E. S : Cultivating Democracy: Civic 
Environments and Political Socialization in America. Washington, DC., Brookings Institution Press, 
2003. 122–123.
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contribution it may make to politics and society, but in its own right, and there is no 
guarantee that religion faithfully practiced will always support the existing political 
or social order. Instead, political pluralism regards human life as consisting of a 
multiplicity of spheres, some overlapping, but each with distinct inner norms and a 
limited but real autonomy”.43
5. Do Civil Society Associations and Institutions Divide Society?
It is commonly asserted – in the tradition of the post-war discussion of “the 
authoritarian personality”44 – that religion is a primary source of social division 
and intolerance; in fact, however, apart from situations of inter-communal confl ict in 
which religion serves as a convenient marker of identity, the social science evidence 
tends to point in the other direction. The most intolerant individuals are often those 
who claim a religious identity but are not actively engaged in a religious community. 
Gordon Allport and J. Michael Ross found, in their 1967 study, that “ frequent church 
attenders were less prejudiced than infrequent attenders and often less prejudiced 
than nonattenders. […] Several studies revealed that casual and irregular fringe 
members of churches were the most prejudiced”.45 A study by pollsters George Gallup 
and Timothy Jones of Americans who are strongly committed religiously, “ found 
that ‘The Saints Among Us’, are more tolerant of other creeds and cultures than the 
uncommitted (1992). In fact, the further down the scale of religious commitment, the 
less tolerant people are”.46
Studies of attitudes toward immigration and immigrants have found that 
individuals with strong religious commitments tend to be more accepting than 
individuals sharing the same religious identity who do not make it a central part of 
their lives. “Those who attended church services every week ranked about 4 percent 
higher on the tolerance scale than those who never attended church at all. Viewed in 
total, the results for diversity confi rmed the fi ndings of previous researchers that it 
is those of nominal-to-middling religious commitment among Protestants, Catholics, 
and Jews, not the most observant, who are the least accepting of immigration”.47  
According to Michael Sandel, this is only to be expected, since “intolerance 
fl ourishes most where forms of life are dislocated, roots unsettled, traditions undone. 
In our day, the totalitarian impulse has sprung less from the convictions of confi dently 
situated selves than from the confusions of atomized, dislocated, frustrated selves, at 
sea in a world where common meanings have lost their force”.48 Faith-based schools, 
43  William G : On the Reemergence of Political Pluralism. Daedalus, Vol. 135, No. 3, On Body 
in Mind (Summer), 2006. 120.
44  Theodor W. A  – Else F -B  – Daniel J. L  – R. Nevitt S : The 
Authoritarian Personality. New York, Harper and Row, 1950. 
45  L  (1996) op. cit. 101.
46  Elmer John T : The Ethics of Evangelism. Downers Grove, IL, InterVarsity, 2011. 113.
47  G –L –S  op. cit. 133.
48  S  (1984) op. cit. 7.
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by anchoring youth fi rmly in a particular tradition and worldview, may give them the 
security to recognize the value of other traditions and worldviews to their adherents. 
At least in the American context, then, weak religion, religion that makes minimal 
claims on its adherents but can serve as an identity over against other identities, is 
associated with intolerance, while strong religion that shapes habits and convictions is 
associated with tolerance.  Such tolerance is a necessary but not suffi  cient ingredient 
of productive civic life. After all, as Christopher Lasch has pointed out, “democracy 
[…] requires a more invigorating ethic than tolerance. Tolerance is a fi ne thing, but 
it is only the beginning of democracy, not its destination”.49
Quite apart from the promotion of tolerance, there is abundant evidence that 
religious associations play an important role in developing the more constructive 
skills and habits crucial to civic life.  Some of these are quite basic, but not otherwise 
available to groups on the margins of society. Sociologist David Martin explains how, 
in Latin America, the intense and supportive community of Pentecostal churches 
“takes those marooned and confi ned in the secular reality by fate and fortune, and 
off ers them a protected enclave in which to explore the gifts of the Spirit such as 
perseverance, peaceableness, discipline, trustworthiness, and mutual acceptance 
among the brethren and in the family”.50 These habits, in turn, tend to make them 
good and productive citizens.
While religious associations are by no means the only setting within which these 
skills and habits can be developed, they are by far the most widespread in American 
society, and they tend to persist as other forms of association wax and wane.  Whether 
religious or secular in their fundamental motivation, “only many small-scale civic 
bodies enable citizens to cultivate democratic civic virtues and to play an active 
role in civil life. Such participation turns on meaningful involvement in some decent 
form of community, by which is meant commitments and ties that locate the citizen in 
bonds of trust, reciprocity, and civic competence”.51
Islam, often cited as an example of a religion-based threat to American and 
Western-European society, provide evidence of the positive infl uence of community-
based religious associations. Islamic terrorism in the West is not generally based in 
practicing Muslim communities, but in isolated individuals and networks formed in 
prison or on the internet. A study of the careers of several hundred jihadists found 
that Islamist terrorists fi nd religion fairly late in life, in their mid-twenties, and do 
not have an adequate background to evaluate the Salafi  arguments and interpret the 
material they read. The new-found faith and devotion to a literal reading of early 
Islamic texts are not a result of brainwashing in madrassas; their fervor results from 
their lack of religious training, which prevents them from evaluating their new beliefs 
in context. Had they received such training, they might not have fallen prey to these 
49  L  op. cit. 89.
50  M  (2002) op. cit. 71.
51  Jean Bethke E : Civil Society, Religion, and the Formation of Citizens. In: Diane R  – 
Joseph P. V  (eds.): Making Good Citizens: Education and Civil Society. New Haven, CT, Yale 
University Press, 2001. 264.
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seductive Manichaean arguments. It follows that more religious education for these 
young men might have been benefi cial.52 
The research I have been directing over several years in Islamic secondary schools 
in diff erent parts of the United States found that parents and staff  share a deep 
concern that students be prepared to be good American citizens, while maintaining 
their commitment to Islamic beliefs and suitably-adapted behavioral norms. Our 
interviews with the students themselves found that they shared this understanding of 
their future, along with a concern to correct the popular identifi cation of Islam with 
terrorism. One student told us, “America is kind of like a melting pot, right? And to 
be able to blend in, you have to stand out in a way. I think faith gives you that edge.”
6. The Importance of Structural Pluralism
If it is the case that voluntary associations and not-for-profi t institutions, and especially 
those with a religious character, are an essential part of a healthy civil society and 
of a democratic political order, how should public policy treat them? Certainly, it 
should not be by entering into an alliance with a particular religious organization, 
as was the case with the Catholic Church in Franco’s Spain; that is unhealthy not 
only for democratic freedom but for the religious organization itself, clasped in the 
fatal embrace of the state. Arguably, one of the reasons for the relatively fl ourishing 
condition of Christian churches in the United States is that there has never been 
a national established church and the last (quite attenuated) state establishment, in 
Massachusetts, was abolished as long ago as 1830. Similarly, as Casanova points out, 
“throughout Europe, nonestablished churches and sects in most countries have been 
able to survive the secularizing trends better than has the established church. […] it 
was the very attempt to preserve and prolong Christendom in every nation-state and 
thus to resist modern functional diff erentiation that nearly destroyed the churches 
in Europe”.53
Religious freedom includes, centrally, the right to believe as one’s reason and 
conscience dictate and to act upon such beliefs, within broad constraints that 
protect the public interest and the rights of others. It includes also the right to reject 
a particular religion or all religions, and to choose as freely to leave as to enter a 
religious association. Public policy best protects these rights by refraining carefully 
from endorsing a particular set of beliefs or of unbeliefs. Thus it must not be secularist. 
Philosopher Jürgen Habermas points out that the neutrality of the state authority on 
questions of world views guarantees the same ethical freedom to every citizen. This 
is incompatible with the political universalization of a secularist world view. When 
secularized citizens act in their role as citizens of the state, they must not deny in 
principle that religious images of the world have the potential to express truth. Nor 
52  Marc S : Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-fi rst Century. Philadelphia, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. 60.
53  C  op. cit. 29.
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must they refuse their believing fellow citizens the right to make contributions in a 
religious language in public debates.54
True neutrality of the state, in an age when so much of social life is organized, 
directly or indirectly, by some level of government requires a recognition of the need 
for structural (or institutional) pluralism. ‘Civil society’, Michael Walzer reminds 
us, “is a project of projects; it requires many organizing strategies and new forms 
of state action. It requires a new sensitivity for what is local, specifi c, contingent – 
and, above all, a new recognition […] that the good life is in the details”.55 It is in 
the nature of government bureaucracies to seek to achieve effi  ciency and impartiality 
through the imposition of formal rules and treating identical situations (defi ned as 
such by external characteristics) identically. This serves very well for issuing driver’s 
licenses and other routine tasks, but not at all well for the human care of human 
beings, including the education of children. 
Children diff er on a wide range of characteristics, but the most signifi cant for 
education is the moral formation that children have received at home and the hopes 
that parents have for the sort of lives their children will choose to lead, and by what 
norms these lives will be guided. For a free society, this means that institutional 
pluralism should extend to the sphere where it is most severely challenged, that of 
k-12 education. Rather than – as often alleged – subjecting children to indoctrination, 
the “best guarantee against institutional indoctrination is that there be a plurality of 
institutions”56 among which families can choose.
What I have called “the myth of the common school”57 contends that civic peace 
and cooperation around common tasks require that all children be arbitrarily 
assigned to schools from which any distinctive worldviews are rigorously excluded. 
This has been the source of bitter confl ict in a number of other countries58, and of a 
mind-numbing blandness in most American public schools. Stephen Carter protests 
against the contention that all children should be exposed to a common culture that, 
increasingly, is made up of relentless consumerism and ever-new fads.
Of course believers should have avenues of escape from the culture. Of course 
believers should have space to make their own decisions, without state interference, 
about what moral understanding their children need, both to function in this world 
and to prepare for the next. Of course a society that truly values diversity and 
54  Jürgen H : Pre-political Foundations of the Democratic Constitutional State? In: Brian 
McNeil (ed.): Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger and Jürgen Habermas. Dialectics of Secularization: On 
Reason and Religion. San Francisco, CA, Ignatius Press, 2006. 51.
55  Michael W : The Idea of Civil Society: A Path to Social Reconstruction. In: E. J. D , 
Jr. (ed.): Community Works: The Revival of Civil Society in America. Washington DC, Brookings 
Institution Press, 1998. 143.
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pluralism should support the development of communities that will reach radically 
diff erent conclusions from those of the dominant culture. The answer is to nurture 
many diff erent centers of meaning, including many diff erent understandings on how 
to fi nd meaning, so that the state will have competition.59
These diff erent ‘centers of meaning’ cannot fi nd expression in individual 
consciences alone; they require support through voluntary associations and 
institutions that are free to express and to live out of “diff erent understandings of 
how to fi nd meaning”. This is not a prescription for social isolation or for mutual 
incomprehension; to the contrary, as George Weigel points out, “genuine pluralism 
is built out of plurality when diff erences are debated rather than ignored and a unity 
begins to be discerned in human aff airs – what John Courtney Murray called »the 
unity of an orderly conversation«”.60
Such rightly-understood pluralism “does not abolish civic unity. Rather, it leads 
to a distinctive understanding of the relation between the requirements of unity and 
the claims of diversity in liberal politics”.61 Defi ning those requirements of unity 
with respect to schooling has always been a source of contention, but never more 
so than today, when society and culture are roiled by competing norms for personal 
and group behavior, each claiming for itself authoritative status. Those holding these 
norms claim for them universal validity and seek to communicate them to such to 
schoolchildren. The Sixties motto of “diff erent strokes for diff erent folks” as the 
expression of tolerant non-judgmentalism is seldom heard today; the new mood is 
expressed by a diff erent catch-phrase: “my way or the highway”. 
Those exercising strong cultural infl uence today reject the idea that it is enough 
simply to tolerate behaviors (especially but not exclusively sexual) that until recently 
– and for many generations – were not tolerated; they should instead be celebrated 
and shielded from challenge or question. In particular, these new cultural arbiters 
tend to be actively hostile toward strongly-held religious beliefs, disparagingly 
referred to as “ fundamentalism”62.
In contrast with this insistence on replacing one set of unquestionable norms 
with another, genuine societal and cultural “pluralism is an achievement, not simply 
a sociological fact. A true pluralism […] is a pluralism in which everyone’s truth 
claims are in play, through a language that is accessible to all, in a public discourse 
conducted within the bonds of democratic civility”.63 Surely that is the pluralism a 
59  C  op. cit. 116.
60  George W : Roman Catholicism in the Age of John Paul II. In: Peter L. B  (ed.): The 
Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. Grand Rapids, MI, Eerdmans, 
1999. 34.
61  William A. G : Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory 
and Practice. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002. 10.
62  Louis B  – Gerald D  M : Our Secularist Democratic Party. The Public Interest, Fall, 2002.; 
George Y : Hostile Environment: Understanding and Responding to Anti-Christian Bias. 
Downers Grove, IL, IVP Books, 2015.
63  George W : Achieving Disagreement: From Indiff erence to Pluralism. The Journal of Law and 
Religion, VIII, 1990/1–2. 184.
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liberal democracy should seek to achieve, one that recognizes, protects, but is not 
afraid to question and debate the diff erent ways in which we understand the nature of 
a fl ourishing human life.
7. Good Intentions Weakening Civil Society
There is something to be said for this new mood, or at least for its rejection of the 
rather demeaning idea that certain beliefs and behaviors – those at issue presently 
having to do largely with sexuality and with identity – should be “tolerated,” in what 
some have called a fl ight from judgment.  George Washington, in a celebrated letter 
to a Jewish congregation in Newport, Rhode Island, in 1790, wrote that the “citizens 
of the United States of America have a right to applaud themselves for having given 
to mankind examples of an enlarged and liberal policy – a policy worthy of imitation. 
All possess alike liberty of conscience and immunities of citizenship. It is now no 
more that toleration is spoken of as if it were the indulgence of one class of people 
that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights, for, happily, the 
Government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution 
no assistance, requires only that they who live under its protection should demean 
themselves as good citizens in giving it on all occasions their eff ectual support”.64
We might elaborate upon that by saying that what citizens owe to other citizens 
is not mere tolerance but respect for their common humanity, a respect that takes 
seriously enough how they live out that humanity to be willing to question it. For 
Jews and Christians it requires that we should see each other as persons, valued not 
only for our characteristics and behaviors, but also – whatever our shortcomings – as 
made in the image of God;65 Habermas, no believer, refers to “the religious origins 
of the morality of equal respect for everybody”.66 
Unlike tolerance, respect cannot properly be undiscriminating, since it does 
not simply accept uncritically but also entails judgments about character and 
achievements. We want to be accepted but also respected not only for just our mere 
existence, but also for what we have done and become. So Washington expected the 
Jews of Newport to behave as good citizens, with the implication that, if they did not, 
they would forfeit the positive regard of their country.
This is the crux of the present controversy over how to deal with sexuality issues in 
schools in the United States. Most Americans have become tolerant of homosexuality 
and even of gender-switching as phenomena (however deplorable these may be in 
the view of many) that exist in the wider society and should not be subjected to 
public disabilities. As schools teach about these behaviors and identities, however, an 
inevitable evaluative dimension is added. Are they deserving of respect, as equally-
valid choices? If public schools respond affi  rmatively, are they not taking a partisan 
64  George W : Writings. New York, NY, Library of America, 1997. 767.
65  Jacques M : The Person and the Common Good. (Trans. John J. Fitzgerald) University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1966. 42.
66  H  op. cit. 27.
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position on an issue about which the public is deeply divided? And, if some faith-
based schools teach that such practices are contrary to God’s will for how people 
should exercise their sexuality, are these schools engaging in bigotry that calls into 
question their right to provide a state-approved (if not publicly-funded) education? To 
receive tax exemption?  To satisfy mandatory school attendance laws?
If, as we have argued above, associations motivated and drawn together by shared 
religious conviction are an important element in a healthy civil society, and serve as 
what Mary Ann Glendon has called “seedbeds” of the virtues of citizenship, then 
eff orts to impose a single set of moral norms, whether religious or secular, – or, 
indeed, to deny that moral norms have any authority apart from what we choose to 
give them – have seriously negative consequences.
Liberal tolerance (as distinct from religiously grounded tolerance) could be lethal 
to many seedbeds. Not only is liberal tolerance intolerant of its rivals, but it slides all 
too easily into the sort of mandatory value neutrality that rules all talk of character 
and virtue out of bounds. […] Liberalism, in order to survive, may need to refrain 
from imposing its own image on all the institutions of civil society. […] The best 
hope for unpopular, non-liberal seedbeds of virtue may be the tolerant liberal polity 
whose ultimate values are at odds with theirs.67
Schools are of course not the only focal point of such religious freedom issues, 
as the role of government in funding and regulating non-government providers of 
human services continues to expand,68 but they represent a particularly sensitive 
arena for controversy because of the impressionable age of their clientele and the 
guiding and protective urges of many parents. Until the post-war expansion of the 
role of state governments and of national associations, the intensely local character 
of American public schools ensured that they refl ected the values of most parents 
in the communities they served. In addition, for many decades non-public schools 
– especially Catholic schools between the 1850s and the 1960s, and increasingly 
Evangelical, Jewish, and Islamic schools in recent decades – have served as an 
alternative for families unwilling to expose their children to public schools. 
Today, however, it is not clear that such alternatives will be allowed to retain their 
distinctive character if they are considered to promote moral norms and perspectives 
that confl ict with the prevailing orthodoxy. The issue is not limited to sexual norms 
but includes the insistence, on the part of some infl uential liberal voices, that every 
school should take as its primary mission to promote the moral autonomy of its 
students and thus to set them free from any familial or traditional norms. This 
educational goal is clearly inconsistent with schools that seek to nurture students in a 
particular religious or cultural tradition, and thus with genuine pluralism.
In supporting separate schools for the children of non-liberal cultural minorities 
liberals should be able to recognise the gains that will be made [for those minorities] 
67  Mary Ann G : Forgotten Questions. In: Mary Ann G  – David B  (eds.): 
Seedbeds of Virtue: Sources of Competence, Character, and Citizenship in American Society. 
Madison Books, 1995. 12.
68  See G  (2000) op. cit.
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in terms of cultural congruence and a sense of belonging but they will also have 
to accept that this entails a loss of individual autonomy. This is only problematic 
if autonomy is granted absolute status as some kind of foundational human value. 
As [Isaiah] Berlin observes, the reality is a trade-off  between human values. There 
comes a point where we have to make a choice, and for Berlin the genuine liberal 
does not require that individuals choose autonomy.69 
Ironically enough, given the liberal elite’s scorn for American consumer culture, 
this emphasis on autonomy is thoroughly consistent with and encourages a lifestyle 
based on consumerism with no fi xed goals. In what philosopher Charles Taylor 
has called the Age of Authenticity, the only obligation of the fulfi lled human life 
is “bare choice as a prime value, irrespective of what it is a choice between, or in 
what domain”. The corollary of this defi ning value is the obligation to respect the 
choices that others make; thus the only “sin which is not tolerated is intolerance”,70 
expressing moral judgments on forms of behavior. 
Ironically, the most striking aspect of the emphasis, by liberal education theorists, 
on autonomy and unconstrained choice is its intolerance: it is not itself represented 
as a choice. There is instead for every child, at least in intention, a compulsion to 
become autonomous. Thus Meira Levinson asserts unapologetically that “[f]or 
the state to foster children’s development of autonomy requires coercion – i.e., it 
requires measures that prima facie violate the principles of freedom and choice. […] 
The coercive nature of state promotion of the development of autonomy also means 
that children do not have the luxury of ‘opting out’ of public autonomy-advancing 
opportunities in the same way that adults do”.71 Nor should this educational objective 
of autonomy itself be subject to public debate, since, she insists, it is a fundamental 
premise of the liberal state which is not open to question!72 
Rob Reich would extend this requirement to homeschooling, now a very 
widespread phenomenon in the United States. He urges that government “provide 
a forum” for homeschooled children where their “educational preferences should 
be heard and duly considered when they are contrary to the preferences of the 
parents.” Government should also require homeschooling parents to use curricula 
that ensure “exposure to and engagement with values and beliefs other than those of 
a child’s parents.” Compliance could then be ensured by subjecting the children to 
“periodic assessments that would measure their success in examining and refl ecting 
upon diverse worldviews”.73 Schools, and even homeschooling families, who fail to 
promote such autonomy should, in this view, be subject to corrective government 
69  Neil B : Must Liberal Support for Separate Schools Be Subject to a Condition of Individual 
Autonomy? British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 48, No. 3, (2000/Sep.) 282.
70  Charles T : A Secular Age. Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007. 
478., 484.
71   L  (1999) op. cit. 38–39.
72  Ibid. 139.
73  Rob R : Testing the Boundaries of Parental Authority over Education: the Case of Homeschooling. 
In: Stephen M  – Yael T  (eds.): Moral and Political Education. New York, New York 
University Press, 2002. 304.
53Strengthening Civil Society
intervention. In the face of this prospect, William Galston urges that there are some 
things that the government may not rightly require all schools to do, even in the 
name of forming good citizens. The appeal to the requirement of civic education 
is powerful, but only in civic republican regimes it is dispositive. In polities that 
embrace a measure of political pluralism, as does the United States, claims based on 
religious liberty may from time to time override the state’s interest in education for 
civic unity.74
After all, as Galston wrote earlier, “liberalism is about the protection of diversity, 
not the valorization of choice. […] To place an ideal of autonomous choice – let 
alone cosmopolitan bricolage – at the core of liberalism is in fact to narrow the 
range of possibilities available within liberal societies. In the guise of protecting the 
capacity for diversity, the autonomy principle in fact represents a kind of uniformity 
that exerts pressure on ways of life that do not embrace autonomy”.75  
The ugly political mood in recent years in the United States (and in a number of 
other Western democracies) refl ects a growing resistance to the imposition of newly-
discovered or invented elite values on a population that does not share them. In some 
cases the issues involved hardly seem to justify the furore that they have caused, 
such as (for example) that over trans-gender bathroom use. A little sympathetic 
imagination makes it possible to understand, however, that millions of Americans 
brought up since childhood with the unquestioned assumption that boys and men 
go to one bathroom or changing room and girls and women to another react to a 
mandate from the federal government that individuals who are biologically male be 
allowed to use the facilities provided for women or girls. It is not diffi  cult to imagine 
that, on complaint from a transgender individual, a zealous government offi  cial might 
enforce this requirement against a church or other house of worship on the grounds 
that it was “open to the public,” perhaps by canceling a property tax exemption.  
It seems foolish to devote any attention to such largely-symbolic issues, but 
cumulatively they could have grave consequences. After all, “If the large number 
of Americans committed to religious belief and experience come to believe, as many 
of them already do, that the political system does not respect their way of life to the 
same extent it respects secular lifestyles, then they themselves will tend not to respect 
that system or the government and laws that it generates”.76 This alienation, of which 
we can already see abundant signs, would be serious indeed.
The only remedy is to base public policy on structural pluralism, allowing 
diff erent worldview-based communities to operate their own institutions refl ecting 
their own norms, provided that – as noted above – individuals be completely free 
74  William A. G : Civic Republicanism, Political Pluralism, and the Regulation of Private Schools. 
In: Patrick J. W  – Stephen M  (eds.): Educating Citizens: International Perspectives on 
Civic Values and School Choice. Washington, DC., Brookings Institution Press, 2004. 321.
75  William A. G : Two Concepts of Liberalism. Ethics, Vol. 105, No. 3, (1995/April) 523. 
76  Frederick Mark G : Some Political Implications of Religious Belief. In: Margaret J. E  – 
Kenneth J. R  (eds.): Issues in Curriculum: A Selection of Chapters from Past NSSE Yearbooks. 
Ninety-eighth Yearbook of National Society for The Study of Education: Part II. Chicago, IL, 
University of Chicago Press, 1990. 438.
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to enter or to leave them. There was a wise provision under the federal law known 
as Charitable Choice, that faith-based social-service agencies competing for public 
funding be allowed to retain and express their religious distinctiveness provided 
that an alternative service without religious character be available to clients. That is 
certainly as it should be: neither denying nor requiring counseling or other services 
with a religious character.77
To adopt institutional pluralism would entail abandoning the civic republican 
strategy for social and educational policy, a strategy (as philosopher Charles Taylor 
and a colleague write) favoring, in addition to respect for moral equality and freedom 
of conscience, the emancipation of individuals and the growth of a common civic 
identity, which requires marginalizing religious affi  liations and forcing them back 
into the private sphere. The liberal-pluralist model, by contrast, sees secularism as a 
mode of governance whose function is to fi nd the optimal balance between respect 
for moral equality and respect for freedom of conscience.78 
8. Redefi ning the Role of Government
The relationship of government and civil society diff ers considerably among Western 
democracies and even more in other societies, and this is especially evident in the 
sphere of popular schooling, entailing as it does so many value-laden choices and 
confl icting interests.79 Only a totalitarian regime can seek, however imperfectly, to 
absorb all of the functions of civil society into its own domain, but it is inherent in 
the very nature of any government to seek to extend its infl uence if not direct control 
over ever more aspects of life, often for the most commendable reasons of effi  ciency 
and social justice. It was, for example, one of the goals of the Progressive Era a 
century ago in the United States to entrust progress to an elite of ‘social engineers’ 
who would apply rational scientifi c method to eliminating a wide range of problems 
and ensuring a better future. 
This agenda of government-managed progress showed very little deference toward 
democratic decision-making, or toward the diversity and intense localism of American 
life. John Dewey’s infl uential Democracy and Education (1916), for example, showed 
no appreciation for the process of decision-making about schooling at the local level 
that had always, until then, characterized American popular education. Dewey called, 
instead, for teachers to decide the goals and the means of education, creating on the 
basis of their superior understanding “an educational institution which shall provide 
something like a homogeneous and balanced environment for the young.  Only in this 
way can the centrifugal forces set up by the juxtaposition of diff erent groups within 
77  See G  (2000) op. cit.
78  Jocelyn M  – Charles T : Secularism and Freedom of Conscience. (Trans. Jane Marie 
Todd) Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2011. 34
79  See Charles L. G  – Jan D  G  (eds.): Balancing Freedom, Autonomy, and Accountability in 
Education (four volumes). Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishing, 2012.
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one and the same political unit be counteracted”.80 The role of parents and families is 
seldom mentioned in Dewey’s copious writing about education, except occasionally 
as an infl uence which teachers should seek to counter.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in a period of heavy immigration in 
North America and of nation-building and consolidation in Europe, this government-
controlled common school strategy – David Tyack’s (1974) “One Best System” – 
functioned reasonably well in promoting literacy, while inculcating national loyalty 
and the habits required by industrial employment.  It did so by treating all children of 
a given social class as though their needs and goals were similar, not only ignoring 
the distinctive beliefs of families and their hopes for their children, but treating these 
as a problem to be overcome by the eff ects of schooling.
More recently, however, this common school model has fallen into confusion, 
struggling to respond to a radically-changed economy, and to a loss of confi dence in 
the possibility of teaching a coherent set of moral norms. What seemed self-evident 
to Horace Mann and his allies (and to Hofstede de Groot and other Dutch education 
reformers, to Jules Ferry and his allies in France, to philosophers Kant and Fichte in 
Germany, and to countless others in the nineteenth century) that popular schooling 
on a uniform basis would reliably create virtuous citizens81 is no longer convincing. 
This is not the place to detail how civic education has given way to a multiculturalist 
recital of grievances, how character education has been replaced by a focus on 
nurturing the self-esteem of students. Nor are these developments necessarily 
inappropriate in contrast with what they have replaced, but they do not provide any 
sort of basis for a uniform system of forming the personal and civic virtues required 
by a healthy democracy. 
Whatever may have been the case in the past, today it is only in individual schools 
where staff  and parents share a clearly-articulated understanding of the goals and 
the means of character-formation that children and youth experience a coherent 
education into personal and civic virtue. It is in such schools, and not in the moral 
confusion of the “shopping mall high school”,82 that children are “educated towards 
autonomy”.83 
Most Western democracies have in recent years been moving toward policy 
arrangements that support autonomous or semi-autonomous schools with public 
funding and recognition of their right to off er an education based on a distinctive 
worldview, whether religious or secular.84 As Alessandro Ferrari puts it, this is based 
on “an awareness that the state is not the only public ‘educator’ of youth but rather 
80  John D : Democracy and Education (1916). New York, The Free Press, 1966. 21.
81  See G  (2011) op. cit.; or Charles L. G : The American Model of State and School. New 
York–London, Continuum, 2012.
82  Arthur G. P  – Eleanor F  – David K. C : The Shopping Mall High School. Boston, 
Houghton Miffl  in, 1985.
83  Elmer John T : Teaching for Commitment: Liberal Education, Indoctrination, and Christian 
Nurture. Montreal, Quebec, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993. 131.
84  See G –De G  op.cit. for many examples.
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the guarantor of a developed and articulated institutional pluralism”.85 This fi nds 
expression in a rich array of schools that teach the essential knowledge and skills 
from a variety of perspectives on what it means to live a fl ourishing human life.
This in turn rests on “a pluralist conception of civil society as itself constituted 
by irreducibly diff erent spheres, each with its own relative autonomy. […] each has 
its own specifi c goods, as well as its own specifi c ways of relating to need, aptitude, 
competence, interest, or faith”.86 Education is one of those spheres, and does not 
fl ourish under an imposed uniformity that prevents the articulation, in the schools 
of a wildly diverse society, of a coherent understanding of the nature of a fl ourishing 
human life.
It is not enough, though, for the state to refrain from seeking to impose uniformity 
in education, a uniformity that (as we have seen) can no longer provide the rich 
moral content required by a real education. The restraint of American governments 
in neither supporting nor intrusively regulating non-public schools has been a way of 
avoiding confl ict, but it is not suffi  cient, as the example of other Western democracies 
demonstrates. After all, a “ just state is one that upholds structural pluralism as a 
matter of principle, not as an uncomfortable or grudging accommodation to interest 
groups, or to individual autonomy, or to its own weakness”.87 Policies supporting 
structural pluralism are not just a way of avoiding confl ict over fundamental 
diff erences; they are a way of showing respect for citizens for whom those diff erences 
are life-defi ning, and for the associations and institutions through which they give 
them expression and continuity.
Public policies that seek to nurture the health of civil society in one of its key 
sectors, that of educating the next generation, should go beyond a hands-off  restraint, 
and instead should value and promote structural pluralism. With schools, as with other 
civil society institutions, the state must do more than simply leave them alone, more 
than simply abstain from usurping the functions of these groups. It must actively help 
these groups in discharging their responsibilities, actively seeking through its laws 
and public policies to empower them, to enable them to eff ectively discharge their 
responsibilities, to eff ectively pursue their particular ends, by providing them with 
the direct and indirect assistance they need to do so. Hence, as John XXIII notes, 
the principle of subsidiarity demands state activity “that encourages, stimulates, 
85  Alessandro F : Religious Education in a Globalized Europe. In: Gabriel M  – Yochi 
F  (eds.): Religion and Democracy in Contemporary Europe. London, Alliance Publishing 
Trust, 2008. 121.
86  Joseph D : Between State and Civil Society: European Contexts for Education. In: Kevin 
M D  – Walter F  (eds.): Citizenship and Education in Liberal-Democratic Societies. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003. 109.
87  James W. S : The Pluralist Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd. In: Jeanne H  
S  (ed.): Christianity and Civil Society: Catholic and Neo-Calvinist Perspectives. Lanham, 
MD, Lexington Books, 2008. 111.
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regulates, supplements, and complements” the activities of the intermediary groups 
wherein “an expanded social structure fi nds expression”.88
Of course, ‘the devil is in the details’, and it is a matter of great delicacy and 
importance to decide what aspects of the operation of a school – or of a social agency 
or other non-government institution serving the public – should be regulated by 
government and what aspects should be left free.  Diff erent pluralistic democracies 
have drawn the line and diff erent points, though often with an almost inevitable 
tendency over time for government offi  cials to seek to extend their prescriptions.
A good starting point for prescribing what government should and should not seek 
to regulate in schools (and homeschooling) is to distinguish between education and 
instruction, with the latter encompassing the skills and knowledge which students 
should acquire, while the former refers to the formation of character and life-
perspectives. Of course, these functions of schooling are frequently intermingled. 
For example, paying close attention to a problem in mathematics or in translation 
develops character; indeed, according to Simone Weil, “the development of the 
faculty of attention forms the real object and almost the sole interest of studies”.89 It 
is possible, nevertheless, to distinguish between the knowledge and skills that society 
has a right to expect every school to foster, and the qualities of character that are the 
business of families and the educators to whom they entrust their children. 
It is for the protection of youth and also of the economic interests of society 
that government may reasonably require that schools provide eff ective instruction 
in prescribed areas, though without precluding additional instructional content 
as the school may determine.  Government may also provide oversight to protect 
the health and safety of students. But it is not government’s role to prescribe how 
schools educate students into a responsible, caring, and purposeful life. Democratic 
pluralism requires that this crucial dimension of each school’s mission be left to the 
educators, parents, and supporters who are directly involved. Thus, as the United 
States Supreme Court has determined, it is no violation of the free exercise clause [of 
the Constitution] for states to require private religious schools to meet accreditation 
requirements and be subject to general state standards of educational quality and 
governance. Nor is it a violation of the free exercise clause for states to impose 
instructional and testing requirements in reading, writing, and arithmetic, or in 
civics, geography, and science. Children who graduate from religious schools cannot 
be handicapped in their abilities and capacities as budding democratic citizens and 
productive members of society. Private schools are perfectly free to teach those 
secular subjects with the religious perspective they deem appropriate.90
88  Kenneth L. G : The Subsidiary State: Society, the State and the Principle of Subsidiarity in 
Catholic Social Thought. In Christianity and Civil Society: Catholic and Neo-Calvinist Perspectives. 
In: H  S  (ed.) op. cit. 51.
89  Simone W : Refl ections on the Right Use of School Studies with a View to the Love of God. In: 
Waiting for God. (trans. Emma Craufurd) New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1973. 105.
90  John W , Jr. – Joel A. N : Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment. Third 
Edition. Boulder, CO, Westview, 2011. 208.
After all, “one of the many competencies arising from institutional sphere 
sovereignty is precisely the right to decide on the religious or ideological direction 
which will guide the institution”.91 Upon this right depends the capacity to provide a 
coherent educational experience, and thus to form the character of students. 
Government agencies and the courts, in exercising their oversight responsibility 
to ensure that every child receive an adequate education, should take care to respect 
the pluralist character of a healthy civil society, and “must take special care to note 
whether apparent ‘facially neutral’ regulations actually create an unfair burden for 
religious communities.” Expecting faith-based organizations and institutions to 
conform in all respects to the norms of their secular counterparts leads inevitably 
either to confl ict or to a fatal loss of mission. “Communities of faith contribute to 
public life in part by off ering their adherents alternative modes of meaning and 
interpretation to the dominant secular culture.  If that unique contribution is to 
be maintained, then the ability of these communities to practice their faith freely 
becomes especially important”.92 Fruitful alternatives must not be regulated away!  
In order to promote a fl ourishing, pluralistic civil society, government agencies 
and courts need to learn to think in new ways about the nature and goals of regulation 
and of public funding.
91  Jonathan C : Civil Society and the State: A Neo-Calvinist Perspective. In: H  
S  (ed.) op. cit. 84.
92  Ronald E. T : Religion in Public Life: A Dilemma for Democracy. Washington, DC, 
Georgetown University Press, 1996. 167.
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Education directly aff ects the present and future of millions of people. When so many 
people spend so much time together, confl icts are bound to occur in their day-to-
day interactions. In our view the problem is not that confl icts arise in educational 
institutions, the problem is that there are no satisfactory mechanisms to resolve such 
confl icts.
Law statutes determine the environment of the educational system. They set out 
the rights and obligations of the participants in the educational system and also set 
out the decision-making powers of the authorities. Besides the specifi c legislative 
acts on education, the Constitution, various international agreements and a number 
of other laws also provide rules that govern the relationships between the participants 
in education. In the course of teaching, various decisions are made and measures are 
consequently taken. However, sometimes the decisions may infringe upon the rights 
of others, despite or regardless the best of intentions.
A total of 22.000 complaints have been submitted, thousands of telephone calls 
have been received and, at conferences, hundreds of problems have been disclosed 
to the Offi  ce thus far. The annual reports on our operations may be of assistance to 
all actors of education, but especially to pupils, students and their parents. They are 
those who need to identify cases of infringement, those who seek legal remedy, those 
who want to make proposals and those who want to fi le initiatives. The law may off er 
help in all of these areas but it cannot substitute co-operation. We are convinced that 
all of us may contribute to promote the development and consolidation of democracy 
at schools and in higher education. This Offi  ce has joined the awareness process; 
so as to make additional contributions to an open, honest and professional dialogue 
on childrens’ rights, and on the democratic operation of local and higher education 
institutions.
Our Offi  ce may act if educational rights are infringed or directly threatened. 
Educational stakeholders will only trust the Commissioner for Educational Rights 
if they can see that his actions are unaff ected by politics or political interests. In 
addition to autonomy, another prerequisite of trust is impartial and unbiased inquiry. 
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The Commissioner for Educational Rights may examine the unlawful decisions and 
measures of educational institutions providing public service. This offi  ce was set 
up by the state to protect its citizens – especially the children – from the unlawful 
decisions of public service providers. The initiatives and recommendations of the 
Commissioner for Educational Rights protect the weak, the party who suff ered a 
violation of rights, using legal means exclusively.
The complaints received since 1999 allow us to draw a few general conclusions. 
One of these is that we received many petitions reporting corporal punishment. It has 
been always known that there is a serious lack of transparency in such issues, many 
cases are not reported or do not receive publicity outside the school. In our view, the 
most serious off ence at school is physical aggression against children and students.
In the course of the investigation of the petitions, it was apparent that confl icts 
were rooted in the lack of information. The children involved in a confl ict are often 
not familiar with the applicable regulations and local provisions. They are not aware 
of their rights, and do not know what proceedings must be followed in case of legal 
disputes. If the rules governing the work of educational institutions are not clear 
for the parents and students, they will not be able to make responsible decisions, 
and tend to come out of their disputes with the institutions as losers. The applicable 
legislative instruments establish clear lines of distinction between the responsibilities 
of the family and those of the educational institution. However, when such lines of 
distinction are known by neither the institution nor the family, confl icts will inevitably 
occur between them, and the parties will blame each other for the arising situation. 
Many cases reveal a total absence of trust. A school did not trust a child with 
disabilities, and did not allow the student to enrol. Another school did not trust that 
its students would not use drugs at the weekends, and introduced drug tests. Some 
parents did not trust their children, and authorised drug tests in the school. A student 
dormitory did not trust the students and bought a breathalyser to check alcohol 
consumption. The reason why parents do not complain is either that they are afraid of 
the institution, or do not trust their own children. Institutions tend to dismiss children 
they do not know how to deal with. These children are not trusted any longer. There 
are students who prefer not to ask their teacher for advice or help because the latter 
has abused their confi dence. It will lead to a loss of trust if a teacher overtly refuses 
to observe the rules that would apply to him or her, but does not hesitate to punish 
students when they break the rules. Many teachers do not trust the families. This is 
because the consequences of family issues tend to appear at school, but teachers feel 
powerless. We have read hundreds of complaints from parents who want to take their 
children out of a school because they no longer trust the institution. It is alarming 
how many forms of control, prohibition and restriction exist. 
Trust can be created and strengthened by co-operation. We can often observe that 
schools are left alone in solving a problem without receiving any external help. In 
many cases they do not know where they could turn for assistance. Teachers should 
be aware of the limits of their competence, and they may act only within those limits. 
However, they should also know that at the point where their own competence ends, 
someone else’s begins, and that this is the person who can help. Teachers need to fi nd 
partners who can take part in the resolution of confl icts which arise in the school, 
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but not necessarily originate in the school only. Drug and alcohol abuse, violence, 
children at risk and poverty are all social phenomena which schools are unable to 
tackle eff ectively on their own. However, families are also unable to cope with these 
problems single-handed. 
How can one provide eff ective help in these cases? In our view, co-operation 
between institutions and NGOs may be the solution in individual cases. Experts 
agreed that violence at school was often due to factors outside the school, and 
therefore the various measures and initiatives – especially the preventive ones – 
could only be successful if the organisations of the local communities work together 
as partners. Violence results in serious social damage and cost; therefore preventive 
measures should aim at achieving a tangible reduction of violence. This co-operation 
must be free of bureaucracy. The joint eff orts of professionals from diff erent sectors 
and services can be a major contribution to success. The possible partners are 
school communities, local authorities and regional governments, as well as their 
various educational, cultural and youth services, along with youth and children’s 
organisations, local and regional NGOs, the local and regional media, scientifi c and 
research centres, universities and colleges.
Co-operation is of vital importance in the protection of rights as well. Developed 
democracies have a complex system of institutions for the protection of the rights of 
citizens. Courts are the ultimate means of dispute resolution, but judicial proceedings 
tend to be lengthy, expensive and less confi dential due to the principle of publicity. 
Fortunately, the number of institutions helping the better enforcement of childrens’ 
rights increased in the last few years. The advocates of patients’ rights and children’s 
rights, the ‘solicitors of the people’, mediators and certain NGOs all aim to ensure a 
more eff ective protection of rights. They are closer to the stakeholders, and may help 
mediation in the initial stage of confl icts or contribute to their settlement via cheaper, 
more confi dential and faster procedures. 
The purpose of co-operation between authorities, institutions and NGOs is to fi nd 
the most appropriate assistance for the cases presented by the citizens as quickly as 
possible. If the institution to which a request is addressed may take action, it will 
provide a service to the citizen. If the matter falls outside its sphere of authority, it 
will act as a compass to provide information to the petitioner on where he or she can 
turn for assistance. Citizens can decide which one of the possibilities presented one 
of the off ered avenues they wish to explore. Such co-operation will create trust, as 
citizens will have a reason to feel that the institutions are there for them, and not vice 
versa. Such trust is benefi cial to both the state and the individual. In a free society, 
where the rule of law prevails, there is no alternative to co-operation.
We have a great debt towards the Hungarian society: in the last 25 years we 
havent found an answer to the most important question concerning our educational 
system: why do we teach, what is the aim of it? If we look back in time, we fi nd clear 
answers, for example the aim of eradicating illiteracy. Later, after the fi rst World 
War, when Hungary lost its raw material treasure and its geographical advantages, 
the educational government realized that it in fact it is culture and education, that 
can pull the country out of trouble. Even to educate the so called “socialist human” 
can be seen as a goal that was able to indicate a clear vision of what the aim of the 
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whole educational system was – according to the communist regime. Then came 
the regime change, when all sorts of reforms started to take place, reforms that we 
believed were important on the basis of international conventions and democratic 
principals; there was only one question we forgat to ask ourselves: why are we doing 
all this? Why are we spending all that money on education? What kind of mandate 
does the society give to the large team of professionals that we call the community of 
teachers? During the last 25 years we have heard many debates over what we should 
teach, and even more debates over how we should teach, but these should be only 
one of the many steps – while the very fi rst step has not been made, the question of 
questions has not been answered.
I dont know whose job it should be to start the discussion on the goal of education, 
but Im sure in one thing: the answer to this question must be consensual. There is 
actually a good example to this: about three decades ago the then fi nnish government 
addressed the scientifi c elite, the opposition, artists, churches, the civil sector – and 
they started a program that was aiming to answer the question of „What will we, 
fi nns be in 50 years?”. And in the process of this debate that involved the whole 
society they found the sentence that is now the foundation of the best performing 
educational system of the world: „We must not let our parents and grandparents pass 
away without learning from them all that they know”.
I am aware of the fact that we are not the Finns. Still, I fi rmly believe that if we 
were to start a search together aiming to fi nd a consensual goal for our future and 
education, that could stream an immense amount of energy towards the educational 
system.
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1. Introduction
This paper examines the justiciability of the prior right to education of the one of the 
most vulnerable parts of the society: the minorities. In my research I would like to 
point to the linguistic communities’ education, which is a key issue in my opinion in 
the multilingual and multicultural Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The two main 
target groups of this survey are the Roma and Hungarian education as these are the 
two main minorities in the region, however, I tried to enlarge the survey to all the 
signifi cant linguistic minorities of the region.
Regarding the connection between linguistic rights and educational rights I 
focus on the question whether current international framework regarding minority 
education is relevant, and if yes, does the Council of Europe (CoE) gain appropriate 
and suffi  cient information on minority education? What is the role of the civil actors 
in this respect?
2. Relation between identity, language and education
Regardless of the lack of a general normative defi nition accepted of “national 
minorities”, yet we may accept that regarding the meaning of that phenomenon the 
almost a century-long literature’s position is nearly unchanged. Yet, following the 
UN documents (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Resolution 
47/135), the CoE documents (Framework Convention and Language Charter) as 
well as the relevant literature (Capotorti, Eide, Smith, Kovács, Heintze, Bibo, 
or Flachbarth) my starting point is that a “national minority” is characterized by 
* Associate professor.
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both a signifi cant character, which directly links to their identity and a numerical 
component, which is an objective criteria.1 Thus, it seems to be wise to start our 
survey at the relevant international documents.2
According to Article 27 of the CCPR, ethnic, religious or linguistic character can 
be determined. However, education is not a direct element of identity of minorities 
in the related UN and CoE documents. In this regard, linguistic rights can contribute 
fulfi lling educational rights and vica versa.
Preservation and maintaining of a minority’s identity and the language is thus 
rest on two pillars. One is the ability to use the language freely both in oral and 
written form in private and in public. The other is the possibility to teach the certain 
language in every level and form to the future generations.3
This importance of education of linguistic communities is, however, can be seen in 
several international treaties and documents. The United Nations’ General Assembly 
adopted the Resolution 47/135 in 1993 of which Article 4 (paragraphs 3 and 4) calls 
upon States to promote teaching in/of the mother tongue and culture.
In fact, more than seven decades had to pass in the international organizations’ 
history to be able to deal with the content of the education and not just the frame as 
was in the early 20
th
 century instruments as it is shown in the following.
3. The early international regulatory framework for education rights in CEE
Codifi cation aff ecting national minorities has rapidly evolved after the First World 
War. Contracts closing the cataclysm had separate provisions on minorities, more or 
less in detail.
In connection with the educational provisions I examined 5 of the era’s 
international treaties such as the 1919 Saint-Germain-en-Laye Agreement with 
Austria, Czechoslovakia and the SHS Kingdom, the 1919 Paris Agreement with 
Romania, and the 1920 treaty with Hungary.
The contracts4 contains the following issues related to minorities:
• the clause of General legal equality,5
• right to life and freedom6
1   In this regard “numerical component” means: group of native citizens who are numerically less than 
the major group.
2   Péter K : Minorités: peuple qui n’a pas réussi. In: Hervé A  – Pierre B  – Mathias 
F  – Franck L  – Jean-Marc S  – Muriel U -S  (eds.): Dictionnaire des 
idées reçues en droit international. Paris, Editions Pedone, 2017. 381.
3   Tove Skutnabb-Kangas considers these pillars as Linguistic Human Rights. Tove S -K : 
Linguistic Human Rights. In: T –S  (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Language and Law. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012. 235–236.
4   In the following as “minority contract” I refer to the contracts with Czechoslovakia, Romania and the 
SHS Kingdom.
5   Czechoslovakia Article 7 (1); Romania Article 8 (1); SHS Kingdom Article 7 (1).
6   Czechoslovakia Article 2 (1); Romania Article 2 (1); SHS Kingdom Article 2 (1).
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• Language rights;7




• Religious and educational autonomy12
The examined contracts are mostly similar in structure. Obligations of the states 
follow each other in the similar order in each agreement, basically in the same text.
The texts regarding education had an almost uniform wording:13
“[The state] will provide in the public educational system in towns and 
districts in which a considerable proportion of [the State’s] nationals 
of other than [majority] speech are residents adequate facilities for 
ensuring that the instruction shall be given to the children of such 
[State] nationals through the medium of their own language. This 
provision shall not prevent the [State] Government from making the 
teaching of the [majority] language obligatory.”
The prescribed “adequate facilities” provided a broad framework, which allowed 
the same text to be applied to all countries. Interestingly, despite of the same rules, the 
domestic legal systems developed in very diff erent ways. Some of the achievements 
of regulations that were introduced in the mid-war period still can be seen in the 
contemporary legal systems.
An example for such (non-internationally obligated) instrument is the 3-level 
linguistic education system, where Type A) is where the teaching language is 
the minority language, the type B) is where the teaching language is a minority 
language, however the majority language is a compulsory subject; and type C) is 
where the teaching language is the majority language, but the minority language is 
a compulsory subject. However, this variety of linguistic education was introduced 
by Hungary in the mid-war-period, today this model of education, which takes local 
characteristics also into account, is exercised only in Croatia among the examined 
countries.
7   Article 7 of Czechoslovakia (3–4); Romania Article 8 (3-4); SHS Kingdom Article 7 (3–4).
8   Czechoslovakia Article 2 (2), Article 7 (2); Romania Article 2 (2), Article 8 (2); SHS Kingdom 
Article 2 (2), Article 7 (2), Article 10.
9   Czechoslovakia 3–6. article; Romania 3–7. article; Kingdom of SHS Article 3–6.
10  Article 8 of Czechoslovakia; Romania Article 9; SHS Kingdom Article 8.
11  Article 9 of Czechoslovakia; Romania Article 10; SHS Kingdom Article 9.
12  Romania Article 11.
13  This is a transformation of the text. Here I highlight the common text of the same regulation.
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Above all, the most important experience of these international treaties perhaps is 
that international law recognized minority rights at an early stage, and within both 
the language and the education rights.
4. The fulfi llment of current international obligations -a comparative study
The international regulation regarding minority protection born in the ‘90s – in the 
context of the breaking-up of the Soviet Union – played a key role in maintaining 
regional stability of CEE. The two main Council of Europe convention, both the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages recognizes not only rights for the 
minorities, but also obligations to the Member States, which is going to be important 
with regard to the fulfi llment of educational rights.
These two international instruments are monitored by the CoE by a similar way: 
the county reports are examined by an independent commission of professionals, who 
are preparing an opinion to the Committee of Ministers to adopt a recommendation. 
In this research I examined eight14 middle-European countries’ most recent reports 
and opinions15 in the scope of the fulfi llment of the articles relating education:
• Framework Convention: Articles 12, 13, 14;
• Language Charter: Article 8.
In the following I highlighted the issues that are common in the Carpathian region 
as well as the tools suggested by the two commissions.
4.1. Statistics
If we have a glance at the population statistics of 2015, with few exceptions, we 
may conclude that in the examined countries the largest numbers of minorities are 
Hungarians and Roma/Gypsy. Another observation according to the evolution of the 
population: the number of ethnic communities (linguistic communities) are running 
out, while the Roma population is still growing in the last decades.
14  Austria, Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary.
15  Language Charter documents reviewed: Slovakia: 3rd and 4th monitoring cycle. Ukraine: 1st and 2nd 
monitoring cycle and the country report submitted for the 3rd monitoring cycle (MIN-LANG (2016) 
PR 1). Romania: 1st monitoring cycle and the country report submitted for the 2nd monitoring cycle 
(MIN-LANG (2016) PR 2). Serbia: 2nd and 3rd monitoring cycle. Croatia: 4th and 5th monitoring cycle. 
Slovenia: 3rd and 4th monitoring cycle. Austria: 2nd and 3rd monitoring cycle. Hungary: 5th and 6th 
monitoring cycle.
 Framework Convention documents reviewed: Slovakia: 2nd and 3rd monitoring cycle. Ukraine: 2nd 
and 3rd monitoring cycle. Romania: 2nd and 3rd monitoring cycle. Serbia: 2nd and 3rd monitoring cycle. 
Croatia: 2nd and 3rd monitoring cycle. Slovenia: 2nd and 3rd monitoring cycle. Austria: 2nd and 3rd 
monitoring cycle. Hungary: 2nd and 3rd monitoring cycle.
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The statistics also repeatedly refer to census data, in which it is clear that the 
use of the mother tongue is marked more times than the national belonging. One 
explanation for that is in many countries Roma tend to taken into account themselves 
as Hungarians.
Nowadays international obligations are signifi cantly more specifi c than it was 
in the previous texts of the early 20th century. The framework of the Language 
Charter approaches from a structural view from the pre-school to higher education, 
adult education and vocational education. The Framework Convention has another 
perspective: approaching from the content of the education.
Both the conventions applied the similar mechanism where the key role lies at 
the independent body (committee of experts / advisory committee). This body gains 
information from the state (governments) on the one hand and form its own on-the-
spot visits on the other hand. From the point of view of the linguistic communities 
the main question is whether the committees reach the adequate and relevant 
information? What does the CoE see from a broad picture of a minority’s present?
If we compare the CoE documentation it shows the by today the recommendations 
are not mainly on legislative and legal issues but often beyond the law: means of 
management, support, cooperation or even sensitizing the majority society and 
striving towards peaceful coexistence. In the following I highlight the common 
16  Source: Eurostat (2016).
17  Source: Eurostat (2016).
18  Source: most recent country reports to the examined conventions.
19  Source: most recent country reports to the examined conventions.
20  Source: most recent country reports to the examined conventions.
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fi ndings of the above mentioned CoE documents. In other words: these are the 
common issues (or problematic fi elds) that the CoE sees in the examined CEE region.
4.2. Roma education
The fi rst common highlighted educational area is the Roma/Gypsy education. It 
seems the CoE recognizes that the Roma community should not be treated as one 
of the linguistic minorities, partly because they are usually regarded not like that. 
On the other hand, romas formulate completely diff erent educational demands 
than others. Roma communities intend to be integrated fi rst and promotion of use 
of language is a secondary issue besides that. However, it should be noted that 
romas usually speak in a minority language, so in many countries it is a twofold 
issue (ethnic and linguistic). In contrast, other linguistic communities usually just 
require self-reliance (self-governance), which may be expressed i.e. as a demand for 
separated (and not segregated) classes or the right to establish own school. Needs of 
these two groups are not interchangeable, which is acknowledged by the committees 
as well. In state reports for the Framework Convention member states usually report 
the educational programs and integration strategies in detail. We shall note that 
special Roma strategy has been introduced to all the countries surveyed, which 
deals largely with educational issues. However, in spite of the strategies, for example 
Slovakia and Romania reports diffi  culties of inclusion of Roma in education. We 
can observe the similar situation in Croatia where this particular number is high: 
the Croatian country report refers to a UN survey, which states that only the 25% of 
Roma children fi nish primary school. Slovenia employs special language support, 
and educational advisors for this purpose.
4.3. Recent changes in legislative environment
In the examined region signifi cant legislative changes have taken place between 2010-
13. New acts on education were adopted in Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania and Hungary. 
Beside legislative measures, some institutional changes (such is the Slovakian 
newly introduced minority plenipotential or the Educational Center in Komarno/
Révkomárom) have occurred in the same period of time. These new instruments will 
have eff ect on the educational system, which will provide measurable outcomes in 
the next cycles of reports.
4.4. Accessibility
The accessibility to the right to education for minorities in this particular region is 
basically guaranteed. The reports and the opinions of expert committees and the 
advocacy of civil actors can further refi ne this picture.
The meaning of a “minority-language” or “bilingual” school get diff erent 
interpretations in diff erent countries. Slovakia set a strict 50–50% of Slovak and 
minority-language classes in the curriculum. In contrast, Croatia, which introduced 
a diff erentiated educational model, does have a school that works completely in the 
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minority language. Another variation can also be observed in the case of Slovenia, 
which has mixed schools, but there are also many who are involved in trainings in 
neighboring countries (Hungary and Austria).
It is an important element of accessibility to have the minorities informed about 
the opportunity of minority-language training, for example in those countries where 
the participation is bound to limit (Serbia, Austria). Awareness, as a role of local civil 
society actors is invaluable in this regard.
According to the reports, it seems that a well-functioning minority school shall 
have: 1) student, 2) teacher and 3) teaching materials, school books. Among these 
three factors the teacher training and the curriculum is included in the conventions. 
Comparing the most recent reports (the last in three years’ time), only Serbia reported 
the increasing number of students enrolled in the bilingual trainings. In all the other 
countries, the number of students is decreasing parallel to their population.
4.5. Quality of training
The summaries of the expert committees contain more information about the quality 
of training than the country reports. According to the results of this comparison, two 
subjects can be pointed out as main factors of minority-language training: (1) the 
issue of the quality of the language, and (2) the quality of the textbooks and teaching 
materials. However, any minority language is a living language, without conscious 
use of that particular language it is more exposed to shallowing, archaizing or loss. 
Worrying reports have been coming for more than a decade from East-Slovenia, 
where a fast loss of language can be detected of the small Hungarian community. 
The Slovenian report unfolds that the teachers’ command of the Hungarian language 
is so weak that in many cases they do not able to reach the appropriate level of 
teaching in minority language. In Slovenia, there are only four kindergartens, 
four elementary schools and one middle school accessible for the little more than 
six thousand Hungarians – no wonder that nurturing a new generation of teachers 
struggling with signifi cant problems. Similar, but not that alarming warnings coming 
from Transcarpathia (Ukraine), Burgenland (Austria) and East-Croatia as well. These 
warnings are mainly provided by local civil associations according to the opinions 
of the committees.
4.6. Publishing textbooks
Publishing textbooks is one of the main problematic issues in all the examined 
countries. Although, minority language textbooks are available in all the countries 
(pro forma), it is not so easy to use them in minority education (de facto). Two striking 
examples can be highlighted. Serbia for example, reports a long list of minority-
language textbooks, but it is clear from the commissions’ evaluation report that there 
is a serious administrative burden related to book publishing, which slows down 
processes. Due to this barrier, new book almost can not even show up to the semester 
in which those were supposed to, so the old ones or the Serbian (majority) language 
books are taken instead. In Slovakia after a long time fi nally a Hungarian textbook 
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was introduced to the administrative authority, which was, however, rejected by the 
Ministry of Education in 2015 and can not be used ever since.
4.7. Teacher training
Teacher training in all regions struggling with challenges. Speaking about the 
largest Hungarian minority, fi rst it seems that there is at least one higher education 
institution in each region, which trains minority language teachers. In the low-
inhabited minority areas (Slovenia, Austria) the main reported problem is a shortage 
of students, but in the large population areas, like Vojvodina (Serbia) the lack of 
training materials and textbooks is the subject of complains. Slovakia recently 
introduced teaching of tolerance in teacher training which is a novelty in the region. 
There is also one important issue in this sphere, which appears implicitly in the CoE 
documents: the low prestige of teaching as a career. The Romanian report is to map 
out that vocational schools are lack of Hungarian-speaking trainer, who usually go 
to business sector rather than teach at school. The teaching profession’s existential 
undervaluation is observed, or at least suspected, in almost all the studied countries. If 
a teacher is the foreign trained (it usually means trained in the kin-state) recognizing 
diplomas may arise as a problem, which had appeared Romanian-Serbian relations 
previously.
4.8. Other problematic issues
Some of the diffi  culties that aff ect the education systems in the region are uncovered 
during the on-the-spot visits of the expert committees. The fi rst is the trend of 
centralization of governance, which is common in the CEE counties. In education 
and mainly regarding curricula, it means the regional needs are counted less than 
the central interests. Shaping education to the special needs of sub-region or at least 
recognition of local specialties is almost impossible. (On the other hand we shouldn’t 
forget, that we are speaking about middle and small sized European countries where 
the local needs are often too small comparing to larger states.) Teaching of history and 
cooperation between majority and minority is also a sensitive issue, but apparently 
due to the Language Charter’s targeted implementation and monitoring we can 
observe a much larger dialogue on this issue than before. However, the Language 
Charter’s Committee of Experts regularly calls the examined countries to include 
minorities in the preparation of curricula.
5. How to develop spreading of information in common issues of education?
The answer to the question raised at the beginning of our survey that whether the 
correct and suffi  cient information come to the Council of Europe is mainly yes. The 
multi-source model, by which the Committees gain information seems to be working 
properly.
It is important to identify those actors who can provide information for the 
committees of experts. Besides the governments, the civil and political organizations 
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have to be highlighted, which are sometimes specialized in certain matters, such as 
education. As a result of the above comparison, I am convinced that minorities’ civil 
organizations form a bridge – as communication channels – linking the international 
organization, the state and the minority citizens. Their main responsibility is to 
provide adequate communication to all other actors, so the relevant information is 
transferred properly.
In addition to the above, more and more research of the highest quality addresses 
the educational sector from a point of view of pedagogy, methodology and linguistics. 
However, the questions examined in the scientifi c literature are often not echoed 
in country reports or evaluations, nor even in the linguistic strategies of certain 
counties or minorities. This leads us to the conclusion that there is no proper channel 
of information between the scientifi c sphere and civil or political actors.
In summary, it worth emphasizing that the above examined international treaties 
have a key role to the region’s stability. Developing rational linguistic policies are still 
the strongest supporters of maintaining peaceful coexistence of diff erent languages 
and communities in the CEE region.
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1. Background
The case was about a 12 years old boy, Gurbaj Singh Multani who attended a school 
in Quebec, Canada. He and his father Balvar Singh Multani are orthodox Sikhs, so 
the boy believed that his religion required him to wear a kirpan1 at all times.
The case started in 2001, when Gurbaj accidentally dropped the kirpan he was 
wearing under his clothes in the yard of the school he was attending. The school 
board – as a kind of fi rst instance – sent his parents a letter in which, as reasonable 
accommodation, it authorized their son to wear his kirpan with certain conditions 
to ensure that it was sealed inside his clothing. Gurbaj and his parents agreed to this 
arrangement. 
The governing board of the school refused to ratify the agreement on the basis 
that wearing a kirpan at the school violated art. 5 of the school’s Code de vie (code 
of conduct) which prohibited the carrying of weapons. The school board’s council 
of commissioners upheld this decision and told Gurbaj and his parents that he could 
wear a symbolic kirpan in the form of a pendant or one made of a material which is 
harmless. 
The father fi led in the Superior Court a motion for a declaratory judgment to 
the eff ect that the council of commissioners’ decision was of no force or eff ect. The 
Superior Court granted the motion (2002), declared the decision to be null, and 
authorized Gurbaj to wear his kirpan under certain conditions.2 The Superior Court 
*   Junior assistant researcher.
1   A kirpan is a religious object that resembles a dagger and must be made of metal. So actually it can be 
seen as a kind of a weapon.
2   These conditions are the following:
 – that the kirpan be worn under his clothes;
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noted that the need to wear a kirpan was based on a sincere religious belief held 
by Gurbaj Singh and that there was no evidence of any violent incidents involving 
kirpans in Quebec schools.
The next instance, the Court of Appeal set aside the Superior Court’s judgment 
and restored the council of commissioner’s decision (2004). The judge also concluded 
that the decision in question infringed Gurbaj’s freedom of religion, but held that the 
infringement was justifi ed for the purposes of s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms3 and s. 9.1 of Quebec’s Charter of human rights and freedoms4. The 
judge considered that the council of commissioners’ decision was motivated by a 
pressing and substantial objective: to ensure the safety of the school’s students and 
staff . There was a direct and rational connection between the prohibition against 
wearing a kirpan to school and the objective of maintaining a safe environment. 
According to the decision, the kirpan was a dangerous object, and the concerns of 
the school board were not merely hypothetical. Allowing it to be worn, even under 
certain conditions, would have obliged the school board to reduce its safety standards 
and would have resulted in undue hardship. The judge stated that she was unable to 
convince herself that safety concerns were less serious in schools than in courts of 
law or in airplanes.
2.The decision of the Supreme Court
In the procedure of the Supreme Court, the main question of the dispute was the 
compliance of the commissioners’ decision with the requirements of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, especially the requirement of freedom of religion.
Because the council of commissioners’ decision was an administrative law 
decision based on legislation (Code de vie), the standard of review could have 
been the standard of reasonableness (which was applied by the Court of Appeal) 
but the Court applied the principles of constitutional justifi cation and held the 
administrative law standard of review as not relevant. Deschamps and Abella JJ 
– that the kirpan be carried in a sheath made of wood, not metal, to prevent it from causing injury;
– that the kirpan be placed in its sheath and wrapped and sewn securely in a sturdy cloth envelope, 
and that this envelope be sewn to the guthra; 
– that school personnel be authorized to verify, in a reasonable fashion, that these conditions were 
being complied with;
– that the petitioner be required to keep the kirpan in his possession at all times, and that its 
disappearance be reported to school authorities immediately; and 
– that in the event of a failure to comply with the terms of the judgment, the petitioner would 
defi nitively lose the right to wear his kirpan at school.
3   “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it 
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justifi ed in a free and 
democratic society.”
4   “In exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper regard for 
democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of Québec. In this respect, 
the scope of the freedoms and rights, and limits to their exercise, may be fi xed by law.”
75Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys…
who wrote concurring reasons to the decision of the Supreme Court argued that the 
Court should address the issue of justifi cation under s. 1 if the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms only where a complainant is attempting to overturn a 
normative rule as opposed to a decision applying that rule and not on the decision 
itself but this argument was rejected. One argument was to avoid the dissolving of 
constitutional law standards into administrative law standards. Another one was that 
judicial review may involve a constitutional law component and an administrative 
law component and the administrative law standard of review is not applicable to the 
constitutional component of judicial review. The main question was the compliance 
of the commissioners’ decision with the requirements of the Canadian Charter and 
not the decision’s validity from the point of view of administrative law.
A s. 1. analysis can be used when there is a confl ict of fundamental rights but in 
this case, the Court did not at the outset had to reconcile two constitutional rights, 
as only freedom of religion was in issue as a fundamental right and on the other side 
there were the safety concerns. Even like this, the Court held that s. 1. analysis was 
the most appropriate one to decide this case. According to this the infringement is 
reasonable and can be demonstrably justifi ed in a free and democratic society if 
the legislative objective is suffi  ciently important to warrant limiting a constitutional 
right and the means chosen by the state authority is proportional to the objective 
in question. The proportionality analysis has three stages: it must be considered 
whether the decision has a rational connection with the objective, the infringement 
can be justifi ed (minimal impairment test) and the deleterious and salutary eff ects 
must also be measured.
The Court stated that freedom of religion was not an absolute right, it had internal 
limits and it could be limited when a person’s freedom to act in accordance with his or 
her beliefs may cause harm to or interfere with the rights of others. Nevertheless, the 
interference with Gurbaj’s freedom of religion was neither trivial nor insignifi cant, 
as it had deprived him of his right to attend a public school.  The infringement of 
Gurbaj’s freedom of religion could not be justifi ed under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms. Although the council’s decision to prohibit the wearing of a 
kirpan was motivated by a pressing and substantial objective (to ensure a reasonable 
level of safety at the school), and although the decision had a rational connection 
with the objective, it has not been shown that such a prohibition minimally impairs 
Gurbaj’s rights. The absolute prohibition against wearing a kirpan did not fall within 
a range of reasonable alternatives. The risk of Gurbaj using his kirpan for violent 
purposes or of another student taking it away from him was very low, especially if 
the kirpan was worn under conditions such as were imposed by the Superior Court. 
The Court also stated that Gurbaj had never claimed a right to wear his kirpan to 
school without restrictions and there were many objects in schools that could be used 
to commit violent acts and that were much more easily obtained by students, such 
as scissors, pencils and baseball bats. The evidence also revealed that not a single 
violent incident related to the presence of kirpans in schools had been reported. 
Although it was not necessary to wait for harm to be done before acting, the existence 
of concerns relating to safety must be unequivocally established for the infringement 
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of a constitutional right to be justifi ed.  Nor did the evidence support the argument 
that allowing Gurbaj to wear his kirpan to school could have a ripple eff ect.  
Lastly, the argument that the wearing of kirpans should be prohibited because 
the kirpan is a symbol of violence and because it sends the message that using force 
is necessary to assert rights and resolve confl ict was not only contradicted by the 
evidence regarding the symbolic nature of the kirpan, but was also disrespectful to 
believers in the Sikh religion and did not take into account Canadian values based 
on multiculturalism. Religious tolerance was a very important value of Canadian 
society, the very foundation of the Canadian democracy. 
A total prohibition against wearing a kirpan to school undermined the value of 
this religious symbol and sent students the message that some religious practices 
did not merit the same protection as others. Accommodating Gurbaj and allowing 
him to wear his kirpan under certain conditions demonstrated the importance that 
the Canadian society attached to protecting freedom of religion and showed respect 
for its minorities. The deleterious eff ects of a total prohibition thus outweighed its 
salutary eff ects.  
3.Outcomes
Prior to Multani, the approach of the courts to judicial review of Charter questions 
was inconstant but this case established a rigorous test: an impugned administrative 
decision that aff ects Charter rights must be held to the same standard as is a law that 
aff ects Charter rights. However, this approach was short-lived. A new framework for 
analysis was established in Doré v Barreau du Québec (2012).5 In this decision, the 
Court cited the critical academic commentary of Multani which generally argued 
that the use of a strict s. 1. analysis reduced administrative law to having a formal role 
in controlling the exercise of discretion. Instead of this, Doré suggests that judges 
should respect the perspectives of administrative offi  cials and reasonableness review 
shifts the focus to asking whether an administrative offi  cial has provided an adequate 
justifi cation for the outcome.6
In Multani, the Court referred the Canadian values based on multiculturalism which 
has been translated into legal principle by s. 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
5   Alexander P : Judicial Review and the Charter from Multani to Doré. Working Paper Series, 
University of Ottawa, November 2013. 4–5. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_
id=2362924 With Doré, the standard of review for an administrative tribunal’s decision is 
“reasonableness”. According to the decision, “when applying Charter values in the exercise of 
statutory discretion, an administrative decision-maker must balance Charter values with the 
statutory objectives by asking how the Charter value at issue will best be protected in light of those 
objectives.  This is at the core of the proportionality exercise, and requires the decision-maker to 
balance the severity of the interference of the Charter protection with the statutory objectives”.
6   Matthew L : Administrative Law, Judicial Deference, and the Charter. Constitutional Forum 
constitutionnel, Volume 23, Number 2, 2014. 19–32., especially 28. https://ejournals.library.ualberta.
ca/index.php/constitutional_forum/article/viewFile/21938/16372 
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and Freedoms, although did not give legal aff ect to the term.7 Still, this case is an 
important part of understanding multiculturalism in Canada which contains a broad 
range of policies and programs adopted by governments in response to diversity. One 
of the tools used by multiculturalism is the policy of exempting minorities from the 
application of certain rules and regulations, like from rules banning the carrying of 
dangerous weapons in public. These exemptions are typically justifi ed on the grounds 
that the law disproportionately impacts individuals because their religious or cultural 
affi  liations.8 In Multani, the core question was the possibility of exemption from 
safety rules: the appellate court privileged the fears of non-Sikh students and staff  
above the religious beliefs of orthodox Sikhs, implying that those fears were more 
empirical than religious belief, even when assessed primarily in terms of perception 
rather than actual fact, the Supreme Court however, rejected the argument that the 
kirpan posed a threat to school safety, especially when sheathed, and concluded that 
prohibiting the kirpan from school premises excessively infringed Gurbaj’s religious 
rights. The Court privileged a particular cultural sensibility as rightfully dominant. 
With this, it emphasized tolerance and pluralism as core Canadian values that school 
boards have an obligation to promote.9
The Multani case was also part of the unfolding “reasonable accommodation” 
debate in Canada: not much time after the decision some commentators have pointed 
this debate as evidence of growing polarization. People, the media and political 
parties were talking about “excessive” accommodations of minorities, they called for 
a new, tougher approach to immigrants and minorities.10 After the Multani decision, 
94 percent of French-speaking Quebeckers and 79 percent of non-French speaking 
Quebeckers were opposed. The people were disappointed because the leading judge 
of the decision, Justice Louise Charron was a Franco-Ontarian but she took a position 
in favour of Canadian values based on multiculturalism and religious tolerance (as a 
7   Joan S : Multiculturalism, Equality, and Canadian Constitutionalism. In: Stephen T  (ed.): 
Multiculturalism and the Canadian Constitution. Toronto, UBC Press Vancouver, 2007. 196–211., 
especially 208. According to s. 27 the Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the 
preservation and enhancement of multicultural heritage of Canadians. S. 27 states rather a value than 
a binding rule, it is in most cases ignored by the Court, if it has some role, it is in the interpretation 
of s. 15 (equality guarantee) which must be interpreted so as to accommodate distinctions that are 
permitted by s. 27. S  op. cit. 198., 200.
8   Michael M : Multiculturalism: A Critical Introduction. Abingdon, Routledge, 2012. 39. 
However, there is a disagreement in the academics over whether exemptions support or undermine 
the principle of equality. Some think that exemptions can be justifi ed as a means of according equal 
consideration and respect to the identity-related diff erences of individuals from minority background. 
Others think that just because a rule has a disproportionate impact for some people, the rule itself is 
not unfair and an exemption must not be granted, rather the disadvantage created by the law and the 
purpose of the law must be weighed and sometimes the legitimacy of the law should be questioned 
rather than granting an exemption. M  op. cit. 40–41.
9   Valerie S : Zero Tolerance? Sikh Swords, School Safety, and Secularism in Québec. Journal of 
the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 75, Issue 4, Dec. 2007. 814–839., especially 835.
10  The Current State of Multiculturalism in Canada and Research Themes on Canadian Multiculturalism 
2008–2010.  http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/multi-state.pdf 16.
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core element of multiculturalism) as the very foundation of the Canadian democracy. 
Gurbaj as a boy, was kept from school for fi ve months over his wearing of a kirpan. 
Then he won the right at Quebec Superior Court, so he returned to his public school 
and got shouted at by 300 people – some told him “Go home, Paki”. He gave an 
interview in 2013, when he considered leaving Quebec. There was a proposed bill, 
the Quebec Charter of Values, trying to end the Quebec controversy on reasonable 
accommodation. The Charter would have banned the wearing of conspicuous 
religious symbols in the public-sector workforce and Gurbaj Multani was wearing 
not only a kirpan but also a turban.11 In the end, the bill died as of the 2014 elections.
After the decision, a few years later, a research program was launched, focused 
on diversity and education, the outcomes were published in 2014. One of the core 
question was, how the elementary school students in New Brunswick might respond 
to the case that was before the Supreme Court. The result was surprising. Most of 
the students didn’t know the labels “turban” or “hijab”. None of them could name 
the religion that might require these as part of its followers’ adherence to their faith. 
Instead, they suggested that perhaps the boy wearing the turban was having a bad 
hair day and just didn’t want to show his hair. They didn’t know what a kirpan was 
and ideas about safety trumped any right to wear a kirpan, even if the kirpan itself 
was perfectly safe. For the students, diversity was something that was foreign. 
The students really saw no reason to accommodate diff erence because they didn’t 
understand what it was. Most of the students simply didn’t understand that a turban 
is not just a hat, that in some religions, material expressions of one’s religious faith 
are an integral part of one’s identity. Although learning outcomes related to diversity 
were key components of the New Brunswick social studies curriculum, so they 
were learning about it in school. The author (Associate Professor of Social Studies 
Education in the Department of Elementary Education at the University of Alberta) 
fortunately also found some good points: although the students did not demonstrate 
an understanding for reasonable accommodation, they were not hostile to the idea, 
their minds were open, they were willing to discuss it and some even tried to come 
up with possible solutions.12
11  https://goo.gl/YLG7k6 
12  Carla L. P : Hope for Canadian Multiculturalism. http://www.cea-ace.ca/education-canada/
article/hope-canadian-multiculturalism 
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ON ADMINISTRATIVE COURT PROCEDURES
As a framework for the justiciability of educational rights
Krisztina F. R *
Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest
1. Introduction
1.1. Educational rights and administrative court procedures
Though principally adherent to the sphere of constitutional law, the justiciability 
of educational rights is closely connected to administrative court procedures. 
Administrative law is applied constitutional law – as the German dictum puts it1. 
Thus, it is important to search for the right procedural framework for the enforcement 
of educational rights and other basic rights. This was also an important perspective 
of the preparatory work and the codifi cation process of the recently enacted Code on 
Administrative Court Procedure. This article aims at highlighting those features of 
the Code, which are connected with the questions of the justiciability of educational 
rights through administrative court procedures and to give insights to the dilemmas 
arising in the codifi cation process. These main features, which are able to bring 
modifi cations to the present system of remedies, are the scope of judicial protection, 
the standing, the actions granted by law and the respondent decisions of courts, as 
well as the special procedures against the omissions of administrative bodies. To 
highlight the changes, the present situation will also be presented shortly.
*   Associate professor.
1   Formulated by Fritz W : Verwaltungsrecht als konkretisiertes Verfassungsrecht. Deutsches 
Verwaltungsblatt, 1959. 527.; and frequently used by German scholars, cf. Eberhard S -
A : Das allgemeine Verwaltungsrecht als Ordnungsidee. Berlin–Heidelberg, Springer, 
22006. 10.; or Rainer P : Neues Verwaltungsrecht im refl exiven sozialen Rechtsstaat. Annales 
Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös Nominatae. Sectio Iuridica, Vol. LIV., 
2013. 34.
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1.2. The long way to the Hungarian Code on Administrative Court Procedure
After the Communist takeover, administrative jurisdiction was abolished in 1949 
according to the principles of the unity of power and the unity of the judiciary. In some 
– very few – administrative matters, however, the possibility of access to ordinary 
courts remained: the Administrative Procedure Act allowed for judicial review in 
fi ve categories of cases, but which were of marginal importance. The administrative 
court procedure was then regarded as a special type of administrative procedure and 
therefore governed by the Administrative Procedure Act. It was only in 1972 that 
Chapter XX. entitled ‘Review of administrative decisions’ was inserted into the Code 
of Civil Procedure (CCP). Thus, the administrative court procedure was conceived as 
a special civil process and therefore fell within the jurisdiction of civil justice.
In December 1990, the Constitutional Court found the enumerative regulation 
of the administrative acts which can be brought before court unconstitutional, and 
smashed the rules regulating access to court, and obliged Parliament to fi nd a lawful 
solution by 31 March 1991.2 As these three months didn’t allow for suffi  cient time 
for in-depth preparation, the law 1991: XXVI. on the extension of access to court 
in administrative matters was enacted to provisionally grant access to court against 
authoritative administrative decisions in general. The extension included certain 
further decisions by local self-government bodies and also created the possibility 
for special regulations opening access to justice in other administrative decisions. 
These latter two categories are important in respect of educational rights, as the local 
self-government were at that time responsible for the provision of educational public 
services, thus the maintenance of schools. The head of the territorial government 
offi  ce could bring annulment actions against the decisions of local government as a 
maintaining organ. With the other extension, the Public Education Act opened access 
to court against the most signifi cant school decisions causing unlawful harm: after 
fi ling an appeal to the maintaining organization of the school, the judicial review of 
the appellate decision was made possible.3 
The new constitution, enacted in 2011, the Basic Law of Hungary allowed in Article 
25 for certain ‘groups of aff airs’ – in particular for administrative and for labour 
disputes – the creation of specialized courts.4 But instead of setting up independent 
administrative courts, the legislator simply created so called ‘administrative and 
labour courts’, which meant, that the administrative judges were transferred from 
ordinary courts to the already existent labour courts, which are situated at the lowest 
level of the judiciary.5 No changes were made to the administrative court procedure 
at that time. In the beginning of 2015, the Hungarian government adopted the concept 
2   Decision Nr. 32/1990. (XII. 21.) AB of the Constitutional Court. 
3   §§ 37–40 of the Public Education Act.
4   On the changes of the constitutional framework of legal protection against administration cf. Krisztina 
R : Änderungen im System des Verwaltungsrechtsschutzes in Ungarn. Die Öff entliche 
Verwaltung, vol. 65, 2013/9. 335–342.
5   The administrative and labour courts started to function on 1st of January 2013.
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of the codifi cation of the new CCP. It was at this point, that it also decided not to 
regulate administrative court procedures as a special civil procedure. The minister of 
justice was ordered to start codifi cation work in respect of the rules of administrative 
court procedures. The concept for the codifi cation was adopted in May 2015 by the 
government and subsequently, the draft of the Code was presented to the public on 31 
March. The draft law was passed at the end of September to the Parliament.6
The codifi cation work was centered around the principle of eff ective judicial 
protection. Four directions of eff ectivity have been identifi ed: on the one hand, 
the granting of subjective legal protection complemented by elements of objective 
control of legality, on the other hand the granting of seamless judicial protection, 
against all forms of administrative action, thirdly the eff ectivity in time, and fourth 
the eff ectivity as regards the procedural equality of arms.
2. Main features of the administrative court procedure connected to the 
justiciability of educational rights
2.1. Widening the scope of judicial protection 
As we can see, at present, judicial protection is ensured generally only against 
concrete authoritative decisions of authorities brought in administrative procedures. 
Of course, time has already proven that not all administrative court procedures fi t 
into this framework, which resulted in the creation of special procedures, like the 
so-called ‘non-contentious administrative judicial procedures’, which can be fi led 
against omissions in administrative procedures of administrative authorities and 
some procedural decisions, like the decision of stay of an administrative procedure 
or its ending without deciding on the merits. This led to a fragmentation of the rules 
on administrative court procedures. There are at present numerous special rules that 
widen the scope of judicial protection. To mention only the Public Education Act, 
administrative courts review the decisions of the maintaining organ of the school 
concerning unlawful acts of the school. The decisions of local self governments 
(still responsible for some public services in the fi eld of education, like education in 
kindergartens) can be sued by the county government offi  ce which is responsible for 
the supervision of local governments. 
According to the new Code, all administrative activity of administrative organs, 
which is regulated by administrative law, can be reviewed by court. Activity is the 
action and the omission of action which is aimed at producing or factually produces 
legal consequences, i.e. changes the legal situation of a person. Thus, it does not 
matter anymore, if the concrete action of an administrative organ was governed 
by the Act on Administrative Procedures, neither if it was an authority or an 
6   The Parliament enacted the code on 6th December, but the President of State referred it to the 
Constitutional Court because of some elements of the regulation of the competence of courts. After 
the decision of the Constitutional Court, the draft was altered accordingly and enacted on 20 February 
2017.
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administrative organ without exercising authoritative powers. By this change, the 
activity of administrative organs in the fi eld of service provision can also be subject 
to review by administrative courts. In the fi eld of service provision, administrative 
organs exercise numerous activities which can be deemed as administrative activity 
governed by administrative law, either in connection with the maintenance of 
institutions providing public services, like public education, or in connection with 
administrative contracts by which administrative organs organize (mostly by 
outsourcing) the provision of public services. In both cases, there will be numerous 
decisions or omissions, which alter the legal situation of individuals. 
During the codifi cation process questions arose whether the activity of public 
service providers, (and this way also schools and other institutions providing 
educational public services) should be directly susceptible to judicial review. But it 
seemed to be more appropriate to fi rst give the maintaining organ the possibility for 
review, as most disputes can be solved this way more easily. Also, this would have 
given rise to quite many conceptual questions connected to the basic questions of 
the notion of public service, which would have placed the Hungarian judiciary and 
legislation under too heavy pressure. 
Another important direction of the widening of the scope of judicial protection 
is the reviewability of the normative acts of non-legislative nature issued by 
administrative organizations. It is not hard to convey that these acts issued by the 
maintaining organization regulating the functioning of public institutions providing 
public services can also have strong impact on the position of users of public 
services. School rules for example can contain rules which are in connection with 
the acceptability of education. These normative regulations, which are not legislative 
instruments, can – according to the rules of the Code – be brought before court 
in connection with individual acts, which apply these regulations. This ensures the 
seamlessness of judicial protection. Of course, this will not make void the functioning 
of ombudsmen, as there are numerous situations where there are no individual acts 
fl owing from these regulations or they do not directly infringe rights or legal interests. 
This possibility can also in the long run foster the creation of rules of norm setting of 
administrative organs, like the rules contained in the model rules of ReNEUAL7 or 
in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 of the United States.8
2.2. Standing
The other crucial element of justiciability in general is the question of standing: who 
is allowed to ask for review, who can bring his plea before court? In this respect, 
the Code makes the rules concerning authoritative decisions to a fully general rule: 
7   The ReNEUAL Model Rules on EU Administrative Procedure, Book II., at http://www.reneual.eu/
8   For a comparison of the two sets of rules cf. Anna F : Administrative Rule-Making based 
on the ReNEUAL Model Rules. In: Balázs G  – Lilla B  – András Zs. V  (eds.): 
Current Issues of the National and EU Administrative Procedures (the ReNEUAL Model Rules). 
Budapest, Pázmány Press, 2015. 441–446. 
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Any person who invokes an immediate infringement of his or her right or legitimate 
interest, can fi le an action for review. Besides this group, public bodies invoking 
an infringement within their area of responsibility also have standing, as well as 
authorities supervising autonomous organizations (like local governments, minority 
councils or professional self-regulating bodies, chambers)9. The law may also grant 
standing to civil organizations defending common interests or human rights. Latter 
possibility has a growing importance in relation to collective litigation, in respect 
of administrative court procedures mostly in cases of environmental protection and 
consumer protection10, but could also be a forceful instrument for the enforcement 
of educational rights.11 The Code thus gives a general possibility to grant standing to 
civil organizations, but the legislator of the special fi eld – in this case responsible for 
education – has to gauge this possibility. 
A question highly connected to standing is the possibility of taking part in 
administrative court procedures by third parties. Those persons and organizations 
who have standing, also have the possibility to take part as third parties in 
administrative court procedures. They enjoy almost the same rights as the parties, 
with exception of the withdrawal of the action.
3. Actions ad decisions
3.1. Types of action
The widening of access to courts through this general formulation of administrative 
activity needs several types of actions, as the traditional annulment action against 
decisions is not able to cover all sorts of pleas. The mandatory action makes it possible 
to ask the court to order the administration to perform, or to refrain from performing, 
for example in relations in connection with administrative contracts. A very 
important part of unlawfulness of administration resorts from the non-fulfi llment of 
positive obligations posed on administrative organs. The Code will thus also provide 
for an action against omission. And of course, there are also situations, where we 
face factual deeds which cannot be annulled, but only deemed unlawful. For these 
cases, the Code makes possible for the court to pronounce a declaratory decision, 
given that an other type of decision could be brought. Of course, the plaintiff  has to 
prove that he has a special interest in having the court declare an activity unlawful. 
The declaration of the unlawfulness of the custodial disposition of the police by 
9   Cf. István H : The Legal Status of the Procedure of Legal Supervision of the Hungarian Local 
Governments: An International and Historical Outlook. In: G –B –V  (2015) op. 
cit. 373–384.
10  Cf. Krisztina R : Public Participation In Administrative Procedures: Possibilities And Recent 
Developments In Hungary. Curentul Juridic, vol. 58., no. 3. (2014) 50–66.
11  At least this is a possible interference from the civil court procedures led by civil organisations against 
ethnic segregation in Hungary, e.g. the case underlying EBH 2015. P.6. of the Curia (April 22, 2015), 
or Case Horvath and Kiss v. Hungary, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2013:0129JUD001114611. 
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the administrative court for example will be a precondition for fi ling an action for 
compensation. 
The diversifi cation of the types of actions necessitates the diversifi cation of 
procedural rules: the Code is therefore divided into a general part containing the 
general rules on courts and on the procedure of the fi rst instance court, on its 
decisions, on the rules of remedies, with view to annulment actions. These general 
rules are followed by rules on the special procedures before administrative courts, 
among which we can fi nd the mandatory procedure, the omission procedure or the 
procedures for the execution of court decisions. 
3.2. Decisions
The types of decisions correspond to the types of actions, of course: there are annulment 
decisions, mandatory decisions, omission judgements and declaratory judgements, 
and of course some types of judgements corresponding to special procedures. As 
a new fi eld, the judgments in connection with administrative contracts will get a 
systematic regulation. As there are no general substantive rules on administrative 
contracts, this may lead to the evolvement of such substantive rules, which would 
be very important pertaining service provision contracts. These are very often used 
in the fi eld of education, because – as a counter-tendency to the nationalization of 
educational public service provision, i.e. transferring responsibilities from local 
governments to the central government12 – churches and minority self-government 
organs take over more and more schools. 
In the fi eld of annulment decisions, the court can either annul or reform the decision 
of the administration if it is found unlawful. Borders of these possibilities constitute 
on one hand the procedural errors that did not have an eff ect on the merits of the case, 
and on the other hand decisions implying a margin of appreciation. In latter cases, 
the court can only review the compliance by the administrative authority with the 
limits and objective of the power, and with other rules which govern the exercise 
of discretion exercise of powers, as well as the procedural aspects of the decision 
making process, but does not conduct a separate assessment of the expediency of 
a discretionary decision. The possibility to reform administrative decisions (i.e. to 
remove the contested decision and decide the merits of the case) is not a new feature, 
but as long as at present the court can only reform decisions if it is given reformatory 
powers by the special legislator, according to the rules of the Code this will be a 
general possibility of the court, if the nature of the case makes this possible and the 
facts of the case are clear and all relevant data is available for the decision. The nature 
of the case only allows reformation, if the court does not engage by it in an exercise 
of the discretionary power in the place of the administrative authority. Reformatory 
powers can help ending administrative disputes in reasonable time, as in lots of cases 
12  Cf. István H  – János F  – Krisztina R : Concentrating or Centralising Public 
Services? The Changing Roles of the Hungarian Inter-municipal Associations in the last Decades. 
Lex localis – Journal of Local Self-Government, vol. 14., no. 3. (2016) 461–467.
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the removal of the contested administrative act and the new procedure would cause 
harm to the plaintiff  through the time still needed to get a new fi nal decision in his 
case. 
3.3. Interim relief
Of course, the dimension of time of judicial protection is also very important. If the 
court can only grant protection with its fi nal decisions that will in numerous cases 
– in the fi eld of education this is extremely true – be not eff ective. As Rec(2004)20 
formulates this in connection with the eff ectiveness of judicial protection: “The 
tribunal should be competent to grant provisional measures of protection pending the 
outcome of the proceedings.”13 It is thus very important to give the court suffi  cient 
means to stop administrative action in advance of the judgment. The Code sets 
forth a set of tools of interim relief. At the one hand, the court can give suspensory 
eff ect to the administrative action, which cannot be performed until the judgement 
is delivered. This is presently also available in a narrower form, as the setting out of 
the execution of administrative decisions. As the fi ling of an action does not have an 
automatic suspensory eff ect, this is a very important tool. As in educational cases 
the suspensory eff ect of the fi ling of an action is often granted by law, in this fi eld, 
the inverse tool of the court to lift the suspensory eff ect of the fi ling of the action 
will be used also quite often. There are of course cases, where the mere prohibition 
of acting will not provide for eff ective protection. The judge has therefore also the 
possibility to order interim measures, in the scope of the judgement, like for example 
making a public service he was denied access to by the administration available to 
the plaintiff  for the duration of the procedure. The taking of evidence in advance is 
the tool completing the system. When deciding on granting interim relief, the judge 
has to ponder periculum in mora and strike a fair balance between private and public 
interests.
4. Omissions of administrative bodies
4.1. The scope of omission procedures
The omission procedure will hopefully be an apt instrument in issues connected with 
positive obligations fl owing from the right to education. An omission is the absence 
of the performance of an action prescribed by law, which can be sued before courts 
in an omission procedure. The court only pronounces that there is an obligation 
prescribed by law, which the administrative organ responsible for it did not come 
after. According to the rules of the Code, the administrative organ is obliged in this 
case to carry out the action by law. As the Code makes suable the duties not only of 
13  Recommendation Rec (2004)20 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member 
states on judicial review of administrative acts (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 15 
December 2004 at the 909th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). 
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authoritative action, but also of service provision, there was need for a diff erentiated 
regulation of the omission decision of the court. Against omissions in administrative 
authoritative procedures, i.e. the omission of issuing an authoritative decision (mostly 
permits), the above-mentioned non-contentious administrative court procedures are 
already a functioning means. Other types of obligations, in connection for example 
with service provision, today are almost not enforceable. Only the local government 
offi  ce responsible for the legal supervision of local governments can bring omissions 
outside authoritative procedures before court at present. The code will guarantee 
access to justice also against all types of omissions for all persons and organization 
with standing. As this fi eld is a very large one, with diff erent types of obligations, 
varying in their conditionality or fi nality, the Code had to strike a balance to ensure 
access to courts and the non-engulfment of courts, which would render access to 
court practically ineff ective. It thus diff erentiates among omissions according to 
the criteria, whether there is a time limit given by law for the performance of an 
obligation: in former, there are mainly the authoritative decisions and decisions in 
internal appellate procedures. Obligations outside of this area seldom are bound to 
a time limit. In these cases, the court has a margin of appreciation: if there is no 
overriding reason relating to the public interest or to the interests of the plaintiff , no 
omission has to be stated. 
4.2. Enforcement of omission decisions
Another important fi eld of the non-fulfi llment of positive obligations is that of 
the non-execution of judicial decisions. There are two types of judicial decisions, 
where court enforcement mechanisms do not work: these are the judgements 
ordering the repeating of procedures and the omission judgements, according to 
which the administrative organ has to fulfi ll the obligations stated to be omitted 
by court. At present, there are only tools for protection against such omissions in 
the fi eld of judicial decisions ordering the reiteration of authoritative procedures, 
but these are lengthy and complicated procedures. According to the new rules, the 
court will have several possibilities, if the plaintiff  signalizes the non-fulfi llment 
of its judgment. After asking for clarifi cation from the administrative organ, if the 
clarifi cation is not satisfactory, the court can impose a fi ne on the administration. 
The fi ne is not the unique tool for achieving the fulfi llment: the court may also order 
another administrative organ or – according to the type of omission, of course – 
the supervisory authority to perform the duty in replacement. If these tools are not 
possible, the courts can order provisional measures until the administrative organ 
fulfi lls its obligations fl owing from the judgement. In case of a repetitive omission, 
the fi ning of the leader of the administrative organ is also possible, which is deemed 
to be an eff ective measure against obstruction of administration in cases where the 
other tools in the hand of the judge do not work.
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5. Closing remarks
By enhancing the eff ectiveness of judicial protection against administration, the 
Code will provide a good framework for a strong judicial review. The general rule of 
access to court, the diff erentiated system of actions and decisions form a system that 
fosters autonomy of judges and the broadening of the horizon of their judicial work. 
The aspects of human rights will be able to appear more frequently, and this will 
hopefully lead to a systematic case law which has more and more links to constitutional 
case law and will also foster the dialogue between administrative courts and the 
constitutional court. The judiciary will have an important role of interpreting the 
rules of the Code in accordance with its aim to guarantee eff ective judicial protection 
and to exercise substantive control of legality over the administration enforcing both 
its negative and positive obligations. As there are numerous new institutions and 
rules regarding judicial review, it will be a great and important challenge to interpret 
the new rules autonomously, proactively not allowing the present case law to hinder 
the improvements envisaged by the Court. 
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 ONE MILLION ASYLUM SEEKERS IN GERMANY (2015/16) 
The Role of the Civil Society in their Education and Training
 Ingo R
President of Irmgard Coninx Foundation)
1. Introduction
In the fi rst days of September 2015, approximately 3,000 refugees were stranded here 
in Budapest at the railway station waiting for the chance to get to Austria or Germany. 
The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, made a lonely decision, to let them in. She 
decided to admit them into Germany and have them registered. Although, according 
to the Dublin regulations of the EU, the registration had to be done here in Hungary, 
or elsewhere, prior to entering the EU.
We all know what happened next: The decision of Chancellor Merkel was 
understood as an invitation to come to Germany. In the Balkans, in Syria, in the 
other Arabic states and in North Africa, they believed they would be welcomed in 
Germany. Meanwhile, the hauler gangs made them believe this too and profi ted 
from it. From September 2015 to August 2016, more than 1 million people arrived in 
Germany and asked for asylum or recognition as a refugee of war. 
They were there and had to be registered, fed, housed, cared for, distributed, 
transported, etc., and their applications for asylum had to be processed. Nobody was 
prepared for that. And then, Frau Merkel made the famous statement: “Wir schaff en 
das” – “We will manage.”
The famous and eff ective German administration was not prepared to manage 
this, and without the massive intervention of the German Civil Society organizations, 
the problem would not have been solved. 
As we talk here about the role of the Civil Society for the awareness, advocacy and 
accountability of the Right to Education, I will report about the German experience 
in the refugee crisis last year.
Let me begin with some personal experiences in Berlin, where I live. Here are 
some snap shots:
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1. Our son, a journalist, lives with his family – three little daughters – in 
downtown Berlin. In the fi rst days of September, when the refugees 
arrived, they had to wait for hours in long lines to get registered. So, where 
were they to sleep? Neighbours were asked to give them a bed for a night. 
My son and his family did. Twice, late at night, after midnight, some tired 
young refugees came, had some food, and slept on mattresses for a couple 
of hours before they left to cue up again.
2. Our neighbour, a professor of education, some 100 kilos of weight, put 
together some of his old suits and coats and brought them to the clothing 
store for refugees. But, the mostly young refugees, were too slender for 
those clothes.
3. A friend of ours, a member of the green party, who organized the help for 
refugees in Berlin, asked for 200 lunch boxes and some skateboards for 
the kids. So, we bought 200 plastic lunch boxes for 1€ each and some used 
skateboards and brought them to the school for refugees.
4. Another friend, a former teacher, had taught a course “German for 
Foreigners” to American students at the university for many years. She 
wanted to teach German to the refugees at a school for adults where 
there was an urgent demand for teachers. But, she was not hired by the 
administration who admitted only those teachers who completed a three-
week special training for adult language learning in Würzburg.
5. My wife and I wanted to “adopt” – so to speak – a family with children in 
order to help them to get through the registration process. No, such kind of 
so called “adoption” or “sponsorship” was allowed by law. This could only 
be done informally.
6. There was the case of another friend who runs a small factory for marmalade 
production in the countryside. She employs 25 seasonal workers from 
Poland. Last autumn, she asked 25 asylum seekers in a nearby home to 
help her. The mayor refused because they had no working permit. She just 
said: “I don’t care.”
7. Another woman, in the South German countryside, where unemployment 
is very low, managed to fi nd jobs for 19 refugees who lived in a nearby 
shelter. These refuges had nothing to do. She just called employers again 
and again until they resigned and employed everybody. The last one, a 
30 year old computer engineer from Nigeria, a Muslim, took a job as an 
apprentice with a butcher where he produces pork sausages. 
8. I, myself, tried to become a legal guardian for a couple of unaccompanied 
young refugees who could not ask for asylum themselves because they 
were minors. Although, I am a law professor who has taught family law for 
years, I was not permitted to without a special training for legal guardians, 
and the money for that training had run out.
I could go on with these kind of stories for hours, but I will not. They show 
that the German Civil Society was, in fact, able to create a friendly climate, a 
“Willkommenskultur” as we call it, to welcome more than one million refugees in 
91One Million Asylum Seekers in Germany (2015/16)
only one year. It was a challenge and nobody thought that the German Civil Society 
would be able to do that. There were some bureaucratic barriers, and there was some 
local resistance too, but fi nally, the Civil Society succeeded and overcame both the 
resistance and the bureaucratic barriers.
Nevertheless, as you will have read in the papers, there were demonstrations 
against the refugees and against Frau Merkel. A new anti-refugee movement was 
founded and it was very successful. A right wing anti-European political party turned 
against the Chancellor’s refugee politics and collected up to 15% of the vote. Asylum 
homes were set on fi re and Neo-Nazi gangs and refugee groups fought in the streets 
at some places. There was a growing security and criminal problem, and, yes, some 
of the refugees turned out to be terrorists sent by the Islamic State. 
The society was split, and nobody knew whether it would become a wound in the 
society which cannot be healed. Only time and integration will heal that wound, and 
integration means education, vocational training and jobs. Therefore, I will now talk 
in a more systematic way on the function of the Civil Society in providing education, 
training and jobs for the refugees. I will follow our usual 3 A – scheme of awareness, 
advocacy and accountability.
2. Awareness of the Civil Society for the right to education of refugees.
Thesis: Within the German Civil Society, there is a high awareness for the fact that 
education and training are absolutely necessary for the integration of the refugees 
into the German society and that this is in the interest of the society, but, even Civil 
Society actors are not aware of the fact that the refugees have a right to education 
and training.
2.1. Information
The information level of the German public on the refugee problem is very high. 
For at least six months, the refugee numbers were top news. And, when Angela 
Merkel came under attack this spring, the refugee problem again was in the news. 
The media ran front stories about demonstrations, about local confl icts over the 
housing of the refugees, and about the sexual assaults on German girls as in Cologne 
on New Year’s Eve. The administration regularly issues the relevant data about the 
arrivals of refugees and the processing of their asylum applications. Big Civil Society 
organizations, like the welfare organizations, distribute information about the so 
called refugee crisis too. One could say that there is even too much information on 
the refugee problem. But, the information is targeted at the social cohesion, at the 
upcoming social confl icts and at the possible consequences for the political system. 
There is no information on the fact that the refugees have a right to education in 
Germany and that this right is guaranteed by international law.
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2.2. Communication
All over Germany last winter, the refugee crisis was the main party talk. Everybody 
gave his or her opinion. The social networks were full of divergent attitudes and, if 
somebody came up with a particular view, whether in favor or not for Frau Merkel ś 
refugee policy, a “shit storm” came over him or her with hundreds and thousands of 
tweets leaving the author completely helpless. Journalists and politicians particularly 
came under attack in the networks. It was a communication of the deaf. Nobody 
listened anymore to what the other had to say. The right of speech does not imply the 
duty to listen. Communication about the right to education and training for refugees 
is therefore absolutely necessary. It must be made clear that the right to education 
under international law is a right and not a privilege granted in the interest of the 
society. Particularly, the lawyers must speak up and explain the international law. 
Therefore, this spring our journal “Youth and Education Law” (Recht der Jugend und 
des Bildungswesens) organized a conference for lawyers and administrators in order 
to facilitate the communication between them on the legal aspects of the refugee 
problems in education.
2.3. Documentation 
The existing information on the refugees and the asylum seekers must be documented. 
Such a documentation can be a source for further information and communication. On 
the internet, you will fi nd a lot of information on asylum laws and on the procedures, 
and it is very complicated to sort them out, even for lawyers like me.  Unfortunately, 
the legal regulations on education and training are not well documented. Although, 
compared to the immigration and asylum laws, they are quite simple. Therefore, we 
will document the papers of the conference which I mentioned above in our journal.
2.4. Institutionalization 
Germany Civil Society is well organized. The freedom of association as in article 
9 I of our constitution guarantees the founding and funding as well as the activities 
of the associations. Therefore, we have a lot of NGOs which articulate private and 
public interests. The rights of the religious associations (art. 4) and of the trade unions 
(art. 9 III) to act as NGOs are protected as well. They all are very active in public life, 
but they do not have standing in court litigation, except for the environmental NGOs. 
And, we have NGOs that particularly fi ght for the rights of migrants and asylum 
seekers, as e.g. a NGO called “Pro Asyl” and others. However, there is no NGO 
which has the right to education and training of refugees as a focus. Therefore, it is 
time to found and fund an NGO under the name of “Refugees´ Right to Education.” 
On the European level, this could be a task for ELA.
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3. Civil Society Advocacy for the Right to Education and Training of Refugees.
Thesis: The right to education as a fundamental right is not laid down in the German 
Constitution, although the constitution can be interpreted in the sense that there is a 
fundamental right to education. As Germany is a federal state, the right to education 
has been granted in the state school laws. The Civil Society should fi ght for the 
Constitutionalization of the right to education as a fundamental right on the federal 
level.
Federal integration law.  In order to cope with the refugee problem this summer – 
that is one year after the beginning of the massive immigration wave – the federal 
parliament passed the new integration law. This does not mention the right to education 
for refugees. As the federation has no say in school education, the integration law 
only regulates labor market problems. It namely asks all refugees to participate in: an 
integration course of approximately 700 hours, 100 hours of general information, 600 
hours German language course that is nearly half a year. In addition, it asks the refugees 
to participate in community work, called “Flüchtlingsintegrationsmaßnahmen” if the 
local communities provide for such work, but education and training are not included 
in this. It also supports the vocational training of apprentices, if the refugees fulfi ll 
the training conditions and fi nd a trainee position (333€ per month) or a one year 
vocational preparation course (310€ per month).
Civil Society organizations must advocate for the implementation of the right to 
education and training on the federal level, particularly for the access of refugees 
to vocational training, and for the additional education and training within the 
community work programs.
3.1. State School Law 
Children under 6 years of age in Germany have the right to preschool education and 
compulsory schooling begins at age 6. According to international law, to go to school 
is a human right, not only for nationals, but also for foreigners beginning the fi rst 
day of their stay in the country. There is no waiting period. Nevertheless, fourteen 
of the German states provide for schooling of refugee children only after six months 
and two states after three months. The reason given is the uncertainty of residence. 
Indeed, it takes a couple of weeks to distribute the refugees in the country and to 
assign permanent homes to them. But, this is no reason to deny the right to education 
to the children. We must realize that thousands of young men, 14 -18 years of age, live 
in camps for six months just doing nothing! Civil Society organizations must insist 
on the fulfi llment of the state obligation to provide for schooling beginning the very 
fi rst day refugees and their children are in the country. (When I was a refugee myself 
from Pomerania to Lower Saxony in the spring of 1945, I had to go to school as a fi rst 
grader during our three-week temporary stay in a Saxonian town which every day 
was bombed by the allied forces.)
After the waiting period, the refugee children have to attend classes which 
euphemistically are called “Welcome Classes.” This means, as long as they do not 
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know enough German to follow the instruction in regular classes, they are segregated 
in order to properly learn German. In Berlin, e.g. there are 530 welcome classes with 
nearly 6,000 children. When they know enough German, these kids should go to the 
regular classes. But, who knows when? And, one can doubt that segregation is better 
for language learning than integration. In these classes, there are refugee children 
from many countries of the world together who do not meet their German counter 
parts, and that is not a good condition for integration. The Civil Society organizations 
should keep an eye on these segregated classes and promote the transfer of the 
children into the regular classes.
3.2. Higher Education Law 
In German constitutional law, there is a right of access to the university which can 
be restricted for qualifi cation reasons and exceptionally also for capacity reasons. 
But, it is the right of equal access, and therefore, this right is also a right of the 
refugees, if they fulfi ll the study requirements. And there is also art. 13 al.2 c of the 
ICESCR which asks the states to make higher education accessible to everybody on 
an equal basis, particularly free of tuition. In Germany, it is up to the universities to 
decide on the access of refugees to the universities. They did so at once last autumn, 
granting the status of the so called “guest students” to the refugees who fulfi lled the 
requirements, and this was done before their applications for asylum were decided 
upon. As guest students, the refugees are entitled to the German study grants. I do 
not have any data on the numbers of guest students and not of the refugees who 
were registered as regular students. The Civil Society organizations, particularly the 
university administration and the students´ unions, should report on this.
3.3. Lobbying 
There are two big NGOs which try to promote the interest in social welfare and 
in children ś rights. One is called “Deutscher Verein für öff entliche und private 
Fürsorge” founded more than 130 years ago at the times of the “Kaiser” which is 
an interesting organization insofar as it tries to lobby for private as well as for the 
public interest in welfare. This is in fact an organization of the local communities 
and the so called “Big Five” and these are the Protestant Church, the Catholic 
Church, the Jewish Community, the labour unions and a “mixed club” of welfare 
organizations. The Muslim welfare organizations were not included. The second 
organization is the so-called “National Coalition for the Rights of the Child” founded 
after the ratifi cation of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC). Both 
organizations should try to promote the right to education and training by lobbying 
for the implementation of this right. Particularly, the “National Coalition” must have 
an interest in this subject because the German handling of the right to education as 
of art. 28 of the CRC will be under review of the UN Children’s Commission shortly.
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3.4. Litigation 
To my knowledge, up to now, there are no cases. German courts until now did not 
hand down decisions on the right to education and training of refugees, and to my 
knowledge, the German administration has not been sued because of the three to six 
month waiting period. Also, the “Welcome Classes” and the segregation of children 
on the basis of their language competencies have not come under legal attack. The 
Civil Society organizations should try to make a case and bring it to court, whether 
it is because of the illegal waiting period or the problematic segregation in “Welcome 
Classes.” Then, the administrative courts will have to decide on the right to education 
and training of refugees or transfer the case to the German Constitutional Court or 
the European Court for Human Rights. I tried to put together a dossier, but I could 
not fi nd an NGO to help me to build a suitable case.
4. Accountability for the Right to Education of Refugees.
Thesis: Accountability becomes a big problem when public services are outsourced 
under very diffi  cult conditions such as the refugee crisis last year. Nevertheless, the 
Civil Society has a right and a duty to hold public as well as private organizations 
accountable for the fulfi llment of the right to education and training.
4.1. National Reporting
The refugees in Germany are registered by the local administration, e.g. the local 
communities, where they arrive. Then, they are distributed to the various states 
according to the population of the states. Their applications for asylum or recognition 
as refugees of war are sent to the Federal Migration Agency (Bundesamt für 
Migration und Flüchtlinge – BAMF). In case of recognition, a residence is assigned 
to the refugees; they now have a right to stay there for a limited time and they receive 
a work permit. Basically, they have the freedom of movement. In the case of rejection 
of the asylum, the refugees should be deported to their country of origin, but mostly 
this is not the case because they get the so called secondary protection under European 
law. In the case of rejection, the asylum seeker can sue the government and many of 
them do so, with the help of Civil Society lawyers. The BAMF, the federal migration 
agency, reports regularly on its decisions; therefore, the information is very good.
The local communities, which are responsible for that housing and the social aid 
to refugees, mostly outsource their duties to private agencies, because they do not 
have the administrative means to fulfi ll these themselves. In this case, there is a great 
variety of contractors, e.g. charities, welfare organizations as well as private profi t-
oriented businesses. In this case, reporting and control very often are defi cient, and 
Civil Society organizations have to take over the control and ask for accountability. 
In fact, up to now, there is no eff ective control and accountability. As the NGOs 
themselves can be contractors, they monitor themselves, so to speak.
The state educational administration is responsible for the accountability in the 
case of the right to education as far as the schools are concerned. They fulfi ll their 
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duty and do report regularly but very often they lack the data because the collection 
of the relevant data is in the hand of the schools and the local communities.
The federal labor administration is accountable for the vocational training, 
particularly for the integration and language courses. These, too, are outsourced and 
diffi  cult to control for the same reasons as in the case of the local communities. 
As we have so many diff erent agencies on the federal, the state and the local level, 
not regarding the welfare organizations and the private business, Germany urgently 
needs a central reporting system for the refugee politics and particularly the right 
to education and training. However, it does not exist. Therefore, seven foundations 
founded an expert organization (Sachverständigenrat Deutscher Stiftungen für 
Integration und Migration) in order to organize the reporting. Their bi-annual report 
is the best source for the accountability of the right to education in Germany.
4.2. International reporting 
The German government, under the CRC, has to report every fi ve years to the 
Secretary General of the United Nations on the implementation of the right to 
education laid down in art. 28 of the CRC as well as on all the other children ś rights. 
It did so for the last time in 2010, long before the present refugee crisis, and the 
concluding observations of the Children ś Commission date from the year 2012. 
They cannot be very eff ective for the implementation of the right to education in the 
present refugee crisis. Nevertheless, the Civil Society organizations, particularly the 
National Coalition for the Rights of the Child, are prepared to deliver the so called 
“shadow report” which will be taken into account by the children ś commission when 
they report on Germany for the next time. The same is true for the Human Rights 
Council of the United Nations which is responsible for the implementation of the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR. Their reporting comes too late to be eff ective, not to speak 
about the other problems which arise within these international bodies.
4.3. Evaluation 
One million refugees within one year, 25% under age 18, which is school age. This 
was, and still is, an extraordinary challenge for the German Civil Society. 250,000 
students had to be integrated into the school system, and many thousands in the 
preschool system and Higher Education and Vocational Training. They all have the 
right to education and training under international law and this right must be fulfi lled 
by the federation and the states. It is still too early to ask for an evaluation, to ask and 
answer the question if the German Civil Society did fulfi ll this right and how it coped 
with the enormous diffi  culties. Now, it is time to discuss the question of whether a 
European Association, like ELA, should be prepared to take over such a task if it is 
asked to do so by the German government. It would be worthwhile!
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 THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
MECHANISMS IN STRENGTHENING JUSTICIABILITY 
OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION IN THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION1
Maria S *
The University of Manchester
The right to education is a universally recognised human right. Article 26 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims the right of everyone to 
education.2 Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights recognises the right to education and sets out its main dimensions 
with the view of their progressive realisation.3 Apart from these two most obvious 
standards, other universal human rights instruments also refl ect a certain aspect of 
the right to education. Although they are often neglected, they are indispensable for a 
comprehensive analysis of all dimensions of this right. For instance, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains non-discrimination provisions that 
are essential for the provision of education on the basis of equality of all.4 These 
provisions correspond to UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education.5 
1   This article is an updated, reduced and reworked version of my dissertation awarded LLM Exeter 
Club annual prize for the best LLM dissertation at the University of Exeter 2012/13. I am most 
grateful to Dr Ana Beduschi and Mr Michael Sanderson from the Law School of University of Exeter 
whose expert advice and insightful comments have led to innumerable improvements of the original 
version. The errors that remain are, of course, my own.
*   Research Associate (The University of Manchester; Chief Researcher, Federal Centre for Educational 
Legislation, Moscow
2   UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III) 
(UDHR). 
3   International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted by General Assembly 
Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966) (ICESCR).
4   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted by General Assembly Resolution 
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966) (ICCPR). See arts. 20(2), 24(1), 26.
5   UN Educational, Scientifi c and Cultural Organisation, Convention Against Discrimination in 
Education (adopted by UNESCO General Conference on 14 December 1960) (CADE).
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International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
contains a prohibition of race-related discrimination of the right to education and 
the urge to combat prejudices through education. 6 Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women comprises numerous provisions on 
equal rights of men and women in education,7 while Convention on the Rights of the 
Child calls for recognition of the right to education of all children including those 
with disabilities, and for elimination of violence, exploitation and drug addiction 
through educational measures.8 Furthermore, International Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities urges governments to ensure ‘inclusive education system 
at all levels and life long learning’ for people with disabilities, 9 while International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families specifi cally mentions children of migrant workers and their ‘basic 
right of access to education on the basis of equality of treatment with nationals of the 
State concerned’.10 The Convention also establishes the right to education of migrant 
workers themselves and of members of their families.11
According to the OHCHR since the adoption of the UDHR in 1948, ‘all UN 
Member States have ratifi ed at least one core international human rights treaty, 
and 80 per cent have ratifi ed four or more’.12 The right to education is, thus, truly 
universally recognised and has been shaped in all its complexity by the binding 
acquis of international human rights treaties. Not only the right to education is 
globally endorsed, but it is also widely represented in binding regional conventions.13 
Moreover, the right to education is mentioned in the overwhelming majority – 90 
per cent – of the world’s constitutions.14 With such worldwide recognition one may 
6   International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted by 
General Assembly Resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965) (CERD). See paras 5(e)(v) and 7.
7   Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly 18 December 1979) (CEDAW), arts 10, 14(2)(d), 16(1)(e).
8   Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted by General Assembly Resolution 44/25 of 20 
November 1989) (CRC). See art 23, arts 28, 29, arts 19, 32, 33.
9   International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted by General Assembly 
Resolution A/RES/61/177 of 20 December 2006) (CRPD), art 24.
10  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families (adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/158 of 18 December 1990) (CMW), art 
30.
11  See arts 43 (1)(a) and 45 (1)(a).
12  ‘Human Rights Bodies’, www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx
13  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), Rome, 4 
November 1950, art 2 of the Protocol 1 (Paris 20 March 1952) as amended by Protocol No. 11; Council 
of Europe, European Social Charter (Revised), 3 May 1996, ETS 163, arts 7 (1) and (3), 10 (1), 15 (1), 
17 (1)(a) and (2), 30 (a); American Convention on Human Rights ‘Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica’ (B-32), 
arts 12 (4), 26; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘Banjul Charter’), 27 June 1981, CAB/
LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), art 17.
14  Comparative Constitutions Project, directed by Professors Zachary E , Tom G , and James 
M , www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org. See also, Jan D  G : Legal Framework for 
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assume that the right to education is universally realised and the situation with the 
protection is just as ideal. 
However, the reality is diff erent. Today 57 million children throughout the world 
still do not have access to schools.15 These are children involved in illegal labour 
and soldier children, girls who were forced to marry at an early age or dropped out 
of school due to early pregnancy, children of refugees and asylum seekers, children 
belonging to ethnic, national, linguistic, cultural minorities, indigenous peoples, 
victims of traffi  cking and slavery.16 774 million adults are still illiterate.17 Schools 
are still destroyed in military confl icts,18 while corruption still devours lumps of 
educational budgets.19 
From these devastating examples a conclusion can be drawn that inadequacy 
of eff orts made by individual states and international community as a whole to 
respect, protect and fulfi l the right of everyone to education is indeed a worldwide 
problem. And although both provision of education and protection of the rights of 
people within state’s jurisdiction clearly belong to the competence of a sovereign 
state,20 the signifi cance of unifi ed eff ort taken through international cooperation and 
supranational mechanisms of monitoring and protection of human rights should not 
be underestimated.21 
In fact, the role that international human rights mechanisms play in strengthening 
the sense of accountability of states for respecting, protecting and fulfi lling human 
rights of people within their jurisdiction is tremendous. The whole plethora of methods 
from dialogue, awareness raising and capacity-building to monitoring of compliance 
with binding human rights instruments and supranational judicial review – all count 
towards reinforcing national systems of realisation and protection of human rights. 
After all, the peoples of the world have united for the purpose of reaffi  rming ‘faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person’.22 Moreover, 
Freedom of Education. In: Charles L. G  – Jan D  G  (eds.): Balancing Freedom, Autonomy, 
and Accountability in Education. Volume 1. Oisterwijk, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2012. 25.
15  Global Education First, the UN Secretary-General’s Global Initiative on Education, www.
globaleducationfi rst.org/malaladay.html
16  See for example a fi lm prepared by the Offi  ce of the United Nations Special Envoy for Global 
Education, http://educationenvoy.org
17  International Literacy Day 2013: Literacy Rates are Rising, but Women and Girls Continue to Lag 
Behind, (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Paris 30 August 2013). www.uis.unesco.org/literacy/
Pages/data-release-map-2013.aspx?SPSLanguage=EN
18  Abed Rahim K : Islamic School was Destroyed During Israeli Military Off ensive, in Gaza. 
Demotix, 30 December 2009. www.demotix.com/photo/214324/islamic-school-was-destroyed-
during-israeli-military-off ensive-gaza-214324
19  Transparency International: Global Corruption Report: Education. http://blog.transparency.org/tag/
global-corruption-report-education
20  See ‘General Legal Obligations’ and ‘Specifi c Legal Obligations’ in the CESCR General Comment 
No. 13 on the Right to Education adopted at the Twenty-fi rst session of the Committee, E/C.12/1999/10 
of 8 December 1999, arts 43–57.
21  ICESCR art 2 (1). 
22  Charter of the United Nations (signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco) (UN Charter). Preamble.
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the goal of ‘promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples’ is 
intended to be reached through employment of ‘international machinery’.23
As a matter of illustration it is worth mentioning the so called ‘4A’ concept 
that originated from within the UN mechanism. It was proposed in 1999 by the 
fi rst Special Rapporteur on the right to education Katarina Tomaševsky and was 
later duplicated in the ICESCR General Comment No. 13. 24  This test, due to its 
clarity and logical, systemic nature, became a framework for state reporting under 
ICESCR. Through the reporting procedure and General Comments cited throughout 
international and domestic case law this scheme was adopted by domestic legislation 
to defi ne normative content of the right to education. 25
The purpose of this paper is twofold. I will aim, fi rst, to reveal how international 
human rights mechanisms contribute to shaping normative content of the right to 
education that can be eff ectively enforced through available system of judicial and 
quasi-judicial protection. In order to render precision to the paper and considering 
its limits I will choose examples from a particular domestic jurisdiction – Russian 
Federation. Second, I will focus on demonstrating how these mechanisms can be 
used to indicate and address inadequacies of implementation of the internationally 
recognised right to education and to bridge existing gaps of protection of this right. 
The structure of this paper refl ects its aims and purposes. The fi rst section is 
dedicated to exploration of existing defi nitions of justiciability as a legal concept. It 
will particularly focus on challenges of justiciability of economic, social and cultural 
rights. The second section will in greater detail analyse the applicability of diff erent 
concepts of justiciability to the right to education disaggregated by dimensions of the 
right to education at both international and domestic levels. 
This structure will support the main argument of this paper: the idea that 
justiciability of the right to education in its various dimensions can be positively 
aff ected by the practice of international human rights mechanisms. 
23  Ibid.
24  These are Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability and Adaptability of education, CESCR General 
Comment No. 13, para 6. See Katarina T : Preliminary report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the right to education (adopted at the Fifty-fi fth session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, E/
CN.4/1999/49 of 13 January 1999). Para 50.
25  See for example Tarantino and Others v. Italy (Applications nos. 25851/09, 29284/09 and 64090/09, 
Judgment of 2 April 2013) notes 2, 4, 16, 32, 33; Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Ruling 
on Admissibility No. 476-O of 16 November 2006 on Borodina claim; Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation Ruling on Merits No. 5-P of 15 May 2006. In Russian domestic legislation the 4A 
scheme is reproduced in some provisions of the Federal Law No. 273-FZ of 29 December 2012 ‘On 
Education in the Russian Federation’ (Federal Law on Education): availability is ensured by public 
responsibility in education (arts 5(5), 6-9); accessibility is guaranteed in arts 3(1)2, 5(3), 5(5)1, 28(6)1, 
41(1)8; acceptability is implied in arts 2(29); 9(1)1, 10(1)1, 11); adaptability is ensured in arts 2(1)1, 
2(1)27, 3(1)7, 11(1)3.
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1. Defi ning Justiciability 
This section will explore the defi nition of the term justiciability in its dual nature as 
a judicial tool and a legal doctrine.26 I will briefl y mention the former concept as it 
is very technical and geographically specifi c, moreover, its application to a civil law 
jurisdiction, such as Russia, is not uncontroversial. I will elaborate in more detail on 
the latter understanding of justiciability since it will lead me to adoption of a working 
defi nition for the purposes of this paper.
1.1. Justiciability as a Judicial Tool
Considering purposes and limitations of this paper, this section will only briefl y 
outline the concept of justiciability as a judicial tool. This concept refers, in a very 
technical sense, to a procedural decision of a court on admissibility of a matter 
for adjudication.27 As summarised by Fallon lawsuits have three stages: fi rst, the 
court determines justiciability, second, if the suit is justiciable, the court rules on 
the merits and, fi nally, determines the remedy.28 Thus in common law jurisdictions 
justiciability is often understood as a statement of assessment,29 synonymous to that 
of admissibility of a case. 
Galloway cites a practical toolset for basic analysis of justiciability: ‘the What, 
the When, and the Who’ justiciability test.30 According to Galloway, the What refers 
to crossing the threshold of adversity and non-collusion, it also aims at interception 
of political questions (such as ‘disposition of nuclear armaments, national security, 
foreign relations and the distribution of scarce public resources,’31 the latter being, 
arguably, one of the challenges of judicial protection of economic, social and cultural 
rights). The When implies meeting the requirements of ripeness, mootness and 
necessity, while the Who refers to the doctrine of legal standing.32 
26  Thomas B : Justiciability: a Theory of Judicial Problem Solving. B.C. L. Rev., vol. 24, (1982–
1983) 505. 
27  Robert S. S : Justiciability. The Modern Law Review, vol. 26, no. 5, (1963) 581.; Erwin S : 
Justiciability. Comp. & Int’l L.J. S. Afr., vol. 15, (1982) 206. (regards justiciability as antimony of 
substantive law); Sisay Alemahu Y : The Justiciability of Human Rights in the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Afr. Hum. Rts. L. J., vol. 8, (2008) 273.
28  Richard H. F , Jr.: The Linkage between Justiciability and Remedies: And Their Connections to 
Substantive Rights. Virginia Law Review vol. 92, (2006) 633–634.
29  Geoff rey M : Justiciability. In: A. G. G  (ed.): Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: a 
Collaborative Work. Oxford, 1961. 267.
30  Russell W. G : Basic Justiciability Analysis. Santa Clara L. Rev. vol. 30, (1990) 912.
31  B.V. H : Judicial Review, Justiciability and the Prerogative of Mercy. Cambridge L. J., vol. 62, 
(2003) 631–634.
32  G  op. cit. 912. See also Erwin C : A Unifi ed Approach to Justiciability. Conn. 
L. Rev. vol. 22, (1989–1990) 677. On the doctrine of legal standing see also R. Craig W  – George 
Lange S : The Justiciability Doctrine and Selected State Education Finance Constitutional 
Challenges. Journal of Education Finance. vol. 32, no. 1, (2006) 1.; Maxwell L. S : Standing 
Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice. California Law Review, vol. 83, no. 6, (1995) 
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Generally speaking, it is easy to agree with Harris who expresses his discomfort 
‘about the courts deciding the limits of their own competence’ – a situation akin 
to one being a judge in his or her own case.33 Considering lack of consistency in 
application of the ‘What. When. Who’ test leading to failures of justiciability, a more 
solid legislative approach is needed to narrow down the margin of discretion given 
to the courts in order to guarantee equal access to a unifi ed standard of justice in a 
democratic manner. 
1.2. Justiciability as a Legal Doctrine
As a legal doctrine justiciability is explained in two diff erent ways: in its narrow 
sense, as an ability of a right or its certain dimension to be brought before a competent 
court and in a wider sense, as a complex system of guarantees comprising domestic, 
regional and international mechanisms derived from ratifi ed obligations of the state 
and designed to protect a certain right in a certain country. 
1.2.1. Justiciability in a Narrow Sense, as an Ability to be Brought before the Court 
Traditional defi nition of justiciability has a direct connection with the ability of a 
matter to ‘be properly brought before a court and [to be] capable of being disposed 
judicially’.34 Other defi nitions of justiciable imply being ‘appropriate for or subject 
to court trial’ or being able to be ‘settled by law or a court of law’.35 Justiciable law is 
understood as ‘capable of being determined by a court of law’ or ‘liable to be brought 
before a court for trial; subject to jurisdiction’.36 
According to the doctrinal sources, ‘justiciable’ means ‘liable to be tried in a court 
of justice; subject to jurisdiction’;37 ‘peculiarly suited for judicial solution’,38 it is also 
explained as property of a right of being ‘amenable to judicial review’.39 A right 
is therefore justiciable if it is ‘subject to test and remedy in the judicial system of 
1309.; Jonathan R. S : Theory of Justiciability. Tex. L. Rev., vol. 86, (2007–2008) 73.; Charles 
H. K : Government Suits against In-Service Conscientious Objectors Who Have Received 
Educational Benefi ts: An Examination of Justiciability and Damages. The University of Chicago Law 
Review, vol. 42, no. 4, (1975) 749.; Lawrence G : Informational Standing under NEPA: 
Justiciability and the Environmental Decisionmaking Process. Columbia Law Review, vol. 93, no. 
4, (1993) 996.
33  H  op. cit. 638.
34  Black’s Law Dictionary. West Group, 92009.
35  Random House Kernerman Webster’s College Dictionary. K Dictionaries Ltd., 42010.; The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. Houghton Miffl  in Company, 42009. 
36  Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged. HarperCollins Publishers, 52003.
37  S  op. cit. 206. 
38  S  op. cit. 530.
39  Gustavo A : Balancing the Right to a Remedy and the Needs of Governance: The Doctrine 
of Limitation of Rights as a Framework for the Development of Domestic Remedies for Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. Tilburg L. Rev., vol. 15, (2010–2011) 15.
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courts and tribunals’.40 In this narrow sense justiciability is thus synonymous with 
enforceability or enforcement.41 
All these defi nitions, when read in synthesis, despite their apparent unanimity, 
leave some fundamental questions unanswered: is justiciability a property of a right 
or does it have to do with the ability of the legal system to protect the right? From 
another angle, is it a property of a right or of a certain decision implementing / 
violating the right or perhaps it is a characteristic of a dispute? 42  Is it a property 
of a right or of a legal norm endorsing it? How can the gap be explained between 
being able to be brought before court and being appropriate for such action?43 Which 
authority is capable of deciding the latter or setting criteria for the former? How can 
one defi nition accommodate the ability of a matter to be settled both by law and by 
the action of a court when these are two separate processes involving independent 
authorities? 
All these questions lead to a conclusion that existing understanding of justiciability 
as a synthetic doctrinal concept referring to the capacity of a matter (a right, a law 
endorsing the right, a decision implementing the right, or a dispute over a violation of 
a right) to be able (or appropriate) to be brought before the court (or being settled by 
the court) – is quite vague and can be interpreted in many diff erent ways depending 
on the legal system and legal tradition.
Stepping aside from jurisprudence-related doctrine is the interpretation 
of justiciability suggested by the International Commission of Jurists. In the 
Commission’s report justiciability refers to ‘the ability to claim a remedy before an 
independent and impartial body when a violation of a right has occurred or is likely to 
occur’.44 The defi nition provided by the Commission has two signifi cant diff erences 
from those analysed above. First, it reduces justiciability of a right to justiciability of 
a claim; and second, it widens the scope of application of justiciability as, pursuant 
to the defi nition, the remedy can be claimed before any independent and impartial 
body, not necessarily a court of justice. Additionally, it renders justiciability a certain 
preventive function (‘likely to occur’). 
Despite this broader interpretation, the Commission’s defi nition still applies only 
to remedial justice and excludes from the notion of justiciability any implications of 
guarantees ensuring better realisation of a right. 
40  John V -W : No Rights Without Remedies: Necessary Conditions for Abolishing Child 
Poverty. Eur. J. Soc. Sec., vol. 8, (2006) 317.
41  Jose Ricardo C : Human Rights and Justiciability: a Survey Conducted in Rio De Janeiro. Int’l 
J. on Hum Rts., vol. 3 SUR (2005) 133.
42  Chris F : The Justiciability of Administrative Decisions: A Redundant Concept? Fed. L. Rev., vol. 
30, (2002) 239.
43  On the dichotomy of legal and extra-legal justiciability and the diff erence between matters that 
are ‘proper’ for decision by court and ‘capable’ of being adjudicated see Peter Gordon I : 
Justiciability. Am. J. Juris., vol. 39, (1994) 353. 
44  International Commission of Jurists: Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights – Comparative Experiences of Justiciability (ICJ, Geneva, 2008) 6 (emphasis added).
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The concept of justiciability has evolved with time. While in mid-XX century it 
used to be viewed as ‘the very foundation of the judicial function,’45 and was only 
regarded in connection with the actions taken by the courts,46 by the end of the century 
the term received a broader interpretation as a ‘juridical mechanism triggered off  by 
the inadequacies in the enforceability or execution of human rights’.47 This defi nition 
is truly revolutionary: not only it regards justiciability as a mechanism of protection, 
rather than an attribute of a right, but it also for the fi rst time goes beyond strictly 
judicial context of this term, suggesting that juridical is wider than judicial.48 
1.2.2. Justiciability in a Broader Sense as a System of Guarantees
By this manner the concept of justiciability has evolved from a mere reaction of a 
court to a certain characteristic of a right or a claim into a mechanism recognising 
the gaps of protection, analysing their reasons and consequences and elaborating 
means to address these gaps. The modern concept of justiciability recognises that the 
capabilities of courts are limited and that, while the courts have the ‘opportunity to 
oversee the quality of the decision-making procedures used by the executive’, there 
can be cases when rendering the matter non-justiciable ‘can mean that an illegal 
decision […] may survive to perpetrate unfairness’.49 
Thus, the contemporary understanding of justiciability adopts a somewhat 
extra-legal, or perhaps even socio-legal approach as it attempts to relate this legal 
doctrine ‘to what actually happens in practice’. 50 As reasonably suggested by Barton, 
‘justiciability can be fully understood only by adopting a perspective beyond, rather 
than within, the closed system.’51 He defi nes this concept ‘as the many relationships 
between adjudicative procedures, and the problems such procedures are asked to 
45  Edwin B : Justiciability. The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 4, (1936) 1.
46  S  op. cit. 581.
47  Michael K. A : The Justiciability of Economic, Cultural Right. Commw. L. Bull., vol. 14, (1988) 
1425. 
48  On the need to go beyond purely legal defi nition of justiciability see also Olivier D  S : 
International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary. Cambridge–New York, CUP, 
2010. 771.
49  H  op. cit. 631–633.
50  William T : Mapping Law: The Macdermott Lecture. N. Ir. Legal Q., vol. 50, (1999) 12., 
45. Socio-legal approach diff ers from doctrinal research in law in that it situates legal phenomena in 
a broader context, namely, in economic, political and social contexts. See David Maxwell W  
(ed.): The Oxford companion to law. Oxford, Clarendon, 1980. 1098.; Reza B  – Max T  
(eds.): Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research. Oxford–Portland, Or., Hart Pub., 2005.; Brian 
Z. T : Realistic Socio-Legal Theory: Pragmatism and a Social Theory of Law. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1997.; Richard A. P : The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship. Yale L. J., 
vol. 90, (1980–1981) 1113.; Neil S : The Possibilities and Perils of Legal Studies. Can. J.L. & 
Soc., vol. 6, (1991) 1.; Alister A. H : Legal Education: Black Letter, White Letter or Practical 
Law, Newcastle L. Rev., vol. 9, (2005–2006) 81.
51  B  op. cit. 507.
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resolve. So understood, justiciability off ers an original perspective from which the 
workings, capacities, and limitations of adjudication can be better explored.52
The same – more pragmatic – approach is advocated by Addo, who argues that 
justiciability ‘presupposes the existence of a review mechanism to determine non-
compliance with the terms of the legal regime,’53 thus suggesting that by tackling 
inadequacies revealed through such mechanism justiciability evolves into a set of 
guarantees.54 
This broader understanding of justiciability forms the basis of synthesised 
working defi nition of this concept adopted for the purposes of this paper whereby 
justiciability of a right within the framework of a certain domestic legal order is 
regarded as a complex characteristic of the respective legal order that allows for 
systemic employment of international and domestic legal and extra-legal mechanisms 
with a view to identify, assess and address the inadequacies of recognition, protection 
and full realisation of the right in question. 
1.3. Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Myths and Challenges
The nature of the existing debate on whether economic, social and cultural rights 
are justiciable in the narrow sense (hereinafter judicially enforceable) is precisely 
summarised by O’Connell.55 From the principled side, there are arguments that 
‘socio-economic rights are simply not real rights, in any meaningful sense’,56 and 
on somewhat more practical side is the argument that their judicial enforcement is 
inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers.57 
In a nutshell, the fi rst argument refers to the ‘special nature’ of economic, social 
and cultural rights. By ‘special nature’ of socio-economic rights both the doctrine 
and the practice understand their ‘fundamental diff erence’ from civil and political 
rights derived from their placement in two separate legal instruments: the ICESCR 
and the ICCPR which was in fact ‘neither an originally-intended nor a necessary 
separation’.58 
For the purposes of justifying the unwillingness to adjudicate economic, social 
and cultural rights both doctrine and jurisprudence insist on identifying these rights 
52  Ibid. 505. 
53  A  (1988) op. cit. 1425.
54  Michael K. A : The Legal Nature of International Human Rights. Leiden–Boston, Martinus 
Nijhoff  Publishers, 2010. 226. 
55  Paul O’C : Vindicating Socio-Economic Rights: International Standards and Comparative 
Experience. Abingdon–New York, Routledge, 2012. 9.
56  Ibid. 9.
57  Some authors set institutional capacity of the courts apart from the separation of powers argument 
(see Aoife N  – Bruce P  – Malcolm L : The Justiciability of Social and Economic 
Rights: an Updated Appraisal. Center For Human Rights And Global Justice, Working Paper no. 15, 
New York, 2007. 19.). However, for the purposes of this paper such over-elaboration is hardly justifi ed.
58  Eric C. C : Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic Rights and the South 
African Constitutional Court. Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev., vol. 38, (2006–2007) 344.
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as positive rights ‘imposing affi  rmative obligations’ on the states,59 vaguely worded 
and imprecise,60 requiring resources for their implementation,61 and not even creating 
immediate obligations, but only an indefi nite need to ensure their progressive 
realisation. All these arguments against justiciability of economic, social and cultural 
rights have long since been rebutted.62 
The second line of argument insists that judicial enforcement of economic 
and social rights undermines the democratic doctrine of separation of powers by 
allowing the judiciary to interfere with budget allocation, since the court must 
engage in prioritising resources by ‘putting a person either in or out of a job, a house 
or school,’63 – a function belonging to the competence of the executive branch. 
However, when one thinks about the doctrine of separation of powers as a holistic 
concept it is evident that judicial review of executive functions is an essential element 
of the principle of checks and balances lying in the core of the concept.64 If some 
executive decisions were deemed outside the scope of judicial review it would clearly 
impede on the principle of equality and fair access to justice. Thus, the position of 
O’Connell appears fully justifi ed as he insists on reinventing the separation of powers 
as a ‘dynamic and ongoing interaction between the diff erent branches of government’ 
where the courts engage not only ‘in an exacting examination of state policies with 
respect to socio-economic rights’, but also in the ‘normative development of the 
content [… thereof], drawing where appropriate on international and comparative 
standards’.65 
59  The negative v. positive dichotomy has been criticised to the eff ect of regarding ‘each right as having 
[both] negative and positive aspects’ (C  (2006–2007) op. cit. 374., see also N –
P –L  (2007) op. cit. 7.), the latter implying providing means to fulfi l the rights while the 
former pertaining to the obligation to respect and protect the right on the basis of non-discrimination 
and appreciation of human dignity. 
60  N –P –L  (2007) op. cit. 9.
61  Ibid. 8.; D  S  (2010) op. cit. 743.
62  See for the overview of rebutting arguments: Malcolm L : The Justiciability of Social Rights: 
From Practice to Theory. In: Malcolm L  (ed.): Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging 
Trends in Comparative and International Law. Cambridge, CUP, 2008. 30. See also: G. J. H.  
H : The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: a Rebuttal of Some Traditional 
Views. In: P. A  – K. T  (eds.): The Right to Food. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff , 
1984. 97., 99. On universality of budgetary implications for implementation of all human rights 
see Jayme B  L  Jr.: The Expanding Nature of Human Rights and the Affi  rmation of 
their Indivisibility and Enfoceability. In: Berma K. G  – Adalid C. B  – Paulo C. 
C  (eds.): Dignity and Human Rights: the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. Antwerp–New York, Intersentia, 2002. 58.
63  E. V. V : The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol. 9, (1978) 103.
64  On the function of judicial review see Thomas Henry B : The Rule of Law. London, Allen 
Lane, 2010. 61.; Michael V : Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers. Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1967. 13.; Thomas O. S : Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive 
Separation of Powers. Cornell L. Rev., vol. 72, (1986–1987) 430., 434. 
65  O’C  (2012) op. cit. 201. 
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Practically speaking, the functions of the executive branch boil down to defi ning 
minimum core obligations of socio-economic rights and designing plans for their 
progressive realisation in accordance with principles set out by the legislature 
pursuant to international obligations of the state. At the same time, the judiciary 
mechanism focuses on non-compliance with established standards. The question of 
adequacy of the standard itself, as well as assessment of the extent to which it meets 
the ‘progressive realisation’ criteria should be left for external monitoring bodies, 
such as UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). 
To summarise, both ‘special nature’ and ‘capacity’ arguments appear rather 
artifi cial. In this regard the reasoning of Christiansen seems perfectly justifi ed as 
he concludes that ‘[t]he nature of the rights themselves is not a legitimate basis for 
rejecting their justiciability’.66 Having said that and adhering to the premise that 
all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated,67 I will 
reiterate that the question of whether disputes concerning economic, social and 
cultural rights are capable of being resolved by courts to the same extent as claims 
concerning other rights is of little relevance for the purposes of present paper. First, 
because it has long since been affi  rmatively answered by contemporary scholarship 
as demonstrated above and, second, it refers to the concept of justiciability in its 
narrow sense. Although essential for adequate protection, the enforceability of a 
right amounts only to one of many dimensions of justiciability in the broader sense 
that would also include all other legal and non-legal mechanisms available within a 
particular legal order for securing its proper fulfi lment. 
2. Justiciable Dimensions of the Right to Education at International level 
and in Russia
Having analysed diff erent approaches that exist to defi ne justiciability as a judicial 
tool and a legal doctrine in both narrow and broad senses, and having supplemented 
this analysis by the reference to specifi cities of justiciability of economic, social and 
cultural rights I will now proceed with narrowing down the focus of my research to 
justiciability of the right to education. 
In this section I will outline the elements of justiciability of the right to education, 
its preconditions and challenges, as well as dimensions of the right to education that 
are part of its justiciable normative content both at the domestic level in Russia and 
through international protection system.
66  C  (2006–2007) op. cit. 347.
67  Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted at the World Conference on Human Rights 
on 25 June 1993, endorsed by General Assembly resolution A/CONF.157/23 of 12 July 1993, art 5.
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2.1. Preconditions of Justiciability of the Right to Education
International human rights instruments and doctrinal sources describe the right to 
education in a range of ways: as a self-standing right in its narrow sense,68 or in a 
broader sense as the right to development,69 as an empowerment right,70 implicit in 
all other rights,71 or pigeonholed to one of the three ‘generations’ of human rights;72 
perceived as a right or a freedom,73 (positive or negative),74 as a right to receive 
education and the right to choose education;75 limited by other rights76 or reinforced 
68  Manfred N : The Right to Education – Its Meaning, Signifi cance and Limitations. Neth. Q. Hum. 
Rts., vol. 9, (1991) 418.
69  UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by the General Assembly, 
4 December 1986, A/RES/41/128; C. Raj K : International Human Rights Perspectives on the 
Fundamental Right to Education – Integration of Human Rights and Human Development in the 
Indian Constitution. Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L., vol. 12, (2004) 237.; Philip A  – Mary R  
(eds.): Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement. Oxford–New York, OUP, 
2005. 551.; Mesenbet Assefa T : Refl ections on the Right to Development: Challenges and 
Prospects. Afr. Hum. Rts. L. J., vol. 10, (2010) 325.; Mohammed B : The Right to Development, 
in International human rights. In: Philip A  – Ryan G  (eds.): Human Rights in Context: 
Laws, Politics and Morals: Text and Materials. Oxford, OUP, 2012. 1532.
70  CESCR General Comment No. 13 (1999) op. cit. para 1.; UNESCO’s Medium-Term Strategy 2002-
2007, (31 C/4, para. 62.), UNESCO, Paris. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001254/125434e.
pdf; Kishore S : The Right to Education: International Legal Obligations. Int’l J. Educ. L. & 
Pol’y, vol. 1, (2005) 103., 107.
71  Roland W : The Right to Education according to Article 14 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. Int’l J. Educ. L. & Pol’y, vol. 1, (2005) 60., 62.; Gerhard   
S : Classifying the Limitation of the Right to Education in the First Protocol to the European 
Convention. Int’l J. Educ. L. & Pol’y, vol. 2, (2006) 153. 
72  John C. M : Towards a New Approach to the Classifi cation of Human Rights with Specifi c 
Reference to the African Context. Afr. Hum. Rts. L. J., vol. 4, (2004) 93.
73  W  (2005) op. cit.; James B : Freedom and Choice in Education. RLE Edu K, Routledge, 
2012.; Virgil C. B : Freedom of choice in education. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1977.; 
Charles L. G : Educational Freedom in Eastern Europe. Washington, DC, Cato Institute, 1994.; 
Noel S. A  – Haroon K  (eds): Education As Freedom: African American Educational 
Thought and Activism. [Lexington Books] 2009. https://www.ebooks.com/466682/education-as-
freedom/anderson-noel-s-kharem-haroon-akom-a-a-banks-ojeya/
74  Ingo R : The Right to Education as a Constitutional Right. Int’l J. Educ. L. & Pol’y, vol. 5, 
(2009) 5.
75  Fons C  – Fried  H  (eds.): The Right to Complain about Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Proceedings of the Expert Meeting on the Adoption of an Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights held from 25–28 January 1995 in 
Utrecht. [SIM Special, no. 18] Utrecht, 1995. 427.
76  Religious freedom: Jan D  G  – Gracienne L : Nobody Can Be Denied the Right to (an Own 
Identity in) Education: Legal Bottlenecks in National and International Law concerning the Freedom 
of Religious Expression: The Case of the Headscarf in Education. Int’l J. Educ. L. & Pol’y, vol. 1, 
(2005) 132.; AnneBert D  – Ben V : Islamic Schools in the Netherlands. Int’l J. Educ. 
L. & Pol’y, vol. 4, (2008) 16.; linguistic rights: Elize K  – Pablo M : Legal Status of Languages in 
Education: The Cases of South Africa and Spain. Int’l J. Educ. L. & Pol’y, vol. 6, (2010) 33.
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by the principles of non-discrimination and equality.77 It is further regarded with 
disaggregation according to the level of education or organisational form (private78 
and public79) or through the prism of special categories of the subjects of this right 
(disabled,80 minorities,81 homeless,82 women and girls83).
The UN Special Rapporteur on the right to education Kishore Singh in his 
annual report to the Human Rights Council in June 2013 made a direct link between 
international recognition of the right to education and justiciability of ‘any or all of 
its dimensions’.84 In his statement Singh appeals to the broader understanding of the 
term justiciability as described in earlier in this paper. By asserting that the right to 
education is justiciable so long as it is internationally recognised Singh, according 
to the synthetic analysis of the whole text of the report, implies a complex set of 
guarantees: from ‘existing constitutional or legislative provisions on the right to 
education’ to the possibility ‘to have legal recourse before the law courts on the basis 
of international legal obligations’ in case of violations.85 
This system of guarantees includes quasi-judicial mechanisms of protection,86 
as well as preventive mechanisms allowing for special attention to vulnerable and 
marginalised groups.87 It also accounts for the capacity of the legal system as a whole 
to eff ectively monitor and address gaps of protection or specifi c factors challenging 
77  Mark J  – Kenneth K : Guaranteeing a State Right to a Quality Education: The Judicial-
Politial Dialogue in New Jersey. J. L. & Educ., vol. 20, (1991) 271.; Brian P. M : Promoting 
Racial Equality through Equal Educational Opportunity: The Case for Progressive School-Choice. 
BYU Educ. & L. J., (2002) 53.; Neville H : Equal Rights in Education in the UK (England). Int’l 
J. Educ. L. & Pol’y, vol. 4, (2008) 4.
78  Patricia M. L : Private Education Alternatives and State Regulation. J.L. & Educ., vol. 120, (1983) 
189.
79  Eileen N. W : Public Responsibility for Special Education and Related Services in Private 
Schools. J. L. & Educ., vol. 20, (1991) 43.; Tomiko B -N : Broad Ownership of the Public 
Schools: An Analysis of the T-Formation Process Model for Achieving Educational Adequacy and Its 
Implications for Contemporary School Reform Eff orts. J.L. & Educ., vol. 27, (1998) 343.
80  Alexandra N : Anatomy of a Debate: Intersectionality and Equality for Deaf Children from 
Non-English Speaking Homes. J.L. & Educ., vol. 24, (1995) 271.
81  Walter K : Learning Integration: Minorities and Higher Education. Special Issue Int’l J. Educ. L. 
& Pol’y , (2004) 21. 
82  James H. S  – Virginia M. H : Legal Barriers to the Education of Homeless Children and 
Youth: Residency and Guardianship Issues. J.L. & Educ., vol. 20, (1991) 201. 
83  Michael A. R  – Anne W. M : National Values and Community Values Part I: Gender 
Equity in the Schools. J. L. & Educ., vol. 21, (1992) 155.; Jennifer T. S : CEDAW’s Flaws: A 
Critical Analysis of Why CEDLAW is Failing to Protect a Woman’s Right to Education in Pakistan. 
J. L. & Educ., vol. 38, (2009) 563.
84  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, Kishore S : Justiciability of the Right 
to Education presented at the Twenty-third session of the UN Human Rights Council, A/HRC/23/35 
of 10 May 2013 para 27.
85  S  (2013) op. cit. para 27.
86  Ibid. para 36–43.
87  Ibid. para 54–58.
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justiciability, such as lack of awareness of the right, legal, cultural, procedural and 
fi nancial barriers to full realisation and successful protection of the right.88 
This important report that features a new broad approach to justiciability is long 
overdue: the current position of the CESCR expressed in the Committee’s General 
Comments concerning justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights including 
the right to education is outdated from both doctrinal and practical points of view. The 
Committee still acts on the premises confi rming partial (or conditional) justiciability 
of economic, social and cultural rights thus lowering the standard of protection of 
these rights in states parties to the Covenant.89 
For example, among the appropriate measures the General Comment No. 3 on 
the nature of state obligations mentions ‘provision of judicial remedies with respect 
to rights which may, in accordance with the national legal system, be considered 
justiciable’.90 The Committee thus admits the possibility that some of the rights 
endorsed by the Covenant might not, in principle, be considered justiciable. This 
narrow interpretation of justiciability creates a closed circuit system where the rights 
must fi rst be considered justiciable (by which authority?) and then judicial remedies 
should be provided for their protection. However, without legislative provision of 
appropriate judicial remedies these rights will never become justiciable. 
Another example of outdated approach to justiciability featured by CESCR is 
paragraph 10 of General Comment No. 9 that distinguishes between ‘justiciability 
(which refers to those matters which are appropriately resolved by the courts) and 
norms which are self-executing (capable of being applied by courts without further 
elaboration)’.91 These two defi nitions appear confusing, because being self-executing 
is a prerequisite condition for justiciability and not an opposing category as it is 
implied in paragraph 10 of the Comment.
It is understandable that the Committee will be hesitant about immediate adoption 
of any daring initiatives due to its institutional and political constraints. First, adoption 
of a new General Comment or revision / update of an existing one is a complicated 
time-consuming procedure involving wide consultation with specialised agencies, 
civil society and academics followed by preparation of a draft for further discussion 
88  Ibid. paras 74–80.
89  The use of CESCR General Comments as a benchmark for the state parties reporting procedure 
has been established in a number of the Committee’s reports, see for example UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Report on the Thirtieth and Thirty-First Sessions (5-23 May 
2003, 10-28 November 2003) E/2004/22 E/C.12/2003/14 (Economic and Social Council Offi  cial 
Records, 2004, suppl no. 2) para 52.
90  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 3: The 
Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, para. 1, of the Covenant), 14 December 1990, E/1991/23 
para 5. 
91  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 9: The 
domestic application of the Covenant adopted at the 51st meeting on 1 December 1998 (Nineteenth 
session) E/C.12/1998/24.
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by the Committee and interested parties and formal adoption in plenary session.92 
Considering the time span between plenary sessions (they take place twice a year, 
in April and November), the fact that the last General Comment was adopted in 
2009,93 and that none of the Comments have ever been updated or revised, the lack 
of intensity in this process suggests inability of this mechanism to accommodate 
upcoming issues. 
Second, political constraints of the Committee’s reluctance to immediately adopt 
new approaches have to do with hyper-sensitivity of the states towards their reporting 
obligations. Since General Comments are designed ‘with a view to assisting States 
parties in fulfi lling their reporting obligations’,94 all changes will be subject to 
extreme scrutiny and political negotiations further complicated by the Committee’s 
general inclination to ‘work on the basis of the principle of consensus’.95 Nevertheless, 
one can anticipate that the ambitious proposal of the Special Rapporteur to use a 
broader notion of justiciability will fi nd its way into domestic practice through the 
Committee’s monitoring procedure as it had happened before.96 
2.2. Justiciable Dimensions of the Right to Education in Russia at the Domestic Level
According to Singh ‘justiciability of the right to education […] has its bases in 
national legal systems’.97 For its eff ective protection in the framework of domestic 
justiciability the content of the right must be clearly defi ned and subjected to judicial 
and quasi-judicial mechanisms of enforcement.98
In the Russian legal system the right to education is recognised on the constitutional 
level and is further developed in both federal and regional legislation. The right to 
education is protected by the judicial system and non-judicial mechanisms as well. 
Without aiming at providing a full review of education law and policies in Russia, 
I will outline those fundamental constitutional and legislative provisions that shape 
the foundation of justiciability of the right to education in Russia. In the following 
92  Follow-up to the recommendations of the Twenty-fourth meeting of chairpersons of the human rights 
treaty bodies, including harmonization of the working methods: other activities of the human rights 
treaty bodies and participation of stakeholders in the human rights treaty body process. Twenty-fi fth 
meeting of chairpersons of the human rights treaty bodies, Geneva, 24–28 June 2013. Item 4 of the 
provisional agenda, HRI/MC/2013/3 of 22 April 2013, para 15.
93  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General comment No. 21: Right 
of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 1 (a), of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights) E/C.12/GC/21 of 21 December 2009.
94  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), Rules of Procedure of the 
Committee: Provisional rules of procedure adopted by the Committee at its third session (1989), 
E/C.12/1990/4/Rev.1 of 1 September 1993, rule 65.
95  Ibid. Rule 46.
96  In 1999 the 4A scheme – Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability and Adaptability of education 
suggested by the Special Rapporteur on the right to education was adopted by the CESCR General 
Comment No. 13 as a benchmark of the states’ obligations in respect of the right to education. 
97  S  (2013) op. cit. para 26.
98  Y  (2008) op. cit. 273.
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three subsections I will describe and evaluate the relevant provisions of the Russian 
Constitution and basic legislation. I will also list the existing judiciary and non-
judiciary mechanisms of protection of the right to education. 
2.2.1. Justiciable Dimensions of the Right to Education in Russia as Articulated 
by Constitutional and Legislative Provisions 
It is generally accepted that recognition of a right at the constitutional level is essential 
for its domestic justiciability.99 The relation between constitutional recognition of the 
right and its justiciability was reiterated by the CESCR in General Comment No. 3:100
In cases where constitutional recognition has been accorded to specifi c economic, 
social and cultural rights, or where the provisions of the Covenant have been 
incorporated directly into national law, the Committee would wish to receive 
information as to the extent to which these rights are considered to be justiciable (i.e. 
able to be invoked before the courts).
By invoking the extent to which the rights recognised by the constitution are 
considered justiciable the Committee presumes that it’s not the question whether 
they are, but only the extent to which they are. 
In Russia the right of every person to education is ensured by Article 43 (1) of the 
Constitution.101 In line with international state obligations in the domain of education 
‘secondary and high vocational education’ is generally accessible and provided free 
of charge ‘in state or municipal educational establishments’.102 The article also places 
pre-school education under the same standard of accessibility.
Free higher education is guaranteed ‘on competitive basis’ in a ‘state or municipal 
educational establishment.’103 Competitive access and institutional limitations are 
further complemented on legislative level by an additional condition: only fi rst higher 
education can be exempt from tuition fees, provided all other requirements met.104 
99   A  (1988) op. cit. 1428; C  (2006–2007) op. cit. 323.; C  (1995) op. cit. 427.; 
S  (2013) op. cit. para 25.; Y  (2008) op. cit. 274.; Salma Y : Rise of Judicially 
Enforced Economic, Social & Cultural Rights – Refocusing Perspectives. Seattle J. Soc. Just., vol. 
10, (2011–2012) 784.; Julia A. S -K  – Robynn K. S : Justiciability and the Role of 
Courts in Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education. Stan. J. C. R. & C. 
L., vol. 6, (2010) 83., 86.
100   CESCR General Comment No. 3 (1990) para 6 (emphasis added).
101   Constitution of the Russian Federation adopted by national referendum on 12 December 1993 
(Russian Constitution).
102   Russian Constitution (1993) art 43(2) in conformity with ICESCR art 13(2)b: ‘Secondary education in 
its diff erent forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally 
available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive 
introduction of free education’.
103   Russian Constitution (1993) art 43(3) in conformity with ICESCR art 13(2)c: ‘Higher education shall 
be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in 
particular by the progressive introduction of free education’ (emphasis added).
104   Federal Law on Education (2012) art 5 (3). 
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This provision is very controversial: the law does not make clear what, in fact, is 
considered ‘fi rst’ higher education: the fi rst fi nished university degree or the fi rst one 
applied for and/or enrolled to (considering expulsions, or voluntary abandoning of the 
course). There is no unifi ed offi  cial database of issued diplomas, let alone of enrolled 
students. Moreover, universities cannot ask for a proof of existing qualifi cations. 
Nevertheless, the legislative limitation was considered by the Russian Constitutional 
Court (RCC) as fully compatible with the Constitution.105
The Constitution guarantees that ‘the basic general education shall be free 
of charge’. It also imposes responsibility on the parents for ensuring compulsory 
basic general education for their children:106 since 2008 all 10 years of schooling are 
compulsory and free of charge.107 
Russian Constitution was adopted in 1993. Its preparation took place long after 
the ratifi cation by the Soviet Union of the ICESCR in 1973, and the distinguished 
members of the Constitutional Council that was called by the President to discuss 
and edit the project have considered those international standards concerning the 
right to education that had been already in force.108
Therefore, the fact that the Constitution does not guarantee directly neither freedom 
of education and ‘liberty of parents […] to choose for their children schools, other 
than those established by the public authorities’,109 nor the ‘liberty of individuals and 
bodies to establish and direct educational institutions’,110 means that these provisions 
have been deliberately omitted due to particular political, economic and/or social 
concerns.
Although the relevant provisions were, nevertheless, included in the acts of 
subconstitutional educational legislation from their very early drafts,111 there is no 
jurisprudence whatsoever on the issues of parental choice or the right to establish 
an educational institution. To be sure, there have been cases dealing with freedom 
105   Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Ruling on Admissibility No. 187-O of 5 October 
2001.
106   Russian Constitution (1993) art 43(4) in terms of established level of compulsory education exceeds 
the standard set by ICESCR art 14: ‘compulsory primary education, free of charge’ (emphasis 
added).
107   Compulsory level of school education was lifted from 9 grades of secondary education to 11 grades 
of complete general education as per the Federal Law No. 194-FZ of 21 July 2007 ‘On Amending 
Certain Legislative Acts of Russian Federation due to Establishment of Compulsory General 
Education’. 
108   Decree of the President of Russian Federation No. 718 of 20 May 1993 on ‘Convocation of the 
Constitutional Council for the Purpose of Finalising the Project of Constitution of Russian 
Federation’. 
109   ICESCR art 13(3).
110   ICESCR art 13(4).
111   The right to choose forms of education and educational institutions was included into the very fi rst 
Law on Education No. 3266-1 of 10 July 1992 (1992), as well as the possibility to establish private 
educational institutions, art 12(3).
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of religious education,112 however the right to establish religious schools is protected 
by specifi c legislation.113 Another case tangentially related to the freedom of school 
choice is the Supreme Court 2011 ruling on territorial accessibility of education, 
but it has more implications on accessibility of public schools than on free choice of 
schools in general.114 
Therefore, we can conclude that although constitutional recognition is generally 
connected to guarantees of stronger justiciability,115 in some cases the lack of relevant 
constitutional provisions does not necessarily lead to non-justiciability of a certain 
right or legitimate interest. In this situation adjudication of the claim will invoke 
other constitutional provisions and will lead to indirect justiciability. For example, 
although the right to establish a private educational institution is not directly 
mentioned in Russian Constitution, it is implicit in other provisions, namely, Article 
34 on freedom of economic activities, Article 35 on the right of private property, 
Article 44 on academic freedom.
As to summarise, justiciable dimensions of the right to education as set forth by the 
Russian Constitution and educational legislation comprise a comprehensive codifi ed 
system. This system consists of general entitlements that are common for all levels 
and forms of education: non-discrimination,116 general availability and accessibility of 
education,117 obligation of public authorities to ‘establish appropriate socio-economic 
conditions conducive to obtaining education and progressive widening of educational 
choices throughout life’,118 guarantees of language choice as appropriate,119 guarantees 
of secular nature of education in public educational institutions,120 freedom of choice 
in education (including the right to form the contents of one’s educational program,121 
etc. It also includes specifi c entitlements for particular categories of participants of 
education process: such as the right of public school pupils to use textbooks and 
teaching aids during the course of their studies without payment122 or the right of 
112   On Russian case law concerning establishment of religious educational institutions see Maria 
S : Freedom of Conscience and the Right to Education in Russia – a Secular Country of 
Cultural and Religious Diversity. In: Charles R  (ed.): International Perspectives on Education, 
Religion and Law. Abingdon, Routledge, 2014. 181–194.
113   Federal Law No. 125-FZ of 26 September 1997 ‘On Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Associations’.
114   Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in its Ruling No. 5-G11-106 of 15 June 2011 confi rmed that 
any regional law establishing priority access to enrolment to the fi rst grade of school for children 
living in close proximity to the relevant institutions, is to be regarded as a purely organisational 
measure aimed at meeting the requirements of federal legislation and cannot be assessed as 
discriminatory or restricting access to education.
115   See, for example, O’C  (2012) op. cit. 7.
116   Federal Law on Education (2012) art 5(2).
117   Ibid. Art 5(3).
118   Ibid. Art 5(4).
119   Ibid. Art 14.
120   Ibid. Art 3(1)6.
121   Ibid. Art 34(1)4–7.
122   Ibid. Art 35.
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public university students to receive monthly allowance from the relevant budget for 
academic achievements or as a means of social support.123 
These entitlements are numerous, well-defi ned and relatively detailed, moreover, 
they are set forth on the legislative (not sub-legal) level: these qualities render 
particular rights in education susceptible for judicial and non-judicial protection. In 
the next two sections I will extract those dimensions of the right to education that are 
protected by judicial and quasi-judicial or administrative methods.
 
2.2.2. Justiciable Dimensions of the Right to Education in Russia as per Domestic 
Case Law
In Russia ‘[s]tate protection of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen [… is] 
guaranteed’ by the Constitution.124 ‘State protection’ includes but is not limited 
to ‘judicial protection’125 of rights, which involves, inter alia, judicial review of 
‘[d]ecisions and actions (or inaction) of bodies of state authority and local self-
government, public associations and offi  cials’.126 It is important that the Constitution 
does not contain any limitation to Article 46 (1) on judicial protection of all rights and 
freedoms. For example, it could only refer to rights and freedoms recognised by the 
Constitution and/or current legislation, or limit the application of judicial protection 
to only justiciable rights and freedoms.127
Thus, theoretically, all rights and freedoms of all individuals are subject to judicial 
protection. However, certain limitations can be imposed at the legislative level 
depending on the type of adjudication, level of the court and type of applicant. For 
example, the rules of admissibility for judicial review of decisions or actions of state 
or municipal authorities or civil servants violating the applicant’s rights or freedoms 
are made clear in a dedicated law.128 These rules expressly provide that in order to be 
admissible for judicial review such decisions or actions must constitute a violation 
of rights and freedoms of the applicant or inhibit their realisation or impose illegal 
obligations or invoke unjustifi ed responsibility.129 
The right to education is also adjudicated through administrative, civil and 
criminal jurisprudence in relevant cases. The vast majority of all decisions (more 
123   Ibid. Art 36.
124   Russian Constitution (1993) art 45 (1).
125   Ibid. Art 46 (1).
126   Ibid. Art 46 (2).
127   For example, art 37(1) of the Constitution of Ethiopia limits the scope of protection by providing 
that ‘everyone has the right to bring a justiciable matter to court’, see Y  (2008) op. cit. 277 
(emphasis added).
128   Federal Law No. 4866-1 of 27 April 1993 ‘On Judicial Review of Actions and Decisions Violating 
Rights and Freedoms of Citizens’ (Federal Law on Judicial Review).
129   Ibid. Art 2.
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than one-fourth) concern health and security issues,130 while another signifi cant part 
relates to physical integrity of students.131 
Other dimensions of the right to education appearing on a common basis before 
Russian courts include the right to receive proper qualifi cations;132 the right to 
access to free pre-school education; the right to combine work and study; the right 
to receive education in one’s native language.133 Less common are cases involving 
expulsion and enrolment;134 equal treatment and fair assessment of knowledge;135 
non-discrimination in education on the basis of income and social origin and other.136
The limits of this paper do not provide for discussion of all of these categories in 
great detail, therefore, I will pick the most salient cases whereby the dimensions of 
the right to education have been signifi cantly amended or altered and if the outcome 
of the case is still relevant according to the newest legislation. 
One of the challenges of Russian education system is ensuring adequate availability 
of pre-school education. For years it has been a serious problem with thousands of 
parents nationwide not being able to secure a place in a nursery for children under 
6.6 years old. Lack of places has often led to creation of a virtual ‘queue’ parents had 
to sign into from the moment their child was born. Eff ectively, this situation has led 
to the expansion of corrupt practices aimed at securing a place in the queue when it 
‘appeared’ to be full. 
Understandably, the right to be put in the queue or a right to keep a certain place 
on the queue was not supported by any legislative provisions, therefore, was not 
enforceable. By adopting respective legislation the government would have confi rmed 
that the constitutional obligation to ensure availability of pre-school education to 
all eligible children has not been fulfi lled. The Constitutional Court would have 
130   Primorsky Krai Regional Court decision No. 33-10985 of 20 December 2010, on failure of a school to 
comply with fi re safety regulations due to budget cuts. The court prioritised public safety and ruled 
on liability of the local authorities to install necessary equipment. Similar decisions: Leningradskaya 
Oblast Regional Court ruling No. 33-5318/2010 of 3 November 2010; Primorsky Krai Regional Court 
ruling No. 33-2282 of 16 March 2010.
131   Moskovskaya Oblast Regional Court ruling No. 33-21461/2010 of 9 November 2010 on liability of a 
school for injuries received by a student during the time he was under care of the institution. Similar 
decision: Supreme Court of Khakassia Repubilic No. 33-1485/2009.
132   Kirovskiy District Court decision of 24 September 2009 on non-pecuniary damages for delayed 
issuance of a diploma. 
133   Constitutional Court of Russian Federation Ruling on Merits No. 16-P of 16 November 2004, on 
equal status of Russian language and offi  cial language of a federal subject (republic) in educational 
process. Similar decisions: Constitutional Court of Russian Federation Ruling on Merits No. 88-O-O 
of 27 January 2011; Supreme Court of Russian Federation Ruling No. 20-GO9-6 of 29 April 2009. 
134   See, for example, Saint-Petersburg City Court Cassation Ruling No. 3112 of 9 March 2011, on 
expulsion for plagiarism or Saint-Petersburg City Court Ruling No. 10622 of 4 August 2010, on 
expulsion for drug dealing and consumption.
135   Supreme Court of Russian Federation Ruling No. 69-G10-14 of 22 December 2010, on equal payment 
for holders of similar qualifi cations.
136   On the analysis of the cases see Vladimir V. N : The Constitutional Right to Education in 
Russian Jurisprudence: Searching for Balance between Private and Public Interests. Yearbook of 
Russian Educational Legislation, vol. 6, (2011) 153.
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immediately invalidated such a provision. Moreover, in the majority of cases the 
courts ruled that the existence of the queue per se is just an organisational measure 
and not an indication of failure to provide access to free pre-school education.137 
Thus, without due legislative and judicial support those parents who were not able 
to secure a place in the kindergarten for their children could only justify their claims 
by appealing to the obligation of public authorities to provide access to free pre-school 
education. Some claims were successful and the courts confi rmed illegal inaction 
of municipal authorities in not creating enough spaces for all children of relevant 
age entitled to free pre-school education and residing in the territory governed by 
these authorities.138 Now in most of the regions transparent online mechanisms of 
registration for pre-school education have been introduced to decrease corruption in 
this sphere and improve visibility of and access to the right to pre-school education.139
Quality of education is a signifi cant dimension of the right to education as one 
of the major characteristics defi ning its acceptability.140 The mode of adjudicating 
quality education in Russia is rather formalised and straightforward and is based 
on evaluating of, fi rst, conditions in which education is provided against those 
benchmarks that are set in the license issued to a particular educational institution 
and, second, contents of education against requirements of state educational standard 
of the relevant level, as stipulated in its certifi cate of state accreditation. 
In a selection of cases the following inadequacies were recognised as violations of 
the right to quality education for the purposes of claim validity: 141
 – formal qualifi cations of teachers are not matching the requirements for 
teaching profession;
 – textbooks are used that are not included in the list of textbooks and teaching 
materials approved by the Ministry of Education and Science142 for use in 
educational process in accredited educational institutions of the appropriate 
level;
 – in-class and extra-curriculum workload exceeds the normative, while 
the number of hours for compulsory subjects is signifi cantly lower than 
envisaged by the standard;
137   On queue-free access to pre-school education see Permsky Krai Court Ruling No. 33-9598/2010 of 2 
November 2010; Moskovskaya Oblast Regional Court Ruling No. 33-15552 of 10 August 2010.
138   Cassation Ruling of Perm Krai Court No. 33-6889 of 11 July 2011. 
139   See among many others examples from Moscow: http://ec.mosedu.ru/norm_docs/; Tatarstan 
Republic: https://uslugi.tatar.ru/cei; Bashkortostan Republic: https://edu-rb.ru; Chelyabinsk: www.
sadiki74.ru; Lipetsk: http://lipetskcity.ru/lipetsk/menu.php?i=3&page=page_3.5.1.3.10.php&text_
pod_menu=pic57
140   As expressly referred to by CESCR General Comment No. 13 (1999) para 6(c).
141   Federal Arbitrage Court of North-Western District Decision No. A56-26788/2007 of 17 June 2008.
142   See for example the Order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Russian Federation No. 
1067 of 19 December 2012 ‘On Approval of Federal List of Textbooks Recommended (Allowed) to 
Use in Educational Process in State-Accredited Educational Institutions Implementing Educational 
Program of General Education in 2013/14 Academic Year’.
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 – the classes are overcrowded;143
 – there are no pre-drafted plans of fi re safety and evacuation and no fi re 
extinguishing equipment, premises of the educational institution do not 
correspond to the requirements of physical safety (no fence around the 
territory, no CCTV).144 
2.2.3. Dimensions of the Right to Education in Russia that Are Protected through 
Non-Judicial Methods
Special Rapporteur on the right to education in his report also highlights the 
importance of ‘quasi-judicial mechanisms such as local administrative bodies, national 
human rights institutions, such as ombudspersons or human rights commissions’ for 
enhancing the protection of the right to education on domestic level.145 As suggested 
by Yeshanew ‘[s]uch institutions ensure the justiciability of human rights through 
quasi-judicial procedures.’146
Among the authorities responsible for addressing violations of the right to 
education in Russia with inquisitorial rather than adversarial functions one will fi nd 
the Federal Service for Supervision in Education and Science with a mandate to 
consider individual complaints under the relevant procedure established by the law. 
147  Most of the claims concern social benefi ts, enrolment and expulsion, illegal actions 
of administration of educational institutions and education authorities, resolution of 
confl ict situations between participants of education process, award of qualifi cations 
and other issues.148 
The statistics of these complaints are, indeed, very indicative. Of 8,763 complaints 
fi led in 2012 twelve per cent were passed on to the Federal Service from the 
Administration of the President and nearly the same number – from the Ministry of 
Education and Science. It means that public awareness of the system of protection of 
the right to education is very low and victims of violations keep sending claims to the 
143   Okoneshnikovsky District Court of Omskaya Oblast Decision of 4 February 2010.
144   Other cases on safety of educational process as a characteristic attributable to its quality include, inter 
alia, Supreme Court of Russian Federation Ruling No. 58-G02-38 of 26 November 2002; Supreme 
Court of Russian Federation Ruling No. 56-G03-6 of 20 May 2003; Federal Arbitrage Court of 
Uralskiy District Decision No. A76-5435/2009-50-80; Federal Arbitrage Court of Povolzhsky 
District Decision No. A55-10197/2008 of 11 November 2008; Supreme Court of Karelia Republic 
Cassation Ruling No. 33-3527/2011 of 29 November 2011; Moscow Oblast Court Ruling No. 33-
24297; Vologodsky Oblast Court Cassation Ruling No. 33-5036/2011 of 2 November 2011.
145   S  (2013) op. cit. para 30., 36.
146   Y  (2008) op. cit. 289.
147   Regulations on the Federal Service for Supervision in Education and Science, approved by 
the Government Decree No. 594 of 15 July 2013, para 5.32. Such claims are fi led in accordance 
with the Federal Law No. 59-FZ of 2 May 2006 ‘On the Procedure Concerning Consideration of 
Communications of Citizens of Russian Federation’.
148   Information on complaints fi led by public in 2012 (Federal Service for Supervision in Education and 
Science, 2012. http://obrnadzor.gov.ru/common/upload/obrashcheniya_grazhdan_2012_g.pdf
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authorities that have the highest profi le in media and not to those directly responsible 
for consideration of such claims.
Response normally provided by the Federal Service includes several types of 
actions, such as explanation or clarifi cation of the relevant law to the claimant, 
passing the issue on to the regional authority or to the competent federal authority, 
such as the Public Prosecutor Offi  ce, initiating fi eld checks, or court proceedings. 
Public Prosecutor Offi  ce is another example of extra-judicial protection of the 
right to education. This offi  ce is very active in extra-judicial protection of the right 
to education through consideration of individual claims and initiating fi eld checks 
on the basis of complaints received. 149 This offi  ce has a direct eff ect on wider 
justiciability of the right to education due to its mandate to act immediately in case of 
detection of a violation and to bring an administrative action against the violator as 
per specialised article of the Code of Administrative Off enses (violation of the right 
to education),150 be it a state (federal or regional) or local (municipal) authority, or 
management of an educational organisation.151 
Examples when Public Prosecutor Offi  ce takes action against violations of the right 
to education are numerous. Some of the recent violations acted upon concerned, for 
instance, lack of due care on the part of local authorities failing to provide heating in 
a public nursery;152 failure of local education authorities to provide free textbooks for 
public schools and charging parents instead;153 violations of established procedures 
of enrolment to a program of higher education (obligatory paid preparatory classes 
ensuring access to a university);154 closure of rural schools without proper democratic 
procedure of obtaining consent of the majority of residents of the village and without 
organising transport access of the children to other schools,155 failure of local 
authorities to ensure record of migrant children not receiving compulsory education 
and provide access to compulsory education to these children accordingly156 etc. 
149   Federal Law No. 2202-1 of 17 January 1992 ‘On Public Prosecution Offi  ce of Russian Federation’, 
arts 10, 21 (2), 27.
150   Code of Administrative Off enses of Russian Federation No. 195-FZ of 30 December 2001, art 5.57 (1).
151   Federal Law ‘On Public Prosecution Offi  ce’ art 26.
152   ‘Prosecutor’s Offi  ce of Kurgan Region Provided Remedy for Violated Rights to Accessible and Free 
Pre-School Education’, 29 August 2013. www.kurganproc.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view
=article&id=4560:2013-08-29-06-25-20&catid=38:news-c&Itemid=166; ‘In Sverdlovsk Region the 
Prosecutor’s Offi  ce Protects Children’s Rights to Accessible Preschool Education’, 22 January 2014. 
www.genproc.gov.ru/smi/news/genproc/news-84587/
153   ‘Prosecutor’s Offi  ce in Komi Republic Takes Action to Secure Constitutional Rights of Citizens for 
Free Education’, 16 September 2013. www.prockomi.ru/news/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=5357
154   ‘Prosecutor’s Offi  ce Disclosed Violations of the Right of Citizens to Higher Professional Education’, 6 
February 2012. http://udmproc.ru/news/show/prokuraturoj-vyyavleny-narusheniya-prav-grazhdan-
na-vysshee-professionalnoe-obrazovanie 
155   ‘Prosecutor’s Offi  ce in the Court Asserted the Rights of Ust’-Kamchatsky Children to Education: 
Local Administration’s Decisions on Closure of Two Schools Were Deemed Illegal’, 24 April 2013. 
http://severdv.ru/news/show/?id=71085
156   ‘Kineshma City Prosecutor’s Offi  ce Disclosed Violations of the Rights to Education of Migrant 
Children’, 27 May 2013. http://prokuratura.ivanovo.ru/кинешемской-городской-прокуратурой-16/ 
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Public prosecutors in the regions are quite effi  cient in terms of providing immediate 
extra-judicial remedy for violations of the right to education. Their interventions 
result in readmitting expelled students;157 providing free textbooks to pupils of 
public schools;158 opening of fi nal two classes of compulsory schooling for a group of 
children insuffi  cient for a full class,159 and so forth.
Field checks conducted by the General Prosecutor’s Offi  ce on the account of 
implementation of the priority national project ‘Education’ in 2012 revealed more than 
80,000 violations of the right to education and management of education activities, 
including misappropriation of funds allocated for equipment of public schools, 
reconstruction and renovation of public school premises, failure to remunerate class 
leaders, to provide access to distance learning for disabled children, or to fi lter out 
restricted Internet content of pornographic or extremist nature.160
Among other non-judicial mechanisms of redress the Commissioner for Human 
Rights in the Russian Federation,161 a National Human Rights Institution with 
ECOSOC status A,162 plays a very important role. Annually, it considers nearly 200 
claims concerning the right to education.163 The Russian Civic Chamber plays a 
similar role.164 Its functions include, inter alia, facilitation of ‘coordination between 
the socially signifi cant interests of citizens of Russia, NGOs, and national and local 
authorities, in order to resolve the most important problems of economic and social 
157   ‘In the City Bolshoy Kamen after a Prosecutor’s Intervention 85 Illegally Expelled Children Were 
Readmitted to the Programs of Non-Formal Learning’, 13 May 2013. http://prosecutor.ru/news/
prokuratura-zato-bolshoykamen/2013-05-13--2.htm
158   Sergey K : Non-Free Right to Education: Authorities of Udmurtia Do Not Provide 
Textbooks. Gazeta No. 33, (1144) 4 September 2013. http://netreforme.org/news/nebesplatnoe-
pravo-na-obrazovanie-vlasti-udmurtii-uchebniki-ne-dayut/
159   ‘Prosecutor Asserted the Right of Children to Continue Education in the 10th Grade in their ‘Own’ 
School’, 6 September 2013. http://udmproc.ru/news/show/prokuror-otstoyal-pravo-detej-prodolzhit-
obuchenie-v-10-klasse-v-svoej-rodnoj-shkole 
160   ‘General Prosecutor’s Offi  ce Analysed the Realisation of Rule of Law in the Process of Implementation 
of the Priority National Project ‘Education’’, 25 February 2013. http://genproc.gov.ru/smi/news/
genproc/news-81254/. Priority National Project ‘Education’ started on 5 September 2005 to address 
the most sensitive areas of Russian education system: class leaders, school lunches, school buses, 
revelation and support of best teachers and gifted children, education of military offi  cers, see the 
Project’s page on the Ministry of Education and Science website: http://минобрнауки.рф/проекты/
пнпо
161   Acting on the basis of Russian Constitution (1993) art 103 (e); Federal Constitutional Law No.1-FKZ 
of 26 February 1997 ‘On the Commissioner for Human Rights of Russian Federation’. 
162   International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights, Chart of the Status of National Institutions Accredited by the International 
Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
accreditation status as of 11 February 2013. www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/NHRI/Chart_
Status_NIs.pdf
163   Report of the Commissioner For Human Rights in the Russian Federation on Consideration of claims 
in 2012. http://ombudsmanrf.org/images/stories/word/prilogenie_doc_2012.doc
164   Acting on the basis of Federal Law ‘On the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation’ No. 32-FZ of 4 
April 2005.
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development, to ensure national security, and to defend the rights and freedoms of 
citizens of Russia’.165 With regard to the right to education such defence is included in 
the mandate of the Council’s Commission on Development of Education.166 
These examples demonstrate how non-judicial methods of redress for violations 
of the right to education in Russia contribute to strengthening of inquisitorial 
justiciability at the domestic level. Although the thematic issues of complaints 
fi led with the authorities briefl y listed above are similar to those that appear in the 
courtroom, some elements of the right to education are only present in non-judicial 
proceedings. For example, violence in education connected with violation of human 
dignity, religious rights in education and corrupt practices comprise, perhaps, the 
main areas of divergence. These types of misconduct are highly latent and rarely 
reach courtroom. However, since non-judicial authorities do have, in most cases, 
the right to initiate checks and investigations, some of the latent cases tend to be 
disclosed through these procedures. Furthermore, engagement with these extra-
judicial procedures does not require any special legal knowledge, nor payment of 
fees, decisions of these authorities take immediate eff ect. Therefore, cases that require 
instant reaction of authorities are most likely to appear before a public prosecutor or a 
regional supervision authority than before a court. 
2.3. International Justiciability of the Right to Education
According to Addo the two levels of justiciability – domestic and international – 
diff er from the perspective of both institutional capacity and procedural basis. 
Domestic justiciability is ‘usually undertaken by the courts of law’, while at the level 
of international law ‘judicialism […] is not always necessary’. From the procedural 
point of view the former type – adversarial justiciability – is achieved, as suggested 
by the term, through a dispute of opposing parties, whereas the latter – inquisitorial 
justiciability – proceeds mainly through an enquiry mechanism of a monitoring 
(treaty) body.167
Regional systems of international protection of human rights are, by and large, 
more substantially and procedurally elaborated and are generally considered more 
eff ective than universal enquiry mechanisms.168 Among them the European Court of 
Human Rights, the ‘crown jewel of the world’s most advanced international system 
165   See the information of the Council’s offi  cial website: www.oprf.ru/en 
166   On the activities of the Commission see: www.oprf.ru/1449/1512 
167   A  (1988) op. cit. 1426. 
168   A  (2010) op. cit. 226. For assessment and analysis of regional human rights mechanisms see also, 
inter alia, Takele Soboka B : The Utility of Cross-Cutting Rights in Enhancing Justiciability 
of Socio-Economic Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. U. Tas. L. Rev., 
vol. 29, (2010) 142.; Tara J. M : ‘Justice vs. Justiciability?: Normative Neutrality and Technical 
Precision, the Role of the Lawyer in Supranational Social Rights Litigation. N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol., 
vol. 39, (2006–2007) 385.
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for protecting civil and political liberties’,169 is perhaps the most prominent and, 
eff ectively, the only adversarial tool of international redress for Russian citizens.
According to Ingram, in relation to international law ‘justiciability’ is defi ned 
as the ‘quality of being capable of being considered legally and determined by the 
application of legal principles and techniques’.170 We can see that this defi nition is 
much more generous in terms of application – there are no institutional or procedural 
restrictions whatsoever, moreover, there is no reference to formalised legal norms, on 
the contrary, according to this defi nition, a matter would be considered internationally 
justiciable if legal ‘principles’ can be applied to resolve it.171
A somewhat narrower approach is taken by scholars to defi ne international 
justiciability with reference to a particular mechanism. For example, with respect 
to ICESCR justiciability is defi ned as the possibility for domestic courts to ‘take 
account of Covenant rights where this is necessary to ensure that the State’s conduct 
is consistent with its obligations under the Covenant’.172 
Whatever the approach, the capacity of a right to be protected on the international 
level is not as important per se as in its connection with those limitations of economic, 
social or political nature that undermine the right’s justiciability. The limitations can 
also be substantial in essence. As researched in great detail by Marcus, justiciability 
of human rights at international level diff ers in scope not only for diff erent types of 
rights (civil and political or socio-economic), but also for diff erent state obligations 
(respect, protect and fulfi l). 173 According to Marcus violations of obligations to respect 
economic, social and cultural rights were more successful in being addressed by both 
judicial and quasi-judicial bodies at supranational level, whereas the obligations to 
protect or fulfi l still ‘resist international judicial scrutiny’ due to their well-known 
‘positive and progressive aspects’. 174
169   Laurence R. H : Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep 
Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime. Eur J Int Law, vol. 19, no. 1, (2008) 125.
170   I  (1994) op. cit. 354 (emphasis added).
171   For the defi nition of legal principles and the way they diff er from legal rules and standards see, inter 
alia, Ronald M. D : The Model of Rules. Yale Law School, 1967.; H. L. A. H : The concept 
of law. 2nd ed., Oxford, OUP, 1997.; Joseph R : Legal Principles and the Limits of Law. Yale. L. J., 
vol. 81, (1971–1972) 823.; Thomas R. K : Rules, Principles, and the Law. Am. J. Juris., vol. 18, 
(1973) 114.
172   Leyla C : Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Review of China’s First Periodic Report on the Implementation 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Colum. J. Asian L., vol. 19, 
(2005–2006) 31.
173   On political limitations of supranational human rights mechanisms see, for example, David M : 
The Normative Development of Socioeconomic Rights through Supranational Adjudication. Stan. J. 
Int’l L., vol. 42, (2006) 53., 68. 
174   As asserted by Marcus the practice of international human rights tribunals supports this conclusion 
as the ECJ is clear on the issue that ‘obligations to fulfi l are beyond its judicial competence’ while 
the ECHR has addressed positive obligations only when overlapping domestic norms provide legal 
cover, see M  (2006) op. cit. 87.
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In Russia ‘international treaties and agreements [… constitute] a component part 
of its legal system’.175 They do not require incorporation; they have precedence over 
national law in cases of legal collision and are directly referred to by domestic courts 
even at the lowest levels,176 as recommended by the CESCR.177 Thus it can be argued 
that all dimensions of the right to education recognised at the international level 
and confi rmed through international case law are potentially justiciable in Russia 
through direct reference to the treaties and their interpretation. 
In Russia the right of everyone to appeal to ‘international bodies for the protection of 
human rights and freedoms, if all the existing internal state means of legal protection 
have been exhausted’ is guaranteed by Constitution.178 Traditionally, the work of the 
European Court of Human Rights is referred to under this provision. However, the 
only two cases on the right to education in Russia that have been considered by the 
court do not provide much material for analysis.179 
It should be noted that this constitutional norm does not limit the possibilities 
of Russian citizens exclusively to adversarial international protection, but also 
includes, potentially, quasi-judicial procedures, such as treaty monitoring bodies and 
complaints procedures. 
Treaty bodies monitoring procedures directly aff ect justiciability of the right 
to education at domestic level by giving highly compelling, albeit not binding, 
recommendations to improve legal, judicial and organisational guarantees of its 
protection.180 However, they do not per se provide a forum for appealing decisions 
175   Russian Constitution (1993) art 15(3).
176   See, for example, Tomsk Regional Court Appellate Decision No. 33-2696/2012 of 26 October 2012, 
concerning arrears in the payment of wages.
177   CESCR expressed their concern, inter alia, with poor referencing to the text of the Covenant 
by national courts, see para 301, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Report 
on the Thirtieth and Thirty-First Sessions (5-23 May 2003, 10-28 November 2003) E/2004/22 
E/C.12/2003/14. Economic and Social Council Offi  cial Records, 2004. Supplement No. 2. 
178   Russian Constitution (1993) art 46(3).
179   In Timishev v. Russia (Applications nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00, fi nal judgment of 13 March 2006) 
the Court held that the applicant’s children were unlawfully denied the right to education provided 
for by domestic law due to the fact that the right to education was made conditional on the registration 
of their parents’ residence (para 66). In Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia (Applications nos. 
43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, judgment of 19 October 2012) Russia was held accountable for the 
violation of the applicants’ rights to education on the contested territory of Transdniestria due to 
the fact that Russia exercised eff ective control over that territory by virtue of its continued military, 
economic and political support (para 150).
180   See for example highly detailed concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child in the 2005 Russian report adopted at the 40th Session of CRC (12 - 30 September 2005) No. 
CRC/C/125/Add.5. The Committee has produced recommendations: on the right of children to take 
part in the administration of education (para 88) and forming of its contents (para 92) including 
through freedom of association (para 103); human rights (paras 90, 262) and patriotic (para 260) 
education at schools; prohibition from ‘physical and mental’ violence in education and protection 
of children from it (paras 168-170); administrative liability of parents for non-fulfi lment of their 
responsibilities to provide education to their children (para 168); ‘educational colonies’ (para 178) 
and ‘corrective colonies’ (para 290) as specifi c detain facilities for juvenile criminals, ‘compulsory 
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taken at domestic level. In other words, for the purpose of this research, a victim of 
violation of the right to education cannot directly apply to a treaty body to remedy the 
violation, but in the long run cumulative eff ect of similar violations communicated 
through NGOs or expert mechanisms may give rise to an action from a treaty body 
that may, in turn, aff ect the situation on the ground. 
Some of the treaty bodies have established their own complaints procedures 
allowing for consideration of individual communications from victims of violations 
of human rights enshrined in the relevant treaties.181 The most relevant procedure for 
the right to education would be the one envisaged by the Optional Protocol to ICESCR 
allowing consideration of individual complaints.182 However, since the Protocol only 
entered into force on 5 May 2013 and Russia is not among the countries that ratifi ed 
it by now, there are no relevant cases to cite. Similarly, the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure has not yet 
entered into force, and Russia is also not among the state parties.183 
As opposed to treaty bodies individual complaints, complaint procedure of the 
Human Rights Council, as established by the Institution-Building Resolution 5/1 to 
replace the previously existing 1503 procedure,184 is strictly confi dential and only 
concerns ‘consistent patterns of gross and reliably attested violations of all human 
educational measures’ as alternative to detention (para 292); compulsory basic general education 
(para 247); home education for children who cannot attend general education schools regularly 
(because of long-term illness, family circumstances, etc.) (para 251); the right to be instructed in 
one’s national language (paras 254, 368); right to education of internally displaced persons and 
registration of migrant children with the view to providing them with access to education (para 278); 
access to schools in Chechen Republic (paras 286–-287).
181   Such procedures have been established under Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, New York, 16 December 1966, 999 United Nations, Treaty Series 171 
(ratifi ed by Russia on 1 October 1991); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, New York, 6 October 1999, 2131 United Nations, 
Treaty Series 83 (ratifi ed by Russia on 28 Jul 2004); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities adopted on 13 December 2006 during the sixty-fi rst session of 
the General Assembly by resolution A/RES/61/106 (not ratifi ed by Russia); International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted by General Assembly Resolution 
2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965) art 14; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, New York, 10 December 1984, (1984) 1465 United Nations, 
Treaty Series 85 (ratifi ed by Russia on 3 Mar 1987) art 22; International Convention for the Protection 
from Enforced Disappearance, New York, 20 December 2006 Doc.A/61/488. C.N.737.2008.
TREATIES-12 of 2 October 2008 (not ratifi ed by Russia) art 31.
182   Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New 
York, 10 December 2008, adopted by General Assembly resolution A/RES/63/117, Doc.A/63/435; 
C.N.869.2009.TREATIES-34 of 11 December 2009.
183   Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a Communications Procedure 
adopted at the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by resolution 66/138 
of 19 December 2011. In accordance with article 19(1) the Protocol shall enter into force three months 
after the deposit of the tenth instrument of ratifi cation or accession.
184   Economic and Social Council Resolution 1503(XLVIII) of 27 May 1970 on Procedure for Dealing 
with Communications Relating to Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms adopted 
at 1693rd plenary meeting.
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rights and all fundamental freedoms’ communicated by individuals and / or civil 
society.185 A number of individual communications from diff erent countries resulted 
in serious and immediate action of the Human Rights Council, including passing 
of country-specifi c resolutions, urgent debates, establishing of country mandates of 
special procedures.186 However, this complaint mechanism still remains a process 
behind closed doors unavailable for analysis. 
Eff ectively, the complaint procedure is more focused on cooperation with the states 
aiming at improving a particular human rights situation rather than on resolving 
individual issues. Thus, it aff ects the justiciability indirectly, by calling the states to 
attest their accountability for gross human rights violations and to adopt legislative, 
judicial and organisational measures accordingly.
As a part of their mandates some special procedures of the Human Rights Council 
receive communications, for which they are entitled to react with urgent appeals and 
letters of allegations. The Special Rapporteur on the right to education in his or her 
work takes into account ‘information and comments received from Governments, 
organizations and bodies of the United Nations system, other relevant international 
organizations and nongovernmental organizations’.187 
However, the number of communications regarding the right to education sent 
to the states by the Special Rapporteur remains consistently low. In 2013 only one 
communication has been sent (compared to an average of 40 for each mandate 
covering torture, human rights defenders, freedom of expression and freedom 
of assembly sent in the same period by the respective special procedures). In the 
previous fi ve years the rate remained consistent: 39 communications on the right to 
education against an average of 1,100 of the same categories.188 In the last three years 
the Special Rapporteur has not sent a single communication to Russia concerning the 
right to education.189 However, this situation is in line with general lack of cooperation 
with this mandate on the part of Russian government.190
185   Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1 of 17 June 2007 ‘Institution-building of the United Nations 
Human Rights Council’, para 85.
186   For the full list of actions taken by the Council see List of Situations Referred to the Human Rights 
Council under the Complaint Procedure since 2006. www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/
HRCouncil/SituationsconsideredHRCJan2013.pdf 
187   UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 1998/33 of 17 April 1998, Question of the Realization 
in All Countries of the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Contained in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and 
Study of Special Problems which the Developing Countries Face in their Eff orts to Achieve these 
Human Rights para 6 (a) (i) to (viii).
188   Communications report of Special Procedures: Communications sent, 1 March 2013 to 31 May 2013; 
Replies received, 1 May to 31 July 2013, A/HRC/24/21 of 22 August 2013.
189   See communications reports of Special Procedures 2011–2013: www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/
Pages/CommunicationsreportsSP.aspx 
190   Special Rapporteur on the right to education has not been able to secure a country visit to Russia for 
the whole period of time since the mandate’s establishment in 1998, and Russia is not listed among 




It is clear that international cooperation in all multiplicity of its methods – from 
interactive dialogue, capacity building and awareness-raising to monitoring 
compliance with international obligations – is a powerful tool that can be used to 
enhance domestic justiciability of all human rights, including the right to education. 
Inevitably, the eff ectiveness of this important instrument is often curtailed by 
political attitudes. Unwillingness to accord appropriate signifi cance or visibility to 
recommendations issued by treaty bodies or special procedures is often explained 
by such categories as ‘national interests’, ‘state sovereignty’, ‘legal culture’, 
‘particularities of the legal system’ or even by imperfection of human rights situation 
in other countries. 
Such a defensive attitude does not make allowances for taking into account 
concrete indications of gaps of protection detected by international experts, whereas 
a somewhat more pragmatic approach to the results of thorough investigation of the 
state’s legislation and factual situation would build up political assets of the state and, 
which is more, be benefi cial to its citizens. Although study of these attitudes and their 
eff ect on realisation of human rights are not in the ambit of the present research, they 
deserve a dedicated close attention.
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ON THE VOCATION OF A CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY IN THE 
DECLINE OF THE MODERN AGE
Address at Pázmány Péter Catholic University, 




Magnifi cent Rector, honorable Deans, other distinguished guests, colleagues, 
and friends, it is a great and unmerited honor to be welcomed into your scholarly 
community, and to be so warmly received at Pázmány Péter Catholic University, and 
indeed in Hungary as a whole on my fi rst visit here.
I had the privilege of being introduced to your beautiful country with a visit to 
the Benedictine Archabbey of Pannonhalma. The millennial Archabbey stands as 
a living monument to constancy and clarity through the centuries and across many 
ages of great upheaval in these lands. It has been able to do so because the basic goal 
of the Benedictine monastic communities, as Pope Benedict XVI put it, has always 
been to seek God, quaerere Deum. According to Pope Benedict, “Amid the confusion 
of the times, in which nothing seemed permanent, they wanted to do the essential – 
to make an eff ort to fi nd what was perennially valid and lasting, life itself.… They 
wanted to go from the inessential to the essential, to the only truly important and 
reliable thing there is”.1
This University, too, was born in a turbulent era. I was fascinated to learn how 
it was founded out of Archbishop Péter Pázmány’s desire to respond to the concrete 
needs and realities of his time, in an age of political occupation and religious division. 
Your University has had to continue that mission over fi ve centuries that have seen 
the rise and fall of empires and the ebb and fl ow of extreme tides of ideological, 
cultural, and political tumult.
1   Pope Benedict XVI, Address at the Collège des Bernardins, 12 September 2008.
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In looking at the world around us with eyes of realism it is diffi  cult not to conclude 
that we are again living in times of momentous upheaval, of confusion and instability. 
Politically, demographically, socially, culturally, intellectually, morally, the ground is 
sliding beneath our feet. What were the certainties of centuries are crumbling before 
our eyes into a million fragments, so that what seemed yesterday to be solid rock 
has today become shifting sand. Perhaps (though one can never really know except 
in hindsight) we are in the midst of a transformation of epochal proportions. Where 
can one stand fi rm on such sliding surfaces, today? How can we be sure of anything? 
How do we go from the “inessential to the essential”, to fi nd what is “perennially 
valid and lasting, life itself”?
In considering this challenge, I cannot help but observe that the origin of Pázmány 
Péter Catholic University was rooted in its founder’s zealous contestation of the 
Protestant Reformation. From that original historical mandate, this University can 
be said to have a special mission to respond to the moral and intellectual crises of the 
contemporary age as well, because so many of the challenges we are facing today 
in the decline and crisis of the Modern era took root and grew in large part from 
seeds sown in the Reformation era. As Brad Gregory, the distinguished historian of 
early modern Europe (and my Notre Dame colleague and friend) has shown in his 
monumental study of the long-term consequences of the Protestant Reformation, so 
many of the distinguishing characteristics of contemporary life are the unintended 
but direct byproducts of the forces fi rst set in motion at the dawn of the Modern 
age, in the Reformation’s response to the failures of Medieval Christendom. Gregory 
documents this dynamic with depth and precision, exposing the early-modern origins 
of today’s pervasive secularization of knowledge, of our acquisitive consumerist 
culture, of the reduction of reason to technocratic scientism, and of our inability to 
provide the foundational warrants to justify and sustain our own liberal institutions. 
As he puts it succinctly, “the Reformation is the most important distant historical 
source for contemporary Western hyperpluralism with respect to truth claims about 
meaning, morality, values, priorities, and purpose”. The unintended result of this has 
been “an undesired, open-ended range of rival truth claims about answers to the Life 
Questions” – that is, questions “about the sort of person one should become and the 
sort of life one should lead, concerning what one should value and what one should 
prioritize”.2
Among the many consequences of this hyperpluralism that Gregory traces over 
the centuries of the Modern age are two intertwined dynamics that have occupied the 
center of my own work in public law and human rights for two and a half decades: 
the conjoining of a limitless individualism with the hegemony of the bureaucratic 
state as the only arbiter of our common life. These two strands together can be said 
to characterize much of the condition of incoherence in which we fi nd the discourse 
and practice of human rights today.
2   Brad S. G : The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, Belknap–Harvard University Press, 2012. 
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On the one hand, human rights are increasingly interpreted to require the 
equal valuing and acceptance of every individual desire and choice, refl ecting our 
incapacity to make any objective judgments about the good. At the extreme end of 
that fragmentation of the Life Questions are the conclusions that no desire can be 
judged to be better than another, and that the only “truth” is that there is no way to 
discriminate legitimately among autonomous individuals’ disparate claims to their 
own truths.
One the other hand, we increasingly see the power of the state as the only source of 
cohesion in that shattered world of pluralistic claims to truth and good. Human rights 
empower states to intervene in every social context, but especially in order to enforce 
the vision of individualism gone mad.
Allow me to illustrate this dual dynamic with just one recently reported example.3 
This past week was World Down Syndrome Day. In many places, Down Syndrome 
adults have put together powerful appeals for the occasion, attesting to their human 
dignity. But last year, the French Conseil D’État upheld a ban on a television 
advertisement that showed Down Syndrome young adults addressing a pregnant 
woman who was considering whether to terminate the Downs fetus she was carrying 
(consider that nine out of ten fetuses diagnosed with Down Syndrome in France 
are aborted). They said to her, “Your child will be able to do many things”. “He’ll 
be able to hug you.” “He’ll be able to run toward you.” “He’ll be able to speak and 
tell you he loves you.” According to the Conseil D’État, this ad risked “disturbing 
the conscience” of women who had aborted Down Syndrome pregnancies. And 
thus we end up with an understanding of human rights that requires the State to 
prohibit expressions urging our societies and fellow citizens to be more open and 
accepting of the weakest and most vulnerable members of the community, because 
this might “disturb the conscience” of those whose individual choices diff er. Here we 
have extreme individualism and state control wrapped together in a symbiotic whole, 
where human rights increasingly become a form of authoritarian orthodoxy in favor 
of an ideology of autonomy that leaves no room for relationships, or for dissent.
This interdependence of hyperindividualism and the hegemony of the state can 
be seen as two sides of the same coin, as a single crisis of the diffi  culty of belonging 
to one another in the contemporary world. As autonomous individuals free of any 
claims of meaning or truth beyond ourselves, we are constantly told by the law and 
institutions of late modern liberalism that our freedom and fulfi llment is to be found 
only in the pursuit of our own subjective desires and instincts. And yet, the elementary 
experience of our need to belong, hard-wired into the structure of the human person, 
remains whether we acknowledge it or not. The deep awareness that the horizon of 
our destinies lies ultimately not in what we possess and consume, or even what we 
autonomously choose, gnaws at us with every reduction of life to lust, money, and 
power. And so we are left with atomized individuals who nevertheless have a deep 
thirst for genuine human relationship and for meaning beyond themselves, and yet 
3   Sohrab A : Soulless Liberalism. Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2017.
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whose capacity to belong to another has atrophied like a muscle that has never been 
used. And then the State steps in to claim its heightened role in maintaining our 
frayed social fabric.
It is no wonder, in this context, that the universality of the human person, especially 
in its dual structure as both individual and community, is under siege from every 
direction. From the political right, renewed forms of exclusive ethnonationalism 
appeal to that unsatisfi ed thirst for belonging, but in ways that threaten our openness 
to the stranger, the vulnerable, the other, and thus obscure our awareness of the 
universality of human nature and experience. On the postmodern left, endless 
parades of identity politics and emerging forms of post-humanism dissolve the 
human being into a chimera of socially-constructed or biologically-determined 
contingencies. Pervasive technocratic materialism provides endlessly better systems 
and technologies but is not capable of giving us any solutions to the human and moral 
dimensions of our problems.
Where, amid these powerful contemporary forces assailing the person, can anyone 
cultivate a self-awareness capable of uniting both the individual and the community, 
both the value of autonomy and of belonging, both freedom and responsibility?
We need to be able to recognize that participation and belonging in a specifi c 
community is essential to the fl ourishing of the individual, not only for the satisfaction 
of material needs but even more as the locus of meaning and culture. At the same 
time that particularity must not close us off  to the awareness of the larger scope of 
our ontological belonging to the entire human family. We must fi nd a way to retain a 
meaningful sense of being a specifi c people, while at same time remaining oriented 
toward a greater good, toward a horizon of meaning and purpose that is always 
beyond any specifi c attachment.
These are not mere abstractions. In practical terms, the challenge is manifest 
in our diffi  culty of dealing with the demands of human migration, integration, 
and social cohesion; with the protection and stewardship of the environment and 
our common home; with the need for economic systems that foster a benefi cial 
production and exchange without vaporizing local communities or instrumentalizing 
and marginalizing vast numbers of people around the world. All of these challenges 
and others like them require us to come to terms with the universal horizon of 
human needs and of the common good, while at the same time understanding that 
the demands of hospitality and social integration, of our need for work and economic 
inclusion, even the breath of clean air we are able to take (or not), are all intensely 
local, particular, and personal. For that reason alone, the abstract universals of the 
Enlightenment self-evidently do not suffi  ce to answer the challenges we face today; 
they are too removed from the concrete experience of individuals and communities.
And so we see that one of the most diffi  cult yet urgent needs of today is to fi nd ways 
to reconcile both the universal and the particular dimensions of human experience. 
How can it be the case that we can affi  rm universal truths within the horizons of 
culturally contingent realities? Or, conversely, can universal truths fi nd varied forms 
of legitimate expression and instantiation amid the plurality of human communities? 
How can these two dimensions remain united?
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The genius of human creativity already gives us suggestive affi  rmative responses 
to that question. Consider for instance the music of Béla Bartók, who gathered and 
gave voice to the folk songs of Hungary, united them with broader European ideas 
and developments, and thus expressed them in ways capable of enriching the entire 
world of music? Or to draw from experiences in my own discipline, consider how 
the great legal synthesis of Justinian, born out of the disparate laws of ancient Rome, 
has inspired hundreds of legal systems and centuries of juridical thought, for so 
many distinct human communities across time and space. Closer to our time, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights – one of the “highest expressions of the 
human conscience of our time”, according to St. John Paul II – aimed to articulate 
universal principles of human dignity while still allowing deliberately for the many 
diff erent contexts in which they would need to fi nd varied expression.
Both of these legal examples, not coincidentally, achieved their universality by 
placing the human person at the center of their work: “it is of little purpose to know 
the law, if we do not know the persons for whose sake the law was made,” says 
the code of Justinian. The Universal Declaration begins with the affi  rmation that 
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world”.
Where, today, can we undertake the diffi  cult but urgent, task of creating the 
conditions for similar reconciliations of the universal and particular on the basis of 
the centrality of the human person, and not just in law or the arts but in all of our 
search for knowledge and our common life?
Here is where we can return to the vision of Archbishop Péter Pázmány. In his time, 
he faced the dual challenges of the Reformation, which fragmented the universality of 
the world of Christendom, and of the occupation of Hungary by the Ottoman Empire, 
which threatened to destroy the rich intellectual and moral identity of its people. He 
was concerned with both the universality and coherence of truth, beyond individual 
or nation, and also with the invaluable distinctiveness of concrete human experience 
that his (and every) culture embodies. His response was to found a university, which 
he would have understood paradigmatically as dedicated to the unity of knowledge. 
There, the universal and the particular can meet, and the affi  rmation of a specifi c 
moral and intellectual tradition can seek harmony with the universal horizon of the 
good, the true, and the beautiful.
Today, we are facing the long-term, unintended detritus of the same era of which 
Péter Pázmány stood at the threshold: a world of hyperpluralism, where universality 
is in retreat everywhere and where at the same time the pulverizing forces of 
globalization and technocracy threaten the distinctiveness of every particular cultural 
expression. Following the example of Péter Pázmány, our most fundamental response 
should be in the renewal of education, an education in which we aspire to overcome 
both the fragmentation of the person and the fragmentation of the knowledge of 
reality, which are in the end one and the same.
Of course, in our era most institutions of higher education have abandoned even 
the aspiration or ideal of a unity of knowledge; they are multiversities rather than 
universities. That is even more reason why Catholic universities bear a special 
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vocation in the modern world. They have crucial resources to bring to the problem 
I have outlined. The Catholic tradition embraces the distinctiveness of belonging to 
a people, while also affi  rming that the moral universality of the human person cuts 
across all ties of blood and politics and history. The Catholic tradition envisions, 
without paradox, the harmony of a universal common good and of subsidiarity as 
a fundamental principle of social order. In the past century Catholicism has been 
one of the principal institutional advocates for the dignity of all human beings as an 
ontological reality, and yet also defends the distinctiveness of cultures, recognizing 
that our capacity to honor human dignity only takes visible shape in concrete 
communities, relationships, and histories. And most of all, perhaps, the role of the 
Church has always been to respond to the specifi c needs of men and women in time, 
but to do so by reminding them and educating them to seek the ultimate meaning 
that is present in every fragment of reality – what is “perennially valid and lasting”, 
to return to where I began with the Benedictines of Pannonhalma. If individual and 
community are two essential dimensions of the human person, then transcendence is 
the third. Indicating, from within our experience of this world, the Mystery beyond 
the horizon of our vision is like using the method of linear perspective in art, which 
provides depth and solidity in a painting by pointing to the vanishing point beyond 
its two-dimensional plane. Without it, our humanity remains fl attened and lifeless.
These are, I believe, some guideposts of our vocational paths as faculty members of 
a Catholic university. In their institutionally embodied ambitions and responsibilities, 
your university and mine share a deep common friendship and affi  nity of purpose.
Allow me to conclude, however, with only one cautionary note. To speak of the 
distinctive vocation of a Catholic university in the decline of the modern era should 
not be understood as a form of triumphalism, but as a form of service. Like all service 
it can only be done with humility – in this case, the humility of being aware that 
we do not and cannot ever possess the truth but only can allow the truth to possess 
us.4 We must follow where it will lead, and thus not merely rest on the categories 
of the past but accept that the Spirit will always press us toward newness of life. 
As Pope Francis has repeatedly and urgently reminded us, service is done at “the 
peripheries, not only geographically, but also the existential peripheries: the mystery 
of sin, of pain, of injustice, of ignorance and indiff erence to religion, of intellectual 
currents, and of all misery”.5 There, with a radical openness to the truth, and in all 
the particularity of an unexpected encounter, we may fi nd ourselves surprised by the 
mystery of the human person and by the unity of reality.
For this reason above all, more than for any honor received, I am grateful for the 
gift of my encounter with you today.
Nagyon szépen köszönöm!
4   Cf. Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Roman Curia, Friday, 21 December 2012.
5   Pope Francis, intervention during the pre-Conclave General Congregation meetings of the Cardinals, 
9 March 2013.
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STATE PROMOTED CARTELS AND OTHER STATE 
RELATED COMPETITION RESTRICTIONS
The following papers focus at the intersection of private and public competition 
restrictions. There are various state measures which can distort free competition 
through promoting or approving private anti-competitive arrangements. Some of 
these cases relate to self-regulatory activities undertaken by boards, or associations 
of undertakings. The papers focus on how the EU Court of Justice has developed its 
case law to reach out to anti-competitive state measures, and how national authorities 
and domestic competition laws deal with mixed infringements, that is where the 
anti-competitive conduct was infl uenced by public measures. The topics covered by 
the papers also raise important questions about the relationship and even confl ict of 
competition and consumer protection with various other public policies. To provide 
a comparative Trans-Atlantic perspective, we also include a paper summarizing the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent judgment in this fi eld.
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AND STATE ACTION IN THE EU AND THE U.S.
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1. Introduction
In February 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court affi  rmed a Fourth Circuit decision, which 
upheld a Federal Trade Commission decision fi nding a state licensing board liable 
for Sherman Act infringements.1 A couple of months prior, the EU Court of Justice2 
ruled that Italy infringed EU law obligations by delegating the power to fi x minimum 
tariff s of road haulage services for hire and reward by API, a committee composed 
of a majority of representatives of the economic operators. A couple of years ago, 
the Hungarian agricultural government actively encouraged the joint setting of 
minimum prices for watermelon by associations of producers and supermarket 
chains. Even though the Hungarian Competition Authority opened an investigation, it 
was terminated soon after due to a lack of public interest. The competition watchdog 
*   Associate Professor at Pázmány Péter Catholic University, and of Counsel for Récziczca Dentons 
Europe LLP. I would like to thank Spencer W. Waller, Pál Szilágyi, Mónika Papp, and Rebecca L. 
Zampieri for their helpful comments. This paper is part of a research project supported by OTKA No. 
109414. 
1   North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2013). See Aaron 
E  – Rebecca H : Cartels by another name: should licensed occupations face antitrust scrutiny? 
(explaining that this was the only appellate court case to expose a licensing board to antitrust scrutiny 
and urging the U.S. Supreme Court to take this opportunity to hold boards composed of competitors 
to the strictest version of its test for state action immunity, regardless of how the board’s members are 
appointed).
2   Joined Cases C-184/13 to C-187/13, C-194/13, C-195/13 and C-208/13 Anonima Petroli 
Italiana SpA v. Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti, Ministero dello Sviluppo 




studied that in the course of the competition law procedure, the Parliament adopted 
an act introducing a sort of agricultural cartel exemption with a retroactive eff ect.3
These recent cases demonstrate that state and private competition restrictions 
can be closely connected on both sides of the Atlantic. Hybrid cases,4 involving 
agreements and decisions of undertakings that would violate antitrust rules, and 
corresponding state actions give rise to various challenging legal issues. States may 
rely on private actors to pursue economic or social policy objectives, thus they may 
encourage, support or approve market conduct that would normally be condemned 
as a cartel. The state may also decide to authorize a chamber or other association of 
undertakings to regulate market entry, quality of services or prices. In this paper 
I focus on how state involvement may impact corporate and individual antitrust 
liability. I will identify the state measures that may create immunity for companies 
and the measures that are considered as mitigating circumstances, reducing the 
extent of the responsibility of private actors.
The issues covered in this paper are closely linked to the theory and practice 
of corporatism. Several Western states employed corporatist elements to mediate 
confl ict between businesses and trade unions.5 Corporatist theory is also invoked 
when representatives of a profession seek state approval to self-regulate the activities 
of its members, allegedly serving the public interest, just like guilds in the medieval 
period. Wolf Sauter notes that this system, usually associated with liberal professions, 
is attractive because the rules are enacted and enforced by experts, allowing for 
minimal formal state intervention at minimal cost. However, he also warns that 
the idea of collective representation is essentially antidemocratic, in as much as 
private interest groups adopt rules with semi-public functions instead of the vote of 
individual citizens represented by political parties.6 Public choice theory suggests 
that rules adopted and enforced by interest groups tend to benefi t the members of that 
group while allocating the costs of the regulation to society as a whole.
State related anti-competitive actions involve a wealth of legal and policy issues. 
Therefore, I fi nd it useful to state which aspects I will not address in this essay. I 
3   Case Vj-62/2012, decision of the Competition Council of Act No. CLXXVI of 2012 adopted on 
November 19 amending Act CXXVIII of 2012 regulating the conduct of professional associations 
in the agricultural sector. For a short summary and evaluation, see: Pá  S : Hungarian 
Competition Law & Policy: The Watermelon Omen. Competition Policy International – Antitrust 
Chronicle, 10/2. (2012) 2–5.; Tihamer T : The fall of agricultural cartel enforcement in Hungary. 
European Competition Law Review, 34/7., (2013) 359–366.
4   By `hybrid cases̀  I refer to cases where there are two connected actions, one on the side of a state 
entity, the other by a group of undertakings. In theory, especially in the EU, both the state and the 
companies could be held liable.
5   Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/138442/corporatism. Wolf 
Sauter defi nes “private interest government, is a term of art in political science that refers to a form 
of organisation of society where industry bodies (formerly organisations of craftsmen, such as the 
guild system) play a crucial role in, fi rst, setting rules that apply to their members (and that restrict 
membership), and second, acting in the public interest.” Wolf S : Containing corporatism: EU 
competition law and private interest government. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2550643.
6   Ibid at 2.
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do not intend to cover legal challenges available to attack the state measure itself7 
or the separate antitrust liability of public companies.8 It is thus not the subject of 
this paper to look into the liability of states themselves under EU competition9 or 
free movement rules,10 under the WTO regime,11 or to a lesser extent, under U.S. 
constitutional law,12 or to consider the exact scope of the state action doctrine.13 The 
7   See for example Marek M : Avoidance Techniques: State Related Defenses in International 
Antitrust Cases. 4–5. (quoting cases where U.S. courts accepted or refused to acknowledge 
foreign states as persons falling under Section 1 of the Sherman Act), available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1782888. Also, Spencer W. W : Suing OPEC. U. Pitt. L. Rev., Vol. 64., 2002. 105. 
(arguing that a case against the output restricting OPEC members could be successful, as the US 
courts have become more focused over time on the nature of the activities when dealing with cases 
implicating foreign states).
8   Public ownership is not a valid antitrust defense. Publicly owned undertakings come under the scope 
of competition rules on both sides of the Atlantic. In one notable case the U.S. Supreme Court refused 
to treat the U.S. Postal Service, lacking separate legal personality, as a ’person’ under Section 2 
of the Sherman Act: Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus. (USA) Ltd., 540 U.S. 736 (2004). In Europe, 
the Commission also found Eastern European public undertakings liable in the case of Aluminum 
imports (85/206/EEC: Commission Decision of 19 December 1984 relating to a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, IV/26.870 – Aluminum imports from Eastern Europe, OJ L 92, 
30.3.1985, p. 1–76.). The decision was addressed, among others, to Hungarian, Polish, East German 
and Czechoslovakian state owned foreign trade companies. Point 9.2 of the decision explained, 
“Entities which engage in the activity of trade are to be regarded as undertakings for the purposes of 
Article 85, whatever their precise status may be under the domestic law of their country of origin, and 
even where they are given no separate status from the State.” No fi ne was imposed on the companies, 
arguably to avoid diplomatic confl icts and lengthy court procedures.
9   Prominent Articles of the TFEU are Article 37 (commercial state monopolies) and Article 106 
(granting exclusive and special rights). Furthermore, the ECJ relied on the combined reading of 
various provisions of the Treaties to construe a general obligation for Member States not to make 
antitrust rules ineff ective. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the EU Court of Justice developed its own 
impressive case law according to which, under strict circumstances, even Member State legislative 
measures making practical use of antitrust rules can be declared unlawful based on competition law 
grounds. Article 101 TFEU prohibiting anti-competitive agreements is addressed to undertakings. 
However, if we `mix̀  it with two other provisions, the result is a cocktail off ered to Member States. 
These other necessary components of the cocktail are, fi rst, the loyalty clause of Art. 4(3) TEU that 
obliges Member States to facilitate the achievement of the Union‘s tasks and avoid taking measures that 
would jeopardize these objectives. Second, Protocol No. 27 on the Internal Market and Competition 
annexed to TEU and TFEU provides that the EU `includes a system ensuring that competition is not 
distorted` (before the Lisbon Treaty, the same ‘non-distortion’ aim was clear from Article 3(g) EEC, 
later Article 3(1)g) EC). 
10  The free movement articles of the TFEU can also be used to challenge anti-competitive state measures 
(i.e., Article 34 relating to goods, Article 49 on freedom of establishment and Article 56 on the free 
provision of services).
11  The instruments of the World Trade Organization do not address the issues of anti-competitive 
practices arising from private conduct, even if they are supported, and encouraged by states.
12  Interstate protectionism is illegitimate under the dormant commerce clause. Herbert H : 
Federalism and Antitrust Reform. U.S.F.L. Rev., Vol. 40., 2006. 627., 646. 
13  The act of state doctrine should not be confused with the state action doctrine. Although both can be 
used as a defense in cases brought against private parties, the application of the act of state doctrine 
does not turn on the identity of the defendants, or on a showing of compulsion. Act of state issues arise 
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paper does not cover statutory immunities that exempt a whole industry, an economic 
sector or some specifi c conduct from the reach of antitrust laws either.14 Instead, my 
aim is to focus on cases which, absent state infl uence, would fall under the scope 
of regular competition rules and to inquire to what extent undertakings can defend 
themselves with state actions. In other words, when and how can they rest peacefully 
in the comforting shadow of the state, escaping the heat around.
In the fi rst part of the paper I set out the various legal standards applicable under 
EU and U.S. laws.15 We see that both the EU and the U.S. rely on case law based legal 
tests instead of well-structured legislation. States seem not to favor adopting clear-
cut rules that tie their hands. The European Court of Justice (hereinafter: the ECJ) 
acknowledged that states can use undertakings, especially public ones, to implement 
their economic policies, particularly under Articles 37 and 106 TFEU. We will 
discuss how the Parker doctrine can be invoked by potential cartels in the U.S.
In the second part of the paper I present how these various legal standards are 
applied in practice by looking at a number of typical scenarios. Hybrid cases are 
common with regard to various boards, chambers and other quasi-public gatherings 
of professionals regulating entry conditions and fair business conduct. Aff ected 
markets involve, for example, dentists, lawyers and transporters. In some markets, 
state intervention is necessary to keep markets working properly. The state regulates 
conduct that would otherwise be a natural candidate for an antitrust investigation. 
Dicta in the U.S. Trinko case16 makes it easier for dominant companies to escape 
antitrust liability, which is in sharp contrast with the approach of the European 
Commission and European courts. The relevance of the U.S. `fi led ratè  doctrine, 
giving safe haven to unilaterally charged prices by dominant companies rather than 
collective actions by competitors, will also be highlighted.
This paper will conclude that just like U.S. states themselves,17 U.S. companies 
benefi t from wider protection than their European competitors when their action is 
when a court must decide upon the eff ect of offi  cial action by a foreign sovereign. See: W  (2002) 
op. cit. 105. Furthermore, the act of state defense is invoked in international litigation, the state action 
doctrine is relied on in domestic litigation.
14  In the U.S., statutory exemptions relate to labor, insurance, etc. For example, under the McCanan-
Ferguson Act, an anti-competitive business activity by insurance companies is exempt from federal 
antitrust laws to the extent regulated by state law (15. U.S.C. § 1013 (b)).
15  The temptation to write about how Hungarian law deals with this issue was almost irresistable. I 
decided not to include rules and practices of my own country, Hungary, so as not to confuse problems 
of a domestic, national legal system with those of federal, supranational legal orders.
16  Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offi  ces of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
17  Although the EU cannot be characterized as a state, if it were, it could be regarded as a more centralized 
formation than the U.S. federal system in the sense that EU competition rules impose many more 
restrictions on how constituent states may intervene in markets. To mention just one example, no 
competition rules exist in the U.S. on state aid granted to undertakings, whereas the control of state 
aid is one of the most important pillars of EU competition policy (Articles 107–109 TFEU). Given 
that the idea of free competition is more deeply embedded in American culture than in Europe, this 
can only be explained by a sort of `overcompensation’ by EU courts refl ected at the unbalanced share 
of powers between the European (quasi-federal) and the member state level. I submit that if more 
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linked to state action. This refl ects a stronger reliance on the theory of federalism in 
contrast to the basic idea of supremacy of EU law underlying the European integration 
process, heading toward accomplishing a genuine single market. Apparently, EU 
Member States enjoy a higher level of sovereignty than U.S. states in the areas of 
foreign, fi scal and defense policy. This seems to come at the expense of accepting 
more serious constraints to the regulation of their economies. The single market 
project, based on the four freedoms of goods, services, capital and establishment ties 
the members of the family of European countries together, so it needs strict rules also 
against state related competition restrictions.
2. The shield of state action
2.1. U.S. and EU law on State action
State action or state compulsion involves an action by the state exercising its sovereign 
powers of law making or public administration. Whenever the state is acting 
through a public undertaking, normal competition rules apply. Both jurisdictions 
acknowledge the unique nature of cases where the sovereign has made its point. 
The involvement of government offi  cials in a cartel-like agreement or decision may 
serve as an umbrella to protect from the damaging rays of the ‘antitrust-sun’ rays. A 
common feature of EU and U.S. antitrust laws is that they both developed doctrines 
through judicial case law to exempt business conduct connected with state action 
from the reach of antitrust.18 Considering the serious nature of this issue involving 
important constitutional questions, this may come as a surprise.
There are also diff erences, though. EU law may provide full or partial immunity 
to undertakings, whereas the legal law consequences under U.S. law are less certain. 
Looking at the origins of the immunities, European immunity rules are rooted in the 
concept of economic activity, whereas U.S. law relies on the federalism doctrine to 
justify both public and private anti-competitive actions. Furthermore, we will see 
that the case law of the EU courts places more emphasis on the nature and intensity 
of state action, factors that are largely irrelevant for U.S. courts.
2.1.1. EU law
EU law allows for several defenses in cases where undertakings, subject to various 
degrees of state infl uence, act anti-competitively. A key feature of EU law is 
inquiring to what extent the state suppressed autonomous business decision-making. 
First, the state may create a regulatory environment where undertakings cease to 
enjoy entrepreneurial autonomy. Some agricultural markets may be good examples, 
competence and fi nancial resources were available at the European level, European institutions would 
be less inclined to exert strict control on regulatory actions by Member States.
18  Even more striking in the statute-based EU legal system is that EU Member States have consistently 
failed to codify this rule, despite numerous amendments of the founding Treaty.
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especially under the previous, old-fashioned EU regulatory regimes. In such a 
command-state scenario, economic actors would not act as genuine entrepreneurs. 
Instead, they would act like agents implementing the rules set by the state. Any 
anti-competitive impact would be the direct result of the state measure itself and 
not be imputed to the undertakings. Second, a similar scenario would involve the 
state compelling a certain activity, such as setting the resale prices legislatively or 
by ministerial decree. Again, lack of autonomous business decision may lead to 
full immunity under competition law. To make this complex situation even more 
exciting, this immunity will not apply for the future activity of the undertakings if a 
competition authority or a court has given a fi nal ruling on the incompatibility of the 
underlying state measure under EU law. The benefi ts of a case law based exemption 
can be taken away by the decision of a law enforcer.
As far as this fi rst category of state measures eliminating business autonomy is 
concerned, the ECJ clarifi ed its position in Ladbroke Racing.19 The judges noted that 
the EU competition rules of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU apply only to anticompetitive 
conduct of undertakings carried out on their own initiative. The court explained 
that if the conduct is required by the legislation, or if the legislation creates a legal 
framework eliminating competition on the part of the undertakings20, the restrictions 
of competition are not attributable to the undertakings.21 This requires the EU 
Commission or national competition authorities and courts to analyze the wording of 
national legislation to check whether undertakings are prevented from engaging in 
autonomous conduct leading to an anti-competitive outcome.
Being an exception to the general rule, the standard will be set at a fairly high level. 
Strintzis Lines proves that the hurdle is high for companies to avoid liability.22 The 
European Commission imposed fi nes for collusion among ferry service companies 
operating between Greece and Italy. The companies argued that the regulatory 
framework and the offi  cial policy substantially restricted their autonomous conduct. 
They were obliged to contact each other to negotiate the parameters of their policies, 
including prices. Yet, the ECJ found that the undertakings still enjoyed some 
autonomy in setting their prices and there was no ‘irresistible pressure’ on them to 
conclude tariff  agreements.
The ECJ did not elaborate on the inherent confl ict between the principle of 
supremacy of EU law and legal certainty, also a central concept of the European 
legal order. Which law shall be followed? The law, often in the form of a statute of 
19  Commission of the European Communities and French Republic v Ladbroke Racing Ltd. (Ladbroke 
Racing), Joined cases C-359/95 P and C-379/95 P [1997] ECR I-6265.
20  It is not easy to successfully argue that the regulatory framework alone is responsible for an anti-
competitive outcome. In the Greek GSK case concerning parallel imports of medicine, the ECJ noted 
that, ‘[…] the degree of price regulation in the pharmaceuticals sector cannot therefore preclude the 
Community rules on competition from applying’. Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06 [2008] ECR 
I-7139, para 67.
21  Ibid 33.
22  Strintzis Lines Shipping SA v Commission of the European Communities (Strintzis Lines), Case 
T-65/99 [2003] ECR II-5433.
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the host country, or the case law based European norm? Proponents of European 
federalism would argue that even if a member state measure obliges companies to 
establish a cartel, undertakings should disobey the national rules. The principle of 
supremacy of European competition rules enshrined in the founding Treaty shall 
win the battle. EU sceptics would defend national rules by recalling the principle 
of legal certainty. The ECJ confronted this issue more in depth in the Italian CIF 
case involving the regulatory framework of the Italian match industry.23 Italian 
matchstick makers argued that their market quota allocation practice, raising entry 
barriers to other European companies, was the result of government regulation. 
The Court ruled that a national competition authority could indeed investigate the 
conduct of undertakings even if the cartel is the consequence of unlawful domestic 
legislation.24 Such legislation must be disused not only by national judges, but also by 
national regulatory and competition authorities.25 Yet, balancing general principles 
of EU law, primacy26 and legal certainty, the ECJ admitted that this duty to disuse 
anti-competitive law cannot expose the undertakings concerned to any criminal or 
administrative penalties with respect to past conduct if the conduct was required 
by the law.27 However, the primacy of EU law prevails for the foreseeable future. 
This means that once the national competition authority fi nds an infringement of 
Article 101 TFEU and disapplication of the anti-competitive national law becomes 
defi nitive, national law no longer shields the companies involved.28 Put diff erently, 
their autonomy is re-established and released from the imperative will of the state.29
A second category of state action is when the state measure merely authorizes or 
promotes a given activity. Here, undertakings can be held liable but could invoke 
state action as a signifi cant mitigating circumstance when it comes to levying fi nes. 
This happened, for example, in Hungary during the hot summer of 2012. The State 
Secretary of the Rural Development ministry acknowledged that he participated in 
23  C-198/01 Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) and Autoritá Garante della Concorrenza e del 
Mercato [2004] ECR I-8079.
24  As previously noted, EU rules prohibit member states from adopting measures that would make EU 
competition rules ineff ective. Consequently, both private and public actions can be deemed unlawful.
25  Id. para 51. The act of ’disapplication’ by an authority or a judge may result in legal uncertainty since 
the legislation found to infringe EU law formally remains in force as long as the national legislature 
decides to withdraw or amend it in line with national legislative procedures.
26  In the U.S. context, see Cooper v. Aaron, where the U.S. Supreme Court explained that federal law 
prevails over state law due to operation of the Supremacy Clause, and that federal law, “can neither 
be nullifi ed openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial offi  cers nor nullifi ed 
indirectly by them through evasive schemes […]” 358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401, 3 L. Ed. 2d 5 (1958). The 
Court held that states are also bound by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court as precedence.
27  The Court confi rmed that if a national law merely encourages, or makes it easier for undertakings to 
engage in a cartel, those undertakings remain subject to EU antitrust rules and may incur penalties, 
including with respect to conduct prior to the decision to disapply the national law. Para 56.
28  Ibid. para 55.
29  One issue with this ruling is the confusion created in regard to the potential erga omnes eff ect of a 
judgment. Put diff erently, companies not involved in the administrative or judicial procedure, yet 
subject to the anti-competitive piece of legislation, may still argue that they are shielded from liability.
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a cartel in the best interest of watermelon producers. The Ministry’s goal was to 
increase the size of land where watermelon is cultivated and secure a 15–20% profi t 
margin for farmers.30 According to the GVH investigation, the Ministry hosted a 
meeting between representatives of watermelon producers and supermarkets in order 
to set a minimum retail price of HUF 99/kg and exclude imported watermelon from 
the shelves.
Another defense for a private entity involved in rulemaking or administration is 
to point out the public nature of its activity. The scope of EU competition rules 
covers only economic activities. Public measures, even with an economic impact, 
fall beyond the reach of competition rules. Even if corporations are entrusted with 
the implementation of environmental protection rules or monitoring the air, their 
action will be immune from antitrust rules. For chambers established by a statute, or 
for hybrid commissions with both public offi  cials and representatives of corporations 
on their board, the blurring distinction between what is public and private will be 
an essential part of their defense. The composition of these bodies, the factors they 
are required to consider, and the veto or supervisory rights of the government are all 
important elements in the evaluation of whether the actions of a body like this are of 
a public nature or pursue profi t motivated private goals.
This category of cases often involves unilateral actions potentially infringing 
Article 102 TFEU, or cartel-like rules set by associations. In the 1980s when 
predominantly publicly owned undertakings provided telecommunication services, 
these entities often enjoyed public law status and often combined rule-making with 
the provision of services. For example, the ECJ rejected the application of the Italian 
government against a Commission decision fi nding the activities of British Telekom 
(BT) unlawful under the equivalent of the current Article 102 TFEU.31 At that time, 
BT was a statutory corporation established under the British Telecommunications Act 
and owned by the state. BT had a duty to provide various telecommunication services 
as the holder of the statutory monopoly for running telecommunications systems in 
the United Kingdom. BT also had the right to exercise rule-making powers setting 
charges and conditions by means of schemes published in offi  cial gazettes. Some of 
these schemes were designed to prevent private message forwarding agencies from 
entering the BT monopolized market. The Commission argued that the schemes 
performed the same function as contractual terms, and were freely adopted by BT 
without any intervention on the part of the United Kingdom authorities.
There were other cases where the Court did not hesitate to refuse challenges against 
high fees qualifying the activity as public by its nature. Eurocontrol concerned 
allegedly abusive fees charged for the provision of services involving the supervision 
30  See the reports of the daily Népszabadság and online portal Index: http://index.hu/gazdasag/
magyar/2012/08/13/budai_kartelleztunk_es_akkor_mi_van/. Later, he refused to use the term 
“cartel”, but did acknowledge that he invited supermarkets not to sell Hungarian watermelon at 
dumped prices and not to import the fruit from abroad. 
31  Case 41/83 Italy v Commission (“British Telecom”) [1985] ECR 873. Remarkably, the Commission 
decision challenging the state of play in the UK was challenged by the Italian government seeking to 
maintain its similar institutional setup and not by the UK.
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of air space. Since the ECJ held that these activities by their nature were connected to 
functions of public authority, the competition rules of the treaty designed to address 
restrictions arising from economic activities could not be applied.32 Eurocontrol was a 
public body, regulated by international agreements, which was not the situation for an 
undertaking registered in Italy as a private corporation that provided environmental 
protection services in the international port of Genoa for a fee. In Diego Cali the ECJ 
held that SEPG was entrusted with duties that belong in the public authority sphere 
and so `clients̀  could not challenge the fees under antitrust rules.33
In addition to pointing out the intensity of state intervention or the public nature 
of activity, undertakings and their associations may also argue that their rule-making 
activity was necessary for the proper functioning of their business or profession. 
Wouters was the fi rst case where the ECJ acknowledged that there are restrictions 
adopted by an association of undertakings that can be justifi ed under Article 101 (1) 
instead of the effi  ciency based exemption provisions enshrined in Article 101 (3).34 
This judicial ruling acknowledges that restrictions exist that are necessary for the 
proper functioning of a market that restrict free, autonomous market conduct without 
directly being related to effi  ciencies.35 Under this Wouter formula, undertakings 
would not dispute the autonomous or economic nature of their activity. Rather, the 
emphasis is on the unavoidable necessity of the restriction so that it should not be 
interpreted as a restriction of competition. The state is involved by establishing a 
chamber and authorizing the chamber to adopt rules that govern the market activity 
of its members. In fact, these rules, often intended to maintain the integrity of a 
profession, could have or should have been adopted by the government itself.
Finally, for the sake of completeness, I mention Article 106 (2) TFEU, which 
provides a specifi c exception for undertakings that perform a service of general 
economic interest from infringing competition rules. This defense is not frequently 
used as it is diffi  cult to prove all the elements of this provision. The undertaking 
should be expressly entrusted with an activity that involves a genuine public service. 
The second part of the test is that the undertaking be un able to fulfi ll its mission 
32  C-364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft v. Eurocontrol [1994] ECR I-43.
33  C-343/95 Diego Calì & Figli Srl v Servizi ecologici porto di Genova SpA (SEPG) [1997] I-1547.
34  Case C-309/99 J. C. J. Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v. 
Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten [2002] ECR I-1577. The Court also applied 
this reasoning in Meca Medina in connection with the Olympic sports doping rules: C-519/04 P David 
Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-7006.
35  The only problem is that the text of Article 101 does not foresee such a category of exemption. Arguing 
that a restriction like this amounts to an anti-competitive restriction that is justifi able because of 
its necessity is an extremely vague and somewhat contradictory eff ort to circumvent the textual 
limitations of EU competition rules. I suggest that a somewhat less contradictory approach would 
have been to label these cases as having neither an anti-competitive aim nor eff ect. A restriction that 
is absolutaly necessary to the rules of the game is a pre-requisite for that market to exist and not really 
a restriction of autonomous business conduct.
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laid down by the member state.36 Finally, the restriction of competition should not go 
against the interests of the common market.
I should note that under EU law, the form of the manifestation of the state will 
does not seem to matter. It is certainly much more straightforward to prove state 
compulsion if a legislative or regulatory act is present, but it is not a pre-requisite 
to establish the lack of liability of the undertakings concerned. In Asia Motors III, 
the ECJ held that Article 101 should not apply if the conduct was imposed by the 
authorities through the exercise of `irresistible pressure‘.37
2.1.2. U.S. law
On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.S. Supreme Court has long held that 
anticompetitive action by state governments and private conduct38 in compliance with 
that measure are immune from liability under the Sherman Act.39 The state-action 
doctrine provides antitrust immunity if the state’s intent to displace competition with 
regulation is “clearly articulated and affi  rmatively expressed as state policy”.40 For 
non-public actors, the state should also establish a mechanism to ensure that private 
interests do not interfere with the public ones. The test examines whether the private 
party’s anticompetitive conduct promotes state policy rather than merely the party’s 
individual interests.41
The leading authority is Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) involving a raisin 
cartel sponsored by the State of California in response to a crisis caused by the 
oversupply of raisins. To put this case into an integration perspective, some 95% of 
California raisins were sold in interstate or foreign commerce, meaning that California 
essentially shifted the costs of the market protection measure to consumers outside of 
California. There does not seem to be much impact on relations between states in the 
EU or the U.S. Interestingly, the measure was not challenged by a foreign importer 
but by a Californian raisin producer arguing that the scheme was a conspiracy 
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiff  sued the director and 
members of the California state advisory committee. The prorate zone was proposed 
by producers and the prorate program was approved by raisin producers but it was 
the State of California, acting through a commission, that adopted and enforced the 
program.
36  Due to space constraints, I will not deal with this unique defense category in much detail in this paper.
37  Asia Motor France SA and others v Commission of the European Communities (Asia Motor III), Case 
T-387/94 [1996] ECR II-961.
38  Since Section 1 of the Sherman act is addressed to ‘any persons,’ a category wider than the concept 
of ‘undertaking’ applied in Article 101 TFEU, the American state action doctrine also encompasses 
actions by state or local government offi  cials.
39  Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The U.S. Supreme Court held at 351 that,̀ [t]here is no suggestion 
of a purpose to restrain state action in the Act’s legislative history. The sponsor of the bill which was 
ultimately enacted as the Sherman Act declared that it prevented only »business combinations« .̀
40  Cal. Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc, 445 U.S. 97, at 105 (1980).
41  Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, at 101 (1988).
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The Parker Court ruled that the U.S. Congress did not intend for the Sherman 
Act to preempt state economic regulation, “[i]n a dual system of government in 
which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may 
constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a 
state’s control over its offi  cers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.”42 
The Court could also point out that there was no contract, agreement or conspiracy 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Actually, it was the State’s action that made 
such conspiracy superfl uous. Even though the marketing program for the 1940 raisin 
crop eliminated competition among producers with respect to the terms of sale, 
including the price, of the crop and to impose restrictions on the sale and distribution 
to buyers who subsequently sell and ship in interstate commerce, this regulation of 
state industry was held to be of local concern not prohibited by the commerce clause 
in the absence of Congressional legislation.43
Antitrust is infl uenced by state sovereignty and federalism. Under the Tenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,44 the powers not delegated by the Constitution 
to the federal government remain in the competence of states. The United States 
Constitution grants the sovereignty of each state. The authority to regulate their 
economies is among the powers not delegated to the federal government, as long 
as such economic regulation does not unduly impede interstate commerce.45 Judge 
Kennedy’s recent opinion in North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 
574 U.S. (2015) recalled that federal antitrust law is a central safeguard for free-
market structures. However, there are other values regulated by states at the expense 
of the Sherman Act. State-action immunity exists to avoid confl icts between state 
sovereignty and the national commitment to a policy of robust competition.46 The 
Court cited FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1003 (2013) and 
FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U. S. 621 (1992) in warning that the immunity is 
not unbounded, “[G]iven the fundamental national values of free enterprise and 
economic competition that are embodied in the federal antitrust laws, ‘state action 
immunity is disfavored, much as are repeals by implication.’’47 This comes close to 
acknowledging the supreme nature of free markets and competition. Exceptions to 
the competition principle should be clearly expressed.
The proper defi nition of “state” and thus the scope of the exception has been 
the subject of controversy. The U.S. state action doctrine fi rst applies to state 
42  Parker v. Brown, at 359.
43  Parker v. Brown, at 368.
44  The Tenth Amendement, as part of the Bill of Rights, was ratifi ed on December 15, 1791. The Court 
reasoned in Parker v. Brown that, “[i]n a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, 
the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, 
an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s control over its offi  cers and agents is not lightly to be 
attributed to Congress.” Ibid. at 351.
45  New York v. U.S. 505 U.S. 114 (1992).
46  North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 574 U. S. (2015).
47  Id. (slip op.) at 7 [citing FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., 568 U. S.,133 S.Ct. 1003 (2013) 
quoting FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U. S. 621, at 636 (1992)].
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governmental persons and governments themselves who are generally immune 
from antitrust liability without further inquiry. The Court explained that “[w]hen 
the conduct is that of the sovereign itself [...] the danger of unauthorized restraint 
of trade does not arise.” The doctrine also covers quasi-governmental entities, like 
cities and other municipalities, regulatory boards and private actors, but they need 
to pass a two-prong test. The two-prong test is also applied to hybrid cases subject 
to this essay.
C    
The seminal Parker v. Brown decision focused on the liability of the state and its 
offi  cials and the Court did not need to resolve the question to what extent state 
mandated private action can be shielded from antitrust laws. The Court developed 
the two-prong test in Cal. Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 
(1980).48
The fi rst prong is “clear articulation.” This prong ensures that the state has clearly 
authorized departures from the principles of free-market competition. The second 
prong of the test is called “active supervision,” which is intended to ensure that state 
action immunity covers only the particular anticompetitive acts of private parties 
that actually serve state regulatory policies. Overall, the state action doctrine makes 
clear that a properly adopted and thoroughly supervised regulation preempts federal 
antitrust policy and creates immunity for companies. 
A general grant of authority to set prices or acquire other entities does not appear 
to meet the clear articulation prong of the test. In Community Communications Inc., 
v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that 
a general grant of authority is not equal to an authorization to engage in specifi c 
anticompetitive conduct.49 Yet, in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 
(1985), the Court decided that giving cities the authority to decide where to provide 
sewage services foreseeably included potentially anticompetitive conduct in the 
form of refusing to serve.50 This low standard for foreseeability led to many cases 
exempting companies from the reach of antitrust law. In Martin v. Memorial Hosp. at 
Gulfport, 86 F.3d 1391 (5th Cir. 1996), the Fifth Circuit held that when the legislature 
authorized the hospital to contract with any individual for the provision of kidney 
dialysis services a subsequent exclusive contracts cannot be subject to antitrust laws, 
because the alleged anticompetitive exclusive agreement was foreseeable.51
Clear articulation does not require that the state compels the anticompetitive 
conduct at issue. In Southern Motor CarriersRate Conference, Inc. v. United States 
471 U.S 48 (1985), the Supreme Court reasoned that a state legislative decision to set 
rates through a public service commission, rather than through free market forces, 
48  Cal. Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
49  Community Communications Inc., v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, at 56 (1982).
50  Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, at 41–43 (1985).
51  Martin v. Memorial Hosp. at Gulfport, 86 F.3d 1391 (5th Cir. 1996).
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clearly demonstrated its intention to displace competition in motor carrier ratemaking 
and satisfi ed the fi rst requirement.52 The absence of compulsion does not mean that 
there is a lack of state policy. U.S. law is more permissive than the EU in this regard. 
Under EU law, permission to restrict competition does not result in immunity. Since 
the autonomy of undertakings was only limited and not eliminated, they are liable 
under Article 101 TFEU.
One challenge with the state action doctrine is that some lower level courts 
extensively apply the doctrine, exempting government offi  cials and undertakings 
from the reach of federal antitrust laws.53 The Antitrust Law Section of the American 
Bar Association (ABA Antitrust Section) warned that, “[s]tate action immunity 
drives a large hole in the framework of the nation’s competition laws.”54 The Federal 
Trade Commission also urged courts to clarify and re-affi  rm the original purposes of 
the state action doctrine to help ensure that robust competition continues to protect 
consumers.55 Hebert J. Hovenkamp warned that inferring immunity from the mere 
grant of otherwise ordinary corporate powers would disserve principles of federalism 
as well as competition policy.56
52  Southern Motor CarriersRate Conference, Inc. v. United States 471 U.S. 48, at 60 (1985).
53  A. M. Dively notes that, “the elusive contours of the doctrine have caused circuit splits and overbroad 
application that threatens to subvert the goals of both federalism and competition”. She analyzes the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decision in Federal Trade Commission v. 
Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. as an example of misapplication of state action immunity. The 
case was about a merger between private hospitals under an allegedly “sham” authorization by the 
state hospital authority. The district court held the combination of the authority’s power to acquire 
and lease hospitals, to operate on a nonprofi t basis, and to operate hospital networks demonstrated 
that Georgia’s legislature “intended to guarantee that hospital authorities could accomplish their 
mission of promoting public health regardless of the potential anticompetitive eff ects”. In FTC v. 
Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 663 F.3d 1369, 1378 (11th Cir. 2011) the appellate court affi  rmed the 
district court’s ruling that because the Georgia Legislature clearly articulated the intent to empower 
county hospitals to engage in anti-competitive activity, the Hospital Authority of Albany–Dougherty 
County’s proposed acquisition of its only competitor was protected under the state action doctrine. 
Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 663 F.3d 1369. In: Angela M. D : Clarifying State Action 
Immunity under the Sherman Antitrust Laws: FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System. St. Thomas 
Law Review, Vol. 25., 2012. 74. Since then, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Trade 
Commission’s petition and more clearly defi ned the contours of the doctrine.
54  A  B  A , S   A  L : The State of Antitrust Enforcement – 
2001. at 42 2001., available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/pdf_docs/antitrustenforcement.pdf.
55  The FTC State Action Report concluded that, “[s]ome lower courts have implemented the clear 
articulation standard in a manner not consistent with its underlying goal.” Offi  ce of policy planning, 
FTC, report of the state action task force 5 (2003), at 25. available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/
stateactionreport.pdf.
56  Herbert J. H : Antitrust’s State Action Doctrine and the Ordinary Powers of Corporations 
6–7. (July 12, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012717 (criticizing some judgments that 
carried the idea of “authorization” much further, concluding that authorizing a fi rm to engage in 
its ordinary corporate activities, such as contracting or acquiring assets, also operates to authorize 
conduct that would otherwise be unlawful under the antitrust laws).
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A     
State action immunity covers public actors and private actors may also benefi t from 
the antitrust shield. Parker immunity may also cover non-sovereign actors controlled 
by market participants, but they must demonstrate that the challenged restraint is 
clearly articulated as state policy, and is actively supervised by the state. These two 
conditions endeavor to ensure that a non-state entity may invoke immunity only if 
it exercises the state’s sovereign power. Accordingly, Parker immunity requires that 
the anticompetitive conduct of non-sovereign actors, especially those authorized by 
the state to regulate their own profession, results from procedures that suffi  ce to 
make it the state’s own. 
Political subdivisions of the state, such as municipalities, cities or townships, are 
not entitled to the same protection from antitrust law as the state itself.57 When faced 
with actions of an entity that has a combination of public and private attributes courts 
usually inquire whether the connection between the state and the entity in question 
is suffi  ciently strong that there is danger that it is involved in a private arrangement.58 
The city must thus show that there is a state policy to displace competition and that the 
legislature contemplated the kind of municipal actions alleged to be anticompetitive.59 
The federal government reacted to this narrow interpretation by passing the Local 
Government Antitrust Act (LGAA) of 1984, barring antitrust damage actions against 
local governments or private parties whose conduct was based on offi  cial action by 
a local government.60 
In GF Gaming Corporation v. City of Black Hawk, 405 F. 3d 876 (10th Cir., 
2005).61, the businesses and property owner plaintiff s in the Central City, Colorado 
sued the neighboring city of Black Hawk and several casinos for conspiring to 
restrain and monopolize trade in the limited gaming industry. The 10th Circuit Court 
of Appeal held that even if defendants met with city offi  cials and urged them to take 
anticompetitive action, as plaintiff s alleged, this falls under the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine, which makes no distinction between petitioning government offi  cials and 
conspiring with them.62 The Court made it clear that allegations of private defendants 
57  Assuming that cities act in their public capacity and not as an economic actor, contrasting with the ECJ 
interpretation that makes no distinction whether the state measure originates from the Parliament, a 
government entity, or a local municipality.
58  Crosby v. Hospital Auth. of Valdosta & Lowndes County, 93 F.3d 1515, 1524 (11th Cir. 1996) and 
Lorrie’s Travel & Tours, Inc. v. SFO Airporter, Inc.,753 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir.1985).
59  Lorrie’s Travel & Tours, Inc. v. SFO Airporter, Inc.,at 792. See also: Community Communications Co. 
v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (holding that Colorado may have authorized the City of Boulder 
to regulate cable television services but the statute did not suffi  ciently articulate state policy to confer 
protection from antitrust laws). 
60  15 U.S.C. § 34–36. Note that the act does not impose a bar on injunction actions.
61  GF Gaming Corporation v. City of Black Hawk, 405 F. 3d 876, 886-87 (10th Cir., 2005).
62  Ibid. at point 16.
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conspiring to further private interests is irrelevant to the question whether they are 
entitled to immunity under the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 (“LGAA”).63
Boards, bars, and various other agencies with mixed private-public features are 
also subject to the second prong of the test. The Supreme Court held in Goldfarb v. 
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), that even if the Virginia State Bar is a state 
agency for some limited purposes, it is not allowed to foster anticompetitive practices 
for the benefi t of its members.64
The second part of the Midcal test, active supervision, requires the actual 
involvement of the state. The existence of a state’s authority to exercise supervisory 
power is not suffi  cient. Midcal involved a California statute that required liquor 
manufacturers to impose resale prices on distributors. The unanimous decision of 
the Midcal Court established that resale price maintenance (RPM) arrangements are 
not immune under Parker due to the lack of active supervision of the state approved 
price schedules.65 This test is more demanding than the EU case law. For the statute 
and subsequent private competition restriction to become lawful, the state not only 
needs to articulate its policy clearly, but it must also review the reasonableness of the 
resale prices.
Another interesting case is Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor Title Insurance 
Company et al., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).66 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) fi led an 
administrative complaint charging insurance companies with horizontal price fi xing 
in setting fees for title searches and examinations. In each of the four States concerned 
– Connecticut, Wisconsin, Arizona, and Montana – uniform rates were established 
by a rating bureau licensed by the relevant state and authorized to establish joint rates 
for its members. Rate fi lings were made to the state insurance offi  ce and became 
eff ective unless the state rejected them within a specifi ed period. Various institutions 
evaluated this set of facts quite diff erently during the course of the procedure. The 
Administrative Law Judge of the FTC held that the anticompetitive activities were 
covered by state-action immunity in Wisconsin and Montana. The Commission held 
on review that none of the states had conducted suffi  cient supervision to warrant 
immunity.67 When the matter came to the courts, the Court of Appeals reversed, 
63  Ibid. at point 27.
64  Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 791 (1975).
65  Midcal, a wine wholesaler, sold a number of cases of wine at a price below the eff ective price schedule. 
In a similar case, in the EU, the Court did not hold the state measure imposing a vertical RPM 
unlawful. A 1981 French statute obliged all publishers and importers to fi x the retail price for their 
books. As a rule, retailers were not able to sell books cheaper than 5% of the fi xed price. It is also 
true, that the Court inserted the qualifi cation, that this measure does not contravene EU competition 
rules “as Community law now stands” and also warned that other rules of the Treaty, notably the free 
movement provisions, may prohibit a law like this. 229/83, Association des Centres distributeurs 
Edouard Leclerc and others/SARL »Au blé vert« and others [1985] ECR 1. The Court did not have 
to deal with the liability of the undertakings themselves, but based upon the doctrine of autonomous 
business conduct, publishers and importers setting the RPM would have been exempt from antitrust 
rules, since their action was prescribed by the state.
66  Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor Title Insurance Company et al. , 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
67   In re Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 FTC 344 (1989).
Tihamér T150
holding that state action immunity applied in each of the four states. The Court 
explained that the existence of a state regulatory program, if staff ed, funded, and 
empowered by law, satisfi ed the active supervision requirement.68 
The Town of Hallie Court explained that where the action of a government entity 
is at issue, it is presumed that it is engaged in state policy, with little chance of being 
unduly infl uenced by private interests.69
The U.S. Supreme Court was more demanding in its most recent North Caroline 
State Board of Dental Examiners case. The justices pointed out that there is a 
structural risk of market participants confusing their own interests with the State’s 
policy goals.70 The second part of the test is to ensure that these entities should not 
diverge from the State’s considered defi nition of the public good and engage in private 
self-dealing.71 The Court emphasized that the supervision requirement turns not on 
the formal designation to regulators but the structural risk of market participants 
confusing their own interests with the State’s policy goals.
What do public offi  cials need to do in order to meet the second part of the test? The 
content of this obligation is still not suffi  ciently clear. The Antitrust Modernization 
Commission recommended that courts could consider using a fl exible, “tiered” 
approach that requires a diff erent level of active supervision depending on various 
factors, like the type of conduct at issue, the industry, and the regulatory scheme. 
If the conduct at issue were price-fi xing, the affi  rmatively articulated state policy 
ought to be more detailed and specifi c than if the conduct involved less clearly 
anticompetitive activities.72
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in North Caroline State Board of Dental Examiners 
that the inquiry regarding active supervision is fl exible and context-dependent. The 
question is whether the State’s review mechanisms provide “realistic assurance” 
that a non-sovereign actor’s anticompetitive conduct “promotes state policy, rather 
than merely the party’s individual interests. The Court also identifi ed a number of 
requirements for active supervision: the supervisor must review the substance of 
the anticompetitive decision; the supervisor must have the power to veto or modify 
particular decisions to ensure they accord with state policy; the state supervisor may 
not itself be an active market participant; and the mere potential for state supervision 
is not suffi  cient.73
An interesting question is to what extent an authorization by the state can meet 
the second prong of the test as far as the past eff ects of an anti-competitive conduct 
are concerned. In Columbia Steel v. Portland General Electric Co., 111 F.3d 1427 
68   Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC. 922 F.2d 1122 (1991). 
69   Ibid. at 45–47.
70   North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 574 U. S. (2015), at 13.
71   Ibid. at 10.
72   Antitrust Modernization Commission Report, at 373. 
73   Ibid. at 13–14., quoting Patrick and Ticor.
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(9th Cir. 1996),74 the 9th Circuit held that retroactive amendment of an order does 
not immunize the anti-competitive conduct of the past 20 years. The opinion 
emphasized that, “state-action immunity is a question of federal antitrust law that 
turns on the clarity of a state’s expression of its policy, not the subjective intent of its 
policymakers”.75 However, in a case decided ten years earlier, the same court agreed 
that the state’s authorization shields conduct that occurred before the measure, 
provided that this was the intent of the legislator.76 The plaintiff  argued that the 
provisions of the legislation were enacted in 1982, and those statutes cannot confer 
retroactive immunity upon a lease agreement that was signed back in 1966. The 
court disagreed by recalling the legislative intent that was to articulate and affi  rm 
a pre-existing state policy of allowing municipalities to enter into anticompetitive 
agreements at public airports.77 In contrast to this, measures by an EU member state 
simply reinforcing, or approving past conduct infringing antitrust rules would not 
shield undertakings from liability.78
If freedom of competition is to be taken seriously, courts should require genuine 
evidence that the state did intend to replace market functions with other means to 
reach its goals. Silence on this issue, just like silence regarding the second prong 
of the test reviewing private business conduct, should not be suffi  cient to apply the 
state action doctrine to exempt otherwise unlawful, anti-competitive private action. 
74   Columbia Steel Co. v. Portland General Electric Co., 111 F.3d 1427, 1442 (9th Cir. 1996). Columbia 
Steel was a large consumer of electric power in Portland, Oregon. The company brought action 
against two electric utilities charging them with dividing the City of Portland into exclusive service 
territories in violation of the Sherman Act. The companies raised a state-action immunity defense 
on the basis of a 1972 order of the Oregon Public Utility Commission that approved a division of the 
Portland market into exclusive service territories. The Court decided that the state did not clearly 
exercise its statutory authority to approve the allocation of exclusive service territories in Portland in 
1972. The 1992 decision by the regulatory commission “could not satisfy the Midcal test retroactively 
by amending the 1972 order years after the company entered into the monopolistic agreement it now 
seeks to cloak with federal antitrust immunity. In other words, the state of Oregon cannot satisfy the 
objective Midcal clear articulation test by declaring that it had intended to displace competition with 
regulation 20 years earlier.”
75   Ibid. at 7–9.
76   California Aviation v. City of Santa Monica, 806 F.2d 905 (1986). California Aviation, Inc. sued the 
City of Santa Monica alleging that the City engaged in unlawful price fi xing and unfair competition 
in the execution of a lease with California Aviation at Santa Monica Municipal Airport. In 1966, 
California Aviation and the City entered into a thirty year lease at Santa Monica Municipal Airport. 
The lease provided that California Aviation could charge no less for petroleum products than the City 
charged. California Aviation contended that this lease provision violated the Sherman Act.
77   Section 21690.5 of the Californian code stipulates, “[t]herefore, since the proper operation of the 
state’s publicly owned or operated airports is essential to the welfare of the state and its people, 
the Legislature recognizes and affi  rms such operation as a governmental function to be discharged 
in furtherance of the policy of securing the benefi ts of commerce and tourism for the state and its 
people”.
78  Moreover, also the member state itself would be liable under the ”reinforce” limb of the eff et utile rule. 
See, for example: C-35/96, CNSD [1995] ECR I-2883, para 53–54.
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Courts should not simply infer from circumstances, or second-guess crucial public 
policy objectives.
The cases presented so far involved a clash between federal antitrust law and 
private action supported by a state or municipality. In addition, state courts held 
that state antitrust rules cannot apply to instances of state action. For example, the 
plaintiff  was unable to successfully challenge the fee of a taxi company that was 
regulated by the City of Chicago.79
2.2. Foreign state compulsion
A specifi c form of the state action doctrine is when the sovereign is a foreign state. 
Hybrid cases involving a foreign undertaking being used by the authorities of its 
country may also lead to immunity, yet the bar seems to be fairly high in practice.80 
The foreign state compulsion defense may provide safe harbor for a corporation or 
individuals who participated in otherwise unlawful anti-competitive conduct ordered 
by a foreign sovereign. Unlike the EU’s autonomous economic activity concept or the 
federalism based state action doctrine in the U.S., this exception recalls international 
law principles like non-intervention and comity.81 
Both U.S. and EU case law require compulsion for successful use of this defense. 
If only the advice, support, or encouragement by the foreign government can be 
established the defense will be unsuccessful.82 The Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines 
of the U.S. DOJ and FTC from 1995 consider the threat of penal or other severe 
sanctions indispensable for recognition of compulsion.83 It is pointed out that the 
defense is unavailable in cases where the conduct occurs in the U.S.
In the U.S., a federal district court in Animal Science elaborated a three-part test 
whereby a defendant alleging compulsion should show: (i) the existence of an entity 
in the defendant’s state qualifying as an arm of the state by enjoying governmental 
or quasi-governmental powers that are ‘either uniquely peculiar to sovereigns or of 
essentially sovereign nature’; (ii) a direct link between the entity’s powers and the 
defendant, allowing the entity to compel the defendant, subject to signifi cant negative 
repercussions for non-compliance; and (iii) the compulsion is the fundamental force 
79  Chirikos v. Yellow Cab, 410 N.E. 2nd at 69.
80  M. Martyniszyn, ibid at 63 (recalling that although it seems to be universally recognized, it is a judge-
made rule, not a principle of international law). See furthermore United Nuclear Corp. v. General 
Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 629 P.2d 231 (1980) (the court in New Mexico allowed a claim to proceed 
despite allegations that the uranium cartel was compelled by the Canadian government).
81  See for example the 1988 Guidelines the DOJ did not share this logic and considered application of 
the state action doctrine inappropriate in international cases, citing the federalist concepts behind it 
and diffi  culties in establishing “clearly articulated state policies and active state supervision” in an 
international context.
82  Spencer W. Waller notes that this defense has been successful only once, in Interamerican Refi ning 
Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). Ibid. at 133.
83  Antitrust enforcement guidelines for international operations, April 1995, point 3.32, available at: 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-enforcement-guidelines-international-operations.
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causing the defendant’s act, challenged as a violation of U.S. law.84 The court noted 
that participation in the framing of the governmental prescript does not exempt it 
from compulsion.
In Swiss Watchmakers85 the court acknowledged that the compulsion would lift 
liability from the compelled companies. This case involved state approved and state 
facilitated regulation of the watch industry. This state action aimed at keeping all 
the know-how, machinery and watch parts in Switzerland to protect the Swiss watch 
industry from potential competition. Although the regulation was recognized and 
approved by the government, it was still considered a private agreement that was 
subject to antitrust rules and the claim of foreign sovereign compulsion was not 
successful. Despite the state’s engagement, the direct foreign government action 
compelling the defendant’s activities was missing.
A recent state compulsion related case in the U.S. was the Chinese Vitamin C 
case.86 Chinese manufacturers of Vitamin C and their trade association were accused 
of price-fi xing and limiting exports in 2005.87According to plaintiff s, prices rose as 
high as $15, from about $2.50, a kilogram during the scheme from about 2001 to 
2006. In March 2013, the Brooklyn jury found in favor of the U.S. Vitamin C buyers 
and awarded $54.1 million in damages which was then tripled to $162.3 million 
under relevant U.S. law. The federal district court found the available evidence too 
ambiguous and denied the foreign sovereign compulsion defense. It was not enough 
that the Chinese government submitted an amicus brief to the U.S. court admitting 
that companies were required by law to coordinate export prices and volumes. The 
court concluded that the government infl uence was not to be regarded as conclusive 
evidence of compulsion, especially since other documentary evidence submitted by 
the plaintiff s contradicted the brief’s position.88
As far as the EU is concerned, the ECJ was also confronted with arguments 
relying on irresistible pressure by foreign governments. Yet, this pressure has 
never been found so intense as to eliminate corporate liability. Aluminum imports89 
84  Animal Science Products v. China Nat. Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corp. (Animal Science), 
69.
85  United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc. (Swiss Watchmakers) 1963 
Trade Cases (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modifi ed, 1965 Trade Cases (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 
1965).
86  In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation (Vitamin C) 584 F. Supp. 2d 546 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). While more 
companies were sued, only North China and Hebei Welcome remained in the case at the time of the 
verdict. Other companies settled out of court. The case is now under appeal: Re Vitamin C. Antitrust 
Litigation, 13-4791, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Manhattan).
87  This suit came after EU and U.S. federal agencies imposed huge fi nes on mostly European 
manufacturers of various vitamins, including Vitamin C. Interestingly, this lawsuit was initiated by 
lawyers of private plaintiff s. The EU Commission did not investigate the alleged infringement.
88  Ibid. 557. A retired ministry employee who was formerly in charge of vitamin C exports admitted at 
trial that ‘on the whole,’ the government did not involve itself in price fi xing.
89  European Commission, 85/206/EEC, Decision Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 85 of the EEC 
Treaty, IV/26.870 – Aluminum imports from eastern Europe (Aluminum imports), OJ L92, 1-76 (1984). 
Note that there was no subsequent court review procedure.
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concerned anticompetitive agreements with very broad membership between mostly 
primary manufacturers of aluminum and a decision adopted shortly before the fall 
of the Berlin Wall. The EU Commission noted that even if a government supported 
a contract in violation of the competition law, this does not alter the position of the 
companies involved. EU competition law does not distinguish between private and 
public undertakings and both are subject to competition rules, even if the latter can be 
used as a tool to pursue public policy.90 In Wood Pulp, a U.S. export cartel attempted 
to rely on this defense.91 The ECJ noted that the U.S. legislation at issue, the Webb 
Pomerene Act, exempts only export cartels from the scope of application of U.S. 
antitrust, but does not require their creation.
2.3. Summary of the tests: diff erent philosophies with similar but not identical results 
To conclude the fi rst part of this paper, the common denominator of various European 
scenarios is the distinction made between economic activity and public actions. 
Whenever the entity involved in the anti-competitive action can be characterized as 
an undertaking for purposes of EU competition rules, it will be subject to antitrust 
rules. More specifi cally, antitrust rules will apply whenever the activity is an 
economic activity, regardless of the public or private law status of the actors.
U.S. case law also covers individual actions of public offi  cials and representatives 
of undertakings due to the diff erent personal scope of the cartel prohibition. Therefore, 
rules need to be enacted to carve out offi  cials who implement state policy and 
thereby interfere with free competition. States may then provide for the defense and 
indemnifi cation of agency members in the event of litigation. States can also ensure 
Parker immunity is available by adopting clear policies to displace competition and 
providing active supervision.
The European approach does not interpret this antitrust shield in the light of 
proper allocation of sovereign powers between EU (federal) and member states 
(state) levels of government.92 Neither undertakings, nor national governments could 
successfully argue that EU competition rules should not be applied just because a 
clearly articulated national policy restricted competition. The emphasis in Europe is 
to draw a line properly between public and genuine business action.
It seems that competition policy protecting the functioning of the single European 
market is superior to industrial and other national policies even if they are clearly 
articulated and supervised by member states. The U.S. approach refl ects a stronger 
trust in the judgment of states. This U.S. approach is in sharp contrast with 
90  For example, according to established case law related to Article 107 (1) TFEU, the resources of public 
undertakings can be regarded as state resources for the purposes of state aid control. That is, a public 
undertaking selling below market prices may involve providing state aid to the buyer.
91  A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v Commission of the European Communities (Wood Pulp), Joined 
Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85 [1988] ECR 5193, para 20.
92  On the other side of the Atlantic, federal law respects the residual sovereignty of states by 
acknowledging their right to regulate their domestic economies the best they can, even by eliminating 
or restricting competition.
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European law and policy where member state regulations are generally suspected of 
protectionism that undermines the grand enterprise of the European single market.
3. Specifi c scenarios contrasting the application of U.S. and EU law
In this chapter I compare cases with similar fact patterns to inquire whether the 
somewhat diff ering European and U.S. state action tests lead to diff erent results. 
First, I consider seemingly business conduct aimed at persuading government 
to adopt rules consistent with the interests of these lobbyists. Second, I discuss 
regulatory, or tariff  setting committees that are undoubtedly part of the public 
administration but transformable into a cartel meeting by decisive infl uence of 
corporate representatives. Next, I present the issues related to regulatory bodies 
composed of market participants, i.e., chambers in Europe and boards in the U.S., 
which often have a public law foundation. Government infl uence may manifest itself 
either before the chamber action occurs, i.e., by giving market actors an uncontrolled 
power to set market parameters, or afterwards, in the form of approving a previous 
decision by this association of undertakings. Then, we turn our attention to regulated 
industries, like energy, telecommunications and other public utilities where public 
service is sometimes provided subject to price regulation.
3.1. Self-regulation by chambers and other associations of undertakings
The potential competition law issues attached to the functioning of associations of 
undertakings are of manifold. The state may authorize them to adopt rules regulating 
entry, advertisement or even prices. This can be done regardless of subsequent 
state approval. Even if these associations do not defend their case with a reference 
to direct state involvement, they may argue that their activity was necessary to 
serve the public interest. A well-organized cartel can also be seen as a form of self-
regulation aimed at eliminating risk and rivalry. Will the legal evaluation change if 
the state empowers an association of undertakings to set certain rules of the game 
for themselves? In cases under this heading the state exercises soft intervention, i.e., 
doing nothing more than creating or authorizing the creation of the association. It is 
then the association, the chamber of undertakings itself that adopts anti-competition 
action that presumably serves other public policy goals.
As to the public or private nature of rulemaking by association, the ECJ summarized 
the point of attribution of liability in Wouters. According to this, undertakings are 
exempt from the reach of antitrust, […] when it (the Member State) grants regulatory 
powers to a professional association, is careful to defi ne the public-interest criteria 
and the essential principles with which its rules must comply and also retains its 
power to adopt decisions in the last resort. In that case the rules adopted by the 
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professional association remain State measures and are not covered by the Treaty 
rules applicable to undertakings.93
Regulatory bodies not covered by the state compulsion defense often develop 
creative arguments to explain why the anti-competitive consequences of their 
measures are not contrary to public interest. In Europe, ECJ case law acknowledges 
that under exceptional circumstances, restrictions inherent in the nature of the 
private regulatory measure may not fall under the prohibition of Article 101 TFEU 
at all. This special rule of reason case law may open the door to creative ideas by 
associations to explain why their profession is special and why they could never 
properly function without the competition restriction at hand.
This rule of reason exemption was also considered and elaborated upon by the 
ECJ in API relating to the Italian regulation of road haul tariff s. The Court explained 
that in order to properly assess the objectives and eff ects of a decision, the overall 
regulatory and economic context should be taken into account.94 The Court applies a 
proportionality test,95 verifying whether the restrictions imposed by the rules at issue 
in the main proceedings are limited to what is necessary to ensure the implementation 
of legitimate objectives.96 Yet, the Court was confi dent that the minimum fees set by 
the commission, and also the legislation approving those fees, were not justifi ed by 
a legitimate objective. The Court acknowledged that preserving road safety can be 
a legitimate public interest objective, but refused to accept the argument that road 
safety would call for setting minimum prices.97 The Court pointed out that a mere 
reference in a general manner to the protection of road safety, without establishing 
any link whatsoever between the minimum operating costs and the improvement of 
road safety is insuffi  cient. Furthermore, the measures in question go beyond what is 
necessary. The rules would not enable carriers to prove that they fully comply with 
the safety provisions in force even though they off er prices that are lower than the 
minimum tariff s fi xed. In addition, there are a number of EU and national regulations 
protecting road safety that constitute more eff ective and less restrictive measures.98
What is striking with this reasoning is that the ECJ did not even mention the 
option of Article 101 (3) to justify the anti-competitive rules. Rather, it relied on its 
case law developed under the free movement provisions relating to goods, services 
and establishment which relate to member state measures hindering trade between 
EU countries. In other cases the Court was more restrictive, quickly dismissing
93  Wouters and Others, C-309/99, EU: C:2002:98, para 97 (on rules imposed by the Dutch Bar restricting 
the establishment of joint offi  ces with accountants).
94  Ibid. para 47. Quoiting the Wouters judgment the ECJ noted that it has to be considered whether the 
consequential eff ects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives.
95  Proportionality is an important principle of EU law that can be applied in various circumstances 
and in various ways. See Wolfgang S : Proportionality in EU law: a balancing act? TILEC 
Discussion Papers, January 25, 2013.
96  Ibid. para 48. See also Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission, C-519/04 P, EU:C:2006:492, para 47. 
97  Ibid. para 50–57.
98  Rigorous compliance with those rules on the maximum weekly working time, breaks, rest, night work 
and roadworthiness tests for vehicles can indeed ensure an appropriate level of road safety.
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company arguments that their imposed restrictions would pursue public interests.99 
The protection of public interest is not the task of entrepreneurs but belongs to the 
hard-core competence of the state.
Another way to make an allegedly anti-competitive agreement lawful is to prove 
that the four conditions of Article 101 (3) are fulfi lled. This balancing act, giving 
effi  ciency claims the green light to proceed is paralleled in U.S. antitrust law by the 
rule of reason principle in Section 1 of the Sherman Act. However, it is uncommon 
for a sector specifi c regulatory measure intended to set minimum prices or restrict 
advertisement to survive the four-prong test of paragraph (3). Competition watchdogs 
would typically argue that it is the role of the state to act in the public interest, not the 
undertakings which are inherently obsessed by their own profi t motives.
In the U.S., the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners opinion is the 
leading authority.100 This Board is the state agency that regulates the practice of 
dentistry in North Carolina. Six of its eight members are licensed, practicing dentists. 
The Board administers a licensing system for dentists. Following complaints that 
non-dentists were charging lower prices for teeth whitening, the Board issued at least 
47 offi  cial cease and desist letters to non-dentist teeth whitening service providers 
and product manufacturers, often warning that the unlicensed practice of dentistry 
is a crime. This led several non-dentists to stop off ering teeth whitening services in 
the state.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) fi led an administrative complaint, 
alleging that the Board’s concerted action to exclude non-dentists from the market 
for teeth whitening services in North Carolina constituted an anticompetitive and 
unfair method of competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act. The FTC, 
sustaining the administrative law judge’s ruling, reasoned that even if the Board had 
acted pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to displace competition, the Board 
must be actively supervised by the state to claim immunity, which was not the case. 
The FTC determined that the Board had un reasonably restrained trade in violation 
of antitrust law. The Fourth Circuit affi  rmed the FTC decision. The Supreme Court 
held that the Board could not invoke state-action antitrust immunity because it was 
not subject to active supervision by the state. The fact that a controlling number of the 
Board’s decision makers are active market participants was a decisive factor.
Parker immunity may also cover non-sovereign actors controlled by market 
participants but they must show: 1) that the challenged restraint is clearly articulated 
as state policy; and 2) it is actively supervised by the state. These two conditions strive 
to ensure that a non-state entity may invoke immunity only it exercises the state’s 
sovereign power. Accordingly, Parker immunity requires that the anticompetitive 
conduct of non-sovereign actors, especially those authorized by the state to regulate 
their own profession, results from procedures that suffi  ce to make it the state’s own. 
The second part of the test is to ensure that these entities should not diverge from the 
99   See Hilti (the dominant company unsuccessfully arguing that tying the purchuse of cartidge nails to 
the machine itself is required to protect the safety and health of users).
100  North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, No. 13–534., decided February 25, 2015. 
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state’s considered defi nition of the public good and engage in private self-dealing.101 
There is a structural risk that market participants would confuse their own interests 
with the state’s policy goals.102
3.2. Regulatory committees
Whenever market parameters, like prices, are not set by the free play of supply and 
demand, but by some combination of market players and state offi  cials, there is 
always a danger of a disguised cartel behind the regulatory process. Usually, there 
is a top down and a bottom up approach. By top down, I mean when the government 
creates a committee to be in charge of the regulation and invites representatives of 
market players to contribute. In my view, there is less likelihood of a disguised cartel 
in situations like this when the state sets up the consultation mechanisms and takes 
the initiative. The bottom up approach refers to associations, chambers created by 
the market players themselves, which take up self-regulatory duties in co-operation 
with state authorities.103 These institutions are at the border of public and private law. 
Their actions are on the edge of anti-competitive decisions, or agreements.
According to EU caselaw, committees that include representatives of enterprises 
may propose that prices be set by the state, provided that the committee members 
decided not only for their own private interests but also for the public. Public 
interest must be taken into account and the State has the power to alter or override a 
committee proposal.
In Centro Servizi Spediporto104 the ECJ held that, where legislation of a member 
state provides for road-haulage tariff s to be approved and brought into force by the 
state on the basis of proposals submitted by a committee, the fi xing of those tariff s 
cannot be regarded as an agreement where: that committee is composed of a majority 
of representatives from the public authorities and a minority of representatives from 
the economic operators concerned; and its proposals must observe certain public 
interest criteria,. Three years later, the ECJ specifi ed in Librandi105 that there is no 
cartel agreement even if the representatives of economic operators are the majority 
of the committee, provided that: the tariff s are fi xed with due regard for the public 
interest criteria defi ned by law; and the public authorities make the fi nal decision 
considering the observations of other public and private bodies.
101   Ibid. 10.
102   Ibid. 13.
103   I fi nd these two groups useful for the purposes of this paper, even though there is a grey area, i.e., a 
chamber for a profession established by law with complusory membership.
104   EU:C:1995:308. In this and similar cases quoted here, the ECJ was asked to rule on the liability of 
member states to establish state liability under the combined readings of Articles 101 TFEU and 
4(3) TEU a private anti-competitive action should also be identifi ed. Therefore, these cases can help 
explore the conditions under which an anticompetitive agreement is absent.
105   C-38/97, EU:C:1998:454.
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Criticizing the ECJ, Damien Gerard observed that the Court’s jurisprudence lacks 
consistency and there is no clearly articulated and consistently applied test.106 The 
reason for that might be because most of the cases decided by the Court focused 
on the liability of members states in connection with an allegedly anti-competitive 
private conduct. The Court was obviously cautious not to put an unbearable and 
unjustifi ed burden on member states, so it tried to navigate wisely to emphasize the 
factors that helped to legitimize the state measure.107
The most recent API judgment gives an example for anti-competitive state 
regulation involving cartel-like conduct in the Italian road transport sector. The 
Osservatorio adopted a series of tables fi xing the minimum operating costs of 
road transport undertakings for hire and reward. The Osservatorio was composed 
principally of representatives of professional associations of carriers and customers.108 
Furthermore, decisions of the Osservatorio were approved by a majority of its 
members without a state representative having a right to veto.109 Those tables were 
set out in a ministerial decision a couple of days later. 110
A subsequent ECJ note is interesting and worrying at the same time. The Court 
emphasized that the activity of the Osservatorio would fall outside the cartel 
prohibition if its members were to act as ‘experts’ who are independent of the 
economic operators concerned, being required to set tariff s taking into account their 
106   Damien G : EU Competition policy after Lisbon: time for a review of the „state action 
doctrine”? available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1533842.
107   The reason for this ’conscious inconcistency’ is that, unlike free movement rules, the European 
eff et utile rule as applied to antitrust cases does not allow for justifi cation based on important public 
interests, like security, consumer, or environment protection. So, the only chance to save a well 
intentioned state measure is to establish that the eff et utile rule was not infringed, due to the lack of 
link between the private and public measures, or that a formal residual power left with authorities 
meant that potential anti-competitive private conduct was supevised by the government. Advocate 
General Maduro suggested in his opinion delivered in Cipolla that, even though the Italian scheme 
for regulating minimum lawyer fees may be lawful under the eff et utile test, it is likely that it would 
fail to meet the requirements of free movement provisions (point 67.). Joined cases C-94/04 and 
C-202/04 Cipolla and others, opinion delivered on 1 February 2006. ECR I-11426.
108   At the material time in the main proceedings, 8 of the 10 members of the Osservatorio represented 
the views of associations of carriers and customers.
109   The state had the power to disregard the desires of private companies in the German cases decided 
some 20 years earlier, see Reiff  (C-185/91, EU:C:1993:886, para 22) and Delta Schiff ahrts- und 
Speditionsgesellschaft (C-153/93, EU:C:1994:240, para 21). The ‘agreement’ or ‘decision’ was always 
conditional on the approval of the public representative. Thus there was no genuine agreement or 
decision approved by the state, and neither undertakings nor the state could be held liable under EU 
competition law.
110   The Italian legislation envisaged a three-layer hierarchy for establishing the minimum operating 
costs: primarily the professional associations of carriers and customers would adopt an agreement, 
failing that the Osservatorio decides, and in the event of inaction by the latter, the Ministry for 
Infrastructure and Transport takes action. During the period between November 2011 and August 
2012, to which the cases in the main proceedings relate, the minimum operating costs were in fact 
fi xed by the Osservatorio. From 12 September 2012, the tasks of the Osservatorio were legally 
assigned to a department of the Ministry for Infrastructure and Transport.
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own business interests, the public interest and the interests of undertakings in other 
sectors or users of the services in question.111 Can you imagine that a gathering of 
persons affi  liated with various competing undertakings who are empowered to adopt 
regulatory decisions without, or even with, the presence of some public offi  cials would 
be able to forget where they came from and where they will return after the meeting? 
Can they genuinely represent the diverging interests of other market players?
Retaining the right to actively supervise the decision of the undertakings is crucial 
in the U.S. too. The FTC enumerated a number of factors in Kentucky Household 
Goods Carrier Association that are relevant in determining whether the supervision 
was indeed actively exercised. These factors include: (i) did the authority proceed with 
a properly noticed hearing?; (ii) did the agency issue a written, reasoned decision?; 
(iii) was there a qualitative and quantitative agency assessment of how private action 
served the public interest enshrined in state legislation?; (iv) what business data was 
collected to establish the background of the decision?; (v) were economic studies 
conducted? ;(vi) were operating costs and profi t levels checked?; and (vi) the history 
of denying previous rate proposals, simple ‘rubber stamping’ being insuffi  cient.112
To conclude this topic, only commercial, economic conduct is caught by 
competition rules on both sides of the Atlantic. For example, if the rules of the game 
are such that individuals participating in rulemaking do not act as representatives 
of corporations, but as experts serving the public interest while under the control 
of public offi  cials, then their gathering would not be regarded as a cartel meeting. 
Consequently, the rules on the composition and operation of bodies taking part in 
the lawmaking process are relevant. The ECJ considers the composition of these 
bodies, i.e., whether private representatives are in a majority, who chairs the meeting, 
what interests the participants consider, and how private members are nominated. 
The foregoing is not an exhaustive list and the Court usually looks at the totality of 
relevant factors before deciding on the existence of market conduct falling under EU 
antitrust rules.
Not only is the composition of these groups relevant, but also the factors they are 
supposed to consider. If these factors are unregulated, it is likely that participants will 
follow their own private economic interests. There is a fair chance of independent 
action as a wise professional instead of an economic actor, if the factors to be 
considered for regulating tariff s are well defi ned by the law.
Finally, the residual role retained by the state, usually by a minister, is decisive in 
deciding whether the adopted rules fall into the category subject to antitrust or are 
exempted due to the public nature of the rule making process. A common concern 
for both jurisdictions is the extent to which government authorities retain the fi nal 
decision in the regulatory process. Under the more formal approach represented by 
EU law, EU competition law will not be applicable if the minister has the authority 
to disregard or amend the agreement or decision put forward by a committee of 
111   Here the ECJ refers again to Reiff  and Delta Schiff ahrt, where it was argued that members of the 
committees were more like experts than representatives of undertakings.
112   139. FTC 404 (2005), aff ’d, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 21864 (6th Cir. 2006).
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representatives of undertakings. The activity and fi nal work product of the commission 
will be considered merely a proposal that is incapable of having any legal or practical 
impact without the decision of the minister. The actual interventional history of 
the state does not seem to matter. The potential for state veto is suffi  cient to grant 
immunity from the reach of competition laws. An eff ect-based approach, like the 
abuse of dominance provision of Article 102 TFEU, would do no harm here either. 
U.S. law is more demanding and more realistic in this respect. If the supervision 
is merely formal, second condition of the state action doctrine will not be met and 
private anti-competitive conduct will not be immunized.
3.3. Lobbying for regulation
Public offi  cials usually take into account the intelligence of market players before 
adopting rules that would govern future market conduct. A distinction should be 
made between the democratic rulemaking process where market players also play 
an active role as well as cartels sponsored by the government. If representatives of 
corporate interests do nothing but lobby for a piece of legislation that would serve 
their interest then antitrust law would not apply. This form of rent-seeking is not 
caught by antitrust, but may be subject to other specifi c laws regulating contacts 
between business and government. Setting a common price level by the government 
is not a cartel agreement on prices applied by companies themselves, even though 
the result for consumers is the same. The rationale is that state intervention into the 
free play of markets is meant to serve broader public interests, even if they coincide 
with the private interests of certain companies. This is so regardless of whether the 
lobbying is in the form of a bilateral relationship, with one undertaking talking to 
the government, or a multilateral scenario where a group of undertakings strive to 
persuade the public decision makers.
European law makes a fi ne distinction between cases where companies genuinely 
recommend government offi  cials a certain way of conduct and scenarios where 
undertakings conclude an anti-competitive agreement and then seek state approval or 
support, i.e., by making their agreement compulsory for every market participant. An 
agreement among competitors setting the same price would be a naked competition 
restriction, whereas agreeing on a common plan to lobby the government to set the 
same price by way of regulation is exempt from the reach of EU competition law.
As far as the U.S. is concerned, Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr 
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.127, 135 (1961) established a specifi c exemption for 
individuals and corporations.113 The U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that, “we think 
it equally clear that the Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from 
associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take 
113   Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.127, 135 (1961) and 
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or a monopoly.”114 
he U.S. approach is based on the respect for the institutions of representation and the 
right of petition. Antitrust rules are meant to govern economic activity. Actions by 
companies targeting government offi  cials are characterized as political activity, even 
if they eventually have economic eff ect.
However, Noerr-Pennington does not provide an unlimited coverage for business 
and context does matter. For instance, fi rms cannot bring an anticompetitive 
agreement outside the reach of the Sherman Act merely by requesting a subsequent 
legislative approval to their pre-existing arrangement. In California Motor Transport 
v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972),115 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
immunity does not apply where defendants tried to defeat the plaintiff ’s application 
to obtain licenses to operate a common carrier by sham complaints before regulators 
and courts. The Court also refuses to acknowledge immunity if a boycott was aimed 
at petitioning economic ends.116
In sum, bi or multilateral lobbying is beyond the reach of antitrust on both 
sides of the Atlantic. However, this may not serve as a disguise for genuine cartel 
conduct, existing prior and without relevance to the subsequent lobbying activity. 
Representatives of undertakings have a narrow path to walk.117
3. 4. The fi led rates doctrine
Another issue, closely related to lobbying and sector specifi c regulation to be discussed 
below, is the doctrine of fi led rates. What is the consequence of an administrative 
authority approving the tariff s proposed by one or more undertakings? Depending 
upon the market structure, this approval may shadow their liability under the cartel 
rules or the rules prohibiting an abuse of their dominant market position.
114   Ibid. at 136.This conclusion was reached even though the track companies lobbied against the truck 
industry in a deceptive and unfair way.
115   California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
116   For example, in SCTLA, an association of lawyers did not accept new cases until the District of 
Columbia did not reaise the hourly fees of court-appointed criminal defense laywers. FTC v. Superior 
Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n (SCTLA) 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
117   In Europe, the liablity of member states may also depend upon how the private component can be 
categorized. The eff et utile rule bites only if there is a cartel-like activity connected to the state 
intervention. State measures creating market circumstances identical to a cartel are not caught by 
this rule. If there is no conduct by undertakings or their associations running against the cartel 
rules, Articles 101 TFEU and 4(3) TEU cannot be applied in combination. However, for the sake of 
completeness, we should mention that state regulation fi xing minimum prices may nonetheless be 
found unlawful under the free movement rules of the TFEU. See, for example Cipolla and Others, 
C-94/04 and C-202/04, EU:C:2006:758, para 46 (judgment fi nding Italian rules on setting minimum 
lawyer fees not infringing this eff et utile rule for the lack of delegation of regulatory powers to 
undertakings). The Court excluded the application of the eff et utile rule but explained that treaty 
rules on free provision of services and establishment may be hindered by minimum tariff s making 
the (higher priced) services of non-Italian lawyers unavailable. Yet, the Court also said that the 
restriction can be justifi ed under certain circumstances on consumer protection grounds.
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U.S. law is driven by the Keogh judgment prohibiting a private plaintiff  from 
pursuing an antitrust action seeking treble damages where the plaintiff  claimed that 
a rate submitted to, and approved by a regulator resulted from an antitrust violation. 
The U.S. Supreme Court explained that only the competent regulator could change 
these rates, even if the rate was higher due to a price-fi xing conspiracy. The Antitrust 
Reform Commission was quite critical of this exemption. Relying on the two-prong 
structure of the state action doctrine, it suggested that the U.S. Congress should 
legislatively overrule when the regulatory agency no longer reviews and just rubber 
stamps proposed rates.118
Similar issues were raised in the infl uential Ticor opinion. The FTC fi led an 
administrative complaint against six of the nation’s largest title insurance companies 
alleging horizontal price fi xing in their fees for title searches and title examinations. 
The Commission charged the title companies with violating Sec.5(a)(1) of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act that prohibits “unfair methods of competition in or aff ecting 
commerce.”119 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that where prices or rates are initially 
set by private parties, subject to veto only if the state chooses, the party claiming 
the immunity has the burden to demonstrate that state offi  cials have taken the 
necessary steps to determine the specifi cs of the price-fi xing or rate setting scheme. 
The mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate substitute for the state’s 
decision. While most rate fi lings were checked for mathematical accuracy, some 
were completely unchecked. Absent active supervision, there can be no state-action 
immunity for what were otherwise private price-fi xing arrangements.
In the EU, if a tariff  is set by the state, an undertaking suggesting this tariff  
would not be caught by competition law. The conclusion could be diff erent when the 
dominant undertaking applied an unfair price as a result of its autonomous business 
decision and sought state approval in the second phase. This rubber-stamping by the 
state could be held to infringe the eff et utile rule, the legal shield would disappear and 
the dominant company could be held liable. Yet, if the state does not automatically 
transform the private price off er into a public tariff  and gives it some consideration, 
then EU competition law would not be applicable either on the public or private 
action.
3.5. Regulated industries
Competition laws may become superfl uous whenever free competition is replaced 
with regulation since there will be no competition in the form of independent 
business decisions to be protected. One issue is how intense this regulation should 
be to eliminate corporate responsibility. An interesting subsection of cases relates to 
118   Report, recommendation No. 68.
119   38 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1). Title insurance involves insuring the record title of real property for 
persons with some interest in the estate, i.e., owners. A title insurance policy insures against certain 
losses or damages sustained by reason of a defect in title not shown on the policy or title report to 
which it refers.
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challenging the fees of companies active in the regulated sectors. Another inquiry is, 
how clearly do these sector specifi c rules state whether and to what extent antitrust 
rules are set aside?120
Regulation interfering with competition rules is not only an issue in the 
telecommunication and energy industry. Agriculture is also heavily regulated. The ECJ 
addressed this issue in Suiker Unie.121 The common organization of the sugar market 
provided that each member state shall fi x, on the basis of the quantity allocated to it for 
each factory or undertaking producing sugar in its territory, minimum and maximum 
quotas. The Court acknowledged that this restriction, together with the relatively high 
transport costs, is likely to have a considerable eff ect on the essential supply element 
of competition, and consequently on the volume and pattern of trade between member 
states.122 However, the common market regulation did not fi x consumer prices and 
producers were consequently each allowed some freedom to determine the price at 
which they intend to sell their products.123 EU rules also did not preclude competition on 
quality. The Court ruled that regulation left, in practice, a residual fi eld of competition 
that comes within the provisions of the competition rules.124 Therefore, whenever 
market regulation leaves some room for autonomous business conduct, collusion 
among market players will be caught by EU competition rules.
In the U.S., where regulatory statutes are silent with respect to antitrust, courts 
must determine whether these rules implicitly preclude the application of antitrust 
laws. The U.S. Supreme Court in Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 
659 (1975) took into account the following factors: (i) the existence of regulatory 
and supervisory authority under the securities law; (ii) evidence that the regulatory 
authority did in fact exercise its authority; and (iii) a resulting risk that the securities 
and antitrust laws, if both applicable, would produce confl icting results.125
The Antitrust Modernization Commission concluded in 2007 that U.S. courts are 
usually reluctant to recognize implied immunities to the antitrust laws in the absence 
of a clear exception clause.126 In contrast, in Credit Suisse Sec. v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 
120   The Antitrust Modernization Commission recommended that statutory regulatory regimes 
should clearly state whether and to what extent Congress intended to displace the antitrust laws. 
Furthermore, courts should interpret savings clauses to give deference to the antitrust laws, and 
ensure that Congressional intent is advanced in such cases by giving the antitrust laws full eff ect 
(recommendations No. 64–65.). The practice of the Hungarian Competition Authority has always 
been not to give way to arguments claiming a lack of jurisdiction just because there exist sector 
specifi c regulation in the given sector, i.e., in telecommunications. According to Section 1 of the 
Hungarian Competition Act, the scope of the Act covers economic activities unless another law in 
the form of an act of Parliament provides otherwise.
121   Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114/73, Suiker Unie v Commission [1975] ECR 1663.
122   Ibid. para 17.
123   Ibid. para 21.
124   Ibid. para 24.
125   Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
126   Report p. 341.
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2383 (2007).127 the U.S. Supreme Court applied the previous three-prong test and 
made it fairly diffi  cult for plaintiff s to rely on the applicability of antitrust in the 
regulated markets of fi nancial services. Under the third prong, the Court reasoned its 
decision to reverse the contrary decision of the Second Circuit that there is a serious 
risk that antitrust courts, with non-expert judges and non-expert juries, will produce 
results confl icting with the position of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Thus, allowing an antitrust lawsuit would threaten serious harm to the effi  cient 
functioning of the securities market.128
Another case on point is Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offi  ces of Curtis v. 
Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).129 Trinko is cited quite frequently in Europe by 
incumbents trying to escape additional antitrust control by national authorities or 
the EU Commission. Interestingly, the Antitrust Modernization Commission warned 
that Trinko is best understood only as a limit on refusal-to-deal claims under Section 
2 of the Sherman Act and that it should not be construed as displacing the role of the 
antitrust laws in regulated industries.130
The European approach is quite diff erent, giving more room for EU antitrust rules 
in sectors where there is a national regulator. One of the reasons lies in the supremacy 
of EU law. The other, there is no fear of generalist, non-expert judges or juries 
reaching fl awed conclusions. According to EU case law, EU competition rules do not 
apply if anti-competitive conduct is required of undertakings by national legislation, 
or if the latter creates a legal framework which itself eliminates any possibility of 
competitive activity on their part. In a situation like this, the restriction of competition 
is attributable to the action of the government and not the autonomous conduct of 
the undertakings. This exception excluding the applicability of EU competition law 
provisions has only been accepted under exceptional circumstances.131
For example, the European Commission did not hesitate to impose fi nes on 
Deutsche Telekom for a margin squeeze despite the wholesale fees of the German 
incumbent having been approved by the sector regulator.132 It was argued that the 
127   Credit Suisse Sec. v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 426 F. 3d 130 (2007).
128   Ibid p. 17. The Court also noted that in this sectors antitrust has little if any added value to the sector 
specifi c regulations. The conduct challenged in this case was also prohibited by SEC and there was 
also a right for bringing damage actions.
129   Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offi  ces of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). In a previous 
case of Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), the First Circuit rejected 
monopolization claims brought by a municipally owned electric utility against an integrated electric 
utility. The same Judge Breyer argued that there was no obvious basis for concluding that federal 
judges sitting in antitrust cases could do a better job than the sectorial regulators in addressing the 
competitive problem.
130   Report, recommendation No. 67.
131   See Case 41/83 Italy v Commission [1985] ECR 873, para 19; Joined Cases 240/82 to 242/82, 261/82, 
262/82, 268/82 and 269/82 Stichting Sigarettenindustrie and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 3831, 
para 27 to 29; and Case C-198/01 CIF [2003] ECR I-8055, para 67.
132   Commission Decision of 21 May 2003 (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579 – Deutsche Telekom 
AG), OJ L 263, 14.10.2003.
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regulation did not prohibit lowering retail prices so the undertaking could have 
avoided squeezing its competitors out of the market. Cases like this demonstrate 
the implications of the well-established EU case law on special responsibility of 
dominant undertakings.133 Dominant undertakings are obliged to preserve the 
residual competition that remains on markets dominated by them. The ECJ also 
held134 that the liability of the undertaking is not constrained just because the national 
regulatory authority may have infringed Article 102 TFEU in conjunction with the 
eff et utile principle the Commission could have brought an action for failure to 
fulfi ll obligations against Germany.135 Since EU law is supreme to national law, it is 
unconcerned with expressing the intentions of domestic lawmakers or the clarity of 
the relevant member state measure. The rule is that member states should not adopt 
measures that could restrict the full application of EU competition rules. This is due 
to the supremacy of EU law to national laws, even legislation adopted by parliaments, 
and not because competition policy is regarded as superior to other public policies.
4. The liability of the state in hybrid cases
EU law seems to be stricter against member state measures than U.S. law, respecting 
state sovereignty regarding regulating their own economies. EU Article 16 TFEU 
addresses the issue of state measures related to public undertakings, and those 
with exclusive or special privileges. More general case-law based on the eff et utile 
doctrine also exists which makes states responsible for their measures approving, 
encouraging, and prescribing cartel-like conduct, including the unsupervised 
delegation of regulatory powers to industry actors. U.S. states cannot be held 
responsible for legislative or regulatory measures like these. So, does it mean that 
EU law does not need antitrust rules covering state-driven anti-competitive actions? 
Does U.S. antitrust law cover a wider range of issues to counterbalance the lack of 
state-related competition law provisions?
The practice of the EU Commission regarding hybrid cases seems to support 
this distinction. Only once has the EU competition watchdog pursued both the 
undertakings and the state itself in a case involving tariff s set by Italian customs 
agents. A law authorized the CNSD, a national association of customs agents, to adopt 
minimum and maximum tariff s that were subsequently approved by a ministerial 
decree. The Commission addressed the CNSD decision and also sued Italy before 
the ECJ for infringing its obligation under the Treaty.136 The ECJ had no doubt that 
even an association created by an act of Parliament can be seen as an association 
of undertakings for the purposes of Article 101 TFEU. It noted that members of the 
133   Case 322/81 Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie-Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, para 57.
134   Case C-280/08 P., Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission, judgment of the Court of 14 
October 2010., [2010] ECR I-09555., para 91.
135   Ibid. at para 91.
136   C-35/96, CNSD [1995] ECR I-2883, para 53–54. 
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CNSD were not appointed by the government, and they were not obliged to take the 
public interest into account. 
Nowadays, the Commission prefers to challenge anti-competitive state regulation 
on the basis of the four freedoms, especially the free movement of goods and the 
free provision of services, or, under Article 37 TFEU regulating commercial state 
monopolies. Most of the European case law on anti-competitive state practices 
arose on the basis of competitor challenges before national courts. In the 1980’s 
the Commission adopted a number of decisions addressing monopolies in the 
telecommunication and postal sectors but it has yet to establish a consistent 
enforcement policy. We can claim that the European eff et utile rule is stricter than 
the U.S. state action doctrine in as much as it does not allow member states to create 
cartel-like arrangements and justify them by invoking important public interests 
going beyond competition policy. The consequence would be a broader liability 
for companies engaging in anti-competitive activities under the public umbrella. 
However, we should add that other TFEU provisions relating to the free movement 
rules can more easily be invoked against anti-competitive state actions without the 
need to prove the link with an Article 101 TFEU-like cartel. These provisions do 
allow for a public interest defense taking into account other interests than undistorted 
free competition.137 With that, more state interventions could be justifi ed, so the room 
for legitimate anti-competitive behavior by undertakings may not be as narrow as if 
we considered only the competition rules of the Treaty.
The European internal market rules have a broader reach than the U.S. equivalent 
‘dormant commerce clause’ since the EU rules also include non-discriminatory 
state measures. Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the 
power to “regulate Commerce […] among the several States”. The U.S. Supreme 
Court interpreted the Commerce Clause as depriving states of the power to impede 
interstate commerce and that interpretation is known as the Dormant Commerce 
Clause. The Dormant Commerce Clause has been applied against discriminatory 
state measures and indirectly provides more room for U.S. states to legalize anti-
competitive market eff ects.
5. Conclusion
The Midcal test is a “rigorous” one that ensure[s] that private parties [can] claim 
state-action immunity from Sherman Act liability only when their anticompetitive 
137   This relationship between competition and free movement rules is also emphasized by Damien 
Gerard, who suggests that the legality of assessing the legality of state measures limiting competition 
should be assessed under the internal market rules instead of the ill-equipped competition rules. 
G  op. cit. One remark I would like to add is that this indeed seems to be the policy of the EU 
Commission. However, the Court has less freedom to make this policy choice since its jurisprudence 
is largely driven by the questions posed by national courts. If the national litigation is centered 
around competition rules, the Court has some diffi  culty in orienting national judges towards internal 
market rules. 
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acts [are] truly the product of state regulation.138 The Parker test is diff erent in the 
sense that it looks at the existence of a clearly established and supervised state policy 
and does not inquire whether entities subject to the regulation had any realistic 
chance to deviate from the state policy. In the EU, EU antitrust rules continue to 
apply when the government only supports an agreement interfering with the free 
play of competition.
Another important diff erence between the European and U.S. perspectives, also 
noted by the Antitrust Modernization Commission,139 is that the state action doctrines 
applies regardless of the eff ects the state measure may have in other states. For 
example, in Parker v. Brown the vast majority of consumers who paid higher prices 
for raisins because of California’s regulatory scheme were outside the state since 
most of the raisins were sold outside of California, Internalizing the positive eff ects 
and exporting the negatives one is a typical result of protectionist state regulation. 
Avoiding this spillover eff ect is central to how EU law perceives this issue.
 Due to the diff erent conceptual settings of the two approaches, U.S. state 
action doctrine does not automatically apply if a municipality is the actor, unlike EU 
case law It must be proven that the actions of the municipality refl ect state policy.140 
This is not the situation in the EU where measures adopted by local governments are 
treated the same way as measures of the state.
Under the second prong of the U.S. test, the state must actively supervise the action 
of private entities. Passive supervision does not suffi  ce. In contrast, EU courts do not 
inquire how intensively public offi  cials control the activity of undertakings when it 
comes to approval of a previous anti-competitive agreement. The second prong of 
the U.S. state action test is more demanding, whereas the fi rst prong allows for much 
more leeway by not requesting autonomy erasing compulsion by the state. In sum, it 
is diffi  cult to judge which approach is stricter. U.S. law provides immunity for fi rms 
that were not compelled by the state to act in an anti-competitive manner so long as 
the state actively supervises their activity. The same situation would constitute an 
infringement of EU law.
In the EU, the internal market principle and the commandment of free, undistorted 
competition play a central role in uniting 28 diff erent countries. In the U.S., the 50 
states share a common history born in wars and united by strong common interests 
that are expressed in strong federal foreign, defense, monetary and fi scal policies, 
all of which are missing in Europe. Perhaps that is one of the reasons why European 
integration is much more sensitive to state imposed competition restrictions and 
stricter conditions on member states with an indirect impact on businesses are 
imposed.141
138   Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988).
139   Ibid. at 374.
140   City of Lafeyette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 412–413. (1978).
141   Another reason is that in Europe, state owned undertakings, even monopolies have played and still 
play a more decisive infl uence in the economy a sin the U.S.
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One area that European law could learn from the U.S. jurisprudence is to give 
more importance to the ex-post control of the government on anti-competitive, state 
authorized competition restrictions. The test applied by the ECJ is more formalistic 
than that of the U.S. Supreme Court. Greater ex-post control would lead to the 
illegality of some state measures and vanishing of the shield protecting business 
from antitrust rules as a result. U.S. case law, unlike its European counterpart, does 
not draw a bright line between state measures mandating or simply encouraging 
anti-competitive conduct. The autonomous decision making doctrine of the ECJ 
is clearly well established from a conceptual perspective. Practically, however, it 
does not really matter whether the state’s action is to be classifi ed as mandatory or 
suggestive given the enormous pressure government entities can exert on individuals 
or corporations. Loyal entities may even be expected to guess and act according to 
the will of the state.
A crucial question is, to what extent can the state measure relating to an otherwise 
cartel-like private arrangement genuinely protect public interest? Under certain 
circumstances, other public policy interests, like safety, consumer or environment 
protection, may legitimize the restriction of economic freedom. In other situations, 
the reference to ‘other public policies’ covers nothing more than the particular 
interests of a group of market players. 
Judge Kennedy’s North Carolina Dental Examiners opinion recalled that although 
federal antitrust law is a central safeguard for free market structures, there are other 
values regulated by the state at the expense of the Sherman Act. State-action immunity 
exists to avoid confl icts between state sovereignty and the national commitment to 
robust competition policies.142 The Court quoted Ticor warning that the immunity 
is not unbounded, “[g]iven the fundamental national values of free enterprise and 
economic competition that are embodied in the federal antitrust laws, “state action 
immunity is disfavored, much as are repeals by implication.”143 This comes close to 
acknowledging the supreme nature of free markets and competition. Exceptions to 
the competition principle should be clearly expressed.
I believe that free and undistorted competition is key to our human fl ourishing and 
the performance of our economies. Yet, competition is not all-mighty. There can be 
various reasons why it does not function properly, and why the side eff ects of rivalry 
call for state intervention. The ultimate question comes easily, but is diffi  cult to 
answer, to what extent do we trust the state when it regulates markets? The problem 
is much more complex than the existence of corruption. Lack of information about 
real and future market circumstances and the lobbying eff orts of strong players can 
easily distort public decisions. I believe that a narrowly construed antitrust immunity 
for state action can help to properly answer these questions.
142   Ibid. 6–7.
143   Ibid. 636.
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Introduction
The American system of occupational licensing is under attack. The current regime 
– which allows for almost total self-regulation – has weathered sustained criticism 
from consumer advocate groups, academics, politicians, and even the White House 
itself. But the recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion in North Carolina Board of 
Dental Examiners v. FTC,1 portends a sea change in how almost a third of American 
workers are regulated. The case has made it possible for aggrieved individuals and 
government enforcers to bring suits against most state licensing boards, challenging 
their restrictions as violating federal competition law. The case has prompted two 
responses: a fl ood of antitrust suits against boards, and a panic among states as they 
scramble to protect licensing boards from antitrust liability. This article describes 
the current system of professional regulation in the U.S., explains the North Carolina 
Dental opinion and its legal impact, and discusses states’ likely responses. The 
upshot is that in order to protect occupational licensing from antitrust suit, states will 
have to reform their regulatory systems in ways that will improve the fairness and 
effi  ciency of American occupational licensing laws.  
1. Occupational Licensing in the United States
Occupational licensing is ubiquitous in the United States: nearly thirty percent of 
American workers must have a government-issued professional license to legally 
*   Professor of Law.
1   135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
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perform their jobs.2 The legal institutions that form this complex web of regulation, 
however, are relatively obscure. For the most part, states, not the federal government, 
regulate occupational licensing. They do so through boards that create and implement 
entry requirements, rules of ethics, and standards for discipline. Each state has a 
separate board for most occupations, with some states having up to forty-nine 
separate boards. This decentralized system of professional regulation has resulted in 
a proliferation of state licensing boards – currently there are 1,740 operational boards 
nationwide – permitting each individual board to operate in relative obscurity.3 In 
the aggregate, these nearly invisible institutions deliver a hefty bill to consumers 
– economists estimate the annual cost of licensing restrictions at around $116 
billion4 – while providing perhaps little in the way of public health and safety.
 
1.1. Professionally-Dominated Boards
My investigation into the state statutes creating the 1,740 American licensing boards 
revealed that the vast majority—85%—are required by statute to be staff ed by a 
majority of license-holders in the profession the board regulates.5 In other words, 
most American occupational licensing regimes amount to self-regulation: doctors 
regulate doctors, and barbers regulate barbers. For example, Ohio’s state medical 
board, which is typical, is comprised of twelve members: seven physicians, one 
osteopathic physician, one podiatrist, and three “public” (non-licensee) members.6 
This composition gives license-holders the ability to vote as a bloc to set the terms of 
competition even when other board members disagree. This overwhelming degree of 
professional control would be bad enough, but the empirical data likely understates 
the problem. Anecdotal investigation into actual board practices reveals that member 
absences, position vacancies, and even violations of statutory requirements often 
lead to professionally dominated decision-making even where dominance is not 
required by statute.7
Self-regulation carries with it the familiar risk of self-dealing. Licensing regulations 
inherently exclude some would-be professionals from the market and set the terms of 
competition among professional providers. These kinds of restrictions are justifi ed 
on theoretical grounds as protecting consumer safety, but of course they also can 
2   See Morris M. K  – Alan B. K : Analyzing the Extent and Infl uence of Occupational 
Licensing on the Labor Market. J. Lab. Econ., Vol. 31. (2013) 173., 198. (estimating that, as of 2008, 
29% of U.S. workers were licensed and noting that licensing is a growing phenomenon in the U.S. 
economy).
3    Rebecca H  A : Foxes at the Henhouse: Occupational Licensing Boards Up Close. Cal. 
L. Rev., (forthcoming 2017) manuscript at 3.
4    See Morris M. K : Occupational Licensing., 14 J. Econ. Persp., Vol. 14. 189, 115 (2000) 189., 
115. (estimating the cost of occupational licensing to consumers at $116–$139 billion a year).
5   A  (forthcoming 2017) op. cit. manuscript at 4.
6   Ohio Rev. Code Ann., § 4731.01 (West 2016).
7   See A  (forthcoming 2017) op. cit. manuscript at 4.
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lead to a less competitive professional environment, which manifests itself in higher 
prices and lower service availability. Self-regulation means entrusting the delicate 
balance between competition and regulation to the license-holders themselves – 
those who have the most to gain from ineffi  ciently restrictive rules.8 The dominance 
of professionals on licensing boards means that the fox is asked to guard the hen 
house. These results should surprise those under the impression that occupational 
licensing in the U.S. is governmental, which is to say that it is in any measure public 
or public-regarding. In reality, licensing schemes are run by entities that look more 
like cartels than governmental agencies.
1.2. Anticompetitive Regulations
The result of self-regulation has been disappointingly predictable. Many licensing 
requirements seem aimed more at relaxing competition among professionals than at 
improving public health and safety. 
Licensing restrictions can be theoretically justifi ed as addressing market failures 
that would occur in an unregulated market for professional services. These failures 
typically involve asymmetrical information about service quality or market 
externalities in a transaction between a provider and a consumer. The fi rst kind of 
market failure occurs when the service provider is unable to credibly communicate the 
quality of his services, and consumers are therefore unwilling to pay a premium for 
excellent service. Services providers in these circumstances will have little incentive 
to provide excellent service, since they cannot command a premium for their special 
eff orts, and will therefore provide only the minimum quality the market can bear. This 
market – famously dubbed the “Market for Lemons” by economist George Akerlof 
– is ineffi  cient if there are professionals willing to provide, and consumers willing to 
pay for, high quality service.9 Licensing regulations can prevent this ineffi  ciency by 
establishing a “fl oor” of service quality through strict entry requirements (such as 
education or examination) and professional standards of practice.
The second kind of market failure occurs as a result of market externalities, 
which are costs that are visited on society at large, not just the transacting parties. 
Without externalities, the costs and benefi ts of an exchange are borne by the parties 
to that transaction. For example, if I buy a bad cup of coff ee, I suff er the harm, and 
will likely visit a consequence on the seller in the future by not returning with my 
business. But in some markets, the consequences of poor quality transactions are 
not fully internalized by the provider and the patient. For instance, the cost of poor 
quality medical care may be visited not only on the patient but also on the patient’s 
employer, family, and local emergency room. Where transactions create negative 
externalities, low-quality, low-price transactions may be ineffi  cient. Licensing can 
8   See Aaron E  – Rebecca H : Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face 
Antitrust Scrutiny? U. Pa. L. Rev., Vol. 162. (2014) 1093., 1156.
9    See George A. A : The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. 
Q. J. Econ., Vol. 84. (1970) 488., 489.
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prevent these ineffi  ciencies by creating a minimum service quality through licensing 
requirements and rules. 
From an effi  ciency perspective, restricting competition by limiting entry and 
dictating the terms of practice can only be justifi ed in the presence of these market 
failures. Further, a licensing restriction can only be justifi ed to the extent that its 
benefi ts (in terms of addressing a market failure) outweigh its costs (the higher 
prices charged to consumers). In other words, licensing is effi  cient only if it actually 
improves quality, and only if it does so without too high a price tag for consumers. 
With competitors controlling their own competitive environment, it is unsurprising 
that many American professional licensing regulations cannot be justifi ed as effi  cient. 
The licensing of many professions in America cannot even pass the laugh test. 
Occupations currently licensed in at least one state include locksmiths, beekeepers, 
auctioneers, interior designers, fortune tellers, tour guides, and shampooers. And 
the excesses of licensing go beyond these examples of regulatory overreach. Some 
commonly licensed professions, such as barbering and cosmetology, lack a plausible 
market failure justifi cation. It is hard to say that consumers are unable to assess the 
quality of these services, or that low quality service creates widespread harm. Further, 
licensing restrictions that do address a plausible market failure often do so with too 
heavy a hand. For example, the requirement that nurse practitioners be supervised by 
doctors, a requirement in many states,10 theoretically addresses externalities in the 
market for healthcare. But in light of empirical evidence that supervised nursing is 
more expensive to consumers, yet provides no added quality or safety benefi ts,11 it 
seems clear that the supervision requirement goes too far. 
Anecdotal evidence of licensing run amok is easy to fi nd, but so is empirical 
evidence that licensing often goes too far in benefi ting professionals at the expense 
of consumers. Licensing has an obvious eff ect on consumer prices, as a theoretical 
matter and as a matter of fact. Labor economists estimate that when a profession goes 
from unlicensed to licensed status, wages rise at least 10%.12 Of course, if that wage 
premium bought higher quality services, it may be effi  cient. But while licensing has 
a signifi cant eff ect on consumer prices and professional wages, its eff ect on service 
quality is dubious. Economic studies of service quality paint a murky picture.13 Most 
of the empirical studies measuring the impact of licensing on quality evidence is 
10  See Sharon C  – Catherine D : Scope of Practice Laws in Health Care: Rethinking 
the Role of Nurse Practitioners. Cal. HealthCare Found., (January 2008) 3, available at http://www.
chcf.org/publications/2008/01/scope-of-practice-laws-in-health-care-rethinking-the-role-of-nurse-
practitioners (noting that thirty states require at least some degree of physician supervision or 
collaboration).
11  See id. at 6 (listing multiple studies fi nding no material diff erence in quality of care).
12  See Morris M. K : Regulating Occupations: Quality or Monopoly? Emp’t Res., Vol. 13., N. 1. 
(2006), available at http://research.upjohn.org/empl_research/vol13/iss1/1.
13  See Morris M. K : Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition? 53 
tbl.3.2 (2006) (showing varying levels of quality improvements in a number of licensed professions).
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equivocal, 14 and one study even claims to show that licensing reduces quality.15 By 
any measure, the American system of professional self-regulation does not achieve 
an effi  cient balance of regulation and competition. 
2. Antitrust Liability and North Carolina Dental
Practitioner-dominated licensing boards came under attack in a recent U.S. Supreme 
Court case decided in May 2015. The case, North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners v. FTC, completed a revolution in the American federal-state balance of 
power that previous cases in this area had foreshadowed. In the process, it placed a 
wide swath of American occupational regulation – perhaps the vast majority of it – in 
the crosshairs of antitrust law. States should interpret this case as an existential threat 
to how they regulate the professions. It will no doubt precipitate regulatory reforms. 
2.1. State Action Immunity and the Antitrust Laws
 
To understand North Carolina Dental and its impact, a few words should be said about 
a relatively obscure area of American law known as antitrust state action immunity 
(or sometimes Parker immunity, for the case that established it). The Sherman Act,16 
the major federal antitrust statute outlawing unreasonable restraints of trade and 
monopolistic conduct, does not limit its reach to private actors. Nothing in the text 
of the statute prevents someone from challenging a state law restricting competition 
as “unreasonable” under the Act. Most regulation, state or otherwise, creates 
competitive winners and losers. Yet the wholesale application of federal competition 
law to state action would threaten to invalidate all or most state regulatory activity, 
a result that would off end principles of federalism. Thus, in 1943, the U.S. Supreme 
Court recognized “state action immunity” from federal antitrust law. In Parker v. 
Brown,17 the Court held that conduct by the state would be untouchable by federal 
antitrust suits. The opinion, however, included an important caveat: a state could 
not merely authorize private actors to violate the Sherman Act. Allowing states to 
selectively repeal the Sherman Act in this way would undermine the national policy 
in favor of competition.18
14  See, e.g, Sidney L. C  – Robert J. G : Occupational Licensing and the Quality of Service. 
Law & Hum. Behav., Vol. 7. (1983) 139., 145. (concluding that licensing results in better delivered 
quality but not better quality received by society as a whole). See Joshua D. A  – Jonathan 
G : Teacher Testing, Teacher Education, and Teacher Characteristics. Am. Econ. Rev., Vol. 
94. (2004) 241., 246. (fi nding “no evidence that testing hurdles have raised the quality of new and 
inexperienced teachers”). 
15  See C –G  op. cit. 145 (suggesting that “excessive restriction” reduces the quality of 
services available to the “lower middle income classes”). 
16  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2016).
17  317 U.S. 341 (1943).
18  Ibid. at 351 (explaining that “a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by 
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful”).
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That caveat in Parker has become the source of decades of controversy as the 
Court has struggled to defi ne the contours of state action immunity. What is the 
precise line between “state action” and action merely authorized by the state? How 
close of a relationship must the regulating entity have to the sovereign branches of a 
state before it can invoke immunity? These questions have proved especially vexing 
as states have increasingly used entities other than its sovereign branches – such as 
municipalities, bar associations, and occupational licensing boards – to create and 
enforce regulation. In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 
Inc.,19 the Court created a two-part test for whether an entity could claim immunity 
for its activity. The Midcal test confers antitrust immunity on entities that both act 
according to a state’s “clearly articulated and affi  rmatively expressed” policy to 
displace competition, and are “actively supervised” by the state itself.20
Shortly after Midcal, the Court further complicated the question by creating 
a shortcut to Parker immunity for some kinds of regulatory entities. In Town 
of Hallie v. Eau Claire,21 the Court held that cities enjoy immunity for their 
anticompetitive regulation as long as they meet Midcal’s fi rst prong. In other words, 
even unsupervised municipal regulation is immune so long as it comports with the 
state’s “clearly articulated” intent to displace competition.22 The court justifi ed the 
shortcut by appealing to a city’s public nature, explaining that “[w]here the actor is 
a municipality, there is little or no danger that it is involved in a private price-fi xing 
arrangement.”23 
Who, besides municipalities, can take the Hallie shortcut? The question turns out 
to be crucial to the status of licensing boards, because the “clear articulation” prong 
has proved to be easily met in the professional licensing context.24 At the time the 
Court was set to hear North Carolina Dental, the question of whether an occupational 
licensing board was entitled to take the Hallie shortcut was very much in dispute. On 
the one hand, the Hallie opinion itself had suggested (without deciding) that state 
agencies would be entitled to the shortcut.25 And because many states refer to their 
boards as “agencies,” this gave boards a good claim to using the shortcut. On the other 
hand, scholars, some lower courts, and the Federal Trade Commission argued that 
what made municipalities special for immunity purposes was not their nominal claim 
to being governmental, but their public accountability. By this measure, occupational 
19  445 U.S. 97 (1980).
20  Ibid. at 943.
21  471 U.S. 34 (1985).
22  Ibid. at 46 (“We now conclude that the active state supervision requirement should not be imposed in 
cases in which the actor is a municipality.”).
23  Ibid. at 47 (emphasis omitted).
24  See, e.g., Benson v. Ariz. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 673 F.2d 272, 275 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that 
a statute which established the board of dentistry and gave it power to regulate professional practice 
and entry requirements satisfi ed the clear articulation prong).
25  Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46 n.10 (“In cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that active state 
supervision would also not be required, although we do not here decide that issue.”).
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licensing boards – which are controlled by self-dealing licensees and which operate 
outside of the public eye – should be held to both Midcal prongs. 
  
2.2. North Carolina Dental
The latest chapter in the state action immunity saga specifi cally addressed the 
question of whether occupational regulation could be challenged under the Sherman 
Act. In 2006, the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners – a licensing 
board comprised of six dentists, one dental hygienist, and one public member – 
initiated a campaign to suppress competition from non-dentists in the market for 
cosmetic teeth whitening. The dentists were apparently vexed by the rise of a new, 
cheaper means of whitening teeth that was being performed in malls and at beauty 
salons, which reduced demand for the expensive teeth whitening services off ered 
by licensed dentists. The Board “did battle” with the non-dentist teeth whiteners 
by issuing cease-and-desist letters characterizing teeth whitening as the practice of 
dentistry and threatening legal action if the non-dentists persisted.26 The campaign 
worked. Within a few months of the Board’s actions, the state’s dentists had regained 
their monopoly over teeth whitening. 
The Federal Trade Commission brought suit, charging that the letter campaign 
was an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The FTC 
argued that the board was not entitled to state action immunity because unlike 
municipalities, it was required to meet Midcal’s “active supervision” prong – a test 
that it would fail. In the FTC’s view, the board was private because of the private 
interests that dominated its decision-making and private regulators were forbidden 
from taking the Hallie shortcut. To the FTC, it did not matter that the state of North 
Carolina believed the Board was a state entity, that state statutes referred to the board 
as a “state agency,” or that the state itself had fi led an amicus brief arguing for the 
board’s immunity. 
Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court sided with the FTC. The Court made clear that 
what made the municipality in Hallie unlikely to join a private price fi xing cartel, and 
therefore merit the immunity shortcut, was not its claim to being governmental in a 
formal sense, but rather its lack of incentives to self-deal. 27 However, for an entity 
controlled by competing professionals and tasked with regulating the terms of their 
competition, state supervision was required. Otherwise, “the national policy in favor 
of competition [would be] thwarted by casting […] a gauzy cloak of state involvement 
over what is essentially a private price-fi xing arrangement.”28 The Court held that 
a state board on which “a controlling number of decisionmakers are active market 
26  N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1108 (quoting App. To Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 103a, N.C. Dental (No. 13-
534), 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27  N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1111.
28  Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 98 (1980).
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participants in the occupation the board regulates” must be actively supervised by the 
state or else face antitrust liability.29
North Carolina Dental left unanswered several questions that will spawn a new 
set of controversies, some of which are already working their way through the lower 
courts. The fi rst open question – what constitutes “active supervision” – is as old as 
the case that created the supervision requirement in the fi rst place. Although the Court 
has considered the issue in several cases, it has always been vague in its guidance. 
The second set of questions – who counts as “active market participants” and how 
many constitute a “controlling number” – are new to the state action immunity 
doctrine. Giving proper meaning of these new terms requires understanding what 
gives rise to the self-dealing risk in the fi rst place. 
2.2.1. Active Supervision
 
The Court has never been particularly clear about what constitutes active supervision. 
Notably, it has never found a supervisory scheme to pass muster. North Carolina 
Dental emphasized that “the inquiry regarding active supervision is fl exible and 
context-dependent,”30 making it diffi  cult to predict how much state involvement is 
enough. The case recited two familiar requirements for supervision – fi rst that it 
be more than a “negative option,” or an unexercised power to review the board’s 
actions,31 and second that it be substantive and not merely procedural.32 The case then 
added a new requirement, that the supervisor “have the power to veto or modify” the 
decision it reviews.33 
Based on the Court’s renewed emphasis on political accountability as a condition 
of antitrust immunity, it seems reasonable to predict that “active supervision” will 
entail a state review process that forces states to take transparent responsibility for 
the substantive content of the regulation. This almost certainly means that review 
must be non-deferential: a state must take a fresh look at the regulation and decide 
whether it comports with state policy without putting a thumb on the scale. And it 
may mean that state supervisors must identify, quantify, and approve the competitive 
consequences fl owing from the regulation. Delegation of regulation to competitors 
creates both a theoretical and, as it turns out, a very real risk of self-dealing at the 
expense of consumers. If, as the Court has said, supervision seeks to “assign political 
responsibility, not obscure it,”34 then supervision should force states to own the 
29  N.C. Dental at 1114.
30  Ibid. at 1117 (“In general […] the adequacy of supervision otherwise will depend on all the 
circumstances of a case.”).
31  See ibid. at 1112 (explaining that the power to review must be actually exercised to be “active 
supervision”). See also Ticor, 504 U.S. at 622–23 (holding that the mere potential for review is 
inadequate).
32  See N.C. Dental at 1116; see also Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101.
33  N.C. Dental at 1116.
34  Ticor at 636.
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economic impact of the regulations they tolerate. To this end, I have advocated for 
the use of competitive impact statements – identifying and at least attempting to 
quantify the economic and competitive consequences of a reviewed regulation – as a 
condition of fi nding that the state “actively supervised” the challenged regulation.35
Under the criteria set out in North Carolina Dental for active supervision, most 
states probably do not supervise their licensing boards. States typically allow boards 
to be sued for failing to comply with that state’s Administrative Procedure Act, but this 
review is likely to be considered insuffi  ciently substantive to qualify as supervision.36 
Some states have “rules review” procedures whereby substate regulations, such as 
those created by a licensing board, are reviewed by a state commission or committee 
before having the force of law ,37 but state legislatures typically cannot modify or 
veto the decision below. At the time North Carolina Dental was decided, no court or 
commentator had identifi ed an example of state-level substantive review of all board 
activity, located in an executive agency not dominated by active market participants.
2.2.2. Competitor Control
 
As my survey of the statutory composition of the 1,740 licensing boards in the U.S. 
reveals, most boards are comprised of a majority of licensees. The North Carolina 
Dental opinion used a curious phrase to describe the dominance that triggers the 
supervision requirement. It held that a state board on which “a controlling number of 
decisionmakers are active market participants in the occupation the board regulates” 
must be actively supervised to enjoy immunity.38 This sentence raises two questions. 
First, who counts as an “active market participant in the occupation the board 
regulates”? Second, how many is a “controlling number” and why did the court not 
simply say “majority”? 
The courts will interpret “active market participant” to mean those most likely 
to self-deal, which in the licensing board context means members currently holding 
a license issued by the board itself. This interpretation comports with the antitrust 
state action principle that additional state involvement is necessary when the state 
relies on industry self-regulation, the most competitively risky form of governance. 
And it comports with substantive antitrust law. Under § 1 of the Sherman Act, naked 
agreements among competitors to restrict competition are per se illegal. This rule 
refl ects the notion that competitors, when combining to decide the terms of their 
competition, inevitably benefi t themselves at the expense of the consumer. The 
principal concern in an antitrust suit against a board is that board members who are 
35  See Rebecca H  A : The New Antitrust Federalism. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102., 
Iss. 6. (2016).
36  See E –H  op. cit. 1123 n.179. Further, because this review only occurs when someone brings 
suit these are likely the “negative option” found lacking by the Court. See ibid. at 1123.
37  See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Assembly, Legislative Regulation Review Committee, https://www.cga.ct.gov/
rr/; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1052 (2013).
38  N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1114.
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currently in competition with one another will often that fi nd that their interest in 
protecting consumers confl icts with their profi t motives to keep competitors out and 
prices high.
The members of a licensing board with the strongest incentive to self-deal 
are those who hold a license issued by the board. When a board only issues one 
kind of license – for example, a dental license – the dynamics of self-dealing are 
simple. Board members who hold the same license are like horizontal competitors 
dealing in undiff erentiated goods. A permissive licensing rule that either lets in 
more competitors or allows for more competition among incumbents threatens the 
bottom line of all license-holders. A more diffi  cult question is raised by boards that 
issue multiple kinds of licenses and have representatives from each kind of license 
on the board. In this circumstance, there is an argument that because two board 
members must obtain separate licenses, they should not both be counted towards 
the dominance discussed in North Carolina Dental. But the reality of these boards 
– that the diff erent licenses issued by the same board often have signifi cant practical 
overlap, and that there is a risk of back-scratching among similar professions – 
suggests that all licensees holding some license issued by the board ought to count 
towards professional dominance.
Likewise, “controlling number” ought to be defi ned according to the reality of 
board practice and procedure. At the very least, it seems likely that “control” will 
mean that license-holders, voting as a bloc, can determine a board’s vote without 
assent from non-professional members. In the simplest case (where the full board votes 
and every member has an equal vote) “controlling number” will be synonymous with 
“majority.” But the voting practices of licensing boards reveals that in many cases, 
even a board without a majority of licensees can make decisions by a “controlling 
number” of professionals. 
Quorum rules – such as the very common rule that a majority of the board 
constitutes a quorum – can allow a professional minority of the board to form a 
majority at meetings.39 Similarly, voting rules, such as a rule that a non-professional 
member of the board cannot vote, can turn what by membership is a non-dominated 
board into one where the licensees enjoy a majority. 40 This may explain why the court 
used the term “controlling number” rather than “majority”: “controlling number” 
captures circumstances where licensees do not formally make up a majority of the 
39  For example, physical therapists have enjoyed a majority at all of the last fi ve meetings of the North 
Dakota Board of Physical Therapy, despite a statutory requirement that half the board’s seats go to 
non-licensees. See Board Minutes, N.D. Bd. of Physical Therapy, https://www.ndbpt.org/minutes.asp 
(last visited July 29, 2016). Despite the attendance issues, the current composition of the board refl ects 
the statutorily required membership. See N.D. Cent. Code § 43-26.1-02 (2015); North Dakota Board 
of Physical Therapy Members, N.D. Bd. of Physical Therapy, https://www.ndbpt.org/about_us.asp 
(last visited July 29, 2016).
40  For an example of this, see the Arkansas State Board of Acupuncture, which disables one of its non-
professional members from voting. Ark. Code Ann. § 17-102-201 (West 2016) (“[T]he ex offi  cio 
member shall have no vote, shall not serve as an offi  cer of the board, and shall not be counted to 
establish a quorum or a majority necessary to conduct business.”).
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board, but in practice exercise voting control. It seems likely that the Court will 
defi ne “controlling number” to refer to those actually present and able to vote when 
a decision was made. 
3. The Future of Occupational Licensing
 
The basic structure of occupational licensing in the U.S. – self-regulation with little 
or no governmental involvement – is endangered. States should see the holding of 
North Carolina Dental as both a threat and an opportunity. The threat, of course, 
is that their boards will be sued and individual board members held liable for treble 
damages for anticompetitive occupational regulation. These suits have already 
begun, and will likely continue to be fi led in signifi cant numbers. The opportunity 
is the chance to reform the regulatory infrastructure governing almost a third of 
American workers to make it more fair, effi  cient, and immune to antitrust suit.
3.1. Boards Under Scrutiny
 
North Carolina Dental has precipitated a legal crisis for states and their occupational 
licensing boards. Since the decision was handed down last year, at least thirteen 
suits have been fi led against licensing boards. Perhaps unsurprisingly, North 
Carolina has been the hardest hit, with three suits against three diff erent boards. 41 
California is facing two suits42 and Connecticut,43 Georgia,44  Louisiana,45 Nevada,46 
Pennsylvania,47 Mississippi,48 Tennessee49 and Texas50 are each facing one suit. These 
thirteen boards are not unique; for every board that has been sued, there are more 
than one hundred others that are potentially vulnerable. The variety of suits refl ects 
the spectrum of competitive risks posed by professional self-regulation. Several 
boards are accused of suppressing innovative new forms of professional practice that 
threaten the bottom line of traditional practitioners. Other suits allege unreasonable 
41  See Jemsek v. N.C. Med. Bd., No. 5:16-cv-00059 (E.D.N.C. fi led Feb. 2, 2016); Henry v. N.C. 
Acupuncture Licensing Bd., No. 1:15-cv-00831 (M.D.N.C. fi led Oct. 7, 2015); LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. 
N.C. State Bar, No. 1:15-cv-00439 (M.D.N.C. fi led Jun. 3, 2015).
42  See Kinney v. State Bar of Cal., No. 3:16-cv-02277 (N.D. Cal. fi led Apr. 27, 2016); Gonzalez v. Cal. 
Bureau of Real Estate, No. 2:15-cv-02448 (E.D. Cal. fi led Nov. 11, 2015).
43  See Robb v. Conn. Bd. of Veterinary Med., No. 3:15-cv-00906-CSH (D. Conn. fi led Jun. 12, 2015).
44  See Colindres v. Battle, No. 1:15-cv-02843-SCJ (N.D. Ga. fi led Aug. 12, 2015).
45  See Rodgers v. La. Bd. of Nursing, No. 3:15-cv-00615 (M.D. La. fi led Sept. 11, 2015).
46  See Strategic Pharm. Solutions, Inc. v. Nev. State Bd. of Pharm., No. 2:16-cv-00171-RFB-VCF (D. 
Nev. fi led Jan. 29, 2016).
47  See Bauer v. Pa. State Bd. of Auctioneer Exam’rs, No. 2:15-cv-01334 (W.D. Pa. fi led Oct. 14, 2015).
48  See Axcess Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Miss. State Bd. of Med. Licensure, No. 3:15-cv-00307-WHB-JCG (S.D. 
Miss. fi led Apr. 24, 2015).
49  See WSPTN Corp. v. Tenn. Dep’t of Health, No. 3:15-cv-00840 (M.D. Tenn. fi led Jul. 30, 2015).
50  See Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., No. 1:15-cv-00343-RP (W.D. Tex. fi led Apr. 29, 2015).
Rebecca H  A182
and unfair entry barriers, and some concern occupational scope-of-practice, the issue 
in North Carolina Dental. 
A fi nding of no antitrust immunity in these suits means that the board members 
are legally no diff erent from members of a private cartel, and so are personally 
fi nancially liable for three times the compensatory damages alleged by a plaintiff . 
Besides money damages, most of these suits ask for injunctive relief that would 
reverse the challenged regulatory action. Without state action immunity, any board 




States are likely to make changes to how they regulate the professions in the wake 
of North Carolina Dental. They should embrace this opportunity to improve the 
substance and process of their licensing schemes. States are likely to regard the 
specter of ongoing antitrust scrutiny as untenable because many licensing rules run 
afoul of the Sherman Act and because personal fi nancial liability for board members 
(with treble damages) is very likely to chill board membership. Boar immunity is 
probably the most effi  cient option for states.
North Carolina Dental provides states with two options for conferring immunity 
on licensing boards: active state supervision or modifi cation of board membership. 
If states minimally comply with the requirements for state action immunity, that 
certainly stands to improve the state of licensing in the U.S.; both options require 
more state involvement and political accountability and discourage self-regulation. 
But states should go further than the fl oor set by federal antitrust law. The stakes 
of occupational licensing go beyond antitrust law. Ineffi  cient licensing rules cost a 
state’s consumers and can amplify income inequality. Since states must make changes 
in response to North Carolina Dental anyway, they should take the opportunity to 




Even practitioner-dominated boards enjoy immunity from the antitrust laws, as long 
as the state actively supervises their activity. Active supervision would allow states 
to confer immunity on all licensing rules and regulations without making changes 
at the board level. Supervision has some distinct advantages over board reformation, 
including centralization: one umbrella supervisor could theoretically oversee all 
licensing board activity. It also has the advantage of ensuring accountability by 
forcing politically responsive state supervisors to examine, approve, and take 
responsibility for board regulations. And if the states use this opportunity – as I 
argue they should – to reform the substance of licensing regimes, centralized state 
supervisors can facilitate effi  cient reform.  
The biggest disadvantage of using supervision to immunize boards is that the 
Court has been vague about what constitutes adequate supervision. States may not 
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feel confi dent that a proposed scheme will pass muster. Another disadvantage is that 
creating a supervisory body would require major legislation, and perhaps even state 
constitutional amendment. Finding the political capital to make that happen could 
be diffi  cult, especially in states where small government is prized and supervisory 
structures would be seen as adding another layer of red tape. A supervisory body 
would also need signifi cant funding, which again could encounter resistance in the 
political process. Despite these issues, at least one state has already passed legislation 
giving its governor’s offi  ce a supervisory role.51 
3.2.2. Board Reformation
For states wary of the legal uncertainties surrounding active supervision, the 
another route to immunity may be attractive. States could reform boards to avoid the 
dominance identifi ed in North Carolina Dental by adding non-licensee members. 
These non-dominated boards would not need active supervision to be immune from 
antitrust suit. This solution is relatively cheap, simple, and politically attractive to 
legislatures hoping to avoid the creation of ever more regulatory infrastructure. It also 
presents an opportunity to add some diversity to the conversation about licensing. The 
nonprofessional member seats could be given to stakeholders, especially consumer 
advocates, who may push for a lighter touch in regulating the professions.
Board reformation has some disadvantages as well. It does not avoid all legal 
uncertainty, since the Court was unclear about what “controlling number” and “active 
market participant” could mean. It may be a more cumbersome solution, because 
while supervision could be created by a single act of the legislature, board reformation 
requires changing every board. Further, board reformation may be a less promising 
means than supervision to enact a state’s vision of leaner occupational licensing. 
Reforming boards to avoid a professional majority may help curb the excesses of 
occupational licensing, but how much it will help remains an open question. States 
may want more regulatory reform, and to get it they may have to adopt a top-down 
solution. In the fi nal analysis, it is unclear which route to immunity is the best – 
whether the goal is lighter licensing requirements or certainty of immunity. States 
will undoubtedly have to experiment with various solutions before anyone can 
confi dently say which is best.
3.2.3. Policy Changes
Whichever route to immunity a state chooses, the goal should not only be antitrust 
immunity but sparer and more effi  cient licensing schemes. For some occupations, 
such as bee-keeping, shampooing, fortunetelling, and the like, licensing should 
be eliminated altogether. For others, licensing restrictions should be pared down 
51  See Ga. Code Ann. § 43-1C-3 (West 2016) (giving the governor authority to “review and, in writing, 
approve or veto any rule” proposed by a state professional licensing board before it becomes eff ective).
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according to a cost-benefi t analysis. More data is needed on how specifi c licensing 
requirements aff ect quality and price. Here, the decentralization of American 
licensing regulation can help; regulatory variety between states means economists 
can compare approaches and study the eff ectiveness of various licensing rules. 
Recognizing this opportunity, the U.S. Department of Labor has made $7.5 million 
available to states wishing to study their own licensing regulation and to develop and 
implement improvements.52 Together with the changes mandated by North Carolina 
Dental, this research and advocacy could have real impact, provided the reforms 
are data-driven, and not, as has been the case for decades, the result of lobbying by 
licensees.
4. Conclusion
Labor economists have been arguing for decades that American occupational 
licensing has gone too far, but real reform has been elusive. The vast majority of 
licensing boards are dominated by licensees, and their regulations refl ect the self-
dealing one would expect from a cartel, not a governmental body. Now, with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina Dental, the states face a Hobson’s 
choice: either change the way that nearly a third of the workforce is regulated, or 
expose licensing rules to antitrust suit. States should take the mandate for reform 
as an opportunity to introduce effi  ciency, transparency, and fairness into their 
occupational licensing schemes. 
52  See Notice of Intent to Fund Project on Occupational Licensing Review and Portability: NOI-
ETA-16-14, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Emp’t. & Training Admin., https://www.doleta.gov/grants/pdf/NOI-
ETA-16-14.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2016).
Pázmány Law Review
4. 2016. • 183–210.
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF ENFORCING
Public Interest Considerations in Merger Control
Aranka N *
Pázmány Péter Catholic University
1. Introductory remarks
There is an on-going debate on whether or not competition policy should aim to 
achieve non-competition related goals. Thus, including considerations other than 
consumer welfare (i.e. pubic interest considerations) into the standard merger 
assessment is a controversial issue. Public interest considerations widen the horizon 
of such assessment,1 but might also encourage political lobbying, which decreases 
the impartiality of the system and shifts the focus from competition related matters 
to other agendas.
Even though considerations, which extend beyond consumer welfare can also 
be found in relation to antitrust procedures,2 this article will solely focus on public 
interest considerations in merger control, due to two main reasons. Firstly, more than 
ninety jurisdictions have merger control laws around the world, and a large-scale 
cross-border transaction can easily trigger obligation to notify in any of those regimes. 
Thus, multi-jurisdictional merger control analysis has become a commonplace 
element of today’s cross-border transactions.3 This feature requires a great level of 
harmonisation and legal certainty, both in terms of procedural and substantial issues. 
*   PhD student, Pázmány Péter Catholic University. The opinions expressed in this article are the 
author’s own.
1   In C. G : Public Interest Mergers. European Competition Journal, Vol. 9., No. 2, (August 2013) 
406.
2   See, for instance M. P. S  – L. T : Balancing the public interest-defence in cartel off ences. 
Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2016/05.
3   At the intersection of the global economy and national interests: foreign investment review and merger 




The existence of public interest considerations can create a signifi cant obstacle 
in merger control procedures and make it considerably diffi  cult for businesses to 
comply with diverging requirements and manage complex global mergers. Secondly, 
merger control had been recognised as a form of economic regulation which can 
be used as an interventionist tool by governments to infl uence the structure of 
markets.4 Mergers between multinational and transnational corporations have the 
potential to have a signifi cant impact on various national economies.5 Political and 
economic consequences can make merger control especially prone to the inclusion of 
considerations going beyond the core goals of Competition Law.6
Many argue that the eff ective application of competition policy itself serves public 
interest,7 and is capable of boosting innovation and economic growth and therefore, 
there is no need to attach further considerations to it.8 Some jurisdictions do not 
consider non-competition factors in their antitrust analysis.9 For instance, the US 
submission to the OECD (2016) refers to the keynote address of former Chairwoman 
Raminez where she points out that while such considerations “may be appropriate 
policy objectives and worthy goals overall […] integrating their consideration into 
a competition analysis […] can lead to poor outcomes to the detriment of both 
businesses and consumers.”10 These thoughts are largely shared by the business 
community that believes that introducing public interest considerations into merger 
4   L. M G  – M. C : Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: The Case of Merger 
Control. Governance, Vol. 12., No. 2., (April 1999) 176–200.
5   J. O : Considerations before sub-saharan African competition jurisdictions with the quest for 
multi-jurisdictional merger control certainty. US-China Law Review, Vol. 9, 2011. 212.
6   OECD: Public interest considerations in merger control. Background paper, 2016. 6.
7   See for instance, UNCTAD, Roundtable on: The Benefi t of Competition Policy for Consumers, 2014, 
„[…]competition is not an end in itself. It contributes to an effi  cient use of society’s scarce resources, 
technological development and innovation, a better choice of products and services, lower prices, 
higher quality and greater productivity in the economy as a whole. Fostering a competition culture 
in which consumers mak informed choices between products and services off ered, businesses refrain 
from anti-competitive agreements or behaviour and public administrations realise how competition 
can contribute to addressing wider economic problems, directly contributes to making markets work 
better for the benefi t of consumers and business”.
8   „[…] the existence of competitive markets benefi ts consumers in the sense that the competitive 
process should ensure, under standard economic theory, that competitive markets lead to the effi  cient 
allocation of scarce resources and deliver competitively priced goods and services. Public interest 
factors are more diffi  cult to quantify and address in terms of how these can be achieved through 
market forces.” D. P  – G. S : Consideration of Public Interest Factors in Antitrust Merger 
Control. Competition Policy International, 2.
9   See the US’s contribution to the OECD (2016, Public interest considerations in merger control). 
10  The US submission to the OECD (2016) also refers to academic literature (Bork, Legislative Intent 
and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.vL. & ECON. 7, 1066) which argued that the Sherman Act was 
not intended “to achieve […] broad non-commercial goals” and that the “test of illegality was entirely 
the eff ect upon commerce, not an eff ect upon some other thing or condition, such as a supposed social 
or political evil”.
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control is unnecessary and potentially counter-productive.11 The ICN Recommended 
Practices for Merger Analysis also suggests that competition authorities should 
decide mergers, albeit on competition grounds.12
Nevertheless, there are certain countries that regard non-competition considerations 
as an integral part of their merger assessment. Including social, political or other 
economic goals in merger control allows competition authorities to apply a more 
holistic approach. For instance, South Africa underlines in its contribution to the 
OECD (2016) that “[…] not only does the Competition Act incorporate features 
which refl ect the unique challenges facing South Africa’s economic development but 
it also performs a dual role in South Africa. In addition to stimulating competition 
and achieving market effi  ciency, it also aims to be an instrument of economic 
transformation and a tool (as part of a suite of economic development policy tools) 
to address the historical economic structure and encourage broad-based economic 
growth.” The latter approach is echoed by many developing countries, likely due to 
the greater role of industrial policies, and their eff orts to align competition policy 
with broader government policies.13 Additionally, public interest considerations may 
be used as tools for ‘young’ competition agencies, which still struggle to achieve 
credibility and legitimacy in their respective countries.14
The main focus of this paper will be on the institutional design in which 
these considerations are enforced. Before categorising existing examples, and 
demonstrating their advantages and disadvantages, the paper will briefl y describe the 
most common types of public interest considerations. It will then present legislative 
and case law examples from all around the world.
2. Public interest considerations in MergerControl
It is almost impossible to list all the factors that could be qualifi ed as serving ‘public 
interest’ in merger control. These considerations generally refl ect the social, cultural, 
historical and political background of an individual state. In line with the recent 
work of the OECD15 in this fi eld, we would regard all the non-competition related 
considerations in merger control as public interest consideration.
11  See the BIAC’s contribution to the OECD (2016, Public interest considerations in merger control). 
BIAC points in its contribution that there are several disadvantages of introducing a separate public 
interest analysis in merger reviews: (a) unpredictability and uncertainty; (b) increasing susceptibility 
of competition agencies to political pressure and to depart from merger-specifi c analysis; and (c) 
the risk of outcomes which damage the long term public interest to the extent effi  ciency-enhancing 
mergers are prohibited or deterred.
12  ICN Recommended Practices (n 1) 1, Comment 3.
13  See A. C  – A. N : Public Interest Clauses in Developing Countries. Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 7., Issue 1, (January 2016) 46–51.
14  D. L : The role of Public Interest in Merger Evaluation, International Competition Network. 
Merger Working Group Naples, September 2002. 2.
15  OECD: Public interest considerations in merger control. Background paper, 2016. 6.
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The most common considerations include, for instance, defence, security of supply, 
media plurality, employment, international competitiveness, exports & imports, or 
other public goods (i.e. environment). As it will be shown throughout the paper, the 
considerations might appear as integral parts of the standard merger assessment, as 
exemptions or exceptions under the general rule, a justifi cation for clearing/blocking 
a merger or as a ground for action for external parties (e.g. politicians, regulators).
There are many diff erent ways how these considerations can be categorised. The 
most notable diff erence probably relates to their form: some jurisdictions prefer to 
apply a broad, while others a more (sector) specifi c defi nition in their laws. This part 
of the paper will present examples of the ‘broad’ and ‘more specifi c’ considerations, 
and evaluate the pros and cons regarding their application.
On one hand, broad terms16 going beyond pure competition considerations provide 
the relevant authority with a very fl exible approach, which can be adjusted according 
to the circumstances. On the other side, broad terms can be easily stretched to 
reach distant policy goals which are not necessarily related to the transaction itself. 
Therefore, it is desirable to provide a very detailed reasoning to the decisions where 
the competition authority applies broad defi nitions. By doing so, countries can 
create a more business-friendly atmosphere, where the enforcement system serves 
legal certainty and is more predictable. In Australia,17 for instance, the Australian 
Competition Tribunal’s (‘Tribunal’)18 interpreted ‘public benefi t’ broadly. It held 
that anything of value to the community generally or any contribution to the aims 
pursued by society, including the achievement of the economic goals of effi  ciency 
and progress should be regarded as benefi ts to the public. In deciding whether to 
grant an authorisation, the Tribunal must be satisfi ed that the proposed merger is 
likely to result in such a ‘benefi t to the public’ in order for a merger to be allowed 
to occur. As for interpreting what is to be considered as a ‘benefi t to the public’, 
Australia’s recent contribution to the OECD (2016) invokes an example by AGL 
Energy/Macquaire Generation case, where the competition authority (‘ACCC’) and 
the Tribunal disagreed on whether the conditions imposed by the Tribunal represent 
a substantial public benefi t. The case points back to 2014, when AGL Energy, a 
publicly listed Australian energy company, applied to the Tribunal for authorisation 
to acquire the assets of Macquarie Generation, a State-owned electricity generator. 
AGL Energy’s application for authorisation followed an announcement by the ACCC 
16  For instance, in Chinese Taipei the ‘overall economic benefi ts’ should be taken into consideration 
when reviewing merger cases. In practice, the scope of the overall economic benefi ts also encompass 
economic benefi ts not related to competition, such as industrial development, employment and 
national competitiveness that are associated with the overall economic benefi ts. See Chinese Taipei’s 
contribution to the OECD (2016, Public interest considerations in merger control).
17  See Australia’s contribution to the OECD (2016, Public interest considerations in merger control).
18  In Australia, as the statutory test is diff erent from the competition authorities review process, parties 
may also apply for merger authorization to the Tribunal after the competition authority (‘ACCC’) 
has opposed a merger either informally or formally. If the Tribunal’s authorization is granted, this 
provides statutory immunity for the transaction. See Australia’s contribution to the OECD (2016, 
Public interest considerations in merger control).
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that it would oppose the acquisition on the basis that it was likely to substantially 
lessening competition. On the contrary, the Tribunal granted authorisation to AGL 
Energy, subject to conditions. The Tribunal was satisfi ed that the acquisition was 
likely to result in signifi cant benefi ts to the public from the payment of $1 billion 
to the State of New South Wales which was proposed to be used by the State of 
New South Wales to fi nance new infrastructure projects and by relieving the State 
of having to continue to operate the assets. The Tribunal accepted that the addition 
of $1 billion to the infrastructure fund would lead to its application to infrastructure 
development that would be a signifi cant benefi t to the public.
However, more specifi c merger tests may qualify as a more transparent and 
business-friendly than the application of the broad term of ‘public interest’. Example 
for such more specifi c terms can be found in the United Kingdom. The list of 
considerations specifi ed by the UK Enterprise Act 2002 (‘the Enterprise Act’)19 that 
allows for intervention in mergers by the Secretary of State (‘SoS’) on certain public 
interest grounds was originally concerning ‘national security’ and ‘media plurality’. 
The UK’s example shows that a specifi ed list equally does not serve as a guarantee 
that there will not be attempts to interpret the list of factors wider. Also, there 
have been attempts for an expansion of the list of public interest considerations. In 
practice, the only additional public interest consideration added since 2002 was the 
‘stability of the UK fi nancial system’, during the fi nancial crisis and in the context of 
the Lloyds/HBOS merger.20 Publicly available information suggested that the merger 
“was truly exceptional in its scale and would not usually be allowed”.21 Thus, the 
SoS considered that the new public interest consideration – the stability of the UK 
fi nancial system – overrode the competition concerns identifi ed by the Offi  ce of Fair 
Trade22 and decided – even before the addition of a new public interest consideration – 
that the merger should not be referred to further investigation.23 The SoS’ decision 
was challenged at court before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (‘CAT’). Given that 
no evidence was raised to show that the decision maker had done anything other than 
balance the considerations of fi nancial stability against the competition concerns and 
come down in the favour of the former, the application was dismissed by the CAT.24
19  See UK’s contribution to the OECD (2016, Public interest considerations in merger control).
20  The merger created the fourth-biggest bank in Britain that also accounted for a third of the mortgage 
market. 
21  See Lloyds TSB seals £12bn HBOS deal, 17 September 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
business/7622180.stm.
22  The Offi  ce of Fair Trade (‘OFT’) is the predecessor of the Competition and Markets Authority (‘CMA’).
23  On an other occasion the attempt to enlarge the list of considerations failed. Concerns were expressed 
in 2014 about the implications of any merger between AstraZeneca and Pfi zer with specifi c regard 
to their R&D activity being carried out in the UK. As a consequence of this, the possibility of the 
inclusion of the protection of R&D as a public interest was raised, but that argument failed. OECD: 
Public interest considerations in merger control, Background paper, 2016. 12.
24  C. G : Public Interest Mergers. European Competition Journal, Vol. 9., No. 2, (August 2013) 
394.
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Another example where more specifi ed considerations can be found in the law is 
the European Union’s relevant provisions in Regulation 139/2004/EC (‘EUMR’).25 
Article 21 (4) of the EUMR does allow Member States to adopt, with regard to 
concentrations of an European dimension, measures to protect certain interests other 
than competition, for as long as these measures are necessary and proportionate to their 
aim and are compatible with all aspects of Community law.26 The three considerations 
are ‘public security’, ‘plurality of the media’ and ‘prudential rules’ which are regarded 
as compatible with EU law. Other considerations should be communicated to the 
European Commission that assesses the public interest consideration based on the 
general principles of EU law. The Court of Justice of the European Union (‘ECJ’) 
interpreted these considerations on several occasions. In Commission v Belgium and 
Commission v Spain27 the ECJ specifi ed that the requirement of public security, as a 
derogation from the fundamental principles of free movement of capital and freedom 
of establishment must be interpreted strictly, so that its scope cannot be determined 
unilaterally by each Member State without any control by the EU institutions. Thus, 
the public security exception may be relied on only if there is a genuine and suffi  ciently 
serious threat to a fundamental interest of society.28
As demonstrated by the above examples, interpreting public interest considerations 
is a challenge. Legal certainty and predictability can be better served by providing a 
detailed analysis on the interpretation of the public interest considerations, which can 
assure businesses that public interest considerations will not be misused. Other tools 
that serve legal certainty include issuing soft law or well-established case law. In 
South Africa, for instance, the Competition Commission’s approach in respect of the 
assessment of public interest factors is set out in the ‘Guidelines for the Assessment 
of Public Interest Factors in Merger Regulation’.29 The recently released guidelines 
adopted a fi ve-step approach to address public interest in mergers, namely i) the 
likely eff ect of the transaction on public interest, ii) whether the eff ect on the specifi c 
public interest is a result of the merger, iii) whether these eff ects are substantial, 
iv) whether the merging parties can justify the likely eff ect on the particular public 
interest and v) whether the concerns can be addressed with remedies. The business 
community welcomed30 the eff ort to promote greater certainty in enforcing public 
interest considerations. This is a clear indication that there would be a need for soft 
25  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, OJ L 24, 29.01.2004. 1–22.
26  See the European Union’s contribution to the OECD (Public interest considerations in merger control. 
2016).
27  Case C-503/99, [2002] ECR I – 4809, Case C-463/00, [2003] ECR I-4581.
28  EU Merger Control and the Public Interest, A Legal Mapping Report by the Lendület-HPOPs 
Research Group in Spring 2016, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences, 10.
29  The guidelines are available at: http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Final-
Public-Interest-Guidelines-public-version-210115.pdf.
30  South Africa: Competition Commission makes available draft guidelines for the assessment of the 
public interest criteria in merger control matters, African Antitrust & Competition Law News & 
Analysis, https://africanantitrust.com/2015/01/23/south-africa-competition-commission-makes-
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law documents in this fi eld. However, there are not many documents available with 
the purpose of clarifying how the relevant authorities will interpret and apply non-
competition related considerations.
3. Institutional models
There are diff erent ways how competition regimes can meet the public interest 
objectives through competition law. The available regimes diff er considerably in terms 
of how, when and by whom public interest considerations are taken into account.31 
This section will examine the various institutional models in which public interest 
considerations can be taken into consideration in merger procedures and eventually, 
establishes and institutional design system. While doing so, the article will use as 
a starting point the basic classifi cation of the OECD background paper on ‘Public 
interest considerations in merger control’,32 however, further develops it by taking 
into consideration recent developments, case law and the most notable examples of 
the country contributions and the discussion of the OECD roundtable.33 
The institutional model developed in this section is demonstrated in the fi gure 
below:
Fi gure 1 Institutional design of enforcing public interest considerations
available-draft-guidelines-for-the-assessment-of-the-public-interest-criteria-in-merger-control-
matters/.
31  Public Interest Regimes in the European Union – diff erences and similarities in approach, Final 
Report of the EU Merger Working Group (10 March 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/
mwg_public_interest_regimes_en.pdf.
32  The Background Paper is available at: http://www.oecd.org/offi  cialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WP3(2016)3&docLanguage=En. The author of this 
article also authored the Background paper referred to in this article.
33  All country contributions are available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/public-interest-
considerations-in-merger-control.htm.
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The OECD Background paper identifi es two main models: the ‘single authority’ 
model and the ‘dual responsibilities’ model. In the former it is the competition authority 
that is entrusted to conduct the public interest test in merger review, regardless of the 
sector or industry concerned. In the latter model, competition authorities follow a 
standard competition assessment, while public interest considerations are assessed 
by a diff erent body (e.g. a sectoral regulator or a political decision-making body). The 
paper will use the same distinction as a starting point of the categorisation.
3.1. The single authority model
The question whether or not to entrust the competition authority with the responsibility 
to enforce public interest considerations relates to the social, cultural and political 
environment of the country. As for the pros and cons, the single authority model 
provides the enforcer with the possibility to apply a more holistic approach; while 
at the same time, it can impose the authority to a greater political infl uence. Also, 
the single authority setting might cause serious internal confl ict of interest in those 
jurisdictions where the competition authority is supervised by a ministry, which 
promotes or prioritises other public interest considerations than competition. An 
often raised criticism claims that competition authorities are not the best placed 
authorities to pursue public policy goals as they are technical and non-elected 
bodies.34 Therefore, it is very likely that competition authorities lack the necessary 
expertise to assess public interest considerations. Companies also suggest that the 
assessment of public interest considerations can signifi cantly slow down the time-
sensitive merger procedures.35 In contrast, other sources emphasise that it should 
rather be the competition authority than any other body, if public interest is enforced 
in Competition Law.36
One could argue that the single authority model might raise the level of uncertainty 
and unpredictability, thus it is more desirable to separate the responsibilities of the 
competition authority from the other body, which is responsible to enforce public 
interest in merger control. On the other side, the question whether it would be more 
effi  cient if the analysis would be conducted by one institution, instead of having a 
fragmented system, could equally be relevant to raise. Some countries’ institutional 
setting suggests that it is easier to reconcile the diff erent considerations within the 
framework of one review process, conducted by one authority. The Harper Review 
(a recently completed comprehensive independent review of Australian competition 
34  OECD: Global Forum on Responsible Business Conduct. Competition Law and Responsible Business 
Conduct, 2015. 17.
35  D. P  – G. S : Consideration of Public Interest Factors in Antitrust Merger Control. 
Competition Policy International, 2014.
36  V. H : Public interest clauses may be a necessary evil, says OECD head, 13 March 2015. http://
globalcompetitionreview.com/article/1061787/public-interest-clauses-may-be-a-necessary-evil-
says-oecd-head.
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law and policy),37 for instance, recommended replacing the current separate ACCC 
formal clearance process and the Tribunal authorization process and making the 
ACCC the fi rst instance decision maker for the combined test.
Probably the greatest fear of businesses in this model is the clash of considerations. 
Mergers are largely driven by the private interest of businesses, whilst public interest 
considerations are rather motivated by political, social, cultural considerations.38 
Competition criteria might not point to the same direction as broader policy objectives, 
which make it very likely that these considerations will confl ict one another. It is 
unpredictable how the competition authority would come to its conclusion, which 
considerations would it value more, and how it would establish the objective criteria 
to weigh these considerations against each other. This feature can make the system 
especially uncertain.
Some of the notable examples where competition authorities are also responsible 
to enforce public interest considerations include countries from all around the 
globe, from Chinese Taipei to New Zealand. In the following sections the paper will 
demonstrate through these examples how the single authority works in practice and 
which are the trade-off s in its operation.
3.1.1. Standard element of the merger assessment
First, the paper will look at a couple of examples where the assessment of the public 
interest considerations is integral part of fi nding whether the transaction leads to 
competition problems. In this model, public interest consideration – which is ideally 
interpreted in law/soft law and well-elaborated by case law – represents a question 
that the competition authority evaluates each and every case, regardless of the sector, 
industry, origin of the undertakings concerned.
The unique operation of South Africa’s merger regime39 has been a subject of 
ongoing discussion ever since its enactment of the law.40 Article 12A (3) of the 
South African competition act specifi es that the relevant South African competition 
authorities (the Commission or the Tribunal) must consider the eff ect that the merger 
will have on: i) a particular industry or sector; ii) employment; iii) the ability of 
businesses owned by historically disadvantaged persons to become competitive; and 
iv) the ability of national industries to compete in international markets. A recent 




39  Other relevant case law examples are Kansai/Freeworld (2012), Glencore/Xstrata (2013), Rio Tinto/
IDC, Hebei, Mauritius SPV (2013), BB/Adcock Ingram (2014).
40  See, for instance S. T : Public Interest Considerations and their Impact on Merger. 
Regulation in South Africa. Global Journal of Social-Human Science, Vol 15, Issue 7, (2015); W. 
S : The Role of Public Interest in Merger Evaluation in South Africa. University of Pretoria, 
April 2016. 
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example includes the transaction conditionally approved by the Tribunal in May 2011, 
between Wal-Mart Stores Inc. of the United States (‘Walmart’) and South African 
retailer Massmart Holdings Limited (‘Massmart’). The transaction did not raise 
any competition concerns. The imposed conditions related solely to public interest 
considerations, in particular employment and the potential displacement of small 
businesses in markets underserved by large retailers.41 AB InBev’s recent acquisition 
over SABMiller is also worth mentioning.42 The mega merger that created the world’s 
largest brewery was subject of merger clearances in several jurisdictions, including 
the European Union, China, United States and South Africa. South Africa gave green 
light to the transaction subject to several conditions.43 Many of the conditions aimed 
at achieving public interest goals, for instance i) the creation of a fund which will be 
utilised for the development of the South African agricultural outputs for barley, hops 
and maize, as well as to promote entry and growth of emerging and black farmers in 
South Africa; ii) the undertaking that InBev will not retrench any employee in South 
Africa as a result of the merger; iii) merging parties also agreed to submit to the 
government and the Commission by no later than two years after closing the merger 
and outline its black economic empowerment plans setting out how the merged 
entity intends to maintain black participation in the company, including equity. 
These case examples clearly demonstrate that the uncertainty and unpredictability 
that accompany the interpretation of public interest clauses may also aff ect the fi nal 
results of the case. Where non-competition goals are applicable, businesses should 
also be ready to off er remedies not based on the ‘theory of harm’ in merger control.
Many countries from the developing world followed South Africa’s example and 
included public interest considerations into merger assessment (e.g. Kenya, Botswana, 
Mozambik, Zambia and Tansania). These considerations mainly aim to align the work 
of the competition authority with government policies. Most notably, and similarly to 
the ones which are applicable in South Africa, they put focus on social considerations 
(i.e. employment, protection of disadvantaged people). In Kenya, the competition 
authority applies both the ‘competitive eff ects’ test and the ‘public interest’ test to 
any proposed merger transaction. In determining the latter, the competition authority 
assesses whether the proposed merger confl icts with government policies.44 Similarly 
to South Africa, Kenya dealt many times with labour-issues in merger cases, which 
is very likely part of the Government’s responses to major unemployment rates in 
Africa. These cases involved imposing remedies, purely based on public interest 
ground. In the merger case Shareholding British–American Investments Company 
(“Britam”)/Real Insurance Company Limited(“Real”)45 the competition test showed 
41  See South Africa’s contribution to the OECD (Public interest considerations in merger control,2016).
42  Anheuser-Busch InBev Clinches $103 Billion SABMiller Deal, Bloomberg (28 September 2016).
43  See the Competition Commission’s press release on the merger clearance at: http://www.compcom.
co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/SABMiller_AB-InBev_31May16_1530-3.pdf.
44  Getting the deal through – Merger control (2017), Kenya, 236.
45  See also Art-Caff ’e Coff ee and Bakery Limited/7 Coff ee Shops of Dormans Coff ee Limited. In Kenya’s 
contribution to the OECD (Does Competition Kill or Create Jobs? 2015).
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that the transaction will not lead to the signifi cant lessening of eff ective competition, 
though problems were raised in relation to the possible future job losses due to the 
merger. Therefore, the merger was approved on the condition that Britam would 
retain at least 85% of the staff  of Real. 
Another example is the People’s Republic of China, where according to the Anti-
monopoly Law of China, the state must protect the legitimate operation of industries 
dominated by the state-owned economy that are vital to the national economy 
and national security.46 Relevant guidance published by Ministry of Commerce 
(’MOFCOM’)47 also provides that specifi c explanations should be given in the fi ling 
notifi cation if the concentration is related to national security, industrial policy, state 
owned assets, etc.48 Some would argue that non-competition issues are a perfect fi t 
to reach goals beyond consumer welfare in the Chinese merger regime, e.g. to both 
domestic consolidation, where industrial policy factors may be supportive, and to 
inbound investment where industrial policy factors may create additional challenges 
in securing merger clearance.49 In some of its recent decisions, MOFCOM claimed 
that it had taken into account ‘other factors’ in the merger assessment it deemed 
relevant. For example, in the Coca Cola/Huiyuan merger, the only deal so far 
that was prohibited, MOFCOM took into account the harm the merger could have 
caused to China’s domestic small and medium-sized manufacturers and the healthy 
development of the Chinese fruit-juice drink industry.50 In the Uralkali/Silvinit 
merger which was conditionally approved MOFCOM shed light on the consideration 
of ‘national economy’ as a relevant factor. In that case, the potential adverse impact 
of the merger of the two entities on China’s agriculture and the industries related 
to agriculture was referred to as a relevant consideration in MOFCOM’s decision. 
Although the underlying analysis and reasoning leading to the relevance of this 
factor are not explained, publicly available information suggests that MOFCOM’s 
concern possibly was the eff ect of the merger on the supply stability and price of the 
products in the Chinese agriculture, which has long been considered as a key sector 
in China’s national economy.51
It is important to point out that this model is not only applicable in the developing 
world. Some of the developed countries also found this model of including public 
interest considerations appealing. For instance, the application of a public interest test 
in Poland is the sole responsibility of the competition authority52. Public interest test 
is a part of standard merger proceedings and is applied by the competition authority 
on a regular basis with no special rules. The so-called ‘ministerial model’ applies 
46  Getting the deal through – Merger control (2017), China, 106.
47  MOFCOM is in charge of regulating and enforcing the merger control in China.
48  Getting the deal through – Merger control (2017), China, 106.
49  Getting the deal through – Merger control (2017), China, 106.
50  Steven W  SU: China Releases New Rules Guiding Merger Control Review. Available at: https://
www.hg.org/article.asp?id=22237.
51  Ibid.
52  See in http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/mwg_public_interest_regimes_en.pdf .4.
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mainly in Europe (3.2. of the paper), whilst interestingly, no ministerial intervention 
is required in Poland. 
3.1.2. A unique element in merger assessment
The paper will assess those jurisdictions where public interest considerations come 
into play in case if the competition authority establishes that the transaction will 
likely lead to competition problems. In these situations public interest considerations 
can take a form of a ‘modifi ed effi  ciency’ test, or serve as a justifi cation to clear 
the transaction subsequently. This means that the competition authority conducts 
a standard merger assessment, while at the end of the process it is either obliged 
or recommended to measure the results of the competition assessment against the 
possible effi  ciencies driven by the transaction. In some situations referring to public 
interest considerations provides the opportunity to clear mergers that would have 
otherwise been found anticompetitive. The competition authority is not obliged to 
assess the public interest considerations in each and every case, but only under certain 
circumstances, for example, if it founds that the transactions leads to a signifi cant 
lessening of eff ective competition.
When the Commerce Commission (‘Commission’) in New Zealand receives 
an authorization application for a merger, it fi rst conducts a traditional, effi  ciency-
based assessment. If the Commission came to the conclusion that the merger is 
likely to lead to a signifi cant lessening of competition, then it must apply the ‘public 
benefi t’ test. Section 67 of the Act requires the Commission to take into account 
public benefi t considerations when assessing applications for merger authorisation. 
New Zealand’s courts have defi ned a public benefi t as: “anything of value to the 
community generally, any contribution to the aims pursued by the society including 
as one of its principal elements (in the context of trade practices legislation) the 
achievement of the economic goals of effi  ciency and progress.”53 The unique effi  ciency 
defence applicable in Canada is also worth mentioning.54 The Canadian model for 
considering effi  ciencies in merger review is unique when compared to most of the 
Competition Bureau’s (‘Bureau’) international counterparts. As Canada pointed out 
to its contribution to the OECD (2016), instead of being one of many factors that may 
be considered in the assessment of whether a merger should proceed unopposed, 
gains in effi  ciency from a merger are assessed under ‘the trade-off  analysis’ set out 
in section 96 of the Canadian Competition Act. Section 96 requires the Competition 
Tribunal (‘Tribunal’)55 to allow an otherwise anti-competitive merger if it fi nds that 
the gains in effi  ciency brought about by the merger outweigh and off set its likely anti-
competitive eff ects. Even though certain proposed legislation contained references 
53  See New Zealand’s contribution to the OECD (Public interest considerations in merger control, 2016).
54  See Canada’s contribution to the OECD (Public interest considerations in merger control, 2016).
55  The Tribunal is a separate adjudicative body that has jurisdiction to hear and dispose of all applications 
made by the Commissioner (the head of the Bureau) under certain sections of the Act, including 
mergers.
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to requiring effi  ciencies gains to be ‘passed on’ to the public in the form of lower 
prices or better products, ultimately the Competition Act did not specify how the 
Tribunal should regard issues of wealth transfer. In the recently contested merger 
Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Tervita Corp., the Canadian courts 
allowed to proceed on the basis of a section 96 defence, the Tribunal stated that the 
total surplus standard should be the starting point, but that the Tribunal will also 
“determine whether there are likely to be any socially adverse eff ects associated 
with the merger” if such arguments are put forth by the Commissioner and “If so, it 
will be necessary to determine how to treat the wealth transfer that will be associated 
with any adverse price eff ects…”.56
In some jurisdictions public interest considerations can be referred to as a 
justifi cation to clear transactions that could eventually lead to the signifi cant lessening 
of eff ective competition. If it appears that the merger is likely to substantially prevent 
or lessen competition’, the COMESA Competition Council (‘CCC’57) must determine 
whether: i) the merger is likely to result in any technological, effi  ciency or other 
pro-competitive gain, greater than the anti-competitive eff ects, which would not 
likely be obtained if the merger is prevented; and ii) the merger can be justifi ed on 
substantial public interest grounds. In determining whether a merger is or will be 
contrary to the public interest the CCC is required to take into account all matters 
that it considers relevant in the circumstances and have regard to the desirability 
of: maintaining and promoting eff ective competition between persons producing 
or distributing commodities in the region; promoting the interests of consumers, 
purchasers and other users in the region with regard to the prices, quality and variety 
of such commodities and services; and promoting, through competition, the reduction 
of costs and the development of new commodities, and facilitating the entry of new 
competitors into existing markets.58 Similar rules are applicable in Nigeria, when 
after fi nding that the transaction likely leads to the lessening of eff ective competition, 
the competition authority has to determine whether or not the merger is likely to 
result in any technological effi  ciency or other pro-competitive advantage that will be 
greater than, and off set, the eff ects of any prevention or lessening of competition; and 
if the merger is justifi able on the grounds of substantial public interest.59 Regarding 
the public interest the competition authority takes into account the following relevant 
considerations: the particular industrial sector or region; employment; the ability 
of small businesses to become competitive; and the ability of national industries to 
compete in international markets.
As already mentioned above, it is important to provide businesses with guidance 
on how the competition authority will likely interpret and enforce the public interest 
56  Based on Canada’s contribution to the OECD (Public interest considerations in merger control, 2016).
57  Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).
58  Getting the deal through – Merger control (2017), Comesa.
59  Getting the deal through – Merger control (2017), Nigeria, 299.
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criteria in practice.60 Many jurisdictions aim to help businesses in understanding the 
competition authorities’ assessment and guiding principles, in diff erent ways. Taking 
the above examples, in New Zealand and Canada it is the Court that interprets the 
broad defi nition or the effi  ciency analysis, whilst in South Africa there is soft law 
guiding the public on the authorities’ approach.
3.2. The dual responsibilities model
More frequently, we can see the model in which the competition authority is not 
the primer responsible authority for addressing public interest. Depending on the 
actual setting, the competition authority might be consulted, overruled or allowed to 
conduct a parallel assessment to the regulator/political branch.
One of the biggest advantages of this model is the clear distinction between the 
body which is responsible to assess competition related considerations (competition 
authority) and the external body entrusted with assessing public interest (sectoral 
regulator, minister or other political body). Therefore, it relieves the competition 
authority from the political pressure, while eventually, places the decision on a 
competition matter in the hands of a body which is not an expert on those matters. 
This model also clearly represents its own challenges. First, the public interest 
interventions tend to prioritise short term solutions,61 serving the specifi c public 
interest, which might result in a serious competition problem on a long term. Second, 
interventions based on public interest considerations might ignore the need of linking 
the intervention to the eff ects caused by the concentration, i.e. to ensure that the 
intervention will be merger-specifi c. Third, it can be argued that cases of a larger 
scale are important to politicians62 who might be too close to the parties or have a 
vested interest in the outcome, so that impartiality can be better guaranteed by an 
independent agency.
In the following sections the paper will make a distinction between those models 
where the ‘other’ institution is a regulator or a political branch (e.g. ministry). 
60  See for instance: Norton R : The World After Wal-mart – will South African mergers ever be the 
same again?, available at: http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/67936/the-
world-after-wal-mart-will-south-african-mergers-ever-be-the-same-again. „The Commission should 
issue guidelines on the information which merging parties are required to provide in their merger 
fi lings in order to speed up reviews. Until then, merging parties who need swift clearances will need 
to anticipate these issues well in advance of lodging their fi lings, and deal with them appropriately. 
This could include off ering appropriate conditions at an early stage of the investigation.”
61  See Graham’s points in relation to the Lloyds/HBOS merger in the UK. C. G : Public Interest 
Mergers. European Competition Journal, Vol. 9., No. 2, (August 2013) 394. It is also suggested by 
the Bolivian contribution to the GCR – Getting the deal through, Merger control (2016) where it 
is emphasised that the merger clearing process can be speeded up substantially if public interest 
considerations are present in the project.
62  G  (2013) op. cit. 405.
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3.2.1. Regulator model 
The ‘dual responsibilities’ model is particular in certain sectors, for instance 
in transport, fi nance, media and broadcasting. In these sectors public interest 
considerations are channelled into the merger control procedure through the offi  cial 
position of the sectoral regulator, whose procedure is sometimes linked to the 
competition procedure in terms of timing and procedural rules, while sometimes it is 
completely distinct from that. In the latter situation the regulator’s procedure goes in 
parallel to the competition authorities’ procedure or follows it. Hereinafter the paper 
will refer to this model as the ‘regulator model’. 
The paper will fi rst show examples of the regulator model that is linked to the 
competition procedure (‘simultaneous procedures’), and the next part will focus on 
subsequent procedures by regulators.
3.2.1.1. S  
A good example for the simultaneous regulator model is the Hungarian regime. The 
competition authority shall obtain the opinion of the NMHH’s Media Council63 for the 
approval of certain transactions where the participating undertakings bear editorial 
responsibility or distribute media content to the general public. The competition 
authority’s task is to investigate a merger’s eff ects on competition, while the NMHH 
is entrusted with assessing its eff ects on the plurality of the media. While the NMHH 
conducts its procedure, the competition authority suspends its merger assessment 
until the NMHH’s professional opinion arrives. The Media Council refused to grant 
approval two times64 in the past fi ve years, decisions that were followed by heavy 
media coverage.65
In Ireland undertakings involved in media mergers are required to make two-stage 
notifi cation process.66 One notifi cation is sent to the competition authority responsible 
for carrying out the substantive competition review to determine whether the merger 
is likely to give rise to a substantial lessening of competition. Another notifi cation 
is then sent to the Minister for Communications (‘Minister’). The Minister has a 
specifi ed time period to consider the media merger. If the Minister is concerned that 
the media merger may be contrary to the public interest in protecting plurality of 
the media, then requests the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland (‘BAI’) to carry out 
a ‘Phase II’ examination. An advisory panel may be set up to assist the BAI in its 
63  The decision-making body of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority, the “NMHH”.
64  In Axel Springer/Ringer merger in 2010, and in RTL/Central Mediacsoport merger in 2017.
65  See, for instance http://bbj.hu/business/media-council-blocks-ringier-axel-springer-merger-in-
hungary_57235; http://index.hu/kultur/media/2017/01/24/a_mediatanacs_nem_engedi_hogy_
az_rtl_bevasarolja_magat_a_central_mediacsoportba/. Hungarian media merger blocked by 
competition and telecoms agencies, (20 February 2017), PaRR.
66  Seven media mergers have been notifi ed and cleared by the competition authority and the Minister for 
Communications. See Getting the deal through – Merger control (2017) 209.
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review. The ultimate decision, however, is made by the Minister. The Department of 
Communications, Energy and Natural Resources facilitated the process with issuing 
guidelines regarding media mergers. The media plurality assessment introduced in 
2014 is relatively new and so far the clearance determinations are generally limited 
to stating that the relevant transaction will not be contrary to the public interest in 
protecting media plurality in the state.67 
We have already emphasised above the role that soft law might play in interpreting 
and enforcing public interest considerations in the ‘single authority’ model. The same 
applies to the dual responsibilities model. In the UK the Offi  ce of Communication 
(‘Ofcom’) published guidance on media mergers in public interest test.68 Even in the 
absence of soft law, the relevant case law can provide businesses with the necessary 
information to comply with the requirements set forth by the law, but only if the 
decision contains a detailed reasoning. This can help businesses and media industry 
and practitioners to understand the basis for the determinations and the manner in 
which the regulator applies the media plurality test.
3.2.1.2. S   
As for the latter, there are many sectors where the regulator conducts a procedure 
parallel (before or after) to that of the competition authorities. Many of these 
subsequent procedures are motivated by national interest considerations.
One of the typical examples can be found in the banking industry: mergers in the 
banking sector are generally a subject of parallel scrutiny, especially if the acquirer 
is a foreign company. In the US, for instance, foreign banks that operate in the US 
and seek to acquire another bank operating in the US may need to notify a number 
of regulators of their transaction for antitrust review. In addition to the Department 
of Justice (‘DOJ’), the Federal Reserve Board (‘FRB’), the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (‘FDIC’) and the Offi  ce of the Controller of the Currency (‘OCC’) 
all have statutory authority to review the competitive eff ects of proposed bank.69 
Foreign corporations seeking to carry on banking in Australia are subject to the same 
requirements as domestic corporations - the corporation must apply to the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (‘APRA’) to become an ‘authorised deposit-taking 
institution’.70
Ideally, these procedures do not interfere with each other’s jurisprudence. 
However, jurisdictional issues are sometimes unavoidable. In Brazil, the Brazilian 
Central Bank (Banco Central do Brasil – ‘BACEN’) has broad powers to regulate and 
oversee fi nancial services. BACEN is involved in a long-standing litigation against 
67  See Getting the deal through – Merger control (2017) 211.
68  “The guidance on this specifi c role for Ofcom is now clearer and hopefully more useful for prospective 
buyers and sellers.” https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/latest/media/media-releases/2004/
ofcom-publishes-guidance-on-media-mergers-public-interest-test.
69  ABA Report 63.
70  ABA Report 68.
201Institutional Design of Enforcing
Banco de Crédito Nacional S.A. and Bradesco S.A. to decide whether BACEN or 
the competition authority, the ‘CADE’ has authority to review transactions in the 
fi nancial market.71 As a result of this ongoing tension between CADE and BACEN, 
fi nancial institutions tend to fi le applications for review of transactions with both 
agencies.72 
3.2.2. Ministerial model
The other type of the dual responsibilities model, to which we will refer as the 
‘ministerial model’, involves three diff erent types:
– The fi rst allows the involvement of a political body (generally, the relevant 
ministry) either through a consultation process (the ‘soft’ version), or by 
overruling the competition authorities’ decision (the ‘hard’ version).
– The second type of the ministerial model involves a situation where the 
Government or the relevant ministry exempts a certain transaction from the 
competition authorities’ scrutiny.
– The last version concerns an independent and parallel procedure to the 
competition procedure (i.e. the foreign investment regime).
3.2.2.1. M  
In the soft scenario the competition authority is obliged, under certain circumstances, 
to consult with the relevant ministry. There can be diff erences in the soft model on 
whether the opinion of the minister is obligatory to the competition authority or not.
An example for the soft consultation model can be found in the Canadian 
legislation. In its contribution to the OECD Canada73 reported on certain industries 
where the Competition Bureau (‘Bureau’) is obliged by law to consult with responsible 
ministries. One such sector is the transportation where due to reasons relating to 
Air Canada’s acquisition of Canadian Airlines, ministerial jurisdiction for merger 
review was extended in 2000 to include airline mergers. It was extended again in 
2007 to include any matter with a transportation undertaking (i.e., matters that relate 
to national transportation). As it stands today, under the Canada Transportation Act 
(‘CTA’), parties to a merger that involves a transportation undertaking and that is the 
subject of a notifi cation under the Act must also provide notice of the transaction to 
the Minister of Transport. Within 42 days of receiving such notice, “If the Minister 
is of the opinion that the proposed transaction does not raise issues with respect 
to the public interest as it relates to national transportation,…” the Minister will 
notify the parties that no further Ministerial review is conducted. However, “If the 
Minister is of the opinion that the proposed transaction raises issues with respect to 
71  ABA Report 70.
72  ABA Report 70.
73  See Canada’s contribution to the OECD (Public interest considerations in merger control.2016).
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the public interest as it relates to national transportation”, the Minister may instruct 
that those issues to be examined and the parties be precluded from implementing 
their transaction unless it is approved by the Governor in Council. In assessing 
whether a merger involving a transportation undertaking raises issues or concerns 
with respect to the public interest as it relates to national transportation, economic, 
environmental, safety, security and social factors are taken into consideration. 
The hard measures model, where consideration of public interest clauses are 
left to a minister or other political branch (non-regulator), and the outcome of the 
competition authority’s assessment may be overruled on the basis of such other body’s 
subsequent assessment, is a very common model in the European jurisdictions.74 State 
interventions in merger procedures are in the spotlight in recent years in Europe.75 
In the following parts the article will briefl y describe some of the notable European 
jurisdictions where the hard ministerial model applies. 
As already mentioned before, the UK system allows the SoS to intervene in 
merger cases based on specifi c public interest factors specifi ed by the law. The 
ministerial involvement is governed by a clear and transparent process, and the 
process followed to introduce new public interest grounds is subject to parliamentary 
and public scrutiny. The functioning of the UK’s system provides suffi  cient checks 
and balances to ensure a reasonable level of transparency: intervention notices issued 
by the SoS must be published, a new public interest consideration requires approval 
from the Parliament, and there are limited duties on the SoS to explain his or her 
reasoning.76 The UK system is also a model from the perspective of guaranteeing the 
independence of the Competition and Markets Authority (‘CMA’), as the roles of the 
CMA and of the SoS are clearly delineated in the process.
Turning to the Netherlands, Section 47 of the Dutch Competition Act77 provides 
merging parties the option to fi le a formal request to the Minister of Economic Aff airs 
(‘Minister’) in order to clear the merger that has been blocked by the Authority for 
Consumers & Markets (‘ACM’). The request should be done within 4 weeks after 
ACM has decided to block the merger. The Minister can clear the merger and grant a 
licence based on his assessment that certain public interests benefi tted by the merger 
outweigh the impediment to competition. The Competition Act does not provide any 
specifi cations on what can be considered as a public interest nor how the assessment 
74  Though there are some interesting examples outside the EU, too. In Morocco copy of the decision is sent 
by the Chief of Government, or the delegated governmental authority, from the competition authority. 
Within 30 days the Chief of Government can exert its power and issue a decision on the transaction for 
reasons of public interest (such as industrial development, competitiveness of the companies within 
the international context or job creation). The transaction is deemed to be authorised when this 30 day 
time limit has expired. Getting the deal through – Merger control (2017), Morocco, 277.
75  See for instance: Almunia voices concern over rising protectionism, cites debate over GE-Alstom 
deal. MLex, 24 June 2014.
76  G  (2013) op. cit. 390.
77  See the Netherlands’ contribution to the OECD (Public interest considerations in merger control, 
2016).
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by the Minister should take place. Even though such requests have been made on 
occasion, the Minister has never reversed a decision of the authority before.
In Spain, in those cases where the competition authority decides either to prohibit 
the merger or to clear it subject to commitments or conditions, the Ministry of the 
Economy may ask the government to decide on two aspects: whether to i) confi rm 
the competition authorities’ decisions; or ii) clear it, subject or not to commitments or 
conditions. In the second case, the government’s decision must be based on certain 
specifi ed public interest criteria other than competition. Should the Minister ask the 
government to intervene, the government has one month to decide on the transaction. 
The intervention of the government in merger control proceedings is informally 
known as ‘Phase III’ procedure. The Antena 3/La Sexta case (2012) is the only ‘Phase 
III case’ in Spain to date. The transaction was notifi ed after the Telecinco/Cuatro 
merger, which had already reduced the number of private free-to-air television 
broadcaster from four to three; the Antena 3/La Sexta merger would leave only two 
such operators. The competition authority imposed more severe conditions that were 
accepted in Telecinco/Cuatro. The Ministry of the Economy decided to refer the case 
to the government, arguing that the decision concerned “reasons of general interest 
related to the guarantee of an adequate maintenance of sector based regulation and 
the promotion of research and technological development”. The government softened 
the conditions originally imposed by the competition authority and declared that the 
conditions should be in “line with those [conditions applied to other operators] in 
the sector”.78 The Competition Act expressly states that such decision must be based 
on certain public interest criteria diff erent from competition ones: national defence 
and security; the protection of public security and public health; free movement of 
goods and services within the national territory; protection of the environment; the 
promotion of technical research and development; and the maintenance of the sector 
regulation objectives.
As demonstrated above, the most frequent scenario in this model is that a 
transaction, having national signifi cance is cleared on public interest grounds, 
although it raises competition problems. A rare example of the opposite (i.e. blocking 
a non-problematic merger on public interest ground) can be found until recently in 
Norwegian79 legislation. The possibility to overturn the competition authorities’ 
decision existed in their competition law since its enactments in 2004. In line with 
Section 21 in the Competition Act, the Norwegian government (or more formally: 
the King-in-Council) could approve a concentration that the Norwegian Competition 
Authority has intervened in cases ‘involving questions of principle or interests of 
major signifi cance to society’. The government also had the legal power to block 
a merger the competition authority has decided not to intervene against based on 
the same grounds. This possibility has been used very rarely, only in two cases 
since 2004, once in the power production and once in the agricultural sector. A very 
78  Getting the deal through – Merger control (2017), Spain, 377–378.
79  See Norway’s contribution to the OECD (Public interest considerations in merger control, 2016).
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similar possibility applies in France, where the Minister for the Economy (‘Minister’) 
holds residual powers in two circumstances: i) even if the concentration is cleared 
by the competition authority at the end of the fi rst phase, the Minister can ask that 
the competition authority opens a second phase in-depth review of the concentration 
(although the competition authority has discretion to act upon this request or not), 
and in addition, ii) whatever the fi nal decision of the Authority at the end of the 
second phase, the Minister can substitute his or her own decision based on public 
interest grounds.80 The considerations on which the ministries’ decision can be based 
may include industrial and technological progress, companies’ competitiveness in 
an international context and social welfare. According to the available sources, this 
power has not been used by the Minister to date.81
Many argue that the independence of the competition authorities can be guaranteed 
through the clear separation of the agency responsible for competition and the agency 
responsible for public interest considerations. This can be evidenced by signifi cant 
changes that took place recently in the Norwegian Competition Act.82 As a measure 
to enhance the competition authority’s independence, a recent proposal aimed to 
establish an independent competition complaints board. This complaints board 
is the fi rst instance to assess complaints on the competition authorities’ decisions 
in mergers as well as cartel and abuse cases. At the same time, the possibility to 
reverse the competition authorities’ decisions based on public interest considerations 
was abolished. It was argued that public interest considerations are better served 
through general regulations rather than political intervention in individual cases 
as such interventions can be infl uenced by strong lobby interests, i.e. the intended 
balancing of public interests versus competition considerations may be skewed. The 
proposals were adopted by the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) in 2016, and were 
implemented 1st January 2017. 
3.2.2.2. L  
The second type of the ministerial model involves situations where the law or 
the Government/relevant minister regard certain transaction of having strategic 
importance and therefore, exempts the deal from a competition scrutiny. These 
exemptions can concern strategically important market players or industries. In 
many of the relevant cases, the exemption is exerted by the relevant minister through 
issuing a piece of legislation (e.g. an injunction or decree).
The legal exemption is granted through a piece of legislation in Cyprus, Hungary 
and Singapore. In the former, the Minister of Energy, Commerce, Industry and 
Tourism can, by issuing a justifi ed order, declare a concentration as being of major 
public interest with regard to the eff ects it might have on public security, pluralism of 
80  Getting the deal through – Merger Control (2017), France, 159.
81  Getting the deal through – Merger Control (2017), France, 163.
82  See Norway’s contribution to the OECD (Public interest considerations in merger control, 2016).
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the mass media and the principles of sound administration.83 A very similar provision 
can be found in the Hungarian Competition Act that enables the Government to regard 
certain transactions on public interest grounds (particularly protecting workplaces 
or ensuring security of supply) of having national strategic importance.84 These 
transactions are exempted under the mandatory notifi cation system in Hungary. The 
modifi cation of the Hungarian Competition Act was enacted at the end of 2013. In 
Israel, the Minister of Economy is authorised to exempt a merger from all or some 
provisions of the law, if he believes that it is necessary on the grounds of foreign 
policy or national security.85
Singapore operates a slightly diff erent system from the above-mentioned examples, 
as the exemption does not apply from the beginning of the investigation (i.e. the 
exemption does not shield the merging parties from submitting an application to 
clear the merger). If the competition authority plans to make an unfavourable 
decision, the applicants who notifi ed the merger to the competition authority for 
decision or, in the case of an investigation, the parties to the merger, may apply to 
the Minister for Trade and Industry (‘Minister’) the merger to be exempted from 
the merger provisions on the ground of any public interest consideration.86 ‘Public 
interest consideration’ for the purposes of the Competition Act refers to ‘national or 
public security, defence and such other considerations as the Minister may, by order 
published in the Gazette, prescribe.’87 A recent example includes the merger of Greif 
International Holding B.V. & GEP Asia Holding Pte Ltd. The merger concerned the 
creation of a joint venture company, Greif Eastern Packaging, in which the merging 
parties wanted to contribute their respective Singapore business in the manufacturing 
and selling of steel drums, bitumen drums and steel pails of various capacities. The 
competition authority wanted to prohibit the transaction, as its main concern was 
that the joint venture may substantially lessen competition in the supply of new large 
steel drums to Singapore, due to horizontal concentration between the two closest 
rivals in the market. The parties fi led an application to the Minister and claimed 
that ‘public interest’ would be the ‘wider economic progress and public benefi ts’ 
that the joint venture would generate for the economy and society of Singapore. The 
Minister declined the parties’ application for exemption on the basis that the grounds 
relied upon by the parties not fall within the existing defi nition of public interest 
considerations, which refers to matters of national or public security and defence.88
In other jurisdictions, like Serbia, exemption is also based on the law, while the 
exemption is granted by the competition authority or the relevant minister under 
certain circumstances. The competition act exempts companies performing activities 
in the public interest as well as offi  cial monetary institutions if the application of the 
83  Getting the deal through – Merger Control (2017) 126.
84  Article 24/A of the Hungarian Competition Act.
85  Getting the deal through – Merger Control (2017) 216.
86  See Singapore’s contribution to the OECD (Public interest considerations in merger control, 2016).
87  Getting the deal through – Merger Control (2017), Singapore, 345.
88  See Singapore’s contribution to the OECD (Public interest considerations in merger control, 2016).
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competition act could prevent them from performing activities in the public interest 
(i.e. from performing entrusted aff airs). For instance, the competition agencies’ 
report from 2009 points out that the competition authority rejected a merger 
notifi cation regarding the acquisition of 51 per cent of the shares in the public Serbian 
petroleum company NIS owing to a lack of jurisdiction. The competition authority 
took the view that the Law on Confi rming the Agreement in the Oil and Gas Sector, 
which required the Republic of Serbia to sell 51 per cent of the shares in NIS to the 
acquirer, constituted lex specialis. As a result, the competition authority did not have 
jurisdiction to assess this concentration.89
The most notable problem with this system is the lack of judicial review. 
Without the possibility to challenge the exemptions on court, the reasoning of these 
interventions remains untested. Hence, it is essential to provide suffi  ciently detailed 
reasoning to these exemptions or pieces of legislation, which clarify the underlying 
reasons and justify the application of public interest intervention. This is an essential 
part to avoid delivery of the bad message of intervening only for the sake of shielding 
the transaction from competition scrutiny. Moreover, providing suffi  cient reasoning 
serves legal certainty, which contributes keeping the economy desirable for investors. 
3.2.2.3. P   – F   
Mergers can also be assessed on public interest grounds, in separate and independent 
administrative procedure that goes parallel with the competition investigation. 
Even those jurisdictions that exclusively target competition-related goals in 
their competition assessment may subject the same transaction to public interest 
assessment. Out of the many possible scenarios, in this subsection we will primarily 
focus on the foreign investment regime.
This parallel procedure can be distinguished from the subsequent procedures 
described under the regulator model, as in this case, the scrutiny is not conducted by 
the regulator. When assessing the acquisition of a foreign investor, the EU Merger 
Working Group’s survey points out that generally it is not the competition authority 
that is responsible for conducting the investigation, but political bodies (ministries).90 
Even though the paper lists the foreign investment regimes under the ministerial 
model, it is important to highlight that the foreign investment scrutiny is not always 
done by a Government or the ministry.91 
89  Getting the deal through – Merger Control (2017), Serbia, 342.
90  Such a review is undertaken by relevant ministers, for example the Ministry for Employment and the 
Economy (FIN), Federal Ministry for Economic Aff airs and Energy (GER), Ministry of Finance (FR), 
or Ministry of Treasury (PL). http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/mwg_public_interest_regimes_
en.pdf, para 18.
91  Though it is the most common example, for instance, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States (“CFIUS”) is chaired by the Department of the Treasury; in Australia it is the Treasurer 
of the Australian Government which examines proposals by foreign investors; a foreign investor 
seeking to invest in France is required to notify the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Employment; 
in Japan it is the Minister of Finance which has jurisdiction over foreign investment decisions.
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Public interest considerations often play a role in the foreign investment regimes. 
Foreign investment regimes generally asses transactions from a diff erent angle of 
that of Competition Law, e.g. assessing whether the foreign investment eliminates 
domestic competition, endangers security of supply or contains risk to public 
security. As a survey conducted by the EU Merger Working Group suggests, scrutiny 
of foreign investments is usually limited to strategic industries or companies.92 Some 
would argue that foreign investment regimes can be used to support protectionist 
purposes.93 For instance, as the French government was openly opposed to the 
GE/Alstom transaction, France has expanded its controls of foreign investments to 
energy supply, water supply, transport networks, electronic communication services 
and public health.94 By doing so, the transaction has equally become a target of a 
foreign investment scrutiny. Due to the French States’ involvement through the 
foreign investment regime, the deal was restructured to fi t conditions set by the 
French government.95
The American Bar Association’ Section of Antitrust Law recently released a report 
on foreign investment regimes around the world (‘ABA Report’).96 The ABA report 
suggests97 that there is an increasing number of large-scale international mergers that 
have been blocked or delayed due to the foreign investment regimes.
There are two interesting observations that this paper points out. First, as 
we could observe in the hard ministerial model, the more typical scenario is the 
clearance of an otherwise anti-competitive merger. In the foreign investment regime, 
however, we more often see the opposite: where the otherwise pro-competitive 
(or neutral) transaction is barred due to foreign investment scrutiny. Secondly and 
more interestingly, many examples raised by the ABA report come from developed 
countries. The ABA Report refers to transactions, including interim refusal of BHP 
Billiton’s bid for Potash in Canada,98 and the French government’s intervention in 
the General Electric acquisition of Alstom.99 The responsible agency in the US, 
92  Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/mwg_public_interest_regimes_en.pdf, para 18.
93  See, for instance: Protectionism in M&A: A mixed picture, March 2015, Allen & Overy, http://www.
allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Protectionism%20in%20MA.pdf.
94  In focus ‘Protectionism’ in M&A: A mixed picture, M&A Insights. Q1 2015, http://www.allenovery.
com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Protectionism%20in%20MA%20A%20mixed%20picture.PDF.
95  N. P : State-Created Barriers to Exit? The Example of the Acquisition of Alstom by General 
Electric. 2015. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2521378.
96  A  B  A , S   A  L : Report of the Task Force on Foreign 
Investment Review (28 September 2015).
97  ABA report 7.
98  In 2010, the Australian BHP Billiton’s (the world’s largest fertilizer company) off er to acquire the 
Canadian Potash Corporation was blocked on the grounds that the sale of BHP Billiton would not 
provide a ‘net benefi t’ to the country notwithstanding BHP’s off er of undertakings in OECD: Public 
interest considerations in merger control. 2016. 14.
99  After the publication of GE’s initial off er to buy Alstom Energy, a new regulation was passed in 
France making foreign investment subject to ministerial authorisation. The deal was structured to 
fi t conditions set by the French government. The merger was eventually cleared by the European 
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the CFIUS is also willing to make a fi rm stand if foreign undertakings are aiming 
to acquire US companies. This appeared to be the case in recent cases involving 
mergers with the participation of Chinese buyers.100 It is also worth highlighting that 
contrary to the socio-cultural approach of developing countries, developed countries 
tend to prioritise considerations relating to strategic industries (i.e. national security 
– defence, security of supply – energy, plurality of media – media and broadcasting).
The result of the foreign investment assessment can easily block the whole deal 
to move forward, although the competition assessment and the foreign investment 
regime are not directly linked to each other. Archer Daniels Midland’s failure to 
secure foreign investment approval for its bid for GrainCorp after clearing competition 
review in Australia101 is a notable example from past years where competition and 
foreign investment investigation led to diff erent outcomes. A very recent example 
from the US is Infi neon’s failed attempt to acquire Cree’s Wolfspeed LED business. 
Publicly available information suggests that there are national security concerns 
behind Cree’s cancellation of the deal.102 
The ABA Report also revealed the substantial and procedural problems with 
parallel investigations. Therefore, many recommendations have been put forward. 
Parties to cross-border and multi-national mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, 
and other transactions, and some reviewing agencies, have expressed an interest in 
fostering greater harmony, transparency, consistency, and predictability in conducting 
multiple reviews.103 More precisely, i) creating more consistency in the timetables 
for reviews; ii) institutionalising communication with comparable agencies in other 
jurisdictions that review foreign investment; iii) more transparency with regard to 
the substantive criteria they apply; iv) encouraging the involvement of other entities 
(e.g. ICN, OECD) in seeking greater harmonization of foreign investment review 
among diff erent jurisdictions.
In reality, it is worth highlighting that the number of cases in which governments 
have intervened and infl uenced deals on national security ground has been relatively 
small.
Commission (M. 7278 General Electric/Alstom), subject to remedies. In OECD: Public interest 
considerations in merger control. 2016. 13.
100  See especially Shuanghui Holdings International Limited/ Smithfi eld, Anbang Insurance Group/ 
Waldorf Astoria hotel in New York City, ABA Report 10.
101  The plan by Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., a US company to take over Australia’s GrainCorp Ltd in 
2013 was rejected by the Treasurer who noted that the proposal attracted concern from stakeholders 
and the broader community (Treasury, 2013) and determined that the acquisition was contrary to the 
national interest as there was not suffi  cient competition in grain handling following the deregulation 
of the industry fi ve years earlier. In OECD: Public interest considerations in merger control. 2016. 
14.
102  See, for instance ’Cree cancels Wolfspeed deal with Infi neon based on US government concerns’ (22 
February 2017), http://www.ledsmagazine.com/articles/2017/02/cree-cancels-wolfspeed-deal-with-
infi neon-based-on-us-government-concerns.html.
103  ABA Report 10.
209Institutional Design of Enforcing
3.2.3. Possibilities to seek legal remedy
Ideally, all the other above-mentioned systems should provide a judicial review 
process for merging parties and interested third parties who are infl uenced/suff ered 
damages by the decision based by public interest grounds. Possible trade-off s can be 
avoided if the process is followed by a full judicial review.
There are some models though where judicial review is not available. For instance, 
if the ministerial model takes a form of a piece of legislation, then there is generally 
no possibility for third parties to seek legal remedy.
However, there are several other models providing the possibility to seeking legal 
remedy. Taking the example of one of the jurisdictions where the responsible minister 
can overrule the competition authorities’ decision, Germany is worth mentioning. The 
German Competition Law provides for the possibility of the so-called ‘ministerial 
authorization’.104 This means that companies, whose merger have been prohibited 
by the Bundeskartellamt (‘BKart’) may apply to the Federal Minister for Economic 
Aff airs and Energy (‘Minister’) for authorization. The requirement for granting an 
authorization is that the restraint of competition in the particular case is outweighed 
by advantages to the economy as a whole resulting from the concentration, or that 
the concentration is justifi ed by an overriding public interest. The survey conducted 
by the ECN Merger Working Group on public interest considerations underlines 
that “in Germany, ministerial authorisations can be and have on some occasions 
been challenged in court. The judicial review of the procedure to be followed by the 
Ministry has been intense (and in one case also lead to the annulment of a ministerial 
authorisation and a part of the procedure had to be repeated). However, with regard 
to the interpretation of public interest grounds German law is generally understood 
to grant the minister a broad margin of appreciation”.105 The most recent example 
relates to Edeka’s takeover of Kaiser’s Tengelmann. The Bundeskartellamt aimed to 
block the merger as it was concerned that a takeover would further strengthen Edeka’s 
market power with regard to producers. The ministerial authorization was preceded 
by broad discussions, including the advisory body to the BKart, the Monopolies 
Commission. The minister granted authorization to the deal, subject to the condition 
that Edeka agrees to safeguard the jobs of Kaiser Tengelmann’s 16,000 workers 
for the next fi ve years. Germany’s Agriculture Minister, Christian Schmidt stated 
that whilst he respected the minister’s decision, he believed that the takeover would 
give Edeka even more leverage with regard to negotiating prices with producers, 
putting them under even more pressure to produce cheaply.106 Other companies 
104  See Germany’s contribution to the OECD (Public interest considerations in merger control, 2016). 
Cases of ministerial authorisation being granted are rare. Since the introduction of merger control 
in 1973, a ministerial authorisation has only been granted without conditions in three cases and with 
conditions in six cases. In total, there have been only about 20 applications. See in Getting the deal 
through – Merger control (2017) 170.
105  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/mwg_public_interest_regimes_en.pdf. 4.
106  http://www.dw.com/en/regulators-overruled-in-supermarket-takeover/a-19122420.
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in the food retail sector (REWE, Normaand Markant) have appealed against the 
ministerial authorisation. In December 2016 the BKart cleared the divestment from 
EDEKA to REWE of 63 food retail outlets in Berlin and two outlets each in North 
Rhine-Westphalia and greater Munich. The BKart’s assessment of the divestment 
followed after REWE had withdrawn its appeal against the ministerial authorisation 
and the relevant ministry had communicated that the conditions of the ministerial 
authorisation had been fulfi lled.107
Very specifi c rules apply in those situations where the Member States violate 
the European Commission’s exclusivity due to public interest purposes regarding 
to mergers having a community dimension. Due to the clear distinction between 
the jurisdiction of the European Commission and those of the Member States, the 
European Commission has an exclusive right to deal with concentrations with a 
community dimension (the “one-stop-shop” principle108). Article 21 (4) of the EUMR 
does, however, allow Member States to adopt, with regard to concentrations of an EU 
dimension, measures to protect certain interests other than competition, for as long 
as these measures are necessary and proportionate to their aim and are compatible 
with all aspects of Community Law.109 As mentioned above, the three considerations 
are ‘public security’, ‘plurality of the media’ and ‘prudential rules’ that are regarded 
as compatible with EU law. Other considerations should be communicated to the 
European Commission, which assess the public interest consideration based on 
the general principles of the EU law. The European Commission is empowered to 
open infringement proceedings against national measures adopted in violation of 
Article 21 EUMR, pursuant to Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (“TFEU”). The European Commission’s assessment is not only 
an empty threat. The E.ON/Endesa110 case in the energy sector, which concerned 
the acquisition of Spain’s electricity incumbent, involved a number of exchanges 
between the European Commission and Spain. Given the Spanish authorities’ failure 
to comply with its decisions, the European Commission brought Spain before the 
European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’), claiming that the broad discretion that national 
administrative authorities applied represented a serious threat to the free movement 
of capital. In March 2008, the ECJ concluded that Spain had failed to fulfi l its 
obligations under the Treaty by not withdrawing the conditions as requested by the 
European Commission. A very similar intervention took place in the polish Unicredit/
HVB merger,111 the Polish Treasury instructed Unicredit to sell its shares in the Polish 
107  See the BKArt’s press release at: http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/
Pressemitteilungen/08_12_2016_EDEKA_REWE_EN.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3.
108  See Articles 21 (2) and (3) of the EUMR.
109   See the European Union’s contribution to the OECD (Public interest considerations in merger 
control, 2016).
110  Commission v Spain, C-196/07 [2008] ECR I-41.
111  M.3894 Unicredit/HVB.
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BPH, despite the Commission’s approval of the merger.112 The Commission launched 
an infringement procedure against Poland and concluded that Poland violated the 
free movement of capital and freedom of establishment rules. After this, the Polish 
government announced an agreement with Unicredit/HVB, allowing the merger of 
two Polish banks, subject to the divestment of almost half of BPH’s branches and an 
agreement not to cut jobs at the merged bank until March 2008.113
4. Lack of empirical studies
One possible justifi cation for the application of public interest considerations might 
be their positive eff ect on the market concerned and through that, the whole economy. 
For instance, given South Africa’s high rate of unemployment, it is not surprising that 
the South African government is committing itself to rapidly accelerate the creation 
of employment opportunities.114 It is very likely to be the reason that the impact of a 
proposed merger on employment has been the core public interest consideration and 
has received the greatest attention from the South African competition authorities.115
Some authors even point out that the most important issues regarding the 
justifi ability of the public interest clause is whether the remedies imposed are 
eff ective.116 Hence, it would be interesting to see how the intervention (or the lack of 
intervention) aff ects the macro-economy or the specifi c public interest that it aims to 
facilitate.
There are not many examples assessing the economic eff ect of the public interest 
interventions (or the lack of the interventions).117 Therefore, one of the greatest 
shortfalls of these models is the lack of empirical evidence of the actual eff ect of the 
intervention. Without these empirical data, there is no actual evidence, and therefore 
concrete justifi cation for the application of public interest considerations.
112   EU Merger Control and the Public Interest, A Legal Mapping Report by the Lendület-HPOPs 
Research Group in Spring 2016, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences, 19.
113   EU M  C    P  I : A Legal Mapping Report by the Lendület-HPOPs 
Research Group in Spring 2016. Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences, 19.
114   J. O : Considerations before sub-saharan african competition jurisdictions with the quest for 
multi-jurisdcitional merger control certainty. US–China Law Review, Vol. 9, (2011) 218.
115   Metropolitan Holdings Limited and Momentum Group Limited 41/LM/Jul10, at 21 “Thus if on 
the facts of a particular case, employment loss is of a considerable magnitude and that short term 
prospects of re-employment for a substantial portion of the aff ected class are limited, then prima 
facie this would be presumed to have a substantial adverse eff ect on the public interest and the an 
evidential burden would then shift to the merging parties to justify it before a fi nal conclusion can be 
made.” O  op. cit. 218.
116  P. B : Antitrust, Cheper Beer, And The First Global Brewery. Developing Word Antitrust, 3 
June 2016.
117   However, there are some examples to put forward. For instance, see T. M  et al.: An ex-
post review of the Walmart/Massmart merger. Working Paper, CC2016/03. The paper evaluates the 
impact of the Massmart Supplier Development Fund which was established as a condition to the 
Wal-Mart /Massmart merger in 2012.
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5. Conclusion
As the above examples suggest, there are surprisingly many jurisdictions around 
the globe which have considerations going beyond the traditional goals of merger 
control. Even those jurisdictions that take a fi rm position in focusing their merger 
control solely on competition criteria, witness attempts to put the inclusion of public 
interest considerations back to the agenda.118
Public interest considerations seem more frequent in developing countries, where 
socio-cultural reasons play a more important role in the merger assessment than in 
developed countries. However, examples show that developed countries also include 
public interest considerations in Competition Law. These considerations focus more 
on economic issues relating to industries like energy, media and fi nance.
The application of public interest considerations remains a challenge. One could 
argue that the application of public interest considerations is generally limited on a 
global scale, and are applied in exceptional circumstances. Some of the relevant cases 
certainly involve a one-in-a-generation situation (i.e. see the Lloyds/HBOS merger in 
the fi nancial crisis) which might require very speedy solutions.119 Even though cases 
invoking the application of public interest considerations are exceptional, and their 
number is limited (compared to the overall number of cases), it is worth underlining 
that these cases are very likely to have long-term eff ects, as they generally concern 
strategically important sectors, industries or undertakings. This feature keeps them 
in the spotlight even though the number of relevant cases is limited.120
As for the institutional design of enforcing public interest considerations, there 
is no universal solution on how to enforce public interest considerations in merger 
control, due to the special characteristic and political/historical background of the 
countries. The OECD discussion in 2016 confi rmed that jurisdictions which have 
a public interest consideration applicable in Competition Law prefer a dual setting 
where the sectoral regulator or the political body channels the public interest angle 
into the process. This paper argues that the dual model has the clear advantage of 
relieving the competition authorities from political pressure. It is a great controversy 
though, that legal certainty and predictability might be better served by competition 
authorities (which might issue guidance or other soft law) than external fi gures 
(whose actions are not necessarily subject to judicial review).
118   P. Feinstein G : I fear the day. US FTC is asked to consider jobs. GCR, 3 February 2017. http://
globalcompetitionreview.com/article/1080941/feinstein-%E2%80%9Ci-fear-the-day%E2%80%9D-
us-ftc-is-asked-to-consider-jobs.
119  G  (2013) op. cit. 406.
120  “[…]public interest based interventions that would be at odds with an economics-based competition 
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ACCOMMODATING PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS 
IN DOMESTIC MERGER CONTROL: EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS
David R *
University East Anglia 
1. Introduction
In the wake of advances in economic theory and global initiatives such as the 
International Competition Network’s (ICN) Recommended Practices for Merger 
Analysis,1 many jurisdictions have converged towards a competition-based approach 
to merger assessment.2 This means, as a default position, most states will assess the 
majority of mergers according to their potential impact on competition within the 
relevant market. Given the emphasis that is now aff orded to competition criteria, 
the infl uence of wider public interest considerations has become increasingly 
marginalised.3 However, despite this marginalisation, most domestic merger regimes 
continue to reserve a role for the public interest, albeit to a very limited degree in 
most cases.4 This raises a number of interesting questions regarding the wider role 
*   Senior Research Associate and Associate Tutor at the Centre for Competition Policy and UEA Law 
School, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK, NR4 7TJ, d.reader@uea.ac.uk. The author would 
like to thank members of the CCP – and, in particular, Professor Morten Hviid, Professor Michael 
Harker, Dr Scott Summers, Dr David Deller and Dr Sebastian Peyer – for their valuable feedback on 
an earlier draft of this paper. The author also wishes to thank participants of the 9th Annual ACLE 
C&R Meeting (Amsterdam), the 8th CLEEN Workshop (Norwich), the 2014 Legal Research Methods 
and Methodologies Conference (Bristol), the 2015 BACL PG Research Workshop (Norwich), and the 
4th BRICS International Competition Conference (Durban). Any errors are the author’s own.
1   I  C  N : ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis. 2009. 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf.
2   Frédéric J : Substantive convergence in merger control: An assessment. Concurrences 21, n. 1, 
(2015) 31–33.
3    CN A  W  G : Competition Culture Project Report. 14th ICN Annual Conference, 
Sydney, April 2015. 10.
4   See Section 3.3, below. Of the countries observed in this paper, 62.7% directly aff ord scope to the 
consideration of public interest criteria in their merger control legislation.
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of the public interest in domestic states and the feasibility of further convergence 
internationally.
So how can domestic states seek to accommodate public interest criteria in an 
environment that is now largely driven by competition ideologies? In practice, states 
face a number of decisions regarding the framework of their substantive merger 
law and their institutional arrangement. In terms of substantive law, countries must 
decide how much infl uence to aff ord to the public interest during the assessment 
proceedings. For example, should public interest criteria be aff orded extensive 
infl uence by considering it as part of the substantive test for assessment? Should it 
be considered in only limited circumstances as an exception to the test? Or perhaps 
it should be assessed as part of a sector-specifi c policy that runs parallel to merger 
control. With regards to institutional arrangement, countries face a potential dilemma 
when identifying who should decide on mergers aff ecting the public interest. Should 
this decision-making role be assigned to NCAs, politicians, sector regulators or a 
combination of these? The decisions a state makes in relation to these substantive 
and institutional issues can signifi cantly dictate the level of infl uence aff orded to 
the public interest in its domestic merger assessments. By considering the choices 
that states have made in practice, this paper identifi es the prevailing methods of 
accommodating the public interest and asks whether this supports the suggestion that 
the public interest now exists only on the periphery of international merger control.
It is also worth considering whether socio-economic factors have had an infl uence 
on the way in which states have chosen to accommodate the public interest in 
practice. Do domestic variables – such as economic development – have a signifi cant 
bearing on the importance a state attributes to the public interest and, in turn, how 
it chooses to accommodate it? It is certainly true that diff erent states will have their 
own interpretations of how the public interest should be defi ned and the role it should 
play in the merger control context. By considering the infl uence of socio-economic 
variables, the paper seeks to establish why there has not been universal harmonisation 
between states with regard to approaching merger control and the public interest.
In seeking to address these research questions, the paper proceeds as follows. 
Section 2 examines the diff erent approaches that states can use to accommodate the 
public interest under domestic merger control. It shows that states will typically: (a) 
adopt one (or a combination) of four core options for framing public interest criteria 
within legislation, and (b) appoint one (or a combination) of three types of public 
interest decision-maker. Section 3 seeks to identify how states have accommodated 
the public interest in practice by conducting an empirical study of 75 domestic 
merger regimes. It fi nds that most states will: (i) either treat the public interest as 
an ‘exception’ to a competition-based test or frame it within parallel sector-specifi c 
policy, and (ii) assign decision-making powers to either a national competition 
authority or a politician. Section 4 extends the empirical analysis to analyse the 
potential infl uence that key socio-economic factors may have on how a state chooses 
to accommodate the public interest. The analysis suggests that factors traditionally 
thought of as infl uential (such as geographic locality, economic development and 
the type of legal regime in place) have only a negligible infl uence on the chosen 
method of accommodation. In contrast, the eff ectiveness of governance within a state 
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appears to correspond with how that state chooses to frame public interest criteria 
within legislation. Section 5 off ers concluding remarks.
2. Approaches to accommodating the public interest
2.1. The decisions facing countries when accommodating the public interest
There are numerous approaches a state can take when seeking to accommodate 
public interest considerations within their merger control regimes. States will usually 
adopt formal statutory provisions which specify how public interest criteria is to 
be accommodated and who will be assigned the relevant decision-making powers. 
In addition, states may also seek to give eff ect to the public interest via less formal 
means that are not specifi ed in legislation.5 Given that these informal methods are 
not readily observable for the purposes of empirical analysis, this paper is primarily 
concerned with the formal means by which states have sought to accommodate the 
public interest. As such, this section focusses on the formal decisions countries must 
take with regards to (i) framing public interest criteria in their domestic legislation 
(“legislative framing options”), and (ii) appointing a ‘public interest decision-maker’.
2.2. Options for framing public interest criteria in domestic legislation
When seeking to accommodate public interest criteria in merger law, the national 
legislature must be mindful of a number of intricate drafting details regarding how 
the public interest should be defi ned and when it should be considered. It is diffi  cult 
to compare the diff erent types of public interest criteria that states adopt, not least 
due to the boundless defi nitions that countries can attribute to these interests. Having 
said this, there are only a limited number of options available to states when it comes 
to deciding when the public interest should be invoked in merger assessments. 
Depending on how the public interest criteria is ‘framed’ in the merger legislation, 
public interest considerations may play a prominent role in every merger assessment, 
a restricted role in some pre-determined assessments, or no role at all. A preliminary 
examination of the 75 states considered in this paper reveals that there are four main 
options for framing the public interest within merger control legislation:
Option 1 – Aff ord no scope to considering public interest criteria.
Although not strictly to be classed as an option for ‘accommodating’ the public 
interest – in fact, quite the opposite is true – this approach still represents an instance 
where the state has made a conscious choice regarding the role of public interest 
5   Consider, for example, the negotiations that took place between the South African Government and 
Wal-mart in Wal-mart/Massmart, and the UK Government and Pfi zer in Pfi zer/AstraZeneca. In both 
cases, there was no statutory requirement for the negotiations to take place but both governments 
sought commitments from the bidding parties in an eff ort to alleviate public interest concerns.
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criteria.6 Under this approach, the state adheres strictly to competition-based criteria 
and aff ords no scope for considering wider public interest factors at any stage in the 
merger assessment process.
Option 2 – Consider public interest criteria as part of the substantive test.
Under this option, the public interest is considered directly alongside competition-
based criteria in every merger assessment. This will sometimes involve ‘balancing’ 
the public interest criteria against competition fi ndings to determine whether or not a 
merger should be allowed to proceed. Alternatively, the substantive test may be split 
into two phases: where the merger is assessed against competition-based criteria in 
the fi rst phase, and against public interest criteria in the second phase. If the merger 
is deemed to satisfy both sets of criteria, the merger will be permitted. If the merger 
raises concerns with regard to one set of criteria, the merger will be blocked or 
remedies will be sought to address the concerns.
Option 3 – Reserve public interest ‘exceptions’ to the substantive test.
Here, the decision-maker will apply competition-based criteria during the merger 
assessment process but may, in exceptional circumstances, apply public interest 
criteria if the merger is suspected to raise public interest concerns. These exceptional 
circumstances may arise in mergers that have a direct impact on specifi c interests 
such as national security, media plurality or fi nancial stability. Alternatively, the 
public interest exception can be defi ned broadly to include any merger that impacts 
upon the ‘national interest’.
 
Option 4 – Enforce sector-specifi c policies that run parallel to merger control.
As with Option 1, this approach does not allow for public interest criteria to be 
considered within the merger control assessment itself, but there is a key diff erence. 
Even after the transaction has been assessed on competition grounds in accordance 
with the merger control procedure, the outcome of the transaction may still be subject 
to a sector-specifi c policy, prompting a parallel sectoral assessment. This parallel 
assessment can then aff ord consideration to a number of sector-specifi c public interest 
issues. The sector-specifi c assessment has the potential to usurp the fi ndings of the 
merger control assessment and thereby block, permit or seek remedies to address 
public interest concerns.
Although a state’s merger legislation will tend to resemble one of the four options 
described above, it is also possible for a state to adopt a mixed-options approach 
which combines two of these options. In this respect, states are limited in the types 
of combination they can pursue,7 but two combinations are possible:
6   For the purposes of this empirical assessment, Option 1 is to be treated as a decision – on the part of 
the state – to ‘not accommodate the public interest’ within its domestic merger legislation.
7   For example, Option 1 (which avoids considering public interest criteria) will not be compatible with 
any of the other options. Equally, Option 2 (which considers the public interest within the substantive 
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 A combination of Options 2 and 4 – Consider the public interest as part of the 
substantive test and, in addition, enforce sector-specifi c policies.
This fi rst mixed-options approach involves assessing the merger on both competition 
and public interest grounds (Option 2), while simultaneously assessing whether the 
merger is compatible with sector-specifi c policy (Option 4). Although there may 
be some overlap between the public interest criteria considered in each parallel 
assessment, there is an observable diff erence between the two. Generally speaking, 
the public interest criteria considered under Option 2 will relate to issues that are 
capable of applying to all sectors (e.g. promoting a domestic fi rm’s competitiveness 
internationally). In contrast, the public interest criteria considered under Option 4 
will be sector-specifi c (e.g. ensuring the continuation of regional water supply in a 
merger between two water companies). As such, an approach that combines Options 
2 and 4 has the potential to give eff ect to a wide range of possible public interest 
considerations.
 A combination of Options 3 and 4 – Reserve public interest ‘exceptions’ to the 
substantive test and, in addition, enforce sector-specifi c policies.
As with the abovementioned combination of Options 2 and 4, this approach is capable 
of allowing public interest criteria to be considered at two stages of the assessment 
process. However, although Option 4 guarantees that public interest criteria will be 
considered in the parallel assessment, Option 3 only allows for such criteria to be 
considered in ‘exceptional’ circumstances. As such, any state that adopts this mixed-
options approach will only exceptionally consider the public interest in both the 
merger and sector-specifi c assessments. It is also worth noting that, in contrast to 
Option 2, it is not uncommon for the types of public interest criteria considered under 
Option 3 to be sector-specifi c (e.g. maintaining a suffi  cient plurality of the media). 
This means that there can be an overlap between the markets-based public interest 
objectives considered under Option 3 and the sector-specifi c policies considered 
under Option 4. The range of potential public interest criteria is therefore unlikely 
to be as vast as that witnessed under the combined Options 2 and 4 approach. That 
said, certain broader public interest exceptions (e.g. ‘national interest’ or ‘domestic 
economic interest’) can allow a wider range of interests to be considered.
Accordingly, it is clear that a state must choose between six possible options when 
framing the public interest in legislation (inc. four core options and a further two 
mixed-options). For the purpose of the empirical analysis that follows, it is important 
to consider the potential infl uence that each option aff ords to the public interest in 
merger assessments. This is not altogether straightforward. The means by which 
public interest criteria is framed in legislation cannot, in itself, off er a defi nitive 
indication of how infl uential public interest considerations will be in practice in 
any given country. For example, let us assume that the merger laws in Country A 
test for assessment) will not be procedurally compatible with Option 3 (where the public interest is 
treated as an ‘exception’ to the substantive test).
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and Country B each frame the public interest as an ‘exception’ to the substantive 
test (Option 3). Country A specifi es a single public interest exception whereas 
Country B lists four exceptions. One interpretation that could be taken from this 
is that the infl uence of the public interest in Country A is only one-quarter of the 
infl uence observed in Country B. But what if Country A enforces a broad public 
interest exception (e.g. ‘national interest’) and Country B adopts four narrowly-
drafted exceptions (e.g. ‘media plurality’, ‘fi nancial stability’, ‘energy security’ and 
‘protection of R&D in the domestic science base’)? If this is the case, more mergers 
may fall under the single broad exception in Country A than under all four narrow 
exceptions in Country B. Consequently, the relationship between legislative framing 
options and the infl uence of the public interest should not be taken at face value.
However, this is not to say that legislative framing does not off er any insights into 
the infl uence of public interest criteria in practice. Clearly, some of the six options 
for framing public interest criteria have the potential to aff ord more infl uence to 
the public interest than others. Imagine a scale from 0-100, where ‘0’ represents a 
merger regime that aff ords no infl uence to the public interest, and ‘100’ is a merger 
regime that treats the public interest as fundamental in every case. At the lower end 
of the scale, Option 1 (No public interest) would feature at point ‘0’, given that it 
aff ords zero scope to the consideration of public interest criteria. Option 4 (Sector-
specifi c policy) is the next to appear on the scale as it enables the public interest to 
be considered in limited circumstances involving mergers in certain sectors. This 
is followed by Option 3 (Public interest exception) which can give eff ect to both 
broad and narrowly-defi ned public interest considerations in all sectors. Next to 
feature is a combination of Options 3 & 4 (Public interest exception and Sector-
specifi c policy), which essentially combines the potential infl uence that each of these 
standalone options aff ords to the public interest. Option 2 (Public interest as part 
of the substantive test) would be ranked towards the upper end of the scale, as it 
allows the public interest to be considered in every merger evaluation. Finally, a 
combination of Options 2 & 4 (Public interest as part of the substantive test and 
Sector-specifi c policy) will rank at the top of the scale on account of the fact that it 
not only enables the public interest to be considered in every merger evaluation, but 
it also requires some mergers to be subjected to further sector-specifi c public interest 
assessments. These rankings are illustrated in Figure 1, below.
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Figure 1. Ordinal scale ranking the legislative framing options according 
to the potential degree of infl uence they aff ord to the public interest 
in merger assessments
 
Ranking the legislative framing options in this way lays the foundations for the 
empirical analysis that follows in Sections 3 and 4 of this paper.8 By using each option 
as a proxy for the degree of infl uence aff orded to the public interest in any given state, 
it is possible to draw preliminary conclusions on the role of the public interest in 
modern-day merger control (Section 3) and, moreover, the eff ect that socio-economic 
factors have had on this role (Section 4).
2.3. Options for appointing a ‘public interest decision-maker’
The second fundamental choice that states must make when seeking to accommodate 
the public interest is to appoint a decision-maker to rule on mergers that raise public 
interest concerns. In a similar vein to the legislative framing options discussed 
above, states will need to consider certain intricacies before appointing a public 
interest decision-maker. For example, if there is a main body that oversees merger 
control in a given state, should this body also decide on mergers aff ecting the public 
interest or should the role be assigned to a separate body? States must also consider 
the expertise, resources and overall competence of a body before it is assigned the 
decision-making role. Among the 75 states considered in this paper, there have been 
three main types of public interest decision-maker appointed:
National competition authorities
By their very defi nition, national competition authorities (NCAs) tend to operate under 
a consumer mandate by seeking to maintain and promote competition in markets. 
8   The ordinal scale in Figure 1 has its limitations; namely, that it is not possible to specify the exact 
size of the interval between any two categories. For example, in terms of the potential infl uence each 
option aff ords to the public interest, the interval between Option 1 and Option 4 may be larger than the 
interval between Option 4 and Option 3. Nevertheless, these ordinal measurements can still be relied 
upon to draw tangible statistical insights, see Sections 3 and 4 below.
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Some states, however, have chosen to extend the mandate of NCAs to consider the 
welfare of the public at large. NCAs will typically seek to employ individuals with 
expertise in competition law and economics, although the resources available to 
NCAs can vary considerably between states.9 The political independence of NCAs 
also varies drastically. Some have overt political links, either operating as part of a 
government department or being overseen by a government minister. Other NCAs 
may appear independent but governments may retain certain powers to e.g. appoint 
and discharge the CEO or to overturn the decisions of the NCA. Of course, there are 
also truly independent NCAs that operate at arm’s length from government and are 
not subjected to political pressure in the decision-making process.
Politicians
For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘politician’ is taken to include a collective 
group of politicians (i.e. a government or a ministerial cabinet), as well as an individual 
politician (e.g. a minister). These are, in the most part, elected offi  cials belonging to a 
particular political party who have a broad mandate to serve the economic and social 
interests of the state. In the context of public interest mergers, politicians may request 
advice from NCAs and regulators when seeking to establish the eff ect that a merger 
is likely to have on competition and specifi c public interest issues. Depending on 
the level of political stability in a given country, the politician(s) appointed to make 
decisions may change at regular intervals, usually after a cabinet reshuffl  e or where 
a new government has been elected.
Sector Regulators
The role of sector regulators is generally to monitor and administer policy in specifi c 
industries that exhibit unique characteristics and, as such, warrant closer regulatory 
scrutiny. Regulators can operate under various mandates (e.g. citizen and consumer 
mandates) and will sometimes have dual mandates which require them to consider 
the eff ects a merger is likely to have on two sets of stakeholders. On account of these 
wide-ranging mandates, regulators may also be required to consider the levels of 
competition in the relevant sector and, as such, may also work closely with NCAs. 
Employees will typically have sector-specifi c expertise and, in some cases, past 
experience of working in the industry. In much the same way as NCAs, the political 
independence of sector regulators varies state-by-state and sector-by-sector.
It is also possible for states to assign the public interest decision-making role to 
more than one of the abovementioned institutions:
Dual decision-makers
In theory, a state could prescribe a joint decision-making role involving all three 
institutions: an NCA, a politician and a sector regulator. In practice, however, no 
9   P. K  – K. P. A  – B. L : What Determines the Reputation of a Competition 
Agency? 12th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference, Chicago, April 2014. https://
editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=IIOC2014&paper_id=470.
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state out of the 75 considered in this paper has opted for this triple decision-maker 
arrangement. That said, some states have appointed dual decision-makers in the form 
of either: (i) an NCA and a Politician, (ii) an NCA and a Regulator, or (iii) a Politician 
and a Regulator. It is diffi  cult to summarise how these dual decision-making roles 
operate in practice, as the relationship between the two decision-makers can take a 
number of forms. For example, it might be that each institution has equal power in 
the decision-making process and, as such, both institutions must approve the merger 
before it is allowed to proceed. Alternatively, in the event of each institution reaching 
a diff erent conclusion on the eff ect of the merger on the public interest, one of the 
institutions may be given the ‘fi nal say’ on whether or not the merger is allowed to 
proceed.10 Furthermore, in contrast to two decision-makers working together to reach 
a conclusion, states may merely appoint two decision-makers to ‘share the workload’, 
with each institution tasked with assessing mergers in specifi ed industries.11 Given 
that the dual decision-making approach can take many forms (both with regards to 
the identity of the decision-makers and the relationship between them), performing 
an analysis of it poses numerous practical challenges. Therefore, so as not to 
unnecessarily complicate the empirical analysis, Sections 3 and 4 of this paper group 
the diff erent types of dual decision-makers into a single category.
It is therefore clear that states can choose from among four possibilities for public 
interest decision-makers (including three standalone institutions and a dual decision-
making approach).12 The choice is made particularly interesting given that the state 
legislature (i.e. the government) is essentially faced with a choice between either: 
(i) assigning decision-maker powers to itself, or (ii) delegating power to a diff erent 
institution to decide on mergers aff ecting the wider public interest. Have state 
governments shown a willingness to delegate these powers in practice? This is one of 
the questions explored in the next section.
In the same way as the legislative framing options, we can again consider the 
potential infl uence that each decision-maker option aff ords to the public interest. 
Unfortunately, whereas there are general rules of thumb that allow the legislative 
framing options to be ranked according to their potential infl uence,13 the same cannot 
be said of decision-makers. Many factors can aff ect how frequently a decision-maker 
10  Such a procedure has been proposed in the UK in the context of media mergers raising plurality 
concerns. For a discussion, see David R : Does Ofcom Off er a Credible Solution to Bias in 
Media Public Interest Mergers in the United Kingdom? CPI Antitrust Chronicle, 2014. 4(1). http://
www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/does-ofcom-off er-a-credible-solution-to-bias-in-media-
public-interest-mergers-in-the-united-kingdom.
11  This is the case in the United States where the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
are assigned competence over mergers in certain specifi ed industries.
12  Note that courts do not feature within the list of public interest decision-makers. Of the 75 states in the 
sample, many assign a role to the courts for reviewing the rulings of the decision-maker, but no states 
has chosen to appoint a court as a public interest decision-maker in its own right.
13  The rule of thumb is that, broadly speaking, we can identify whether public interest criteria will be 
considered in (i) every case, (ii) some cases, or (iii) no cases, depending on how the criteria are framed 
in legislation.
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will give eff ect to the public interest. The most obvious is the merger legislation 
itself, which frames the public interest and specifi es the powers of the decision-
maker. However, we should also be mindful of the extra-legal factors that can 
infl uence decision-makers, such as their political independence and whether they are 
particularly prone to lobbying. These are not clear-cut categories that decision-makers 
can be grouped into, they are issues faced by every decision-maker regardless of their 
identity. If we were to rank the diff erent types of decision-maker, it would require 
making a number of broad assumptions about the institutional make-up of NCAs, 
politicians and sector regulators in diff erent states. To do so would be to oversimplify 
the research and, owing to this, the paper refrains from relying on decision-makers 
as a proxy for the infl uence aff orded to the public interest. Rather, the analysis of 
decision-makers is conducted to off er important insights into (i) the extent to which 
governments have been willing to delegate decision-making powers to other bodies, 
and (ii) whether a certain type body is considered more appropriate for assessing the 
public interest. This can be achieved without having to rank the decision-makers.14
3. How have states accommodated the public interest in practice? 
Section 2 has identifi ed two fundamental choices that a state must make when seeking 
to accommodate the public interest in its domestic merger regimes. The fi rst concerns 
how the state wishes to frame the public interest in merger legislation, where there 
are six possible options to choose from. The second involves appointing a decision-
maker to rule on mergers that raise public interest concerns, of which there are four 
main decision-makers a state can recruit. Having identifi ed the options available to 
states, the next stage is to observe how frequently these options have been adopted 
in practice. This section seeks to make these observations by adopting an empirical 
methodology which considers the merger regimes of 75 domestic states. The section 
proceeds by fi rstly providing an explanation of the empirical methodology, before 
presenting a description of the domestic data set and, fi nally, revealing the fi ndings 
of the empirical analysis.
3.1. Research Methods
3.1.1. Advantages and limitations of the empirical approach
By utilising an empirical methodology, the analysis in this paper is able to draw 
insights that a traditional doctrinal approach would otherwise fail to deliver. This 
is achieved by identifying key features within each state in the sample, and thereby 
14  In Carletti et al, the authors rank the diff erent decision-makers by assigning an ‘eff ectiveness’ score 
between 0–1 to each body. This does not, however, overcome the need to make broad assumptions 
for an entire class of decision-maker. Elena C  – Philipp H  – Steven O : The 
economic impact of merger control legislation. International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 42., 
2015. 88., 92.
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grouping the states according to the methods of accommodation outlined above. By 
segregating the data in this way, one can more readily observe the global norms 
by which states have accommodated the public interest in practice. In addition, the 
empirical approach has the eff ect of assigning quantitative values to qualitative data, 
meaning the data is more directly comparable with some of the quantitative data 
utilised in the study of socio-economic variables in Section 4.
Despite the notable benefi ts associated with empirical methodologies, it is worth 
noting the potential limitations of this approach. The main concern regards overlooking 
the important domestic variables that an empirical analysis of domestic legislation 
is unable to take account of. Legal academics have warned of the pitfalls of placing 
too much emphasis on legislation without consulting other important sources, such 
as case law, policy statements, news reports and academic commentary.15 Indeed, 
although merger legislation can off er a useful proxy for the infl uence aff orded to 
public interest criteria domestically, it might not off er an accurate representation of 
the circumstances where the public interest is considered in practice. For example, 
merger legislation cannot generally reveal whether decision-makers will attach a 
wide or narrow interpretation to the public interest criteria.16 Nor will legislation 
refl ect any guidelines or interim policy changes that have taken place in lieu of 
statutory reform.17 The author acknowledges these limitations and notes the potential 
for future research projects that would seek to reinforce the empirical analysis in this 
paper, by undertaking additional domestic case studies.
3.1.2. Methodology
Having decided to adopt an empirical approach, the next stage is to devise a 
methodology that makes eff ective use of empirical methods. A detailed explanation 
of the methodology used in this paper can be found in Appendix 1 but, broadly 
speaking, the methodology consists of four steps.
Firstly, as Section 2 has highlighted above, it has been necessary to identify the 
various methods by which states can accommodate the public interest in practice. 
This has been accomplished by conducting an initial doctrinal study of 20 states, 
to reveal the six options for framing the public interest in legislation and the four 
options for appointing a public interest decision-maker.18
15  Maher M. D : International and Comparative Competition Law. Cambridge, CUP, 2010. 38.
16  For instance, ‘national security’ is a public interest criteria that is referenced in several regimes and 
attributed very diff erent meanings. 
17  Consider, for example, the introduction of the Tebbit Doctrine in the UK. Although it had no impact 
on the wording of the merger provisions under the Fair Trading Act 1973, a policy speech by Norman 
Tebbit MP in 1984 prompted the UK authorities to depart from a public interest test in favour of a 
competition-based approach to merger control. HC, Deb 5 July 1984, vol 63, cols 213-14W.
18   For details on the sources of data for this initial doctrinal study, see Section 3.2.1 for an overview of 
the data set.
David R224
Secondly, a data set has been compiled to consolidate the information relating 
to merger control in each state. Further information relating to socio-economic 
variables has also been incorporated into the data set in order to lay the foundations 
for the analysis that follows in Section 4. A detailed account of how the data has been 
collected and codifi ed can be found in Section 3.2, below.
Thirdly, having compiled the data set, the states are then grouped according to 
how each has chosen to accommodate the public interest in practice. This involves 
interpreting the data entries of each state and recording which of the six framing 
options they have chosen to adopt and which of the four decision-makers they have 
appointed.19
The fourth and fi nal step involves subjecting the grouped data to empirical 
analyses. A number of analyses are conducted throughout this paper. Section 3.3 
undertakes a basic assessment of the frequency distribution of states adopting each 
legislative framing option and each decision-maker option. Section 4.3 examines 
whether socio-economic variables have infl uenced the way states have chosen to 
accommodate the public interest by making use of a range of statistical techniques 
(such as choropleth mapping and inferential tests, such as t-tests and ANOVA) 20 
to interpret the data. With regards to the legislative framing options, the empirical 
analysis uses the ranking system illustrated in Figure 1, above, to identify whether 
there is a relationship between socio-economic variables and the level of infl uence 
states aff ord to public interest criteria in domestic merger legislation.21
3.2. Data on domestic merger control
3.2.1. Overview of the domestic data set
The consolidated data set is comprised of information relating to the merger-specifi c, 
socio-economic and foreign investment variables of 75 domestic states. The merger-
specifi c variables record various qualitative data, including: (i) the substantive test 
for merger assessment that the state has adopted, (ii) whether there is direct scope 
to consider public interest criteria in the merger regime,22 (iii) whether the public 
interest is framed as part of the substantive test (Option 2); (iv) whether the public 
interest is framed as an exception to the substantive test (Option 3); (v) whether sector-
19  Tables that group the states according to their choice of legislative framing options and decision-
makers can be found in Appendices 2B and 2C respectively.
20  These techniques are used respectively in Section 4.3.1 (Geographic locality) and Sections 4.3.4 and 
4.3.5 (Eff ectiveness of domestic governance and Openness to foreign investment).
21  An interesting alternative to ranking the options would be to calculate a score for each state, based on 
the degree of infl uence it aff ords to the public interest. As noted above, a similar approach has been 
used to measure the ‘eff ectiveness’ of merger regimes and the impact this has on the stock prices and 
profi tability of targets in bank mergers; C –H –O  (2015) op. cit. 92.
22  Direct scope is aff orded if the public interest is either part of the substantive test or an exception to 
the test.
225Accommodating Public Interest Considerations…
specifi c policy gives eff ect to public interest criteria (Option 4); (vi) the identity of the 
public interest decision-maker; and (vii) whether the decision-maker is independent 
of government. The records for the socio-economic variables include: (i) whether the 
state in question is a developing economy;23 (ii) the type of legal system the state has 
in place; and (iii) the eff ectiveness of governance in the country.24 Finally, the records 
for the foreign investment variables consist of: (i) whether the state is an OECD 
member country;25 and (ii) how ‘open’ the state is to foreign direct investment.26
3.2.2. Populating and codifying the domestic data set
The data for the analysis in this section is predominantly derived from two main 
sources: (i) the country overviews that appear in the 2014 edition of the Global 
Competition Review (GCR) Merger Control Handbook,27 and (ii) the country profi les 
available from the George Washington University (GWU) Worldwide Competition 
Database.28
The GCR Handbook is a reputable reference document that is updated annually 
and aims to provide legal and business practitioners with overviews of merger control 
procedures in a number of jurisdictions across the globe.29 The country overviews 
have been written by preeminent merger control practitioners and each overview 
has also received factual verifi cation from some of the world’s leading competition 
authorities.30 Each country overview also provides answers to 36 ‘key questions’ 
relating to various substantive and procedural aspects of the domestic merger 
regime.31
The GWU Database is an online research resource hosted on the website of the 
George Washington Competition Law Center. At the time of writing, the database 
23  Based on the development status attributed to the state by the IMF; I  M  F : 
World Economic Outlook: Uneven Growth – Short- and Long-Term Factors. IMF, 2015. 150–153. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/. [hereinafter: IMF (2015)]
24  According to the 2014 readings of the World Bank Governance Indicators; W  B : Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) project. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. 
[hereinafter: W  B  WGI]
25  i.e. A recognised member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
26  According to the 2014 ratings of the OECD FDI Index; OECD: FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index. 
OECD Investment, June 2014. www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm.
27  Global Competition Review: Getting the Deal Through: Merger Control 2014. (Law Business 
Research 2013). Hereafter, the ‘GCR Handbook’.
28  C  L  C : Worldwide Competition Database. GWU Competition Law Center. 
http://www.gwclc.com/World-competition-database.html. [Hereafter: GWU Database]
29  As an indication of its reputability, the GCR Handbook has been endorsed by both the International 
Bar Association and the American Bar Association.
30  GCR Handbook op. cit.
31  The main questions the data collection considers are: (Q1) ‘What is the relevant legislation and 
who enforces it?’; (Q8) ‘Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant 
approvals?’; (Q19) ‘What is the substantive test for clearance?’; and (Q22) ‘To what extent are non-
competition issues (such as industrial policy or public interest issues) relevant in the review process?’.
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is populated with short country profi les for 120 competition regimes worldwide. In 
a similar fashion to the GCR Handbook, the country profi les in the GWU Database 
pose 38 questions regarding, inter alia, the obligations, independence and governance 
of competition authorities in each state. Many of these questions require binary ‘Yes/
No’ answers, but the country profi les also provide additional elaboration where 
appropriate. For the purposes of the analysis in this paper, the GWU Database off ers 
a reliable resource for cross-checking the information relating to decision-makers 
contained in the GCR Handbook, particularly with regards to their independence.32
In total, 75 domestic merger regimes are included in the data set and there are three 
main reasons for selecting this sample size: (i) to reduce the risk of data distortions, 
(ii) to ensure the data is suffi  ciently representative of global merger control, and (iii) 
to ensure the data is readily accessible from a reliable source.
Firstly, on the point of avoiding potential data distortions, there are justifi able 
grounds for imposing certain criteria on the types of state that are to be included 
within the sample.33 For example, as the purpose of the study is to identify trends in 
domestic merger control regimes, it follows that the states within the sample should 
be domestic rather than supranational.34 Moreover, the state must have enacted 
formal merger control laws that explicitly refer to assessment criteria.35 By restricting 
the sample to states that possess these characteristics, it ensures that the states are 
suffi  ciently similar to facilitate a robust empirical analysis of the eff ect of socio-
economic variables.36 An important question to bear in mind here is whether the 
sample should include states that have not made eff orts to accommodate the public 
interest domestically. The decision has been made to retain these states in the sample 
because they potentially off er valuable insights into the eff ect that socio-economic 
variables have on the decision of whether or not to accommodate public interest 
criteria in the fi rst place.
Secondly, the data set must be suffi  ciently representative of global merger control 
in order for the empirical analysis to obtain valid insights on the international norms 
32  In terms of independence, the key questions posed in the country profi les are: ‘Does the executive 
have powers to decide on specifi c cases based on public interest?’ and ‘Does the executive retain 
decision-making powers over the Competition Authority?’. 
33  By imposing qualifying conditions on the sample, this facilitates control variables that can be 
maintained throughout the sample to reduce the risk of data distortions.
34  The ‘domestic state’ requirement precludes the consideration of supranational merger regimes, such 
as the European Union and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which 
both feature in the GCR Handbook.
35  Uruguay enforces a procedural-based merger regime that lacks a substantive test for assessment. As 
such, the role aff orded to competition and public interest criteria is not clear. Uruguay is therefore 
precluded from the sample. Luxembourg also fails to qualify by virtue of its lack of substantive 
merger assessment.
36  Comparative scholars have noted that a meaningful comparative analysis requires states to be 
suffi  ciently comparable in terms of certain shared characteristics; see A. Esin Ö : Methodology 
of comparative law. In: Jan M. S  (ed.): Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law. Edward Elgar, 
2006. 442.
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for accommodating the public interest. As such, the sample states are selected from 
a broad geographic spectrum, thereby ensuring that the sample is more indicative 
of a range of socio-economic variables, many of which are signifi cantly infl uenced 
by a country’s geographic location. The 75 states in the sample are selected from 
six continents,37 and also consist of a relatively even split between developed and 
developing economies,38 one of the key socio-economic variables that will be analysed 
in Section 4. It is anticipated that this will be suffi  ciently expansive to identify the 
international trends relating to the accommodation of the public interest in domestic 
merger control and to the infl uence of key socio-economic variables.
Thirdly, the sample size will also be infl uenced by the availability of reliable data 
on the merger regime of any given state. Information and literature on certain merger 
regimes is scarce, particularly in countries that have only recently adopted merger 
control. This problem is aggravated by language barriers and the various statutes, 
institutions and reforms that need to be taken account of. Therefore, it is logical to 
select the sample states from amongst the countries featured in the GCR Handbook 
or the GWU Database, two reliable points of reference for information on domestic 
merger control and institutions.
3.3. Observations on how states have accommodated the public interest in practice
Before considering the potential infl uence of socio-economic variables, the data 
can fi rst be assessed to identify the most common means by which the 75 states 
have accommodated the public interest, in terms of legislative framing and decision-
makers.
3.3.1. Framing the public interest in merger legislation
Let us fi rst consider the most popular options for framing the public interest in 
merger legislation. In light of the general rhetoric in academic and practitioner circles 
which advocates that states should adopt a competition-based approach to merger 
assessment,39 one would expect to see most states either framing the public interest 
in a restrictive way or aff ording it no scope whatsoever. Indeed, the data appears 
to support this proposition. Table 1, below, specifi es the number of states adopting 
each legislative framing option, with the options ranked according to the potential 
infl uence they aff ord to the public interest, as detailed above.
37  These include representatives from Africa (8 states), Asia (12), Europe (37), North America (7), South 
America (6) and Oceania (5).
38  Of the 75 states in the sample, 38 are developed and 37 are developing.
39  See, for example, the ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis (n 1) 1, Comment 1.
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Table 1. Frequency distribution of states adopting each option 












Opts 2 & 4















Within the sample, 81.3% of states either avoid considering the public interest 
(Option 1) or frame public interest restrictively – either in sector-specifi c policy 
(Option 4), as an exception to the substantive test (Option 3) or a combination of both 
(Options 3 & 4).40 In contrast, the options that aff ord a greater degree of potential 
infl uence to the public interest (Option 2 and Options 2 & 4) are adopted by only 
19.7% of states. The most popular options for framing the public interest are Option 
3, Option 4 and, to a lesser extent, a combination of the two; 69.3% of states adopt 
one of these three options.41 This indicates that, while the vast majority of states have 
chosen to aff ord scope to the public interest,42 there is a general preference for states 
to frame the public interest restrictively, meaning it will only be invoked in limited 
circumstances involving certain types of merger.
Moreover, the skewness of the data indicates a slight positive skew that tails 
towards the ‘least common’ options on the right-hand side of Table 1.43 Again, this 
suggests that, as the degree of infl uence an option aff ords to the public interest 
increases, the probability of a state adopting that option decreases. These fi ndings 
correspond to the initial proposition that international merger control has converged 
towards a predominantly competition-based approach.
Inference 1. The vast majority of states continue to assign a restricted role to 
public interest criteria in their merger control regimes.
3.3.2. Appointing a public interest decision-maker
The next step is to consider who states have appointed to the public interest decision-
making role in practice. Predicting the most popular decision-maker is not altogether 
straightforward. On the one hand, given that the ICN Recommended Practices for 
Merger Analysis suggest that NCAs should decide mergers, albeit on competition 
40  61 out of 75 states frame the public interest restrictively or aff ord no scope to it.
41  52 out of 75 states adopt Option 3, Option 4 or a combination of both.
42  47 out of 75 states (62.6%) aff ord direct scope to the public interest in their merger legislation, and 
66 out of 75 states (88.0%) aff ord direct scope to the public interest in merger legislation or sector-
specifi c policy.
43  The degree of skewness within the distribution is calculated at 0.3430, indicating a noticeable – but not 
signifi cant – positive skew; see Appendix 2A. The distribution also has a kurtosis of 2.44, indicating 
the curve of the data is relatively fl at compared to a normal distribution; Appendix 2A.
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grounds,44 it may be that states have chosen to extend the decision-making 
responsibilities of NCAs to also include public interest assessments. In particular, 
if the domestic law requires the decision-maker to balance competition and public 
interest considerations, states may feel that NCAs are best-suited to this task by 
virtue of their competition expertise. On the other hand, states may prefer to assign 
the decision-making role to politicians because of (i) a constitutional belief that 
mergers aff ecting the public interest should be decided by a public representative, 
or (ii) a reluctance to cede decision-making powers on matters of public or strategic 
signifi cance. Table 2, below, indicates that NCAs and politicians are, in fact, equally 
common among the states in the sample when it comes to appointing decision-makers. 
Table 2. Frequency distribution of states appointing each public interest decision-maker











[Source: Appendix 2C].  Denotes states that do not consider the public 
interest and, as such, do not appoint a public interest decision-maker.
Of the 66 states in the sample that have appointed public interest decision-
makers,45 31.8% have opted for NCAs, a further 31.8% have appointed politicians, 
13.6% assign the role to regulators, and 22.7% implement a dual decision-making 
procedure. Given that less than one-third of states have appointed politicians as 
decision-makers, this would appear to indicate that states have shown a strong 
willingness to cede public interest decision-making powers to other bodies. However, 
if we consider the political independence of the decision-makers in the sample, the 
infl uence of state governments may not be as restrained as Table 2 implies. Only 
37.9% of the decision-makers in the sample (25 out of 66 states) take their decisions 
independently of government.46 Hence, despite the majority of states opting against 
appointing politicians as direct decision-makers, the assessment of public interest 
mergers remains largely politicised in most states.
Inference 2. NCAs and politicians have proved the most popular choices to fulfi l 
the public interest decision-making role. However, despite showing a readiness to 
delegate decision-making powers, state governments retain a notable infl uence over 
the decision-making process.
3.3.3. The most popular combinations for accommodating the public interest
We have so far established that states demonstrate a preference for: (a) prescribing 
a restricted role to public interest criteria in their merger regimes (Options 3, 4 or 
both), and (b) appointing NCAs or politicians as public interest decision-makers. In 
44  ICN Recommended Practices (n 1) 1, Comment 3.
45  These are the 66 states who aff ord scope to the public interest during the assessment process.
46  See Appendix 2D. The politically independent decision-makers in the sample include: 13/21 NCAs 
(61.9%), 0/21 Politicians (0.0%), 6/9 Regulators (66.7%), and 6/15 Dual decision-makers (40.0%).
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an eff ort to identify the dynamics between the two sets of choices, the legislative 
framing and decision-making variables can be considered together to reveal the most 
popular combinations for accommodating the public interest.
Overall, there are 21 possible combinations for states to choose from.47 This is a 
broad range of possibilities but, nevertheless, there are some specifi c combinations 
that we would expect to observe more frequently in practice. For example, when a 
state frames the public interest in terms of sector-specifi c policy,48 it might be more 
inclined to delegate the decision-making role to a sector regulator, in order to benefi t 
from the regulator’s industry expertise. Alternatively, if the public interest is framed 
as part of a substantive test that requires the public interest to be balanced with 
competition criteria,49 the state may be more likely to appoint an NCA as decision-
maker or, at least, implement a dual decision-making procedure that includes an 
NCA. Figure 2, below, illustrates the most popular accommodation combinations 
within the sample.
Figure 2. Distribution of diff erent combinations of legislative framing 
and decision-maker options available to states 
[Source: Appendix 2E]
A number of inferences can be drawn from the data. What is immediately observable 
is the wide variety of combinations that the states have adopted in practice. Of the 21 
possible combinations available, 15 have been utilised by the 75 states in the sample. 
One explanation for this broad distribution is that, rather than simply transplanting 
47  This fi gure includes the option of not aff ording scope to the public interest. For a table of the possible 
combinations, see Appendix 2E.
48  I.e. Option 4, Options 2 & 4 or Options 3 & 4.
49  I.e. Option 2 or Options 2 & 4.
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the merger laws of another country, states have shown a willingness to tailor their 
approach in order to accommodate the public interest in a manner that suits their 
own domestic needs.50 By a slight margin, the joint-most common approaches in the 
sample are (i) to avoid considering public interest criteria altogether (Option 1), and 
(ii) to frame the public interest as an exception to the substantive test (Option 3) and 
to appoint a politician as decision-maker – these approaches have each been adopted 
by 9 states.51 The next-most popular combination is also Option 3 but with an NCA 
appointed as decision-maker (8 states).
Given that the sample includes an equal number of NCAs and politicians as 
decision-makers, it is possible to directly compare the distributions of both. A 
notable diff erence between the two can be observed in instances where the public 
interest is framed as an exception (in Option 3 and Options 3 & 4). Although states 
adopting Option 3 have shown an eagerness to appoint both NCAs and politicians, 
not a single state that adopts a combination of Options 3 & 4 has chosen to appoint an 
NCA (compared with 7 states who have appointed a politician). In other words, where 
states have framed the public interest as an exception, the ratio of NCAs to politicians 
is 1:2.52 One way to interpret this is that, although many states believe that politicians 
should rule on the public interest, these states have been reluctant to over-politicise 
their merger regimes and, as a consequence, have restricted political decision-making 
powers to maintain the objective credibility of the review process. This is in contrast 
to what is observed under the legislative framing options that aff ord a greater degree 
of potential infl uence to the public interest. If we consider Option 2 and Options 2 & 
4 as a whole, the ratio of NCAs to politicians is 2.33:1.53 The inference here is that, 
whenever public interest criteria is considered in every merger assessment, states are 
more than twice as likely to delegate this responsibility to NCAs. However, although 
NCAs are more likely to play a role when the legislation aff ords signifi cant infl uence 
to public interest criteria, this is not to conclude that NCAs themselves have more 
infl uence over the public interest. On the contrary, 6 of the states in the data set have 
appointed NCAs to oversee Option 4 (one of the lowest ranked options in terms 
of potential public interest infl uence). Therefore, considering the distribution as a 
whole, there is no signifi cant diff erence between NCAs and politicians in terms of the 
infl uence they have been able to derive from their domestic legislation.54
As anticipated, states have shown a greater willingness to assign the decision-
making role to sector regulators when the public interest is framed in terms of sector-
specifi c policy, either under Option 4 or under a combination of Options 3 & 4. Indeed, 
these are the only two groups in which states have assigned sole decision-making 
50  Section 4 of this paper will test this claim by considering socio-economic variables.
51  The United Kingdom is one of the states to adopt the ‘Option 3 with politician’ approach.
52  Of the states adopting Option 3 or Options 3 & 4, 8 have appointed NCAs and 16 have appointed 
politicians.
53  Of the states adopting Option 2 or Options 2 & 4, 7 have appointed NCAs and 3 have appointed NCAs.
54  Appendix 2F calculates an estimate for the mean level of infl uence that each decision-maker has 
derived from legislation. The mean averages of NCAs (3.429) and politicians (3.524) are very similar.
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powers to regulators. This implies that states attach a great deal of importance to the 
sector-specifi c expertise of regulators, but have little desire for regulators to make 
decisions outside of their areas of expertise. Option 4 is also the most diverse group 
in terms of decision-makers, with all four types of decision-maker represented.
States have also been prepared to implement a dual decision-making role in a 
variety of circumstances. The only instance where dual decision-makers have not 
been adopted by at least one state is where the public interest has been framed as 
part of the substantive test for assessment (Option 2). This is somewhat unexpected 
given that the multi-disciplinary skillset of dual decision-makers (e.g. an NCA and a 
politician) would appear well-suited to the task of balancing competition and public 
interest criteria, a common feature of Option 2. However, dual decision-making is 
more prominent where legislation is framed under a combination of Options 2 & 4.55
Inference 3. States have been prepared to adopt various combinations of legislative 
framing and decision-makers to suit their own needs. Where states have framed the 
public interest as an ‘exception’ to the substantive test, politicians have been the 
preferred choice in terms of decision-maker. When the public interest is framed to 
play a role in every merger assessment, most states place their trust in NCAs to make 
the fi nal decision. Sector regulators are considered desirable when ruling on sector-
specifi c public interest issues because of their industry expertise. But few states have 
taken advantage of the multi-disciplinary insights of dual decision-makers when it 
comes to balancing competition and public interest criteria.
Having identifi ed the most common methods for accommodating the public 
interest in practice, the logical progression of the paper is to consider whether 
any socio-economic factors have infl uenced how states have chosen to make this 
accommodation.
4. What is the potential infl uence of socio-economic variables?
The extent to which socio-economic factors infl uence a state’s adoption and 
enforcement of competition policy has become a prominent point of discussion for 
academics and policy makers alike. Comparative competition law researchers, in 
particular, have emphasised the importance of appreciating the potential infl uence 
of socio-economic variables when it comes to assessing why a country chooses 
to design its competition law and institutional framework in a certain way.56 
Fundamental design choices can be infl uenced by a country’s legal, political and 
economic culture,57 and merger control, in particular, can be immensely refl ective of a 
55  Four states have prescribed a dual decision-making role here, and all of them involve NCAs: Greece 
and Poland (NCA and regulator), and Israel and Taiwan (NCA and politician).
56  See, for example, Dabbah who suggests that the mere fact that almost all competition regimes are 
derived from a particular political philosophy makes it extremely diffi  cult to separate competition law 
from its socio-economic framework. D  (2010) op. cit. 63.
57  Eleanor M. F  – Michael J. T : The GAL Competition Project: The Global Convergence of 
Process Norms. In: Eleanor M. F  – Michael J. T  (eds.): The Design of Competition Law 
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country’s legal traditions, historical context and its stage of economic development.58 
Moreover, as a competition regime begins to mature and its eff ectiveness becomes 
more observable, there is an increased likelihood that legislators will seek to adapt 
the law and, in doing so, take inspiration from the broader institutional arrangement 
of the state’s legal system as a whole.59
By virtue of these socio-economic discrepancies between states, it is widely 
accepted that the goal of a single universal formula for global competition law is, for 
the time being at least, incomprehensible.60 However, as has been noted above, eff orts 
have been made at an international level to facilitate substantive and procedural 
convergence between domestic merger regimes. If such convergence can be 
facilitated, it has the potential to ‘neutralise’ the infl uence of certain socio-economic 
factors by encouraging greater uniformity.
In practice, initiatives launched by competition convergence champions (namely, 
epistemic communities including the ICN,61 the OECD,62 and UNCTAD,63 among 
others) have reached important milestones in their eff orts to promote substantive 
convergence in merger control.64 Nevertheless, Section 3.3 observes that, 
between them, the 75 states in the sample have adopted 15 diff erent approaches to 
accommodating public interest criteria in practice. This is indicative of the notable 
inconsistencies that persist between states at a substantive and institutional level 
when considering public interest criteria.65 So what has been the main obstruction 
Institutions: Global Norms, Local Choice.s. Oxford, OUP, 2013. 4.
58  Larry F  – Megan A : Convergence in International Merger Control. Antitrust ABA, 
Vol. 26., N. 2, (Spring 2012) 20–21.
59  Mariana P  – Michael T : Path Dependence, Development, and the Dynamics of 
Institutional Reform. University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 59., (2009) 341., 354.
60  Ratnakar A : What Type of Competition Policy and Law Should a Developing Country Have? 
South Asia Economic Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1, (2004) 1., 2.
61  Namely the ICN Recommended Practices (n 1) and the ICN Merger Working Group.
62  OECD: Recommendation of the Council on Merger Review, 23 March 
2005, C (2005) 34. http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.
aspx?InstrumentID=195&InstrumentPID=191&Lang=en&Book=False.
63  The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. UNCTAD’s convergence materials 
are derived from its peer reviews of merger control in certain regions and jurisdictions; see e.g. 
UNCTAD: A Tripartite Report on the United Republic of Tanzania-Zambia-Zimbabwe: Comparative 
Assessment. (2012) UNCTAD/DITC/CLP, 2012/1. http://unctad.org/en /Publications Library/
ditcclp2012d1_overview_en.pdf.
64  These initiatives have succeeded in facilitating tangible convergence on market defi nition and 
substantive standards of analysis; see J  (n 2). However, procedural divergences endure in relation 
to timeframes for assessment in some countries, which creates unnecessary costs for merging parties 
in international transactions; Jonathan G : Convergence in International Merger Control. 
Competition Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2, (2009) 179., 185.
65  The Chairman of the OECD Competition Committee, Frédéric Jenny, suggests that substantive 
diff erences between merger regimes are primarily due to diff ering economic characteristics or the 
presence of public interest clauses. He suggests further convergence can be achieved by reducing the 
importance of public interest considerations; ibid 41.
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to convergence in this area of law? A number of socio-economic factors potentially 
hold the answer.
4.1. Identifying socio-economic variables
This section will analyse the potential infl uence that fi ve socio-economic variables 
have on how a state chooses to accommodate public interest criteria in its merger 
regime. These variables include:
(a) Geographic locality;
(b) Economic development;
(c) The type of legal system in place;
(d) The eff ectiveness of domestic governance; and
(e) Openness to foreign investment.
The decision to analyse these particular variables as part of the empirical assessment 
has been made for several reasons. The primary reason is that four of these variables 
– (a), (b), (c) and (d) – have either formed the basis of previous studies in competition 
law, or have been cited as potentially infl uential factors when states are seeking to 
design and implement competition policy.66 Given their perceived signifi cance in the 
literature, these variables off er a useful starting-point for the empirical assessment. 
In contrast, the fi fth variable to be tested – (e) Openness to foreign investment – has 
been aff orded relatively little mention in the competition law literature. It is, however, 
beginning to receive greater attention in practitioners’ circles, owing to the interplay 
between merger control and foreign direct investment (FDI) review when overseeing 
cross-border mergers.67 As it is possible for both merger control assessments and FDI 
reviews to consider public interest criteria, it is interesting to consider the relationship 
between the two and how they cohabit.
An important point to raise with regards to variable (e) concerns the dynamics 
of its relationship with merger control. If we consider variables (a) to (d), it appears 
that the relationship between these variables and the design of merger control is 
predominantly one-way; in other words, variables (a) to (d) have the capacity to 
66  For examples of studies of these variables or references to their potential signifi cance, see (a) 
Geographic locality, e.g. Mark R. A. P : The worldwide growth of competition law: an empirical 
analysis. Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 43, (1998) 105., and Brian A. F  –Cassandra B : Competition 
and Antitrust Laws in Canada: Mergers, Joint Ventures and Competitor Collaborations. LexisNexis 
Canada, 2013. 19.; (b) Economic development, e.g. A  (2004) op. cit. 2., and Moisés N : Does 
Latin America Need Competition Policy to Compete? In: Moisés N  – Joseph S. T  (eds.): 
Competition Policy, Deregulation, and Modernization in Latin America. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1999. 31.; (c) Type of legal system, e.g. F  – T  (2013) op. cit. 5–6., and D  (2010) 
op. cit. 15.; and (d) Eff ectiveness of domestic governance, e.g. David J. G : Global Competition: 
Law, Markets and Globalization. Oxford, OUP, 2009.
67  The inspiration to consider openness to foreign investment as a variable comes from the author’s 
attendance of the GCR Live conference on Foreign Investment Review – Getting the Deal Done in the 
Evolving Regulatory World. London, 17 October 2013).
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infl uence – but not be infl uenced by – the design of merger control. For example, how 
a state chooses to design its merger control will not aff ect its geographic locality, nor 
is it remotely likely to prompt a change in its legal system or alter the eff ectiveness 
of its domestic governance (which includes factors such as political stability and 
rule of law). Variable (b) is a slight exception to this because, in the long-term, 
it is conceivable that the design of merger control will have a tangible impact on 
the economic development of a state. However, given the wide range of measures 
that are considered in the calculation of economic development,68 and the relative 
infancy of merger control in developing states, we can legitimately assume that no 
domestic merger control regime has yet given rise to a developing country achieving 
developed status. For variable (e), on the other hand, there is every possibility that a 
two-way relationship exists between itself and the design of merger control. If a state 
adopts a macro-economic stance of being ‘closed’ to foreign investment, it is logical 
that the state’s merger control will refl ect this in some way (e.g. by embedding a 
public interest clause that seeks to protect ‘the national interest’ or strategic sectors). 
Equally, by enforcing these protectionist clauses (and, as such, sheltering domestic 
fi rms from potential foreign purchasers), merger control can itself be said to infl uence 
the state’s overall ‘openness’ to foreign investment. It is therefore important to bear 
in mind this two-way relationship when it comes to analysing whether openness to 
foreign investment has an infl uence over how a state chooses to accommodate the 
public interest in merger control.
One limitation to note, which indirectly stems from the adoption of an empirical 
methodology, is the absence of ‘the goals of competition law’ as a socio-economic 
variable in this study. Indeed, there exists a wealth of literature that speaks of the 
observable relationship between the goals that states attribute to competition law 
and the design of the competition laws that states ultimately adopt.69 To analyse 
the infl uence that individual goals have had on how states accommodate the public 
interest would certainly produce some insightful fi ndings. Unfortunately, there 
are practical limitations associated with such an analysis in an empirical study. In 
practice, domestic states have a long ‘shopping list’ of diff erent goals to choose 
from.70 The length of this list does not, in itself, pose a practical problem for the 
empirical analysis because the states in the sample can be grouped according to their 
68  The World Bank, International Monetary Fund and United Nations Development Programme all 
consider a broad range of economic, environmental and social factors in their development indices; 
Lynge N : Classifi cations of Countries Based on Their Level of Development: How it is Done 
and How it Could be Done. IMF Working Paper, 11/31, (2011) 7–18. http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=24628.0.
69  See, e.g. David A. H  – William E. K : Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, and the 
Goals of Competition Law. Fordham Law Review, Vol. 81, N. 5, (2013) 2163.
70  This list includes, inter alia, protecting jobs, protecting small fi rms, promoting domestic industries 
and promoting a diverse spread of ownership. Eleanor F  – Michal S. G : Drafting Competition 
Law for Developing Jurisdictions: Learning from Experience. In: Michal S. G  and others: Economic 
Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions: Their Implications for Competition Law. Cheltenham 
(UK), Edward Elgar, 2015.
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chosen goal, in much the same way as this paper has done for the legislative framing 
options and decision-makers. The practical limitation lies in the fact that states will 
defi ne these goals diff erently, in terms of meaning and scope, and may also select 
more-than-one goal. As a consequence, to model the variable would require grouping 
the states according to standalone goals (of multiple defi nitions) and joint-goals (of 
multiple combinations). As the potential number of groups is high, there is a risk 
that the data set will become fragmented which, in turn, has the eff ect of reducing 
the robustness of the statistical analysis.71 For this reason, the analysis refrains from 
considering ‘the goals of competition law’ as a socio-economic variable.
4.2. Overview of data on socio-economic variables
Whereas in Section 3 the data pertaining to domestic merger control has been derived 
from two main sources (the GCR Handbook and the GWU Database), it has been 
necessary to consult a number of sources in order to populate the socio-economic 
fi elds within the data set.72 The relevant data sources for each variable are referred to 
separately under each of the empirical tests conducted in Section 4.3, below. Further 
details of the data collection process for the socio-economic variables can be found 
in Appendix 3.
By way of an overview, it is worth noting that some of the socio-economic 
variables in this section are modelled with discrete data,73 whereas others make use 
of continuous data. The decision to use one or the other is, in the most part, a matter 
of necessity. For example, ‘Geographic locality’ and ‘Type of legal system’ are clearly 
discrete variables that cannot be measured numerically. In contrast, ‘Eff ectiveness of 
domestic governance’, ‘Economic development’ and ‘Openness to foreign investment’ 
can all be considered continuous variables, which can be assigned a numerical value 
to refl ect the level of stability, development or openness in a state.74 As an extension 
of this, it is also possible to model these continuous variables with discrete data 
by defi ning classes or thresholds. For example, if political stability (a component of 
domestic governance) is measured on a scale between -2.5 and 2.5,75 a threshold could 
be imposed (for example, at point ‘0’) to distinguish between ‘politically stable states’ 
and ‘politically unstable states’. This ‘categorisation’ of continuous variables is often 
seen in the expression of economic development, where continuous data is relied 
upon to categorise states as discrete variables; either ‘developed’ or ‘developing’.
71  This is particularly true where a small or moderate sample size is involved (such as the 75 states 
considered in this study), meaning the average number of states in each group will be small.
72  These sources are referred to below and include openly accessible data from the IMF, World Bank 
and OECD.
73  I.e. Categorical data.
74  A number of international bodies – including the World Bank, the IMF and the OECD – have 
developed indices for measuring these variables numerically; see Sections 4.3.2 – 4.3.5.
75  This is the range adopted by the World Bank for expressing ‘political stability’ (a component of 
domestic governance) within its World Governance Indicators; see Section 4.3.4.
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Both continuous and categorical data have their advantages and disadvantages 
when undertaking empirical analyses. Continuous data provides greater detail on a 
variable and can be modelled using more robust statistical methods, but categorical 
data are less prone to the reliability issues often faced by continuous data that rely 
on estimates.76 For the analysis in this section, continuous data is used to model 
the ‘Eff ectiveness of domestic governance’ and ‘Openness to foreign investment’ 
variables, whereas categorical data is used to test ‘Economic development’. Although 
continuous data is available on economic development via the World Bank,77 the data 
takes the form of separate indicators – such as estimates for human development, 
environmental resources and industrial development – rather than a single aggregated 
indicator that specifi es the overall level of development in a given country. In 
the absence of an aggregated indicator, the analysis relies on the development 
classifi cations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which groups countries 
into discrete categories of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ economies.78
4.3. Observations on the infl uence of socio-economic variables
4.3.1. Geographic locality
Turning fi rst to consider the potential infl uence that geographic locality has on how 
a state chooses to accommodate the public interest, what patterns (if any) would 
we expect to observe? Here, the process of ‘knowledge exchange’ off ers a possible 
indication. A common occurrence when a country adopts or adapts its competition 
laws is that it will draw on the experiences of other competition regimes, in an eff ort 
to optimise the eff ectiveness of its own practices. The United States and the European 
Union have ‘dominated’ knowledge transfer in terms of inspiring the competition 
laws of other states,79 so we might expect that the states located in geographically 
close proximity to the US or EU will share similar characteristics. Given that the US, 
in particular, has historically demonstrated a high degree of competition advocacy,80 
it might be that countries in the Americas take a similarly strict competition-based 
approach to merger control and, as such, aff ord little scope to public interest criteria. 
Furthermore, neighbouring states may also seek to accommodate public interest 
criteria in similar ways in order to address public interest concerns experienced in a 
particular geographic region.
76  Dawn I : Continuous and Discrete Variables. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 2001. Vol. 
10, N. 1, (2001) 37.
77  W  B : World Development Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators.
78  IMF (2015) op. cit.
79  D  2010) op. cit. 3.
80  Maurice E. S : Is competition always good? Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Vol. 1, N. 1, 
(2013) 162., 162–165.
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The geographic locality variable can be examined in several ways. For this 
section, choropleth mapping has been used to visualise the distribution of legislative 
framing options and decision-makers across the geographic spectrum. A limitation 
of conducting choropleth mapping across international states is that it is prone to 
exaggerating the signifi cance of land mass, which one should be mindful of when 
interpreting the maps. However, this aside, choropleth mapping allows clusters 
of countries adopting similar framing options and decision-makers to be directly 
observed. The existence of these clusters would indicate that geographic locality 
is infl uential when accommodating the public interest in merger regimes in certain 
parts of the world.
Figure 3, below, shows a choropleth map illustrating the geographic distribution 
of each option for framing the public interest across the sample states. The lighter 
shaded regions represent states that adopt legisltative framing options that aff ord 
little-or-no scope to the public interest, whereas darker regions indicate states that 
adopt options which aff ord a greater degree of consideration to public interest criteria.
Figure 3. Choropleth map showing geographical distribution 
of legislative framing options across states 
[Source: Appendix 4A]
The value of Figure 3 as a visual aid is somewhat limited by the moderate number 
of states in the sample but, nonetheless, several observations can be made. Firstly, 
public interest criteria appears to display a high degree of infl uence in the merger 
regimes concentrated around Africa, Southeast Asia and, to a lesser degree, Eastern 
Europe. Of the 8 African states in the sample, 5 of these states (62.5%) adopt either 
Option 2 or a combination of Options 2 & 4, which aff ord the greatest scope to the 
public interest.81 This is in contrast to the relatively small proportion of states that 
adopt the two most infl uential options in other regions: Asia (33.3%), Europe (10.8%), 
81  See Appendix 4A.
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North America (0.0%), South America (0.0%), and Oceania (20.0%). A larger sample 
size would be necessary to substantiate these percentages but the preliminary 
indication is that legislative framing options which aff ord an extensive role to the 
public interest are much more likely to be adopted in African states, compared to 
other geographic regions. More generally, the choropleth gradient in Figure 3 also 
suggests that states in the Eastern Hemisphere demonstrate a greater willingness to 
aff ord scope to the public interest, compared to their Western counterparts.
In terms of regions that exhibit less of a willingness to consider public interest 
criteria, all 6 of the South American states in the sample adopt either Option 1, 
Option 4 or Option 3, which aff ord the least scope to the public interest. Additionally, 
6 of the 7 North American states in the sample adopt one of these three options.82 
Furthermore, not a single one of the North and South American states in the sample 
has adopted Option 2 or a combinations of Options 2 & 4, corroborating the idea 
that merger control in the Americas will tend to adhere more strictly to competition-
based principles.
Inference 4. African states are considerably more likely to assign an extensive role 
to the public interest in their merger control regimes. North and South American states 
typically frame public interest criteria more restrictively in their merger regimes. 
These observations indicate that the geographic region does have a bearing on how 
the public interest is framed in merger legislation, although they may also be explained 
by other socio-economic variables present in a particular geographic region.
Further observations can also be made by referring to the geographic distribution 
of public interest decision-makers between states. The map in Figure 4, below, charts 
the decision-makers appointed by each of the sample states.
Figure 4. Choropleth map showing geographical distribution 
of public interest decision-makers 
[Source: Appendix 4B]
82  The remaining North American state, Panama, adopts a combination of Options 3 & 4.
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The map reveals that a geographically diverse range of appointments have been 
made in each region, with at least two types of decision-maker present in every 
continent. As has been noted in Section 3.3.2, NCAs and politicians are the most-
favoured decision-makers within the sample and, if we consult the blue and orange-
shaded regions in Figure 4, we can observe the geographical distribution of each. 
At fi rst glance, one would be forgiven for thinking that political decision-making 
is concentrated in Eastern Europe and large parts of Asia, but this is somewhat 
misleading given the large land mass of China, India and Russia (who each appoint 
politicians as decision-makers). In reality, the proportion of NCAs and political 
decision-makers is fairly even on all continents.83 Nevertheless, there are clusters of 
neighbouring states which share the same type of decision-maker, therefore implying 
the existence of regional infl uence. As aforementioned, both Europe and Asia see 
large clusters of neighbouring states appointing politicians. In the case of Europe, 
the cluster of states adopting political decision-makers might be explained by the fact 
that EU Member States are caught under the jurisdiction of EU merger control, which 
may have infl uenced the domestic merger regimes of Member States.84 In contrast, 
states appointing NCAs are comparatively well-dispersed; the only region that 
resembles a ‘hot spot’ for NCAs is in central and southern Africa. Much of Oceania 
and even some Nordic territories have opted for dual decision-makers.
Inference 5. Decision-makers are very widely distributed between continents, 
suggesting that geographic locality does not have a signifi cant infl uence on the type 
of public interest decision-maker selected by a state. NCA and politicians, the two 
most common types of decision-maker in the sample, are also distributed relatively 
equally on each continent. A cluster of political decision-makers in Europe may 
be explained by the infl uence of EU merger control, whereas there is also a high 
concentration of NCA decision-makers in Africa.
Although there are certain inferences we can take from the infl uence of geographic 
locality as a socio-economic variable, it is important to consider why we observe 
similarities in particular regions. Although knowledge transfer, as noted above, 
provides a possible explanation for these similarities, another possible reason is that 
states in a particular region are facing similar socio-economic challenges and, as 
such, are forced to adopt similar laws and institutional designs in order to address 
these challenges. The analyses of the remaining socio-economic variables in this 
section should shed further light on why we observe these geographic patterns.
83  This is more apparent from Appendix 4B.
84  The governments of EU Member States can intervene to assume competence over EU-level merger 
assessments where it is considered necessary in order to protect a legitimate public interest concern, 
under Article 21(4) EUMR. The fact that governments perform this public interest function in relation 
to EU-level mergers may have also infl uenced the public interest decision-making role in relation to 
domestic mergers.
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4.3.2. Economic development
Economic development is commonly cited as a key infl uencing factor when states 
decide how to design and implement competition law. This has, in the most part, been 
attributed to the diff erent types of challenges faced by developed countries when 
compared with developing and emerging economies.85 Although the development 
goals of every developing country are unique in form and scale, they very often 
seek to address public interest concerns, such as mass unemployment, poverty and 
social inequality. It has been well-documented in the literature that many developing 
countries have sought to give eff ect to these development goals by incorporating them 
within their competition laws.86 Scholars have suggested that this may be an attempt 
by developing countries to make competition law and merger control ‘more friendly 
to growth and development’.87 This has prompted Frédéric Jenny, the Chairman of 
the OECD Competition Committee, to suggest that public interest criteria may be a 
‘necessary evil’ in some developing countries, who would otherwise decide against 
adopting competition law if it meant they could not consider wider development 
goals.88 Others have suggested that developing countries may also need to assign 
a prominent scope to the public interest in order to give NCAs (as public interest 
decision-makers) credibility in the eyes of the public.89 In light of this literature, 
one might therefore expect to see that the developing countries in the sample adopt 
legislative framing options that aff ord a greater scope to the public interest.
For this analysis, the states in the sample have been grouped into ‘developed’ 
and ‘developing’ states, according to their IMF classifi cation.90 This produces a 
ratio within the sample of 38:37 with regards to developed and developing countries. 
Because the number of developed and developing states in the sample is almost 
identical, this avoids signifi cant distortions when it comes to comparing the developed 
and developing states directly against one another.
85  For example, whereas developed countries may adopt competition laws to promote welfare and 
effi  ciencies, many developing countries have implemented competition law for substantive and 
even symbolic purposes in pursuit of development goals; Spencer Weber W : Comparative 
competition law as a form of empiricism Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 1998/23. 455., 456.
86  South Africa has attracted particular attention from academics and practitioners for integrating 
development goals within its competition law; see Vani C : The Place of Public Interest in 
South Africa’s Competition Legislation: Some implications for international antitrust convergence. 
53rd Spring Meeting of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Johannesburg, April 2005. http://apps.
americanbar.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-ic/pdf/spring/05/aba-paper.pdf.
87  J  (2015) op. cit. 41.
88  Henry V : Public interest clauses may be a necessary evil, says OECD head. Global Competition 
Review, 13, March 2015. http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/38187/public-interest-
clauses-may-necessary-evil-says-oecd-head.
89  Lewis suggests that, in developing countries, an NCA that is only able to decide mergers on competition 
grounds, even if the decision appears counterintuitive to development goals, will seriously struggle 
to achieve credibility and legitimacy; David L : The Role of Public Interest in Merger Evaluation. 
ICN Merger Working Group, Naples, 28–29 September 2002. 2.
90  IMF (2015) op. cit.
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Figure 5, below, shows the respective number of developed and developing 
countries adopting each legislative framing option.
Fig ure 5. Distribution of legislative framing options adopted 
by developed and developing countries
Once again, it is interesting to note that every legislative framing option has been 
adopted by at least one developed and one developing country. Indeed, we see that 
developed and developing countries fall into each extreme of the legislative framing 
options; both Option 1 (no public interest consideration) and Options 2 & 4 (public 
interest as part of the substantive test and sector-specifi c policy). This, in itself, is an 
early indication that economic development does not have a tangible impact on how 
a state accommodates the public interest.
Indeed, by performing a two-sample t-test to compare the respective means of each 
distribution, as Appendix 5 demonstrates, it transpires that there is no statistically 
signifi cant diff erence between the types of legislative framing options that are 
typically adopted by developed and developing countries.91 However, even though 
the t-test suggests that economic development does not generally dictate the level of 
infl uence a state aff ords to the public interest, Figure 5 does reveal certain intricacies 
that a t-test overlooks. For example, a signifi cant proportion of developed countries 
(39.5%) choose to frame the public interest as an exception to the substantive test 
(Option 3), which is considerably more than the proportion of developing countries 
who choose to take the same approach (10.8%). Conversely, 35.1% of developing 
countries accommodate the public interest in sector-specifi c policy (Option 4), 
compared to 15.8% of developed countries. This is perhaps due to the perceived 
91  In testing the null hypothesis that economic development has no signifi cant infl uence on how a state 
frames the public interest, to a p = 0.05 level of signifi cance, the t-test returns a p-value of 0.338. As 
this is statistically signifi cant, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. See Appendix 5B.
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need that developing states have to protect certain strategic sectors that aid their 
development goals.92
Interestingly, whereas only 3 developed countries in the sample have decided 
against aff ording scope to public interest criteria (Option 1), 6 developing countries 
have decided to do this. This would seem to dispel the commonly held belief that 
developing countries take an altogether more liberal approach to the public interest. 
It also hints at the possibility that some developing countries are taking inspiration 
from the strict competition-based approach witnessed in the United States. However, 
if we consider the other end of the spectrum, developing countries are also more 
likely to adopt options that aff ord extensive scope to the public interest compared to 
developed countries. Taking Option 2 and Options 2 & 4 as a whole, 9 developing 
countries apply one of these options, compared with 5 developed countries. In reality 
then, we observe a disproportionate number of developing countries residing at 
both extremes on the legislative framing scale, which is in contrast to the common 
conceptions cited in the literature.
Inference 6. Considering the sample as a whole, economic development does not 
have a signifi cant impact on how much infl uence states choose to aff ord to the public 
interest when framing merger law. However, in practice, developed states have 
typically shown a preference towards public interest exceptions (which appear in the 
middle of the ordinal public interest scale), whereas developing states favour sector-
specifi c public interest policy and, to a lesser extent, a public interest test (closer to 
the extremes of the public interest scale). States that aff ord an extensive role to the 
public interest are more likely to be developing countries, but states that aff ord the 
public interest no scope at all are also more likely to be developing.
Continuing the analysis of this variable, what of the eff ect that economic 
development has on the public interest decision-maker a state chooses to appoint? 
Once again, the literature presents some insights into the norms that we are likely 
to observe with regards to decision-makers in developed and developing countries 
respectively. One of these insights has already been referred to in the analysis of 
legislative framing options above; namely, the suggestion that developing countries 
have sought to incorporate public interest criteria into their merger regimes in order 
to provide credibility for NCAs in the eyes of the public.93 If this has indeed arisen in 
practice, we would expect to see more developing countries appoint NCAs as public 
interest decision-makers, in the belief that this role will benefi ts NCAs. A second 
insight from the literature is provided by Adhikari who suggests that, due to the 
natural monopolies that endure in numerous developing countries, the role of sector 
regulators is sometimes considered a necessity.94 This could imply that developing 
countries will also be more likely to prescribe a decision-making role for sector 
92  The former Chairman of the South African Competition Tribunal has himself claimed that it is 
‘widely accepted that there is a greater role for industrial policy, for targeting support at strategically 
selected sectors […] in developing than in developed countries’. L  (2002) op. cit. 2.
93  Ibid.
94  A  (2004) op. cit. 12.
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regulators in the merger control context, either as a standalone decision-maker or as 
part of a dual decision-making set-up. Both of these hypotheses can be tested with 
a straightforward comparison of the frequencies with the developed and developing 
country sub-groups.
Figure 6, below, shows the distribution of public interest decision-makers 
appointed within developed and developing countries.
Figu re 6. Distribution of public interest decision-makers appointed 
by developed and developing countries 
[Source: Appendix 5C]
On the basis of Figure 6, it appears that both of the abovementioned hypotheses 
possess some credibility. Firstly, with regards to the suggestion that developing 
countries appoint NCAs to the public interest decision-making role in order to 
increase their credibility, NCAs are indeed the most popular choice of decision-
maker for developing countries. But there is a stark evenness between the number of 
states adopting NCAs and politicians, which is true of both developed and developing 
states. The ratio of NCAs to politicians is 11:12 for developed countries and 10:9 for 
developing countries, which demonstrates that states are equally willing to appoint 
NCAs and politicians, regardless of their level of economic development. Indeed, 
65.7% of developed countries and 61.3% of developing countries have adopted either 
an NCA or a politician as their decision-maker.95 Given the absence of any signifi cant 
discrepancies between developed and developing countries with regards to these two 
main decision-makers, it appears very unlikely that economic development has a 
95  Of the states in the sample that have appointed public interest decision-makers. 
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statistically signifi cant impact on the type of public interest decision-maker a state 
appoints.
Secondly, in relation to Adhikari’s hypothesis regarding the extended role of 
regulators in developing countries, Figure 6 also confi rms that standalone regulators 
are much more likely to be aff orded public interest decision-making powers in 
developing countries compared with developed countries. Sector regulators account 
for 18.9% of the decision-makers appointed by developing countries in the sample, 
which is in marked contrast to developed countries, where sector regulators have 
been the least common appointment to the role (5.3%). This corroborates Adhikari’s 
hypothesis and is also consistent with the aforementioned fi nding that the single 
most-common legislative framing option among developing countries is Option 4 
(sector-specifi c public interest policy). Moreover, 28.6% of developed countries have 
appointed dual decision-makers, compared with 16.1% of developing countries.
Inference 7. Economic development does not appear to have a signifi cant impact 
on the type of public interest decision-maker a state chooses to appoint. Developed 
and developing countries have been equally willing to appoint an NCA or a politician 
as a standalone decision-maker. Developing countries have made greater use of the 
specialist skills of regulators (potentially due to the existence of natural monopolies), 
while developed countries have also been open to the possibility of dual decision-
making.
4.3.3. Type of legal system in place
In a similar vein to the geographic locality variable tested above, the type of legal 
system an individual state has in place can be readily identifi ed, this time by referring 
to the sources of law that states attribute the greatest weight to. It is possible to identify 
whether a state enforces a predominantly civil law, common law, religious law or 
mixed legal system by referring to its legislative framework and its court system. 
But, although the task of identifying a legal system is relatively straightforward, 
establishing how the type of legal system can infl uence design choices in merger 
control is less clear. So we can ask whether it likely that a state will assign a diff erent 
role to the public interest depending on the type of legal system it operates.
The academic commentary on the relationship between the type of legal system 
and the design of competition law is sparse. Referring to legal systems in the context 
of the design of competition agencies, Armoogum and Lyons note the tendency of 
common law states to aff ord greater discretion to decision-makers (most notably 
judges), while civil law countries prioritise the word of the national legislature and 
aff ord less discretion to decision-makers.96 The additional discretion that decision-
makers possess in common law jurisdictions has the advantage of allowing them to 
adapt their decisions according to economic and social change.97 In turn, it has been 
96  A –L  (2014) op. cit. 8.
97  Richard A. P : Economic Analysis of Law. Little, Brown and Company, 1973. 569.
David R246
suggested that this adaptive decision-making makes common law systems suitable 
for ‘stable, slowly evolving law’, whereas civil law is better suited to states who are 
attempting rapid legal change and institutional upheaval.98 In terms of what we might 
expect to see in the context of merger control, the discretion that decision-makers 
enjoy in common law jurisdictions could suggest that common law countries will 
aff ord a more prominent role to public interest criteria, in order to give decision-
makers the legislative scope in which to exercise their discretion. Conversely, civil 
law jurisdictions may be more inclined to frame public interest criteria narrowly in 
order to limit the scope for discretion to be exercised. Alternatively, if a civil law 
jurisdiction does aff ord a wide scope to public interest criteria, it may seek to appoint 
politicians to the decision-making role order to ensure that this discretion is exercised 
within the confi nes of what the legislation intended.
In truth, however, it is diffi  cult to make robust predictions regarding the infl uence 
of diff erent types of legal system, not least because the type of legal system a state 
has in place will itself be infl uenced by some of the other socio-economic factors 
that are considered in this section. In addition, empirically testing the infl uence of 
legal systems produces its own practical limitations. Of the 75 states in the sample, 
48 have adopted civil law, 14 common law, 3 religious law and 10 have incorporated 
a mixed legal regime. Given the signifi cant proportion of states in the sample that 
operate under a civil law system, this produces an unbalanced sample that limits the 
observations one can derive from testing this variable. Nevertheless, by grouping the 
sample states according to the legal system they have in place, it is still possible that 
the frequency bar charts can identify the existence of any notable diff erences between 
how diff erent legal systems accommodate the public interest in merger control. 
Figure 7 shows the distribution of legislative framing options adopted by states 
that operate under each type of legal system.
Given that the vast majority of states in the sample are civil law jurisdictions, it is 
unsurprising that the preferences of civil law countries resemble those of the overall 
sample. Civil law countries demonstrate a preference for Option 4, Option 3 or a 
combination of both, which is consistent with the hypothesis that civil legal systems 
will frame the public interest narrowly in order to limit the discretion of decision-
makers. The most popular legislative framing option among common law states is 
Option 3, which is adopted by 6 of the 14 common law countries. So despite the 
expectation that common law systems aff ord greater scope to the public interest, this 
is not the case in practice. Another observation one can make regards mixed legal 
systems, which are represented by the yellow bars in the chart. These appear towards 
the right-hand side of Figure 7, suggesting that states operating under a mixed legal 
system will typically aff ord a more expansive role to the public interest. It is unclear 
why this is the case but, given that mixed legal systems will often entail diff erent 
bodies of law applying to diff erent groups of people within a state, the interests of 
98  Benito A  – Veneta A : Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking. In: Claude 
M  – Mary M. S  (eds.): Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer, 2005. 229.
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these groups may be more readily served if public interest criteria is broadly scoped 
within legislation.
Figur e 7. Distribution of legislative framing options adopted by states of diff erent legal systems 
[Source: Appendix 6A]
Aside from these observations, the individual sub-groups are distributed relatively 
evenly. Indeed, although it would be necessary to increase the sample size in order to 
conduct a meaningful empirical assessment, the lack of any clear divergences within 
the individual sub-groups in Figure 7 implies that the type of legal system has no 
signifi cant bearing on how a state frames the public interest in legislation.
Inference 8. The impact that the type of legal system has on a state’s choice of 
legislative framing option is inconclusive from the analysis, due to the unbalanced 
sample. However, both common law and civil law states show a preference for 
framing the public interest narrowly within legislation.
With regards to the relationship between the type of legal system and the choice of 
public interest decision-makers, we can again draw observations from the frequency 
distributions for each type of legal system. Figure 8, below, illustrates the distribution 
of public interest decision-makers appointed within each type of legal system. 
David R248
Figure 8. Distribution of public interest decision-makers appointed by states of diff erent legal systems 
[Appendix 6B]
Again, as one would expect given its relative size within the sample, the choice 
of public interest decision-makers in civil law systems is broadly consistent with the 
choices of the sample as a whole, i.e. showing a preference for politicians, NCAs and 
dual decision-makers. In common law countries, politicians are the most favoured 
decision-makers (35.7%), more so than NCAs (14.3%) and regulators (7.1%) combined. 
This is an interesting fi nding given that the literature implies common law states are 
more willing to delegate discretionary decision-making powers to non-state bodies. 
One explanation for this is evident from the analysis of the legislative framing options 
in Figure 7, above, which shows that many common law systems choose to frame the 
public interest as an exception to the substantive test. Like the merger regime in the 
United Kingdom, which itself operates under a common law system, it may be that 
national governments have been willing to delegate the majority of merger decision-
making powers to an NCA (or another body), but has reserved itself the power to rule 
on exceptional mergers aff ecting the public interest.
Note, however, that the unbalanced sample makes it diffi  cult to draw robust 
conclusions on the infl uence that diff erent types of legal system have on the choice of 
public interest decision-makers.
Inference 9. There is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the type of legal 
regime a state operates under has any signifi cant bearing on that state’s choice of 
public interest decision-maker. However, a notable observation regards the number 
of common law states that appoint politicians as decision-makers, which is over 
twice the number of common law states appointing an NCA.
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4.3.4. Eff ectiveness of domestic governance
Before analysing the potential infl uence of domestic governance on how states 
accommodate the public interest, it is worth unpacking the meaning of ‘governance’ 
in this context. The World Bank aff ords a wide-ranging defi nition to governance, 
which it refers to as ‘the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country 
is exercised’.100 This includes, inter alia, the way in which a country selects and 
monitors its government, the capacity for government to create and implement sound 
policies, and the government’s respect for citizens and their rights. Two components 
of this defi nition are particularly applicable in relation to merger control and the 
public interest; namely, ‘rule of law’ and ‘political stability’.
There are several elements of the rule of law that are of relevance in the context 
of designing merger control legislation and appointing decision-makers. Generally 
speaking, a state that adheres to the rule of law will attribute signifi cant value to 
applying laws with predictability and consistency.101 Therefore, if consistency 
between decisions is attributed particular importance in states adhering to the rule of 
law, the merger laws in these states may aff ord only a very limited scope to the public 
interest, to avoid the risk of it being applied inconsistently. Additionally, these states 
may also be more likely to favour the appointment of NCAs or sector regulators 
as public interest decision-makers, again due to the consistency and continuity that 
these bodies provide in contrast to politicians.
Political stability encompasses a host of features, ranging from government 
stability and ethnic tensions to armed confl ict and torture.102 For the purposes of 
this assessment, government stability perhaps represents the most relevant feature 
with regards to the design of merger control. For example, one hypothesis that can 
be put forward is that states with a low rate of government stability will be more 
likely to assign decision-making powers to NCAs or sector regulators because of 
the increased likelihood of political upheaval. Indeed, if certain states demonstrate 
particularly low levels of political and government stability, it follows that these states 
are likely to experience a change of government more frequently, meaning there are 
more opportunities for new governments to gain power and exert own infl uence and 
ideologies on domestic merger control. If politicians from across diff erent parties 
recognise the instability that this could also bring to the domestic merger regime, 
they might be more inclined to delegate the public interest decision-making role to 
an independent agency (e.g. an NCA or a sector regulator). As well as facilitating 
stability and consistency within the merger regime, this also reduces the risk of the 
100   W  B  WGI op. cit.
101   Edward I  – Michael J. T : Canada: The Competition Law System and the 
Country’s Norms. In: F –T  (eds., 2013) op. cit.. 131.
102   See W  B  WGI (op. cit.) for defi nitions of ‘political stability’ and the other dimensions of 
governance.
David R250
public interest criteria being applied diff erently whenever a new political party gains 
power.103 
This analysis makes use of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) which, as well as providing an aggregated rating for overall governance 
within a state, also provides ratings for individual components of governance.104 
The aggregated WGI for each state is represented on a scale from 0–100, with a 
rating of ‘100’ allocated to states whose domestic governance demonstrates optimal 
eff ectiveness.
Figure 9, below, plots the WGI ratings of all 75 states in the sample and groups 
them according to their choice of legislative framing option. It overlays box-and-
whisker plots in order to visually illustrate the distributions of the WGI ratings within 
each group of states.
Figure 9. Scatter plot with box-and-whisker overlay showing states’ ratings 
for domestic governance and the legislative framing option adopted 
As Figure 9 illustrates, the 
WGI ratings within each group 
appear to be very broadly 
distributed, with the notable 
exception of the states in the 
‘Options 2 & 4’ group, which 
are clustered between the 
values of 57.82 (South Africa) 
and 83.89 (Taiwan). The Option 
4 category, in particular, 
demonstrates an extremely 
broad distribution of states.105 
The means of each group also 
reveals some interesting results. 
On average, states that adopt 
Option 4 or Option 2 perform 
relatively poorly in relation to 
103   This does not, of course, prevent a new government from reforming the merger legislation to suit its 
own manifesto. But, depending on the level of political instability, time constraints may hamper the 
ability of a new government to undertake these reforms. Moreover, if all political parties are mindful 
of the political instability in the country, there may exist a cross-party consensus on limiting political 
decision-making if rival parties are frequently in power. 
104   These individual governance indicators include: ‘voice and accountability’, ‘political stability and 
absence of violence’, ‘government eff ectiveness’, ‘regulatory quality’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘control of 
corruption’. W  B  WGI op. cit.
105   Of the states adopting Option 3, Venezuela has the poorest WGI rating (0.95) and Finland the highest 
(99.05). The spread of the distribution is so broad that neither of these states amount to statistical 
outliers. Indeed, the only outlier in the entire sample is Nigeria, whose WGI rating of 12.32 falls 
below the lower fence of the Options 3 & 4 group.
[Source: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2013]
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governance (both have a median average WGI rating between 40–50). In contrast, 
states that adopt one of the mixed options (‘Options 3 & 4’ or ‘Options 2 & 4’) 
have a median WGI rating between 70–80, and states adopting Option 1 or Option 
3 have the highest median ratings (80–90). These medians do not appear to directly 
corroborate the hypothesis that states with a high adherence to the rule of law (and, 
as such, a high WGI rating) will generally frame public interest criteria narrowly. 
However, if we focus on the states that have achieved the highest WGI ratings (90 and 
over), we observe that not one of these states feature in Option 2 or Options 2 & 4, the 
options that aff ord the greatest legislative scope to the public interest.
The wide distributions and the lack of any notable pattern between the points 
in Figure 9 would suggest that there is no relationship between governance and 
legislative framing options. However, we can test this hypothesis using inferential 
statistical methods. One way of testing whether domestic governance infl uences the 
choice of legislative framing option is to conduct an analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
which can be used to determine whether one of the legislative framing groups is 
signifi cantly diff erent to the other groups.106 With reference to the ANOVA carried 
out in Appendices 7A and 7B, the test fi nds that there actually is evidence within the 
sample that suggests governance has a statistically signifi cant infl uence on the choice 
of legislative framing option.107 This would appear to be a refl ection of the considerable 
diff erences between some of the median WGI ratings within the groups of legislative 
framing options, as referred to in the previous paragraph. The relationship itself is not 
linear; it is not simply the case that a higher level of governance will see a state aff ord 
a lower degree of scope to the public interest (or vice versa). Rather, the respective 
medians within each group suggest the distribution is multimodal, with Option 1 
and Option 3 representing the preferred choices for states with eff ective domestic 
governance. Therefore, in statistical terms at least, we can draw the conclusion that 
it is likely that the ‘eff ectiveness of domestic governance’ has a tangible impact on a 
state’s choice of public interest decision-maker.108
Inference 10. The ‘eff ectiveness of domestic governance’ within a state does 
appear to have a statistically signifi cant bearing on how that state chooses to frame 
public interest criteria within merger legislation. States with a highly eff ective system 
of governance have all chosen to frame the public interest narrowly, potentially as 
106   ANOVA is appropriate in this instance because we are comparing more than two groups (i.e. a 
multivariate test). It was appropriate to use a t-test (a bivariate test) for the analysis of economic 
development in Section 4.3.2 because the analysis was framed to compare only two groups, 
developed and developing countries. 
107   The ANOVA in Appendix 7B tests the null hypothesis that the eff ectiveness of domestic governance 
has no signifi cant infl uence on how a state frames the public interest, to a p = 0.05 level of signifi cance. 
The test returns an F-value of 2.9823. This exceeds the critical F-value (2.35) which denotes the 
upper limit of statistical similarity between diff erent groups. As a consequence, we reject the null 
hypothesis.
108   An extension of this analysis would be to use multivariate inferential tests to assess the infl uence of 
the ‘rule of law’ and ‘political stability’ components separately.
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a means of ensuring consistency between decisions (an important factor of the rule 
of law).
Given the infl uence that domestic governance appears to have on how the public 
interest is framed in legislation, do we observe a similar infl uence with regards to the 
choice of public interest decision-maker? Figure 10, below, plots the WGI ratings of 
the states according to their choice of public interest decision-maker.
F igure 10. Scatter plot with box-and-whisker overlay showing states’ ratings 
for domestic governance and the public interest decision-maker appointed. 
Once again, the box-and-
whisker diagrams demonstrate 
a very broad spread of WGI 
ratings within each group of 
decision-makers. However, on 
this occasion, we do not observe 
such signifi cant diff erences 
between the median WGI ratings 
of each group. Indeed, the 
median average WGI ratings of 
states adopting either an NCA, 
politician or sector regulator 
only range from 51.18 to 
60.66.109 If domestic governance 
does have a tangible infl uence 
on the choice of decision-maker, 
we would expect to observe 
greater distortions between 
these medians. An ANOVA test 
can again be used to estimate 
whether it is likely that this 
infl uence exists. This time, the 
ANOVA fi nds there is no statistically signifi cant relationship between domestic 
governance and the type of public interest decision-maker operating in a state.110
Figure 10 can also be used to establish whether states with high WGI ratings are 
more likely to appoint non-political expert decision-makers – namely, independent 
109   The median WGI ratings for the states in each decision-maker group are: 60.66 (NCA), 59.72 
(Politician), 51.18 (Regulator), and 80.09 (Dual). The median rating of states that do not consider 
public interest criteria and, as such, do not appoint a public interest decision-maker is 81.99.
110   See Appendices 7C and 7D for the statistical descriptives of the sample and the ANOVA. Once again, 
the ANOVA tests the null hypothesis that the eff ectiveness of domestic governance has no signifi cant 
eff ect on a state’s choice of public interest decision-maker to a p = 0.05 level of signifi cance. The 
analysis returns an F-value of 0.9295 which sits below the critical F-value (2.50). As such, we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis.
[Source: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2013]
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NCAs and sector regulators – in order to facilitate consistency between merger 
decisions. Interestingly, Figure 10 actually implies that the reverse is true, and that 
states with a high WGI rating prefer to appoint politicians as public interest decision-
makers. In total, 19 of the states that appoint public interest decision-makers have a 
WGI rating of 90 or over, and 7 of these states have chosen to appoint politicians. This 
is in contrast to NCAs (5 states), sector regulators (1 state) and dual decision-makers 
(3 states). However, one should also bear in mind that, of the lowest ranking states (the 
13 states with a WGI rating of 30 or under), 6 of these states have chosen to appoint 
politicians. We therefore observe this somewhat odd fi nding, whereby politicians 
seem to be the favoured decision-makers of (i) countries with very eff ective domestic 
governance, and (ii) countries with very ineff ective domestic governance.
Inference 11. The type of public interest decision-maker that a state decides to 
appoint is not signifi cantly infl uenced by the eff ectiveness of its domestic governance. 
Politicians are the preferred choice of public interest decision-maker for both states 
with a very high level of eff ective governance and states with a very low level of 
eff ective governance.
4.3.5. Openness to foreign investment
The fi fth and fi nal socio-economic variable that this paper examines is a state’s 
‘openness to foreign investment’. Does there exist a discernible relationship between 
how open or closed a state is to foreign direct investment (FDI),111 and how that state 
chooses to accommodate the public interest in its domestic merger regime? There 
is literature that alludes to this possibility. Economic scholars, for example, have 
observed a tendency for some states to apply merger control strategically in order 
to promote national interests – such as the employment of domestic citizens and the 
competitiveness of domestic fi rms – at the expense of foreign competitors.112 One 
way for a state to serve these strategic national interests is to formulate public interest 
criteria that enables mergers to be assessed on grounds that promote domestic fi rms 
and discriminate against foreign bidders. For this reason, we might expect states that 
are relatively closed to FDI to aff ord a broad scope to public interest criteria in their 
merger control legislation. This is a result to look out for when it comes to testing 
the infl uence that ‘openness to foreign investment’ has on the choice of legislative 
framing option.
However, there are also good reasons for anticipating a completely diff erent 
result. Countries often have separate laws for regulating domestic mergers and FDI, 
111   The intricacies of FDI are plentiful, but they broadly take the form of either (i) a foreign takeover 
(where foreign fi rms invest or gain ownership of an existing domestic fi rm), or (ii) greenfi eld entry 
(where foreign fi rms set up business from scratch in a domestic country). See F  T : 
Defi nition of foreign direct investment. http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=foreign-direct-investment.
112   Mario M  – Damien N  – Jorge P : Antitrust, Regulatory Capture and Economic 
Integration. Bruegel Policy Contribution, 2015/11. 4. http://www.bruegel.org/publications/
publication-detail/publication/891-antitrust-regulatory-capture-and-economic-integration/.
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sometimes justifying this on the basis that FDI poses additional risks to national 
security and strategic interests.113 In theory, states can use these foreign investment 
rules to pursue industrial policy goals; for example, by using FDI rules to block 
foreign takeovers and, in turn, promote and maintain ‘national champions’. Indeed, 
where industrial policy goals are pursued, the dynamics between merger control 
and FDI regulation is interesting, because FDI regulation can either be used as a 
complement to merger control or as an alternative to it. If the latter is true (i.e. states 
prefer to frame public interest and industrial policy criteria in FDI regulation, rather 
than in merger control), we might expect states that are closed to FDI to aff ord less 
scope to the public interest in merger control.
We can also frame a hypothesis with regards to the potential eff ect that ‘openness 
to foreign investment’ has on a state’s choice of public interest decision-maker. States 
that have a tendency to block foreign takeovers or heavily restrict FDI are, in eff ect, 
exerting their control over domestic ownership. Therefore, this would also imply that 
these states will want to exert greater control over domestic merger control and, as a 
consequence, they are more likely to appoint politicians as public interest decision-
makers in order to ensure the ‘word of the State’ is given eff ect to. This is another 
outcome we can expect to observe in the analysis.
In terms of sourcing data for the analysis, a measure for the ‘openness to foreign 
investment’ variable is available from the OECD’s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness 
Index (hereafter, the ‘FDI Index’).114 The FDI Index off ers an aggregated estimate 
for the level of restrictiveness that countries impose on foreign investment within 
their domestic legislation.115 The estimates are derived by rating the individual 
levels of restrictiveness in 22 diff erent industries within each country. These ratings 
take account of what the OECD describes as ‘the four main types of restrictions 
on FDI’: (i) foreign equity limitations, (ii) screening or approval mechanisms, 
(iii) restrictions on the employment of foreign nationals as key personnel, and (iv) 
operational restrictions (e.g. restrictions on the repatriation of capital or on land 
ownership).116The ‘restrictiveness’ of a given state is indicated by a rating between 
0 and 1, with ‘0’ indicating a state that imposes no restrictions on foreign investors, 
113   For an overview of FDI rules in Australia, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, see Alex C  – Nelson J : The Public Interest and Competition-
based Scrutiny of Mergers: Lessons from the evolution of merger control in the United Kingdom. 
CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Vol. 4., N. 1. (2014) 17–22. https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.
com/the-public-interest-and-competition-based-scrutiny-of-mergers-lessons-from-the-evolution-
of-merger-control-in-the-united-kingdom-/.
114   OECD: FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index. OECD Investment, June 2014. www.oecd.org/
investment/fdiindex.htm. The analysis in this section uses the ratings from the 2014 study, which are 
the most recent at the time of writing.
115   Although a rating in the FDI Index measures how ‘closed’ a state is to foreign investment, this same 
rating can be interpreted to measure how ‘open’ a state is to foreign investment.
116   Blanka K  – Angel P  – Stephen Thomsen: OECD’s FDI Restrictiveness Index: 2010 
Update. 2010. OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2010/03. 6. www.oecd-ilibrary.
org/fi nance-and-investment/oecd-s-fdi-restrictiveness-index_5km91p02zj7g-en..
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and ‘1’ indicating a state that restricts all foreign investment.117 The FDI Index does 
have its limitations. For example, it considers the restrictiveness posed by legislative 
provisions, but it does not take account of how often these provisions are exercised 
or the quality of the institutions that conduct the assessment.118 Furthermore, the FDI 
Index itself takes account of any restrictive provisions embedded in domestic merger 
control (whether these be public interest provisions or otherwise). Given that they 
each take account of domestic merger control, there may be an inherent correlation 
between the FDI Index ratings and the legislative framing options adopted by the 
states in this sample, which is an issue to bear in mind when interpreting the results 
of this section. A fi nal limitation to note is the number of states considered in the FDI 
Index. The 2014 version of the Index includes aggregates for 58 countries, but only 
46 of these countries overlap with the 75 states in the domestic data set that the paper 
has utilised up to this point. This means that some of the legislative framing options 
or public interest decision-makers are likely to be underrepresented in the analysis 
that follows.
Fi gure 11. Scatter plot with box-and-
whisker overlay showing states’ ratings 
for FDI restrictiveness and choice of 
legislative framing option
The ‘openness to foreign 
investment’ variable can be 
tested with similar techniques 
to those used for testing the 
impact of domestic governance 
in Section 4.3.4, above. Firstly, 
we can analyse the potential 
infl uence that openness to 
foreign investment has on the 
way states choose to frame the 
public interest within merger 
legislation. Figure 11 plots the 
FDI restrictiveness ratings of the 
states according to their choice 
of legislative framing options.
117   As will become apparent in this section, no state within the FDI Index has had a restrictiveness rating 
that exceeds 0.5 in practice. The state with the highest level of restrictiveness in the OECD sample is 
China, with an FDI Index of rating of 0.418.
118   Stephen T : OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index: A tool for benchmarking countries, 
measuring reform and assessing its impact. Overview presentation. OECD, 2014. 2. www.slideshare.
net/OECD-DAF/oecd-fdi-regulatory-restrictiveness-index?ref=http://www.oecd.org/investment/
fdiindex.htm.
[Source: OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index 2014]
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A striking initial observation that can be derived from Figure 11 is the broad 
spread of FDI restrictiveness ratings within the group of states that choose to frame 
public interest criteria as an exception to the substantive test (Option 3, represented by 
the blue-shaded region).119 In contrast, the interquartile ranges for the other groups of 
legislative framing options are relatively narrow, particularly those states that choose 
not to accommodate public interest criteria (Option 1, illustrated by the red points). 
This diff erence between the spreads of the distributions can, in part, be attributed 
to the revised sample size, where the states adopting Option 3 are comparably well-
represented in relation to other the groups, thus increasing the likelihood of a broad 
distribution.120 Nonetheless, the median average FDI restrictiveness rating for states 
adopting Option 3 is also notable higher than the other legislative framing options, 
which implies that states which frame the public interest as an ‘exception’ in domestic 
merger control are also more likely to impose more restrictions on foreign ownership 
and investment. This is suggestive of a high instance of broad public interest 
exceptions, such as ‘national security’ or ‘national interest’ exception, which apply 
to all mergers but are inherently more likely to be of relevance to mergers that involve 
foreign bidders. However, this fi nding aside, Figure 11 reveals no obvious pattern to 
hint at the relationship between FDI openness and the choice of legislative framing 
option. Indeed, by conducting an ANOVA in the same way as in the previous section, 
it fi nds that there is no statistically signifi cant diff erence between the variances of 
the six legislative framing groups.121 We can therefore conclude that ‘openness to 
foreign investment’ has no tangible infl uence on how states choose to frame the 
public interest in legislation.
Inference 12. A country’s ‘openness’ to foreign investment has no tangible impact 
on how a state chooses to frame public interest criteria in its merger laws. Indeed, 
countries that frame the public interest as an exception to the substantive test for 
assessment (Option 3) demonstrate a particularly wide range of diff erent attitudes 
to foreign investment. However, states that do not consider public interest criteria in 
their merger assessments (Option 1) are, on average, the states that show the most 
‘openness’ to foreign investment.
Finally, we can test to see whether there exists a noticeable relationship between 
a state’s ‘openness to foreign investment’ and the type of public interest decision-
maker it appoints. Above, it is suggested that countries that are ‘closed’ to foreign 
investment are more likely to appoint politicians as decision-makers, but is this 
119   In fact, the distribution of the states adopting Option 3 is so broad that neither China (CHN) nor 
Saudi Arabia (SAU) are statistical outliers, despite being the most restrictive states in the FDI Index.
120   In contrast, Option 4 (sector-specifi c public interest policy) is underrepresented, having constituted 
19 out of the 75 states (25.3%) in the original sample, but only 9 of the 46 states (19.6%) in the revised 
sample.
121   See Appendix 8A for FDI data descriptives, and Appendix 8B for the corresponding ANOVA. The 
AVOVA tests the null hypothesis that ‘openness to foreign investment’ has no discernible impact on 
the choice of legislative framing option, to a p = 0.05 level of signifi cance. This returns an F-value 
of 0.8907, which is lower than the critical F-value (2.45). Thus, we do not reject the null hypothesis.
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actually the case? Figure 12, below, plots the FDI restrictiveness ratings of the states 
according to their choice of public interest decision-maker.
Figure 12. Scatter plot with box-and-whisker overlay showing states’ ratings 
for FDI restrictiveness and public interest decision-maker 
From an initial glance at 
Figure 12, we see that 2 out of 
the 4 states that are most ‘closed’ 
to foreign investment do indeed 
appoint politicians as public 
interest decision-makers.122 
However, both of these states 
are statistical outliers in terms 
of their position relative to the 
other states in the sample.123 
The medians of each group 
actually reveal that the states 
that are more ‘closed’ to foreign 
investment are most likely to 
appoint regulators as their public 
interest decision-makers (see 
the median of the green shaded 
region), but this is hardly a robust 
observation given it is based on 
the FDI restrictiveness ratings of 
only 4 states. Lastly, an ANOVA 
of the sample again fi nds there 
to be no statistically signifi cant 
relationship between ‘openness to foreign investment’ and the choice of public 
interest decision-maker.124
Inference 13. A state’s ‘openness to foreign investment’ has no signifi cant impact 
on its choice of public interest decision-maker. There is an indication that states 
that demonstrate a restrictive stance towards foreign investment are more likely to 
122   The four states with an FDI restrictiveness rating over 0.25 are: China and India (who both appoint 
politicians), Saudi Arabia (which appoints an NCA), and Indonesia (which has adopted a dual 
decision-making arrangement).
123   The upper fence for the FDI restrictiveness ratings in the ‘Politicians’ group is 0.246, which both 
China (0.418) and India (0.264) exceed.
124   See Appendices 8C and 8D. On this occasion, the ANOVA tests the null hypothesis that ‘openness 
to foreign investment’ does not signifi cantly infl uence the choice of public interest decision-maker 
to a p = 0.05 level of signifi cance. The ANOVA returns an F-value of 0.4867, which is lower than the 
critical F-value (2.60). Thus, we do not reject the null hypothesis.
[Source: OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index 2014
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appoint sector regulators, but the sample would need to be expanded in order to 
corroborate this.
4.1. Remarks on the infl uence of socio-economic variables
This section has undertaken an empirical analysis to assess the infl uence that key 
socio-economic variables have on the way in which states accommodate public 
interest criteria in their merger control regimes. In doing so, it has made a number of 
preliminary observations regarding the potential eff ect of (a) geographic locality, (b) 
economic development, (c) the type of legal system in place, (d) the eff ectiveness of 
domestic governance, and (e) openness to foreign investment.125 It could be argued 
that each of these variables has had at least some discernible impact on how states 
have accommodated the public interest, even if this merely relates to only a single 
type of legislative framing option or decision-maker. However, in terms of statistical 
signifi cance, the only tangible relationship that the analysis uncovers is the infl uence 
that the ‘eff ectiveness of domestic governance’ has on how a state frames public 
interest within its merger legislation. This specifi cally infers that states demonstrating 
a high degree of governance will tend to either avoid considering public interest 
criteria completely (Option 1), or will frame the public interest criteria narrowly as 
an ‘exception’ to the substantive test for assessment (Option 3).
In many ways, the fact that there are very few observable patterns between the 
socio-economic variables and the methods of accommodation is an interesting 
fi nding in itself. It would seemingly imply that none of the socio-economic variables 
examined in this section are key determinants in how states choose to accommodate 
the public interest. But given that other studies have referred to the signifi cant potential 
infl uence of these socio-economic variables in competition law – in particular, 
geographic locality and economic development – it is remarkable that the design 
and implementation of merger control rules does not correlate with any of these 
variables. Perhaps the main determinant of how public interest is accommodated 
in merger control is a socio-economic variable that has not been discussed in this 
paper. The ‘goals of competition law’ – which this paper has chosen not to assess 
due to practical issues posed by modelling them empirically – could well be one such 
determinant. Alternatively, it is certainly possible that public interest accommodation 
is determined by more than one of these variables. If this is the case, it becomes more 
diffi  cult to empirically analyse the infl uence of individual variables independently, in 
the knowledge that other factors are also exerting an infl uence.126 Indeed, as has been 
mentioned above, one should also bear in mind the potential impact of knowledge 
exchange between competition regimes. If knowledge exchange is prominent 
between the 75 states in the sample, it could be inferred that these states have not so 
125   These fi ndings are detailed in Inferences 3-13, above.
126   A possible way to overcome this would be to perform a ‘Two-way ANOVA’ using diff erent 
combinations of socio-economic variables. This can be used to estimate the combined infl uence of 
two dependent variables on a single independent variable.
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much been infl uenced by socio-economic variables but, rather, by the existing laws 
and procedures of other countries.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper has drawn insights on the role that domestic states have aff orded to 
the public interest in merger control by pursuing three distinct research avenues: 
(i) by identifying the diff erent methods that are available to states who seek to 
accommodate the public interest; (ii) by considering the methods of accommodation 
that states have adopted in practice; and (iii) by analysing the potential infl uence 
that key socio-economic variables may have on the choices that states exercise when 
accommodating public interest criteria. By adopting an empirical approach to pursue 
these avenues, the paper makes a number of revelations and dispels several myths 
regarding the wider role that the public interest plays in modern-day merger control.
The study estimates that approximately 88% of domestic merger regimes 
incorporate some form of public interest criteria within their merger control laws. 
This corroborates the suggestion that ‘public interest’ does not merely reside on the 
periphery of international merger control but, rather, retains the potential to infl uence 
merger assessments in most jurisdictions. This represents a key motivating factor 
for the continued research and debate on the role that public interest considerations 
should play in merger control and competition policy in general.
Based on the assumption that the two main choices a state must make before 
accommodating public interest criteria are (a) how to frame the public interest in 
merger legislation, and (b) who to appoint as decision-maker, the paper fi nds that there 
are 21 possible approaches that states can implement. Within the sample, 15 of these 
approaches have been implemented in practice, with the most popular being: (i) to 
avoid considering public interest criteria completely, (ii) to appoint a politician and 
frame the public interest as an ‘exception’ to the substantive test, and (iii) to appoint 
a national competition authority and frame the public interest as an ‘exception’ to the 
substantive test. The wide variety of diff erent approaches that states have adopted in 
practice signals a lack of substantive and institutional convergence with regards to how 
public interest criteria is accommodated in domestic merger control around the world.
Overall, the vast majority of states that incorporate public interest criteria within 
their merger laws have chosen to frame this criteria narrowly, i.e. as an ‘exception’ 
to a competition-based test, or as part of a parallel sector-specifi c policy.127 This 
illustrates a general preference for states to assess mergers according to competition 
criteria as a default position, and implies that these states appreciate the wider welfare 
benefi ts that a competition-based approach can facilitate, in addition to consumer 
benefi ts. Moreover, national competition authorities and politicians have each proved 
to be equally popular appointments to the public interest decision-making role, with 
127   Of the states that have chosen to aff ord consideration to public interest criteria, 78.8% have framed 
this criteria narrowly within merger control legislation.
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63.6% of states appointing one or the other. This off ers an intriguing insight into the 
ongoing debate regarding political involvement in competition policy, as it infers that 
an equal proportion of states are convinced by the perceived advantages of NCAs 
making decisions (i.e. making eff ective use of their economic expertise and relative 
independence) and political decision-making (i.e. satisfying the constitutional belief 
that matters of signifi cant ‘public interest’ should be decided by publically-elected 
representatives). In practice, it is wholly apparent that states take diff erent sides in 
this debate, and this is a catalyst for institutional divergence between states.
Finally, the paper’s statistical analysis of key socio-economic variables acts to 
dispel a number of myths often associated with states that consider public interest 
criteria. For example, the geographic location of a state appears to have little bearing 
on how that state chooses to accommodate the public interest; although, certain 
patterns emerge, including the tendency of African states to assign an extensive role 
to the public interest and to appoint NCAs as decision-makers. However, the empirical 
analysis fi nds that the level of eff ective governance within a state often corresponds 
with that state’s design choices, with regards to framing public interest criteria within 
merger legislation. States with a highly eff ective system of governance tend to frame 
the public interest narrowly, perhaps as a means of facilitating consistency and 
predictability between decisions.
Contrary to oft-cited assertions in the existing literature, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the economic development of a state has any statistically signifi cant 
correlation with how much infl uence it chooses to aff ord to public interest criteria. 
Having said this, states that aff ord an extensive role to the public interest are more 
likely to be developing countries.128 Therefore, if the epistemic communities (e.g. the 
ICN, OECD, UNCTAD, etc) believe that states adopting an ‘extensive public interest 
role’ pose an obstacle to eff ective cross-border merger control, these communities 
should aff ord due consideration to economic development variables if they decide to 
draft ‘International Best Practice Guidelines’.
128   Which is intriguing given that the majority of states that aff ord the public interest no scope whatsoever 
are also developing countries.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Collecting and compiling the domestic data set
The data collection for the empirical analysis in this paper has been extensive, 
utilising fi ve diff erent sources,129 to sample 75 domestic states, and therein collect 
1200 unique readings.
The main task with regards to collecting the data has been to interpret the 
qualitative data sources (namely, the written information in the GCR Handbook and 
the GWU Database that relates to domestic merger control and competition law) 
and identify the relevant extracts that relate to the legislative framing options and 
the public interest decision-makers that each of the 75 states has adopted. Having 
identifi ed the options that each state has adopted in practice, the sample states could 
then be grouped according to their public interest accommodation methods, ready 
for statistical testing. Segregating the sample in this way lays the foundations for 
the empirical analysis and, in the case of the legislative framing options (which have 
been subjected to ordinal ranking in Figure 1), it indirectly aff ords a quantitative 
dimension to the qualitative data.
For identifying a state’s legislative framing choice and its public interest decision-
maker, it has been necessary to refer to the GCR Handbook and, in particular, the 
answers that the expert practitioners had given to the following questions: Q1) 
‘What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?’; Q8) ‘Are there also rules on 
foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?’; Q19) ‘What is the 
substantive test for clearance?’; and Q22) ‘To what extent are non-competition issues 
(such as industrial policy or public interest issues) relevant in the review process?’. 
The answers to these questions have been recorded and interpreted within the data set. 
The accuracy of these readings was checked against the corresponding information 
in the GWU Database and, in order to increase the sample size to 75 states, the data 
for approximately 10 further states was harvested from the GWU Database. The 
decision was made to add these additional states in order to increase the number 
of developing countries in the sample, in order to minimise data distortions when 
testing the ‘economic development’ variable. Given that the CGR Handbook is aimed 
at legal practitioners, its selection of countries is somewhat skewed towards states 
that experience a relatively high degree of merger activity, or have a long-established 
129   These include: G  C  R : Getting the Deal Through: Merger Control 2014. 
Law Business Research, 2013.; C  L  C : Worldwide Competition Database. 
GWU Competition Law Center. http://www.gwclc.com/World-competition-database.html. 
Hereafter, ‘the GWU Database’; World Bank Governance Indicators; W  B : Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) project. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.; 
I  M  F : World Economic Outlook: Uneven Growth – Short- and Long-
Term Factors. IMF, 2015. 150–153. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/; and OECD: 
FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index. OECD Investment, June 2014. www.oecd.org/investment/
fdiindex.htm.
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merger regime. This means the GCR Handbook includes a higher proportion of 
developed countries. So there is a need to redress this imbalance in the data set with 
reference to other sources.
Finally, the accuracy for the data relating to these 10 states was checked with 
reference to the national legislation websites, and the websites of state governments, 
sector regulators and national competition authorities.
Appendix 2. Distribution of the domestic data set





Σ ( )2 148.6666
Σ ( )3 70.3556
Σ ( )4 672.5956
0.3430 (Skewness of sample)
2.4422 (Kurtosis of sample)
† Represents total ‘ranking values’ where the each legislative framing options is assigned a value from 
1–6 according to the potential infl uence they aff ord to the public interest (for rankings, see Figure 1). 1 
= Option 1, 2 = Option 4, 3 = Option 3, 4 = Options 3 & 4, 5 = Option 2, 6 = Options 2 & 4. 
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Appendix 2B. List of states adopting each option for framing 



















































































Appendix 2C. List of states adopting each option for appointing 
a public interest decision-maker





























































Appendix 2D. Table specifying political independence of public interest decision-
makers appointed by states within the sample. [Source: GWU Database]
Total in sample Proportion independent
NCA 21 13 (61.90%)
Politician 21 0 (0.00%)
Regulator 9 6 (66.67%)
Dual 15 6 (40.00%)
Total 69 25 (37.88%)
Appendix 2E. Distribution of combinations of legislative framing 
and public interest decision-maker options adopted by states
NCA Politician Regulator Dual N/A
Option 1 0 0 0 0 9
Option 4 6 2 6 5 0
Option 3 8 9 0 2 0
Options 3 & 4 0 7 3 4 0
Option 2 6 3 0 0 0
Options 2 & 4 1 0 0 4 0
Total 21 21 9 15 9
Appendix 2F. Descriptive statistics for decision-makers and the infl uence aff orded 
to the public interest in the merger legislation they oversee
NCA Politician Regulator Dual N/A
21 21 9 15 9
Σ 72 74 24 56 9
3.429 3.524 2.667 3.733 1
Where  represents the mean category of each 
decision-maker.†
† The means are calculated by assigning a value from 1–6 for each legislative framing option, based 
on the potential infl uence that each option aff ord to the public interest (for rankings, see Figure 1). 1 = 
Option 1, 2 = Option 4, 3 = Option 3, 4 = Options 3 & 4, 5 = Option 2, 6 = Options 2 & 4. 
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Appendix 3. Compiling data for the analysis of socio-economic variables
As with any empirical study of this kind, the objective is to test for any relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables. Identifying which variables 
are independent and which are dependent is not always straightforward and much 
depends on how the study is framed. In simple terms, empiricists will generally seek 
to change the independent variable and measure the eff ect that this change has on the 
dependent variable. This logic can be applied to the analysis in Section 4. As the aim 
of Section 4 is to identify the eff ect that key socio-economic variables have on how 
the public interest is accommodated domestically, it follows that the independent 
variable will be the socio-economic variable and the dependent variable will be the 
method of accommodation.
Appendix 4. Estimating the infl uence of ‘economic development’ on accommodating 
the public interest in merger control
Appendix 4A. Table showing distribution of states adopting each legislative 
framing option according to their geographic region
Africa Asia Europe N. America S. America Oceania
Option 1 0 0 5 1 2 1
Option 4 1 3 7 5 3 0
Option 3 1 4 11 0 1 2
Options 3 & 4 1 1 10 1 0 1
Option 2 4 2 2 0 0 1
Options 2 & 4 1 2 2 0 0 0
8 12 37 7 6 5
Appendix 4B. Table showing distribution of states appointing each public 
interest decision-maker according to their geographic region
Africa Asia Europe N. America S. America Oceania
NCA 5 4 9 0 1 2
Politician 3 5 11 1 1 0
Regulator 0 0 4 4 1 0
Dual 0 3 8 1 1 2
N/A 0 0 5 1 2 1
8 12 37 7 6 5
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Appendix 5. Estimating the statistical signifi cance of ‘Economic development’ on 
accommodating the public interest
To examine whether a state’s economic development has a meaningful impact on 
how a state frames the public interest in merger legislation, the following null and 
alternative hypotheses can be proposed:
H0: The economic development of a state has no signifi cant impact on the legislative 
framing option it chooses.
μDeveloped = μDeveloping
H1: The economic development of a state has a signifi cant impact on the legislative 
framing option it chooses.
μDeveloped ≠ μDeveloping
In order to test the legitimacy of H0, it is necessary to establish that there is no 
signifi cant diff erence between the data relating to developed and developing states. 
For this analysis, we are only comparing two data categories, so it is appropriate to 
use a t-test.130 A t-test assesses the similarity of two groups of data by comparing 
their respective means relative to the overall spread of the data. However, which type 
of t-test is appropriate depends on whether the variance between the two data groups 
is equal or not.131 The equality between the respective variances of the developed and 
developing state data can be assessed using Levene’s test, as detailed in Appendix 
5A, below.132
Appendix 5A. Non-parametric Levine’s test for equality of variances between 
developed and developing states, at p = 0.05 signifi cance level 
(H0:  σDeveloped
2 = σDeveloping
2      and H1:  σDeveloped
2 ≠ σDeveloping
2)
Source of Variation SS df MS F p - value
A (Between Groups) 8788.468 5 1757.694 361.420 0.000
B (Within Groups) 335.568 69 4.863
Total 9124.036 74
p < 0.05, so reject null hypothesis.
130   To compare the statistical similarity of three-or-more data groups, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
would be required. 
131   David W N  and others: The operating characteristics of the nonparametric Levene 
test for equal variances with assessment and evaluation data. Practical Assessment, Research & 
Evaluation, Vol. 16., N. 5., (2011) 1.
132   Because the sample data is not distributed normally (rather, it is positively skewed, see Appendix 
2A), a non-parametric Levine’s test is required. Ibid 2.
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In this instance, Levine’s test returns a p-value which is less than 0.05 (the level 
of signifi cance), so we reject the null hypothesis that the variance between the data 
groups is equal. As such, when comparing the respective means of the developed 
state and developing state data groups, it is important that the t-test assumes unequal 
variances. The results of the t-test feature in Appendix 5B, below.
Appendix 5B. Two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances between 
developed and developing states, at p = 0.05 signifi cance level








p > 0.05, so do 
not reject null 
hypothesis.
As the table illustrates, the t-test returns a p-value of 0.338, meaning we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis H0. We therefore conclude that there is a signifi cant probability 
that the economic development of a state has no signifi cant impact on the legislative 
framing option it chooses.
Appendix 5C. Table showing distribution and proportions of developed 
and developing states appointing public interest decision-makers
Developed Developing
NCA 11 (31.4%) 10 (32.3%)
Politician 12 (34.3%) 9 (29.0%)
Regulator 2 (5.7%) 7 (22.6%)
Dual 10 (28.6%) 5 (16.1%)
N/A† 3 6
35 (38) 31 (37)
† Figures for ‘N/A’ are not counted when calculating percentages because the state has chosen not to 
accommodate the public interest and, as such, does not exercise a choice to appoint a decision-maker.
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Appendix 6. Observing the relationship between types of legal systems and how 
states accommodate public interest
Appendix 6A. Table showing distribution and proportions of legislative framing 
options adopted in each type of legal system
Civil Common Religious Mixed
Option 1 7 2 0 0
Option 4 15 3 1 0
Option 3 9 6 1 3
Options 3 & 4 11 1 0 2
Option 2 3 1 1 4
Options 2 & 4 3 1 0 1
Total 48 14 3 10
Appendix 6B. Table showing distribution and proportions of public interest 
decision-makers appointed in each type of legal system
Civil Common Religious Mixed
NCA 11 2 2 7
Politician 12 5 1 2
Regulator 8 1 0 0
Dual 10 4 0 1
N/A 7 2 0 0
Total 48 14 3 9
Appendix 7. Estimating the statistical signifi cance of ‘Eff ectiveness of domestic 
governance’ on accommodating the public interest
H0: The level of ‘rule of law’ in a state has no signifi cant impact on the legislative 
framing option it chooses.
(μOpt1 = μOpt4 = μOpt3 = μOpt3&4 = μOpt2 = μOpt2&4).
H1: The level of ‘rule of law’ in a state has a signifi cant impact on the legislative 
framing option it chooses.
(Not every μ is equal).
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Appendix 7A. Descriptives of adherence to ‘rule of law’ 












Options 2 & 4
(PI Test & 
Sector PI)
n 9 19 19 14 9 5
Σ xi 624.17 919.91 1428.43 952.60 405.22 358.77
μ 69.352 48.416 75.181 68.043 45.024 71.754
Σ (xi – μ)
2 6211.29 17416.38 11572.70 11357.14 3181.18 481.80
Appendix 7B. One-way ANOVA for eff ect of adherence to ‘rule of law’ 
on chosen legislative framing option
Source of Variation SS df MS F p - value F crit
A (Between Groups) 10853.18 5 2170.6357 2.9823 < 0.05 2.35
B (Within Groups) 50220.49 69 727.8331
Total 61073.67 74
F(5,69) = 2.9823, p < 0.05; F(5,69) > 2.35, so reject H0.
H0: The level of ‘rule of law’ in a state has no signifi cant impact on the public 
interest decision-maker it appoints.
(μNCA = μPolitician = μRegulator = μDual = μN/A)
H1: The level of ‘rule of law’ in a state has a signifi cant impact on the public 
interest decision-maker it appoints.
(Not every μ is equal).
Appendix 7C. Descriptives of adherence to ‘rule of law’ and chosen decision-maker
NCA Politician Regulator Dual N/A
n 21 21 9 15 9
Σ xi 1353.54 1244.55 436.03 1030.81 624.17
μ 64.454 59.264 48.448 68.721 69.352
Σ (xi – μ)
2 12810.69 21133.57 8303.98 9533.89 6211.29
Appendix 7D. One-way ANOVA for eff ect of adherence to ‘rule of law’ 
on chosen decision-maker
Source of Variation SS df MS F p - value F crit
A (Between Groups) 3080.25 4 770.0620 0.9295 < 0.05 2.50
B (Within Groups) 57993.42 70 828.4774
Total 61073.67 74
F(4,70) = 0.9295, p < 0.05
F(4,70) < 2.50, so do not reject H0.
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Appendix 8. Estimating the statistical signifi cance of ‘Openness to Foreign 
Investment’ on accommodating the public interest
H0: The openness of a state to foreign direct investment has no signifi cant impact 
on the legislative framing option it chooses.
(μOpt1 = μOpt4 = μOpt3 = μOpt3&4 = μOpt2 = μOpt2&4)
H1: The openness of a state to foreign direct investment has a signifi cant impact on 
the legislative framing option it chooses.
(Not every μ is equal).













Options 2 & 4
(PI Test & 
Sector PI)
n 5 9 15 10 3 4
Σ xi 0.215 0.759 1.998 0.891 0.210 0.277
μ 0.043 0.084 0.133 0.089 0.070 0.069
Σ (xi – μ)
2 0.0009 0.0363 0.2304 0.0914 0.0081 0.0040
Appendix 8B. One-way ANOVA for eff ect of openness to foreign 
direct investment on chosen legislative framing option
Source of Variation SS df MS F p - value F crit
A (Between Groups) 0.0413 5 8.26 × 10-3 0.8905 < 0.05 2.45
B (Within Groups) 0.3710 40 9.28 × 10-3
Total 0.4123 45
F(5,40) = 0.8905, p < 0.05; F(5,40) < 2.45, so do not reject H0.
H0: The openness of a state to foreign direct investment has no signifi cant impact 
on the public interest decision-maker it appoints.
(μNCA = μPolitician = μRegulator = μDual = μN/A)
H1: The openness of a state to foreign direct investment has a signifi cant impact on 
the public interest decision-maker it appoints.
(Not every μ is equal).
Appendix 8C. Descriptives of openness to foreign direct investment 
and chosen decision-maker
NCA Politician Regulator Dual N/A
n 14 12 4 11 5
Σ xi 1.353 1.367 0.427 0.988 0.215
μ 0.097 0.114 0.107 0.090 0.043
Σ (xi – μ)
2 0.1239 0.1568 0.0284 0.0837 8.5 × 10-4
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Appendix 8D. One-way ANOVA for eff ect of openness to foreign 
direct investment on chosen decision-maker
Source of Variation SS df MS F p - value F crit
A (Between Groups) 0.0187 4 4.67 × 10-3 0.4867 < 0.05 2.60
B (Within Groups) 0.3936 41 9.60 × 10-3
Total 0.4123 45
F(4,41) = 0.4867, p < 0.05
F(4,41) < 2.60, so do not reject H0. 
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THE DISAPPEARANCE OF ARTICLE 101(3) IN THE REALM 
OF REGULATION 1/2003: AN EMPIRICAL CODING
Or B * 
University of Amsterdam
1. Introduction 
The debate on the scope of Article 101(3) and the room that it leaves for the 
consideration of non-competition interests is as old as the Article itself. From the 
very beginning of the EEC project, the protection of competition interests had to be 
balanced against the protection other non-competition interests,1 such as effi  ciencies, 
innovation, public health, culture, and education. From the time of the drafting of 
the Treaty of Rome the Member States have not reached a consensus about the role 
non-competition interests should have under the Article. Such role directly aff ects 
the characteristics and limits of EU competition law, and as such refl ects a balance 
between various political, economic and social interests. Yet today, some sixty years 
after its instatement, there is still no clear legal or economic framework guiding the 
scope of application of Article 101(3). 
In the past, the lack of a clear framework had rather limited consequences. 
The Commission had a monopoly to grant exemptions under Article 101(3) in 
*   PhD candidate, University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Law, Amsterdam Centre for European Law 
and Governance (ACELG). Comments gratefully received at o.brook@uva.nl. This paper is part of a 
broader ongoing Ph.D. study, which maps the role of public policy considerations in the enforcement 
of EU competition law. The study codes all Article 101 TFEU decisions rendered by the Commission, 
EU Courts, and NCAs and national Courts of fi ve Member States. I would like to Tihamer Toth, 
Rebecca L. Zampieri, Kati Cseres and the participants of the Public Interest Considerations in 
Competition Law Workshop in the Competition Law Research Centre, Budapest for their valuable 
comments; any errors are mine.
1   In this paper the term “competition interests” refers to the protection of the competitive process 
and competitive structure as such. All other interests are referred to as “non-competition interests” 
(including, economic and non-economic values, such as consumer welfare, economic effi  ciency, 
industrial policy, growth, market and social stability, market integration, environmental and cultural 
considerations).
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public enforcement proceedings. The enforcement was based on a notifi cation and 
authorization system, where potential anti-competitive agreements required an ex-
ante Commission approval in order to benefi t from an Article 101(3) exemption. 
Hence, the institutional setup allowed the Commission to apply Article 101(3) on a 
case-by-case basis in a centralized and fairly unbiased manner.
The 2004 reform of the enforcement of EU competition law has changed this 
institutional setup. The new enforcement regime enacted by Regulation 1/2003 is 
based on a self-assessment and decentralized system. Undertakings must evaluate 
the applicability of Article 101(3) independently, and the Commission and NCAs 
only assess the Article ex-post. Therefore, achieving the aims of the enforcement 
regime of Regulation 1/2003 – namely, an eff ective, uniform and clear application – 
merits a clear framework defi ning the scope of Article 101(3).
This paper exhibits, on the basis of a comprehensive set of empirical fi ndings, that 
the Commission’s practice has failed to achieve this goal. In fact, the comprehensive 
and empirical “coding” of the more than 800 Commission decisions applying Article 
101 TFEU between 1958–2016 reveals the “disappearance” of Article 101(3) under 
the enforcement regime of Regulation 1/2003. The empirical fi ndings demonstrate 
that in the period from 1958 through April 2004, Article 101(3) exemptions were 
the heart of many Commission decisions. Exemptions were granted in 48% of the 
proceedings in which they were requested equating to 28% of all Commission Article 
101 TFEU proceedings during that time. Nevertheless, following the entering into 
force of Regulation 1/2003 in May 2004, the Commission never accepted Article 
101(3) as a defense from the application of Article 101 TFEU.2 
Remarkably, the empirical fi ndings indicate that not only had the Commission 
never accepted an Article 101(3) exception after 2004, but that the undertakings also 
stopped invoking it. There is a signifi cant drop in the reference to Article 101(3) 
in the Commission’s decisions after May 2004, from 60% to a mere 22% of the 
proceedings.
Consequently, the discussion of the much-debated scope of Article 101(3) and 
the role it leaves for non-competition interests has nearly disappeared from the 
Commission’s post-2004 decisional practice.
This paper argues that this outcome is regrettable. As part of modernizing EU 
competition law, the Commission has advocated a new, narrower interpretation to 
Article 101(3). Whereas past practice of the Commission and EU Courts considered 
broad non-competition interests when applying Article 101(3), today the Commission 
declares in its policy papers that application of Article 101(3) is confi ned to the 
consumer welfare standard. Nevertheless, this paper maintains that the boundaries 
of Article 101(3) remain ill-defi ned since the Commission has yet to demonstrate 
how the new interpretation of Article 101(3) ought to be applied in practice and the 
EU Courts have not fully endorsed the Commission’s new approach. As a result, the 
disappearance of Article 101(3) from the Commission’s decisional practice actually 
2   A so-called “positive decision” pursuant to Article 10 of the Regulation.
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contradicts the Commission’s own policy. Unfortunately, the debate on Article 101(3) 
disappeared at the time when the Commission’s guidance on the issue was perhaps 
needed the most.
2. Empirical methodology and structure 
The application of Article 101(3) and the role of non-competition interests within 
this Article have already been the subject to an extensive debate. Previous studies 
were predominantly based on analyses of selected case studies or policy papers.3 In 
addition, they were mostly confi ned to a limited period of time without addressing 
the challenges emanating from the 2004 reform.4
This paper is based on a comprehensive empirical analysis aimed to describe the 
enforcement of Article 101(3) in practice. It applies a systematic content analysis 
(“coding”) of all of the Commission’s Article 101 TFEU proceedings5 from the 
establishment of the EEC in 1958 to 2016. Covering more than 800 proceedings, the 
3   See, C. S : The future role of the non-competition goals in the interpretation of Article 
81 EC. Global Antitrust Review, 2008.; B. V  R : Economic Effi  ciency: The Sole Concern 
of Modern Antitrust Policy? Non-effi  ciency Considerations Under Article 101 TFEU, 51. 2012., 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:Economic+Efficiency+:+Th
e+Sole+Concern+of+Modern+Antitrust+Policy?+Non-efficiency+Considerations+under+Arti
cle+101+TFEU#0; G. M : Article 81 EC and public policy. Common Market Law Review, 127(2), 
2002., http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/document.php?id=5103811; A. C. W : Public Policy Goals 
Under EU Competition Law – Now is the Time to Set the House in Order. European Competition 
Journal, 8(3) 2012. 443–471., http://doi.org/10.5235/ECJ.8.3.443; S. L : What role for 
national competition authorities in protecting non-competition interests after Lisbon? European Law 
Review, Vol. 35., N. 5., 2010.http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=3324846; L. G : 
The emerging interface between Competition Policy and Environmental Policy in the EC. In: J. 
C  – P. D  – D. G  (eds.): Trade and the Environment: The search for balance. 
Vol. I. 1994.; R. N : Article 81 EC between time present and time past: A normative critique of 
“restriction of competition” in EU law. Common Market Law Review, 81(1), 2006.; H. H. S : 
Competition Law and Public Policy: Reconsidering an Uneasy Relationship. The Example of Art. 81. 
2007., http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/7623.; P. N : The balancing myth: The economics 
of article 81 (1) & (3). Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Vol. 32., N. 2., 2005. 123–145., http://
www.kluwerlawonline.com/document.php?id=LEIE2005017.; GCLC Annual Conference. (2010a) 
M. M  – D. F. W  (eds.): Towards an Optimal Enforcement of Competition Rules in 
Europe: Time for a Review of Regulation 1/2003? Groupe de Boeck, 2010.; C. T : Article 81 
EC and public policy. http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/23975. including an annex with a review of 
some Article 101 TFEU formal decisions granted between 1993–2004.
4   See S. W. D  – P. L. O : Assessing competition policy: Methodologies, gaps and agenda for 
future research. 2010. 48. noting the general lack of long-term studies evaluating EU competition 
policy in general.
5   In this paper the term “Article 101 TFEU proceedings” covers all public enforcement actions of the 
article published in any form (decision, opinion, press release or reference in an annual report) and 
using any regulatory instrument (decisions on infringements, inapplicability, settlements, formal 
or informal commitments, decisions not to investigate or to terminate investigations, and formal or 
informal opinions on conduct of a specifi c undertaking). In addition, it includes proceedings involving 
the enforcement of the national cartel equivalent.
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content analysis is based on the assumption that each proceeding has roughly the 
same value. Therefore, it departs from the focus of previous scholars on leading cases 
and precedence, and refl ects the position that case law is not simply a refl ection of the 
law but it is the law itself.6
This is predominantly true with regard to the debate on the role of non-competition 
interests within Article 101(3). As elaborated in the following sections, the wording of 
the Treaties tells us little about the scope of the respective Article, and the Commission 
and EU Courts have yet to supply a clear framework defi ning application of Article 
101(3). In the absence of such a framework, under the self-assessment regime of 
Regulation 1/2003, undertakings must evaluate their compliance with EU competition 
rules essentially pursuant to the practices of Commissions, NCAs and Courts.7 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 3 begins with a historical overview 
of the drafting of Article 101(3) and the development of the EU Court and the 
Commission interpretations of the Article. It shows that the uncertainty about the role 
of non-competition interests in Article 101(3) dates back to disagreements among the 
Member States on the wording and structure of Article 101 TFEU and the procedural 
enforcement rules of Regulation 17/62. While the issue remained unresolved, until 
2003 the Commission and EU Courts have interpreted Article 101(3) in a way which 
allows to consider a broad array of non-competition interests. Yet since they have 
followed a case-by-case approach to the balance between competition and non-
competition interests they have not established clear legal and economic principles 
for applying the Article. 
Section 4 describes the changes introduced by Regulation 1/2003 and the 
Commission’s policy papers. It shows that while the Commission advocated a new, 
narrow interpretation of the Article, the EU Courts have not seemed to accept this 
change. Section 5 discusses the empirical fi ndings on the application of Article 101(3) 
prior to, and following, the reform. It demonstrates the disappearance of the debate 
on the scope of the Article from the Commission’s practice since 2004. Finally, 
section 6 concludes with a plea for “positive” Commission decisions illustrating the 
application of Article 101(3) in practice.
 3. The debate on the scope of Article 101(3) prior to 2004
The uncertainty of Article 101(3)’s scope derives from the wording and structure 
of Article 101 TFEU and the procedural enforcement rules of Regulation 17/62. 
These were the result of negotiations and compromises among the Member States 
having substantively diff erent economic policies and traditions at the time of drafting 
6   M. H  – R. W : Systematic content analysis of judicial opinions. California Law Review, 
2008. 78, 84–86., http://www.jstor.org/stable/20439171.
7   GCLC Annual Conference. (2010b). M. M  – D. F. W  (eds.): Towards an Optimal 
Enforcement of Competition Rules in Europe: Time for a Review of Regulation 1/2003? Groupe de 
Boeck, 2010. 19., 58–76.
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the Treaty of Rome.8 Favoring consensus over clarity, EU primary and secondary 
competition rules have not explained how Article 101(3) should be applied.
This section describes how in the absence of such an interpretive framework, 
the substantive scope of Article 101(3) was developed on a case-by-case basis by 
the decisional practice of the Commission and the jurisprudence of the EU Courts. 
However, prior to the 2004 this practice had not produced a set of well-defi ned legal 
or economic tools explaining what non-competition interests can be examined under 
Article 101(3) and how. 
3.1. The origins of Article 101(3) and the enforcement regime of Regulation 17/62
The EU prohibition against anti-competitive agreements, laid down in Article 101 
TFEU, is based on a bifurcated structure. Article 101(1) identifi es competition 
restraints. It is drafted in broad terms to cover “all agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may aff ect 
trade between Member States and which have as their object or eff ect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market.”
In its place, Article 101(3) sets an exception to the general prohibition. It states 
that Article 101(1) may be declared inapplicable in the case of any agreement “which 
contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefi t, and which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned 
restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) aff ord such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect 
of a substantial part of the products in question.” Thus, Article 101(3) provides a 
structured framework to balance anti-competitive eff ects, primarily the harm to 
competition interests, against possible benefi ts arising from an agreement.9
This distinctive feature of Article 101 TFEU is linked to the political process 
preceding its adoption. The wording and the bifurcated structure of Article 101 
TFEU were strongly infl uenced by French competition rules. During the negotiations 
of the EEC Treaty, France was the only Member State with an existing competition 
law.10 French Decree of 9 August 1953 on the maintenance and re-establishment of 
free competition,11 and the Draft Law 9951 of July 1952 that preceded it, initiated a 
two-step mechanism to assess anti-competitive agreements. Article 59 bis prohibits 
8   K. S  – L. F  P : The drafting and the role of regulation 17: a hard-fought compromise. 
In: K. Klaus P  – H. S  (eds.): The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law. 
Oxford, OUP, 2013. 55.; A. K  – L. W : National Traditions of Competition Law: A 
Belated Europeanization through Convergence? In: P –S  (eds.) op. cit. 103–109.
9  J. F  – A. N : The EC law of competition. Oxford University Press, 2014. 310., http://scholar.
google.nl/scholar?q=Faull+and+Nikpay+%282014%29&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5#5.
10  S –P  (2013) op. cit. 59–62.
11  Decree No. 53–704 of 1953.
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anti-competitive agreements, while Article 59 ter exempts agreements having a 
benefi cial eff ect.
The bifurcated structure of the French competition law refl ected the French view 
on restrictions to competition. It aimed to control anti-competitive agreements 
rather than outright prohibit them. The French law assumed that an anti-competitive 
agreement in not necessarily harmful. Rather, a distinction should be made between 
a “bad” agreement that is prohibited under Article 59 bis, and a “good” agreement 
that could be exempted under Article 59 ter.12 Under the French system of that time, 
such distinction was made ex-post, on a case-by-case basis. 
This French principle aiming to “control” anti-competitive agreements stood 
in contrast with the German concept of competition law. During negotiations on 
the Treaty of Rome, Germany had not yet fi nalized its national competition law. 
However, the German vision of competition law advocated a principle of prohibition, 
barring any horizontal agreement between undertakings. Based on this policy 
choice, the German representatives proposed a rule during the negotiations on the 
Treaty that applied a total prohibition on anti-competitive agreements, allowing for 
no exceptions.13
The clash between the French and German approaches was resolved by a 
compromise. Although the wording of Article 101 TFEU closely followed the 
French law and tolerated some anti-competitive agreements [Article 101(3))], it was 
inspired by the German approach by declaring that anti-competitive agreements are 
in principle prohibited [(Article 101(1)] and automatically void [Article 101(2)]. As 
part of this compromise, the controversial decision on how the exception provided in 
Article 101(3) should apply was postponed. Article 101(3) remained silent as to the 
procedural and substantive criteria guiding the declaration of inapplicability.14 
The procedural criterion for applying Article 101(3) was clarifi ed only in 1962, 
when the procedural enforcement rules embodied in Regulation 17/62 came into 
force. During the negotiations on Regulation 17/62, the French delegation proposed 
that a declaration of applicability would be based on a self-assessment with an ex-post 
control, corresponding to the French law. However, the German delegation rejected 
the French proposal as being incompatible with the wording and structure of Article 
101 TFEU. They noted that the phrasing of Article 101(3) that the provisions of Article 
101(1) “may, however, be declared inapplicable”, requires a constitutive decision by 
the Commission in order to exempt an agreement from the cartel prohibition.15
The German proposal, which was fi nally accepted, gave the Commission a monopoly 
for granting exemptions under Article 101(3) in public enforcement proceedings. The 
application of the Article was based on a notifi cation and authorization system where 
12  S –P  (2013) op. cit. 59., 62.; K –W  (2013) op. cit. 100., 103–104.
13  S –P  (2013) op. cit. 60–62.; K –W  (2013) op. cit. 96–98., 103–104.
14  S –P  (2013) op. cit. 63.; K –W  (2013) op. cit. 110–111.; Commission 
Modernization White Paper para 12, 18.
15  S –P  (2013) op. cit. 70.; B. S : The Evolution of Article 81 (3) of the EC Treaty. The 
Antitrust Bull, 51. 2006. 923.
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potentially anti-competitive agreements needed to be notifi ed and approved ex-ante 
by the Commission in order to benefi t from Article 101(3). Indeed, while the wording 
of Article 101 TFEU refl ected a strong French infl uence, the procedural enforcement 
rules adopted by Regulation 17/62 were infl uenced by the German approach opposing 
the creation of anti-competitive agreements.
3.2. The practice of the Commission and EU Courts prior to 2004 
Even after the adoption of the procedural enforcement rules, the substantive aspect 
of the application of Article 101 remained unclear. The general and vague wording of 
Article 101(3) did not clearly indicate: what type of “improvements” can justify the 
disapplication of Article 101(1); how to measure the “fair share” of such improvements; 
“indispensability”; or when the competition on the market is “eliminated.” 
Moreover, questions were raised regarding the possibility of considering non-
competition interests when applying the four conditions of Article 101(3). Unlike the 
free movement rules, the EU Treaties do not contain any explicit ipso facto exception 
for non-competition goals.16 Therefore, the possibility of considering those types of 
interests within competition law had to be resolved with case law of the Commission 
and Courts. 
As early as the 1966 Grundig-Consten17 ruling, the EUCJ recognized that the 
application of Article 101(3) may entail balancing certain benefi ts and harms to 
competition.18 The Court explained that an anti-competitive agreement could only 
be exempted under Article 101(3) when it generates benefi ts that are large enough 
to compensate for the distortion of competition. It noted that “the very fact that the 
Treaty provides that the restriction of competition must be ‘indispensable’ to the 
improvement in question, clearly indicates the importance which the latter must 
have. This improvement must in particular show appreciable objective advantages 
of such a character as to compensate for the disadvantages which they cause in the 
fi eld of competition.”19
The possibility to consider certain types of non-competition interests was 
explicitly formulated by the EUCJ in 1977 in its landmark decision of Metro I.20 
According to the teleological interpretation adopted by the Court, Article 101 TFEU 
read in conjunction with Article 3 EEC, the appropriate standard for applying Article 
101(3) is not necessary one of perfect competition. Rather, the Court adopted a notion 
of workable competition in which the degree of competition protected under Article 
16  S  (2008) op. cit. 20.; S  (2006) op. cit. 925–926.; GCLC Annual Conference (2010a) 
op. cit. 82–92.
17  Joint Cases C-56/64 C-58/64 Grundig-Consten
18  N  (2005) op. cit. 134.
19  Joint Cases C-56/64 C-58/64 Grundig-Consten, 348.
20  C-26/76 Saba.
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101 TFEU is that required for the attainment of Treaty objectives, particularly the 
creation of a single market.21
The need to balance competition and non-competition interests within the 
application of Article 101(3) was further formalized with the introduction of what 
was referred to as “cross-sectional” or “policy-linking” clauses by the Single 
European Act of 1986 (SEA).22 Those clauses required that EU institutions consider 
certain public policy interests within the enforcement of other EU policies. The fi rst 
three cross-sectional clauses of the SEA included industrial policy, cohesion and 
environmental policy.23 The Maastricht Treaty of 199224 expanded upon the SEU by 
including health, culture, consumer protection, development cooperation, education, 
employment and equality between men and women.25
While the cross-sectional clauses require that, as EU institutions, the Commission 
and EU Courts consider certain social policies within the application of Article 
101 TFEU as an EU policy, they have not explained how such consideration should 
take place. Regrettably, case law has not resolved this question. Rather, as Sufrin 
described it, both the Commission and the EU Court decisions were “neatly side-
stepping” the issue.26
In Ford/Volkswagen,27 for example, the Commission mentioned the cross-sectional 
clauses as a source for justifying an exemption under Article 101(3). The Commission 
explained that it considered the contribution of the examined joint ventures to two 
interests that are protected by the EU Treaties: the creation of jobs and reduction of 
regional disparities. Yet, the Commission ambiguously added that, “this would not 
be enough to make an exemption possible unless the conditions of Article 85 (3) were 
fulfi lled, but it is an element which the Commission has taken into account.”28
The GC upheld the Commission’s reasoning. It added that, while the Commission 
was right to consider the interests protected by the cross sectional clauses, they 
did not serve as the basis for the Commission’s exemption.29 By simply affi  rming 
21  The notion of “workable competition” was derived from the work of an American scholar 
J. M. C : Competition as a dinamic process. 1961. For more information, see R. 
W : The Modernisation of EC Competition Law. 2000. 35. http://scholar.google.nl/
scholar?q=competition+wesseling&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5&as_ylo=2000&as_yhi=2000#2.; R  
(2012b) op. cit. 151.
22  D. J. G : Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus. Oxford 
University Press, 1998. 371.
23  Articles 130, 130a, 130r.
24  Articles 3, 126–130.
25  Article 2 of the Agreement on social policy concluded between the Member States of the European 
Community, with the exception of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (OJ 
1992 C 191, p. 91), annexed to Protocol (No 14) on social policy, annexed to the Treaty establishing 
the European Community.
26  S  (2006) op. cit. 959–960.
27  33814 Ford v.Volkswagen.
28  33814 Ford v.Volkswagen, para 36. 
29  T-17/93 Ford v.Volkswagen, para 96.
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the Commission’s decision, the Court did not explain what the result would be if 
the Commission had not explicitly recognized the supererogatory nature of the 
exceptional circumstances.30 In other words, could the creation of jobs or the reduction 
of regional disparities in and of themselves justify an anti-competitive agreement?
Subsequently, even during the mid-1990s when the GC’s decision in Ford/
Volkswagen was rendered, the scope of Article 101(3) remained unclear almost 40 
years after its drafting.
3.3. The lack of a clear framework detailing the boundaries of Article 101(3) in a 
centralized enforcement system 
The cases presented above demonstrate that, while the EU Courts and the 
Commission have regularly emphasized the possibility, if not duty, to balance 
competition against a variety of social and political interests when applying Article 
101(3),31 they have not established a clear framework for applying Article 101(3). 
They followed a case-by-case approach, tailoring the application to the specifi c 
circumstances of the case, economic and social situations, and to the concept of 
competition applicable at the relevant time.32 The scope of Article 101(3) was based 
on the discretionary powers of the Commission. It was founded on a set of well-
defi ned legal or economic tools explaining what non-competition interests can be 
examined under Article 101(3) and how.
Up to the mid-1990s, the need to employ discretionary powers and assess 
various objectives when applying Article 101(3) was actually viewed as one of the 
justifi cations for the EU centralized enforcement system. For instance, in its 1993 
policy report the Commission explained, “the grant of a derogation from the ban on 
restrictive agreements requires assessment of complex economic situations and the 
exercise of considerable discretionary power, particularly where diff erent objectives 
of the EC Treaty are involved. This task can only be performed by the Commission”.33 
Along the same lines, in the “Modernization” White Paper of 1999, the Commission 
emphasized that the centralized enforcement system was seen in past as the “only 
appropriate system” to ensure a uniform application of Article 101 TFEU throughout 
the EU and to allow a suffi  cient degree of legal certainty for undertakings.34 
Consequently, the lack of a clear framework for applying Article 101(3) had 
rather limited consequences under the enforcement regime of Regulation 17/62. 
The institutional setup of the old enforcement regime meant that confl icts between 
30  S  (2006) op. cit. 959–960.
31  See T  (2009a) op. cit. 102.; F –N  (2014) op. cit. 311–312.; C. D. E : The 
modernization of EC antitrust policy a legal and cultural revolution. Common Market Law Review, 
37/2000. 549.
32  W  (2000) op. cit. 36–41.; R  (2012b) op. cit. 153.
33  Policy report 1993. 107. Also see Commission Modernization White Paper, para. 4.
34  Commission Modernization White Paper, para 4, 6, 24.
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competition and non-competition interests were balanced ex-ante and resolved in a 
centralized and fairly independent manner by the Commission. 
As the next section demonstrates, this situation had dramatically changed with 
the introduction of Regulation 1/2003 that replaced the old procedural enforcement 
regime of Regulation 17/62.
4. The scope of Article 101(3) following 2004
4.1. Regulation 1/2003 merits a clear defi nition of the scope of Article 101(3)
The 2004 reform in the enforcement of EU competition law, brought about by 
Regulation 1/2003, introduced two main changes. First, the enforcement regime was 
decentralized, entrusting the NCAs with application of Article 101(3) in parallel to 
the Commission. Second, agreements could be declared inapplicable even without 
notifi cation. Rather, similar to the original French proposal for Regulation 17/62,35 
the assessment of Article 101(3) ought to be independently preformed ex-ante by 
undertakings and is only reviewed ex-post by the competition enforcers.
Just six years after the Commission argued that the balancing within Article 
101(3) “can only be performed by the Commission”, it had completely revised this 
statement in Modernization White Paper of 1999. According to the Commission’s 
new approach, the switch to a self-assessment system was now possible since, “after 
35 years of application, the law has been clarifi ed and thus become more predictable 
for undertakings.”36 This statement was perhaps true with respect to EU competition 
law in general but did not refl ect the legal situation with respect to the boundaries 
of Article 101(3). As discussed above, prior to the modernization of EU competition 
law, the EU had no clear legal and economic rules defi ning the boundaries and rules 
for applying Article 101(3).
The need for case law clarifying the boundaries of Article 101(3) became even 
more pressing due to the substantive modernization of the EU competition rules. 
In parallel with the procedural reform announced by the enforcement system of 
Regulation 1/2003, the Commission advocated for a narrow consumer welfare 
approach as the basis for Article 101(3). It called for a narrow and rigorous application 
of the four conditions leaving little room for non-competition interests.
This section begins with setting out the Commission’s new approach to the 
application of Article 101 (3). Next, it shows that such approach had deviated from 
the Commission’s and EU Courts’ previous case law.
35  See section 3.1
36  Commission Modernization White Paper, para 48.
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4.2. The Commission’s approach in its policy papers since 2004: narrowing the scope 
of Article 101(3)
From the very inception of the Modernization White Paper, the Commission was 
concerned that the decentralized enforcement of Article 101 TFEU would result in 
the incorporation of national-political non-competition interests in the application 
of Article 101(3). While the Directorate-General for Competition of the European 
Commission (DG Competition) is generally free from political interference in the 
enforcement of individual cases, not all NCAs are equally independent authorities.37 
Although some NCAs are institutionally and politically independent of their 
governments, others are not.38 For example, in some Member States the selection of 
cases is based on the infl uence, direct or indirect, of national political institutions.39 
Moreover, even in the NCAs that are relatively independent from the infl uence of 
private undertakings and political pressure, the Member States have found ways to 
direct NCAs to protect specifi c national interests, for example by adopting legislation 
that interprets EU law.40 
In order to avoid such infl uences, the Modernization White Paper reframed 
Article 101(3) as a tool facilitating economic assessment that is devoid of 
political considerations.41 It explained that Article 101(3) is intended “to provide 
a legal framework for the economic assessment of restrictive practices and not 
to allow application of the competition rules to be set aside because of political 
considerations.”42 The Commission limited the discretion required in its application 
by transforming Article 101(3) into a pure economic effi  ciency norm.43
Commentators quickly pointed out that the new interpretation of Article 101(3) 
was incompatible with Commission and EU Court case law that reserved signifi cant 
37  R  (2003) op. cit. 659.; FIDE C : General Report on the Application of Community 
Competition Law on Enterprises by National Courts and National Authorities. 1998. 17; 
I. M : Networking competition authorities in the European Union: Diversity and 
change. European Competition Law Annual, 2002. 223–236; https://scholar.google.nl/
scholar?q=Maher+%22Networking+Competition+Authorities+in+the+EU%3A+Diversity+and+
Change%22&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5. 224.
38  R  (2003) op. cit. 659.; FIDE Congress (1998) op. cit. 17.
39  M G : Competition Policy Enforcement in EU Member States. Springer, 2016.; N. P : How 
Much Discretion Do, and Should, Competition Authorities Enjoy in the Course of Their Enforcement 
Activities? A Multi-Jurisdictional Assessment. Concurrences: Revue Des Droits de La Concurrence, 
2010.
40  R  (2003) op. cit. 659.; M  (2002) op. cit. 225.
41  P  (2009) op. cit. 6.; R  (2012a) op. cit. 257.; S  (2006) op. cit. 96.; T  (2009b) op. 
cit. 80.; M  (2002) op. cit. 1092.; G. M : EC competition law. 2007. 21., http://books.google.nl/
books?hl=en&lr=&id=hHe2PklOqPUC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=%22EC+competition+law%22+%
22monti%22&ots=hLTMi7ED-Q&sig=jOFJm-G9-Fcha04UoSXwUZZrh4g.; C  (2007) op. cit. 
169.; K  (2005) op. cit. 17.; GCLC Annual Conference (2010a) 82.
42  Commission Modernization White Paper, para 57. Also see para 72.
43  K. C : The controversies of the consumer welfare standard. 2007., https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.c–fm?abstract_id=1015292.
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room for non-competition interests under that provision. Former Director General 
of DG Competition Ehlermann acknowledged that a literal reading of the above 
White Paper provision confl icted with case law. Instead, he suggested a restrictive 
interpretation of the Modernization White Paper, explaining: “[i]t would probably 
be an exaggeration to assume that, according to the Commission, non-economic 
considerations are to be totally excluded from the balancing test required by Article 
81(3). Such an interpretation would hardly be compatible with the Treaty, the Court 
of Justice’s case law, and the Commission’s own practice.” 44 Rather, Ehlermann 
believed that the Modernization White Paper was only an indication that non-
competition-oriented political considerations should not determine the application 
of Article 101(3).45 
Similarly, the German Monopolkommission was critical of the Commission’s 
approach. It stated that, “in the White Paper the Commission attempts to tone down 
the signifi cance of a discretionary process of weighing up in the frame of exemption 
decisions […] No matter how much such a viewpoint should be welcomed the 
Commission is neither empowered nor able to issue a binding interpretation of the 
EC Treaty.”46 In other words, while the Monopolkommission seemed to agree with 
the substantive merits, it considered the Commission’s approach to be incompatible 
with EU law.
The new narrow interpretation of Article 101(3) was reinforced by the adoption 
of Article 101(3) Guidelines in 2004.47 The Guidelines limited the “improvements” 
mentioned in Article 101(3) to only “objective economic effi  ciencies”,48 stating that the 
aim of Article 101(3) analysis “is to ascertain what are the objective benefi ts created 
by the agreement and what is the economic importance of such effi  ciencies.”49 The 
Guidelines further concluded that, “goals pursued by other Treaty provisions can be 
taken into account to the extent that they can be subsumed under the four conditions of 
Article 81(3)”.50 This, in conjunction with the general spirit of the Guidelines, suggests 
that non-competition interests could only be considered under Article 101(3) if viewed 
as economic effi  ciency gains. A similar approach was followed in new versions of the 
vertical Guidelines adopted in 2010 and the horizontal Guidelines of 2011.51
Moreover, as part of the more economic approach, Article 101(3) Guidelines 
also introduced the notion of consumer welfare as the sole aim of EU competition 
policy, particularly with Article 101(3). They declared “the aim of the Community 
competition rules is to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing 
44  E  (2000) op. cit. 549. Also see R  (2012b) op. cit. 255–256.
45  Ibid. 
46  German Monopolies Commission (2000) para 52.
47  Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty (2004).
48  Commission Article 101(3) Guidelines para 59.
49  Commission Article 101(3) Guidelines para 50.
50  Commission Article 101(3) Guidelines para 42.
51  Vertical Guidelines (2010) 6, 19, 60, 96, 122–127.; Horizontal Guidelines (2011) para 29, 49, 95-100, 
141, 183, 217, 246.
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consumer welfare and of ensuring an effi  cient allocation of resources consumer 
welfare and of ensuring an effi  cient allocation of resources.”52 
The new interpretation of the “improvements” that can be examined under Article 
101(3) and the focus on consumer welfare marked a clear deviation from case law of 
the Commission and EU Court. Many non-competition interests considered until the 
end of April 2004 were no longer applicable in the Commission’s view.53
This new approach increased the uncertainty with respect to the scope of Article 
101(3) following the 2004 reform. As soft-law instruments, the Commission’s 
Modernization White Paper and Guidelines cannot contradict EUCJ case law which 
has supremacy. On the other hand, in contrast with EUCJ judgments, the Commission 
Guidelines off ered a rather detailed framework for the application of Article 101(3). 
As we discuss in the next section, the confusion on the scope of Article 101(3) grows 
when examining the EU Court decisions after 2004.
4.3. The EU Courts have not fully endorsed the Commission’s narrow approach 
after 2004 
The EU Courts have yet to fully endorse the Commission’s new interpretation of 
Article 101(3).54 As demonstrated below, while the EU Courts have refrained from 
stating so explicitly, various indications suggest that they have not embraced either 
the consumer welfare standard and or the limited non-competition interests that can 
be examined under Article 101(3).
In 2009, fi rst in T-Mobile55 and later in GlaxoSmithKline,56 the EUCJ rejected, at 
least in part, the consumer welfare standard as the sole aim of Article 101 TFEU. 
It declared that, “Article 81 EC, like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is 
designed to protect not only the immediate interests of individual competitors or 
52  Commission Article 101(3) Guidelines para. 33. In parallel, the Guidelines also declare that the 
protection of the competitive process, not consumer welfare, is the “ultimate” role of Article 101 
TFEU. The Guidelines contain a rare statement by the Commission on the goal of the article by 
declaring “ultimately the protection of rivalry and the competitive process is given priority over 
potentially pro-competitive effi  ciency gains which could result from restrictive agreements. The last 
condition of Article 81(3) recognises the fact that rivalry between undertakings is an essential driver 
of economic effi  ciency, including dynamic effi  ciencies in the shape of innovation. In other words, 
the ultimate aim of Article 81 is to protect the competitive process” (Commission Article 101(3) 
Guidelines para 105). Also see D. G : The eff ects-based approach under Article 101 TFEU and 
its paradoxes: modernisation at war with itself? In: J. B  – D. W  (eds.): Ten Years 
of Eff ects-Based Approach in EU Competition Law Enforcement. Brussels, Bruylant, 2012. 29–30.
53  W  (2016) op. cit. 166.
54  Also see T  (2009a) op. cit. 178–181.; A. W : The More Economic Approach to EU Antitrust 
Law. 2016. 261–295., https://books.google.nl/books?hl=en&lr=&id=j3dDDQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&
pg=PR5&dq=witt+the+more+economic+approach+to+eu+antitrust&ots=wcN176fpnm&sig=t-
fTRYK_7F6laLkPZWH_bR6BwXE. 6).; G  (2012) op. cit. 36–38.; GCLC Annual Conference 
(2010a) op. cit. 84–85.
55  C C-08/08 T-Mobile.
56  C-501-06P C-513-06P C-515-06P C-519-06P GlaxoSmithKline.
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consumers but also to protect the structure of the market and thus competition 
as such.”57 This defi nition has since been repeated in other cases discussing the 
objectives of EU competition law.58 
Notably, the EUCJ opted for a softer formulation in T-Mobile compared to the one 
suggested by the Advocate General. AG Kokott stated that Article 101 TFEU is not 
designed “only or primarily” to protect competitors or consumers but is mainly to 
“protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such (as an institution).” 
She argued that consumer welfare is only a secondary eff ect of competition policy 
as “consumers are also indirectly protected.”59 Unfortunately, unlike the Advocate 
General, the Court has not adopted a clear legal position on the role of consumer 
welfare.
Seemingly, EU Courts have not accepted the Commission’s narrow reading of 
the “improvements” that can be examined under Article 101(3). First, the EUCJ 
recognized in its preliminary rulings that the protection of non-competition interests 
related to fi nancial services,60 IPRs,61 sport,62 and regulated professions63 could justify 
exemptions. The EUCJ also made a parallel between the justifi cations under Article 
101(3) and the free movement rules that have broad public policy considerations to 
justify an exemption.64
Second, the GC held that cross-sectional clauses require the consideration of 
non-competition interests in the application of Article 101(3). In CISAC, it noted 
that Article 151(4) EC on the protection of culture implies, “that it is necessary to 
bear in mind the requirements relating to the respect for and promotion of cultural 
diversity when considering the four conditions for the application of Article 81(3) 
EC, in particular as regards the condition relating to the indispensable nature of the 
restriction.”65 While the Court does not specify how culture should be considered 
within Article 101(3), it is clear that such interests are relevant. 
Finally, following Regulation 1/2003’s eff ective date, the EU Courts upheld the 
Commission’s decisions prior to 2004 exempting agreements on the basis of non-
57  C-08/08 T-Mobile para 38. Also see C-501-06P C-513-06P C-515-06P C-519-06P GlaxoSmithKline 
para 62. 
58  T-357/06 Bitumen para 11; T-461/07 Visa para 126. Also see A. W  (2016) 266.
59  Opinion of AG Kokott in C-08/08 T-Mobile para 58: “Article 81 EC forms part of a system designed 
to protect competition within the internal market from distortions (Article 3(1)(g) EC). Accordingly, 
Article 81 EC, like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is not designed only or primarily to 
protect the immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers, but to protect the structure of 
the market and thus competition as such (as an institution). In this way, consumers are also indirectly 
protected. Because where competition as such is damaged, disadvantages for consumers are also to 
be feared.”
60  C-238/05 Asnef-Equifax para 67.
61  C-403/08 C-429/08 Football Association Premier League para 145–146.
62  C-403/08 C-429/08 Football Association Premier League para 145–146.
63  C-1/12 Ordem dos Técnicos Ofi ciais de Contas para 100–101.
64  C-403/08 C-429/08 Football Association Premier League para 145–146.
65  T-451/08 CISAC para 103.
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competition interests. Accordingly, they confi rmed that non-competition interests 
relating to sport,66 the environment,67 and fi nancial services68 justify declaring 
exemptions under Article 101(3). In addition, they confi rmed that at least in theory, 
that protection against free riding,69 and the promotion of R&D70 and culture71 could 
also justify an exemption. 
The above indicates that the EU Courts seemed to object, at least in part, to the 
Commission’s new interpretation of Article 101(3). EU Courts continued to follow the 
case law prior to 2004, leaving signifi cant room for consideration of non-competition 
interests within Article 101(3). Nevertheless, EU Courts did so in an indeterminate 
manner. They were unclear on the role of consumer welfare and non-competition 
interests in application of the Article, and the substantive criteria for declaring 
inapplicability.
The remainder of the paper explores how the uncertainty regarding the scope 
of Article 101(3) is especially apparent given the very limited Commission cases 
applying Article 101(3) since 2004. The Commission has yet to explain how the 
narrow interpretation of the scope of Article 101(3), which was declared in its policy 
paper, aligns with the broad interpretation by the Courts.
5. Empirical fi ndings: the “disappearance” of Article 101(3)
Table 1 summarizes the application of Article 101(3) by the Commission. It presents 
the percentage of proceedings in which Article 101(3) was mentioned (left column). 
In addition, the table includes the percentages of Article 101 TFEU proceedings 
(right column) and Article 101 TFEU proceedings wherein Article 101(3) was argued 
(middle column) in which Article 101(3) was accepted.
Table 1. application of Article 101(3) by Commission
% of cases in which 
Article 101(3) was 
argued from total 
Article 101 TFEU 
proceedings
% of cases in which 
Article 101(3) was 
accepted from cases in 
which it was argued
% of cases in which 
Article 101(3) was 
accepted from total 
Article 101 TFEU 
proceedings
1958–2004 60% 48% 28%
2005–2016 22% 0% 0%
The empirical fi ndings support the following conclusions. First, Article 101(3) had 
great importance in the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU until the eff ective date of 
66  T-193/02 FIFA rules on player agents; C-171/05P FIFA rules on player agents.
67  T-289-01 DSD para 38; T-419/03 Austrian system for the disposal of packaging waste para 23.
68  T-259-02 T-260-02 T-261-02 T-262-02 T-263-02 T-264-02 T-271-02 Austrian banks – ‘Lombard Club. 
69  T-491/07 Groupement des cartes bancaires para 77, 259.
70  T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline para 268.
71  T-451/08 CISAC para 103.
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Regulation 1/2003 in 2004. The Article was discussed in 60% of Commission Article 
101 TFEU proceedings, and accepted in 48% of the proceedings in which it was 
discussed, equating to 28% of total Article 101 TFEU proceedings. 
The role of Article 101(3) was marginalized after May 2004. Article 101(3) was 
never accepted as a basis for disapplication of Article 101 TFEU under the realm of 
Regulation 1/2003. Since the eff ective date of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission has 
not rendered any “positive decision” in the meaning of Article 10 of the Regulation.72
Second, the empirical fi ndings record a signifi cant drop in the percentage of 
Article 101 TFEU proceedings in which Article 101(3) was discussed, from 60% 
of the proceedings prior 2004 to only 22%. The drop can perhaps be attributed to 
the new priority setting powers granted to the Commission by Regulation 1/2003.73 
Whereas the Commission was required to examine all notifi ed agreements under 
the old notifi cation regime, the Commission can allocate its own enforcement eff orts 
under the new self-assessment regime.
The Commission had declared that it would focus on hard-core cartels involving 
naked restrictions of competition.74 This focus is compatible with Recital 3 of 
Regulation 1/2003, which explains that the abolishment of the notifi cation procedure 
was justifi ed since it prevented the Commission from concentrating its resources on 
curbing the most serious infringements. The coding indicates that the Commission 
followed this approach in practice. After 2004, the application of Article 101(3) was 
mainly examined in cases involving price fi xing, market sharing and restrictions 
having equivalent eff ects.75
Notably, the Commission declared with its Article 101(3) Guidelines that although 
Article 101(3) does not exclude a priori certain types of agreements from its 
scope, hardcore restrictions are unlikely to fulfi ll the conditions of Article 101(3).76 
Arguably, the undertakings would not have attempted to invoke Article 101(3) since 
it is unlikely to apply to those hardcore, anti-competitive agreements. 
72  Article 10 of Regulation 1/2003 provides, “[w]here the Community public interest relating to the 
application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty so requires, the Commission, acting on its own 
initiative, may by decision fi nd that Article 81 of the Treaty is not applicable to an agreement, a 
decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted practice, either because the conditions 
of Article 81(1) of the Treaty are not fulfi lled, or because the conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
are satisfi ed.”
73  Regulation 1/2003, preamble 18; Modernisation White Paper para 45.
74  Policy report 2004. 36.; Policy report 2006. 11.
75  37750 French beer market para 75; 38456 Bitumen Nederland para 162–168; 39181 Candle waxes 
para 317; 39188 Bananas para 339–343; 39125 Carglass para 529–532; 39633 Shrimps para 438–440; 
39510 Ordre National des Pharmaciens en France (ONP) para 703–706; 38549 Barême d’honoraires 
de l’Ordre des Architectes belges para 104–110; 38662 GDF-ENEL para 143–145; 38662 GDF-ENI 
para 120–122; 39736 SIEMENS/AREVA para 82–83; 39596 BA-AA-IB para 77–80; 39258 Airfreight 
para 1040–1045; 39839 Telefónica and Portugal Telecom para 439–446; 37214 DFB (Joint selling of 
the media rights to the German Bundesliga) para 24; 38173 The Football Association Premier League 
Limited para 30.
76  Commission Article 101(3) Guidelines para 46.
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Third, the coding demonstrates that the Commission has not detailed the substantive 
scope of Article 101(3) in the few proceedings following 2004 in which the Article 
was mentioned. In most of those proceedings, Article 101(3) was outright rejected 
because the agreement failed to meet the fi rst condition, declaring that no relevant 
benefi t was identifi ed.77 In others, such as the pay-for-delay settlement proceedings, 
the Commission held that the effi  ciency gains claimed were not suffi  ciently 
substantiated.78 Consequently, the Commission has not taken the opportunity to 
detail the possible scope of Article 101(3), even in the few cases involving the Article. 
Finally, the empirical fi ndings might explain the scarcity of EU Court decisions 
after 2004 detailing the role of non-competition interests under Article 101(3). The 
Courts have not had the opportunity to scrutinize its application in appeals since the 
Commission has not discussed Article 101(3) in its decisions. 
6. Conclusions – a plea for “positive decisions” 
The disappearance of the debate on the scope of Article 101(3) following 2004 is 
unfortunate. The combination of a lack of clear framework to apply Article 101(3) 
in the practice of the Commission and Courts prior to 2004, together with the 
Commission’s new interpretation of the Article since modernization and the case 
law of EU Courts that have not endorsed the Commission’s new approach, created 
uncertainty in a period when certainty was needed the most.
This uncertainty hinders attaining the aims of Regulation 1/2003, specifi cally the 
eff ective, uniform and clear enforcement of Article 101 TFEU.79 On the one hand, 
there is a risk that undertakings will refrain from concluding agreements that are 
good for undertakings, markets and the society due to the narrow interpretation given 
to Article 101(3) in the Commission’s policy papers. An incorrect interpretation of 
Article 101(3) could thus impede the eff ectiveness of the Article. On the other hand, 
the Commission’s policy papers serve an important role in ensuring a uniform and 
clear application of the Article. Ignoring them and relying solely on the EUCJ’s case 
law may hinder attainment of the latter two aims.80
Against this backdrop, it is argued that the Commission was wrong to conclude 
that a positive decision detailing the scope of Article 101(3) was “unnecessary to 
date” in its Report on the Functioning of Regulation 1/2003.81 This paper makes 
77  37980 Souris para 143–158; 38456 Bitumen Nederland para 162–168; 37750 French beer market para 
75; 39181 Candle waxes para 317; 39188 Bananas para 340; 39633 Shrimps para 438; 39510 Ordre 
National des Pharmaciens en France (ONP) para 703–706; 38549 Barême d’honoraires de l’Ordre des 
Architectes belges para 104–110; 38698 CISAC para 231–237.
78  39226 Lundbeck para 1221–1231; 39685 Fentanyl para 406–439; 39612 Perindopril (Servier) para 
2074–2122.
79  Regulation 1/2003, preamble 1; Modernisation White Paper para 11., 43–47.
80  GCLC Annual Conference (2010a) 63
81  “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Report on the 
functioning of Regulation 1/2003 [2009] (COM(2009) 206).,” n.d para 15. Also see Commission 
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a plea for formal Commission decisions demonstrating how an exception from 
the prohibition of Article 101(1) can be successfully obtained. Such decisions are 
essential in order to defi ne the scope of Article 101(3) under the already aging realm 
of Regulation 1/2003. 
(2009) para 114; GCLC Annual Conference (2010a) 63.
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 SAFEGUARDING PUBLIC INTERESTS IN SELF-
REGULATING PLATFORM: AN OPTION FOR ONLINE 
TRANSPORTATION NETWORK INDUSTRY IN INDONESIA?
Sih Yuliana W  *
Atma Jaya Catholic University of Indonesia
1. Introduction
Indonesian Constitution of 1945 has established the fi rst premise for the setup of 
public policy in economic matters in Indonesia mandating that everybody shall 
have equal opportunities to take part in all economic activities.1 This premise is 
understood as the implementation of democracy in economic life. However, it 
also entangles other premises that anchor in the concept of state responsibility to 
achieve public welfare, such as the provision of employment and the protection of 
small companies. Competition policy in the country attempts to adopt the divergence 
of means of how public welfare could be achieved and the attempt results in the 
diverse objectives of competition policy from aiming at public welfare, protecting 
fair competition, achieving effi  ciency, safeguarding the interest of consumers, 
to protecting small companies. Despite the legitimacy of having a multipurpose 
competition policy, this policy model entails major diffi  culties, in the fi rst instance, to 
balance between diff erent competing policies in certain cases, and second, to adopt 
certain public policy that has not received suffi  cient room in the current competition 
policy consideration. 
Among other matters, ensuring consumer welfare might confl ict with other 
elements of economic welfare, such as securing the interest of small and medium-
size enterprises (SMEs) to remain in the market and securing other non-competition 
interests, such as employment. While innovation serves the interest of consumer in 
terms of the provision of product choices, better technology and product quality, and 
*   Senior Researcher/Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Atma Jaya Catholic University of Indonesia, Jakarta–
Indonesia. Email: yuliana.siswartono@atmajaya.ac.id or yuli.wahyuningtyas@googlemail.com. 
1    Indonesian Constitution of 1945, 4th Amendment (2002), Article 33 par. (4): “The national economy is 
governed on the basis of economic democracy […]”.
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other traits that make life easier, it also requires research and development processes 
in many cases that SMEs might not be able to aff ord. Hence, shaping public policy 
that provides equal protection for diff erent parts of and interests in the market in 
some cases could be a dreadful task.
To shed some light in weighing diff erent public interests in the purview of 
competition policy, Indonesian competition authority (Commission for the Supervision 
of Business Competition, hereafter KPPU) has published check lists of regulations 
that require reviews on the basis of their compliance to competition policy and 
guidelines on how to use the check lists for reviewing purposes. The Guidelines are 
set forth in KPPU Regulation No. 04 of 2016 on Guidelines for the Review of Drafts 
of Regulation or Policy or for the Review of Regulations or Policies on Economic 
Sectors Based on Competition Policy Check List (hereafter, Policy Guidelines). The 
Policy Guidelines contain four categories of check list: (1) concerning regulations 
on economic sectors that are not exempted from the application of Law No. 5 of 
1999 on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition 
(hereafter, Law No. 5 of 1999); (2) concerning regulations on economic sectors that 
are exempted from the application of Law No. 5 of 1999; (3) concerning regulations 
on economic sectors that grant monopoly rights; and (4) concerning regulations 
that provide protections for SMEs and for domestic enterprises against foreign 
enterprises.2 Based on the Guidelines, KPPU shall undergo a process of policy 
review and provide a recommendation to the Government as to whether changes 
should be made in order to ensure the compliance of the regulation under scrutiny to 
competition policy. While the Guidelines could be useful, there might be a problem 
whether such recommendation would be eff ective in practice, because it might entail, 
to some extent, a sacrifi ce of certain interests in favor of some other interest. A 
balancing is again required, only this time it would be somewhere else, i.e. not by 
KPPU but by the regulator.
On another spectrum of consideration, while policy makers and regulators are 
struggling to reach a compromise about the most workable policy and regulation, 
markets might take initiatives to regulate themselves in order to shield the interests 
of the contracting parties. Although such initiative is guarded by the principle of 
the freedom of contract, questions remain in how far the interests of all parties are 
well balanced and how this mechanism could carry out the missions mandated by an 
established public policy.
The problem becomes more complex in cases of disruptive innovation where there 
has not been any regulation serving as a solid legal ground for the parties to base 
their contract and the existence of their transaction on yet, apart from consensus and 
certain fundamental principles such as the utmost good faith. Disruptive innovation 
has its trait of potentially not only creating a new market, but also exterminating the 
existing market that might mean a risk of people losing their jobs – a non-competition 
but important part of public interests. Hence, dealing with disruptive innovation is a 
2   KPPU Regulation No. 04 of 2016 Article 2 lit. a–d.
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hard fact for the players of the existing market and this might call for public policy 
intervention when the existing market involves the living of many.
In the past at least a couple of years, new players have entered Indonesian market 
to off er an online platform to bring supply and demand of transportation services 
together throughout the country, such as Uber, GrabCar, and GoJek.3 I refer to these 
types of services as the online transportation network.4 The introduction of the 
new kind of door to door public transportation services in the market is not without 
controversies concerning numerous issues from the legality of its business license, 
the measures in place to ensure passenger safety and security, taxation, to competition 
concerns that are raised until today by conventional taxi providers.5 Indonesia has 
a large market for both taxi and motorbike service (in Indonesian, the motorbike 
service is called ojek). With the entrance of automobile-based service, the market has 
witnessed the birth and development of online transportation network that challenges 
the existing conventional taxi and motorbike services.
Among the complex issues brought be the emerging of the online transportation 
network in the country is the question about safety and consumer protection. Also, 
the implementation of the sharing economy concept combined with the rise of market 
demand, the new business models and innovation that has produced easiness to off er 
and obtain door-to-door transportation services – have created a major resistance 
from conventional transportation service providers that suff er substantial losses of 
market share in a reasonably short period of time. Asymmetrical regulations applied 
for conventional door to door transportation providers and for online transportation 
network have been blamed as the major cause of the imbalance of competition 
capacity in the market. However, the short-term outcome for consumers is not to be 
undermined. Not only consumers have more choices available in the transportation 
market, they also benefi t from taxis reducing their fares in order to make their pricing 
more competitive.
Online transportation network is one among new online business schemes 
developed in the digital market. Indonesian market also witnesses other schemes 
such as online shopping (e.g. Tokopedia.com, Lazada.com), non-banking loan (e.g. 
UangTeman.com), and online traveling agent for hotel, fl ight, and train reservation 
(e.g. Taveloka.com, Tiket.com). Focusing on online transportation network, GoJek – 
one of the major players in the market, has been expanding its business to diff erentiate 
its products ranging from off ering motorbike or car ride, to courier services to carry 
documents and packages and delivery of services ranging from services to do 
3   J. R : Uber Gains Government Approval to Operate Legally in Jakarta, Indonesia. Techcrunch, 
2015. http://techcrunch.com/2015/12/08/uber-gains-government-approval-to-operate-legally-in-
jakarta-indonesia.
4   This term is a subset of the broader term transportation network – that includes conventional taxi 
providers.
5   L. C : The Jakarta Police’s Uber Investigation Raises Many Questions, and Is Likely Just to 
Appease Taxi Firms. Tech in Asia, 2015. https://www.techinasia.com/talk/the-jakarta-polices-uber-
investigation-raises-many-questions-and-is-likely-just-to-appease-local-taxi-fi rms.
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shopping, food and medicine order and delivery, top up services for mobile phones, 
to massage services. The study takes the case of online transportation network as the 
focus of analysis and excludes other types of online businesses.
The paper is structured into fi ve parts. After explaining the background and 
uttering the research questions in the fi rst part, the second part of the paper discusses 
the challenges brought by the emerging of online transportation network to the 
existing competition policy. The third part analyses whether public policy could 
be integrated in the self-regulation of online transportation network. In the fourth 
part, the paper analyses whether self-regulation of online platform could serve as an 
alternative of balancing the existing regulation asymmetry by means of government 
regulation for the online transportation network industry. The fi fth part concludes.
2. The Emerging of Online Transportation Network and Challenges 
to the Existing Competition Policy
2.1. The Role of Innovation in Indonesian Competition Policy
Innovation is mentioned as a new element included in competition policy 
considerations taking into account the current development in the market. Law No. 5 
of 1999 does not mention innovation in its provisions. How innovation plays a role in 
Indonesian competition policy will be discussed below.
2.1.1. Competition Policy Framework
There are two main KPPU Regulations that refer to innovation as a key element in 
guiding how competition law should be implemented by the competition authority. 
First, innovation receives a place in competition policy consideration in the context 
of the interplay between competition law and intellectual property rights. Second, 
innovation is used as a reference when evaluating whether a certain policy or 
regulation results in the decreasing of consumer welfare when it lessens the incentive 
to compete.
2.1.1.1. I    I   C  L   IPR
In KPPU Regulation No. 2 of 2009 concerning the Guidelines on the Exemption of 
the Agreements related to Intellectual Property Rights from the Application of Law 
No. 5 of 1999, KPPU clarifi es that both intellectual property right (hereafter, IPR) 
protection and competition law share a common interest to encourage innovation 
and creativity. While IPR regime provides incentive and rewards for innovation, 
competition law plays its role in ensuring a level playing fi eld that enables fair 
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competition in the market and thereby, opens the opportunities for innovation to take 
place.6
According to the Guidelines, although agreements related to IPR are exempted 
from the application of the competition law,7 the Guidelines provide a basis to 
justify competition law intervention in cases where IPR is abused to foreclose a 
market. 8 In order to evaluate whether competition law intervention can be justifi ed, 
the Guidelines rely on a test as the primary indicator whether an IPR license has 
a signifi cant negative impact on the market.9 While the test has a broad scope of 
interpretation, it also covers a specifi c reference to innovation in cases where license 
agreements involve limitations of production and distribution. Agreements that put 
restrictions as such that hinder a licensee to innovate are considered as infringing 
competition law. 10
2.1.1.2. I    P  G
The policy Guidelines place innovation as part of the testing element in the fi rst 
check list concerning regulations on economic sectors that are not exempted from the 
application of Law No. 5 of 1999 when considering whether a regulation or policy or 
its draft has been in confl ict with the interest to protect fair competition. The term 
regulation covers not only those imposed by the Government but also regulations 
that are imposed by private entities. The latter is further distinguished between self-
regulation and co-regulation (such as those created and imposed by associations).11 
However, the discussions in this paper are limited to regulations imposed by private 
entities in the form of self-regulation.
To carry out the test, the evaluation process is grouped in four categories 
of regulations or policies (1) concerning the limitation of volume and scope of 
companies, (2) concerning the limitation of the capacity of companies, (3) reducing 
the incentives to compete, and (4) concerning the limitation of consumer choices 
of goods and/or services. The Guidelines use innovation as a reference to evaluate 
the third test concerning regulations or policies that reduce the incentives of market 
players to compete. However, it is also used in the examples of cases in other 
categories of the test.12
The Guidelines emphasize that a regulation or policy that reduces the incentives 
to compete would hinder innovation and in turn, it would reduce consumer welfare.13 
In order to evaluate whether a regulation or policy or its draft has such impact, the 
6   KPPU Regulation No. 2 of 2009, p.10.
7   Law No. 5 of 1999 Article 50 lit. a.
8   KPPU Regulation No. 2 of 2009, p. 16.
9  Ibid. 13–14.
10  Ibid. 20.
11  KPPU Regulation No. 04 of 2016, Attachment, p. 33.
12  Ibid. Article 2.
13  Ibid. 12.
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Guidelines provide a catalogue of questions whether the regulation or policy consists 
of a provision that:
(1) grants a full authorization to regulate a sector of industry to a group of 
companies (such as associations);
(2) requires an agreement between a group of companies and the Government in 
order to enact a sector regulation;
(3) requires all companies to inform public or an association all data about their 
products, prices, distributions, and/or costs;
(4) exempts certain companies from the application of Law No. 5 of 1999.14
Further, to exemplify how a regulation or policy could harm innovation, the 
Guidelines provide three cases as discussed below.
2.1.1.2.1. Market Allocation Policy v. Innovation15
Innovation might be hindered in cases of a regulation or policy that limits distribution 
areas or imposes market allocation either for goods, raw materials, services, capital, 
or labour. The Guidelines clarify further that under this category are regulations 
or policies that facilitate companies to allocate market between them and it does 
not include local government regulations that by its nature are limited in terms of 
the scope of geographical jurisdiction. This clarifi cation, nevertheless, makes the 
Guidelines unclear whether it would address only regulations or policies that facilitate 
distribution cartels or those that contain provisions that limit the distribution area or 
impose market allocation. The Guidelines use both terms, but then limit the scope 
to the fi rst in the description while at the same time excluding local government 
regulations.
This category is the case, for instance, when a regulation or policy either in national 
of regional level attempts to protect new comers or infant industries. Such regulation 
is not uncommon in developing countries. However, it also has the downside that 
by limiting the area of distribution or allocating the market, it creates isolated 
market fractions and this could result in the limitation of innovation and product 
diff erentiation. To evaluate whether negative impacts of such type of regulation or 
policy occur, the competition authority should carry out an investigation whether: (1) 
there is a relation between the obstacle to innovate and the purpose of the regulation 
or policy; (2) the regulation or policy that results in the obstacle to innovate does not 
exceed what is necessary to attain the purpose; (3) rational arguments would support 
the use of the obstacles to reach the purpose of the regulation or policy; and (4) the 
restrictions are imposed for a certain period of time.16 
14  Ibid.
15  Ibid. 28.
16  Ibid.
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The zoning policy for the food retail industry could become an example of this 
case, in which modern retailers are subject to the minimum proximity from traditional 
retailers. 17 The policy has been under debates since the enactment. However, it has 
not yet been investigated under the new Guidelines.
Although the Guidelines take a further steps from what have previous state of the 
art that left the justifi cation of providing privileges for any activity or agreement that 
is carried our as an implementation of a regulation or policy merely as part of the 
block of exemption in Article 50 of Law No. 5 of 1999, it lacks of a critical question, 
namely the justifi cation of the purpose of the regulation or policy under scrutiny 
as such. Hence, a contradiction between the purpose of competition policy and a 
regulation or policy in question remains unresolved.
2.1.1.2.2. Pricing Policy v. Innovation18
A regulation or policy that limits the freedom of companies to set prices might also 
harm innovation. The pricing policy referred to in the Guidelines includes policies 
for both the fl oor and ceiling prices. Both types of pricing are common in Indonesia. 
The fi rst is for instance for agricultural products such as rice and chili. The second 
is common for goods that are in high demand to meet basic needs of the consumers, 
such as cement. While the fi rst is imposed in order to protect small market players 
(SMEs) from unfair competition from strong players, the second is used to protect 
consumers from too high prices.19
There are two scenarios of how pricing policies might harm innovation. In the fi rst 
scenario, when the fl oor price is imposed, although effi  ciency or innovation could 
result in the ability to off er low prices, companies are still not allowed to sell below 
the fl oor prices. Thus, companies would not have suffi  cient incentives to innovate. 
On the other hand, innovation does not always result in low prices. It could also 
entail high prices, for instance, because of the cost for the research and development 
(hereafter, R and D). Thus, in the second scenario, the enforcement of a ceiling price 
policy might dissuade companies from innovating, although the innovation might 
lead to better quality of products, if it results in a higher price level than the assigned 
ceiling price.20
The Guidelines do not elaborate further, how eliminate the negative impacts of the 
pricing policy to innovation or which grounds could be considered as justifi cations to 
keep the policy at the cost of innovation, or whether the Guidelines would not justify 
such policy at all.
17  S. Y. W  – A. Y. A. N : Retail Policy and Strategy in Indonesia. In: M. 
M  – R. C  – E. H  (eds.): Retailing in Emerging Markets: A Policy and 
Strategy Perspective. Oxford, Routledge, 71–72.
18  Ibid. 29.
19  Ibid.
20  Ibid. 29–30.
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2.1.1.2.3. Self- and Co-Regulation v. Innovation21
Self- and co-regulation are also referred to by the Guidelines as types of regulation 
that potentially could impair innovation. The term self-regulation refers to a 
regulation made by a group of companies, i.e. association, based on an authorization 
granted by the Government on the matters relevant to competition, such as price 
fi xing, new business permit, and selling quota. The term co-regulation is understood 
as a regulation that requires a policy related to the industry that has to be agreed upon 
by the group of companies, i.e. association, and the Government.22
Innovation might be at stake when a regulation or policy contains a reduction of 
incentives to compete. According to the Guidelines, this is the type of regulation or 
policy that potentially would facilitate a cartel. Self- and co-regulation are seen as 
belonging to this type. They are considered as being able to be used to secure the 
interests of companies to survive in the market. Because such regulations potentially 
do not leave a suffi  cient room for other parties to negotiate, it could be used to reinforce 
the market power of the companies. As such, by allowing self- or co-regulation, there 
would be a danger that companies would not have suffi  cient incentives to innovate 
any longer.23 However, the statement in the Guidelines seems to be more of refl ecting 
concerns about self- and co-regulation models and a traditional view that favors state 
regulation over the other regulation models than inducing a per se prohibition of 
using self- and co-regulation. 
The Guidelines also do not elaborate further on how to evaluate such types of 
regulation and to what extent they could be justifi ed or whether all regulations of 
those types would be considered as by design in confl ict with competition policy and 
hence, when exist, shall be revoked.
2.1.2. Policy and Regulation Framework for Digital Market
The policy road map for Indonesian digital market is included in the 9th Package of 
Economic Policy aiming at becoming a major digital market player in South East 
Asia in 2020. According to the policy road map, to optimize the development of 
the digital market in the country, it would be based on the empowerment of local 
SMEs (startups). This leads to the policy to signifi cantly reduce legal costs and 
administrative burdens for setting up businesses. This approach is taken based on the 
major contribution of SMEs to the product domestic brutto (PDB), which according 
to the data from the Ministry of SMEs in 2015, the total amount of 59.2 billion of 
SMEs in the country contributed to 61,41% of the PDB. To implement this Policy 
Package, the Government is preparing a Government Regulation that is expected to 
be released and to enter into force in 2017.
21  Ibid. 32.
22  Ibid. 32.
23  Ibid. 33.
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According to the Report by Indonesian Telecommunication Providers Association, 
in 2014, 91% of Indonesian population had access to cellular signal and in 2016, 
almost all the inhabited land area has signal coverage.24 In 2016, the penetration 
of cellular phone in Indonesia was 126% and internet users reached 51.85% of the 
population (93.4 million users), among those, 71 million are smartphone users.
The responsibility for regulating activities on the internet in Indonesia is mandated 
to the Ministry of Communication and Information (hereinafter, Menkominfo) with 
one of the main tasks to support the Government to set policy for the industry.25 The 
Ministry is also responsible for regulating the telecommunication industry that had 
been existent long prior to the use of internet. The placing of the responsibility to 
regulate activities on the internet on the Ministry is based on the reason that internet 
access is basically made available by internet network that becomes part of the 
telecommunication services.
The task as the regulator in the telecommunication market is further carried out 
by Indonesian Telecommunication Regulation Body (Badan Regulasi Telekomunkasi 
Indonesia, hereinafter, BRTI) that was established in 2008.26 The strong intervention 
of the Government in the industry is justifi ed under Law No. 36 of 1999 on 
Telecommunication (hereinafter, Indonesian Telecommunication Law). The Law sets 
out that telecommunication is controlled and fostered by the state in order to improve 
telecommunication operations, by means of setting policy, regulation, supervision, 
and monitoring.27 
Although competition policy in the telecommunication industry uses ex-ante 
regulation approach, an ex-post approach is also used in the applicability of competition 
law. Under Law No. 36 of 1999, in providing services in the telecommunication 
industry, companies are prohibited from carrying out activities that could result 
in monopoly practices and unfair business competition,28 i.e. Law No. 5 of 1999 
concerning Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition 
(hereinafter, Indonesian Competition Law). The provision is further implemented 
in the Decision of the Ministry of Communication No. 34 of 2004 concerning the 
Supervision of Fair Competition in the Fixed Network and the Provision of Basic 
Telephony Services. It mainly lays down the prohibition of dominance abuse, rules 
for the use of access code and interconnection, and obligation to meet demand in 
limited services.
24  I  T  P  A : Building A Digital Indonesia: A 
Snapshot of the Indonesian Telecommunication Industry. Summary Report, 2015. 10.
25  Ministry of Communication and Information Regulation No. 17/PER/M.KOMINFO/10/2010 
concerning Organization and Working Procedure of the Ministry of Communication and Information.
26  Ministry of Communication and Information Regulation No. 36/PER/M.KOMINFO/10/2008 
concerning the Establishment of Indonesian Telecommunication Regulation Body as amended by 
Ministry of Communication and Information Regulation No. 31/PER/M.KOMINFO/8/2009.
27  Law No, 36 of 1999 Art. 4 par. (1)–(2).
28  Ibid. Art. 10 par. (1).
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As regards the use of internet, a diff erent regulation applies, namely Law No. 
19 of 2016 (hereafter, EIT Law) that amends Law. No. 11 of 2008 on Electronic 
Information and Transaction. The provisions of the law are implemented further in 
the Government Regulation No. 82 of 2012 concerning the Provision of Electronic 
Transaction System (hereafter, PETS Regulation). Although the placing of the 
responsibility to regulate the use of internet on the Ministry of Telecommunication 
and Informatics seems to be logical, it is feared that the Ministry would treat the 
digital market industry the same way as it treats the telecommunication industry as 
such that the digital market would be heavily regulated as the telecommunication 
industry. This concern is, however, still to be closely observed.
2.1.3. The Ex Post and Ex Ante Approaches
2.1.3.1. E  P  . E  A  A
To complete its task to ensure fair and eff ective competition in the market, competition 
law commonly takes an ex post approach, according to which the evaluation on the 
occurrence of anticompetitive elements in a certain conduct is carried out on a case 
by case basis. By taking this approach, competition law provides suffi  cient rooms for 
the freedom of companies to engage in business activities and moreover, to innovate, 
without the companies being restricted to overly rigid rules. In Indonesia, Law No. 
5 of 1999 is applied as a tool for ex post analysis of an allegation of an infringement 
of competition law.
Nevertheless, in certain cases, an ex ante approach is necessary. Such approach 
can be seen in several industries, especially those that are heavily regulated such as 
the telecommunications,29 energy,30 food retail,31 and the transportation industry.32
The choice to use an ex ante approach is justifi ed for instance when it involves 
public interests such as the interest to protect consumers and to safeguard public 
welfare by means of imposing tax regulation. In order to ensure that those interests 
are well shielded in the market, ex ante regulations are imposed. This is also the case 
in the transportation industry which becomes the focus of this study such as in Law 
No. 22/2009 on Traffi  c and Transportation, related specifi cally to taxi services.
The problem with taking ex ante approach is that it could be the case that a new 
development in the market has not yet been covered by the existing regulations, 
29  C. W  – J. S  – N. K : Telecom Regulatory and Policy Environment in 
Indonesia Results and Analysis of the 2008 TRE Survey. Final Report, 2008. 12.; E. M : The 
Protection of Consumer’ Rights and the Application of Criminal Law in the Unlawful Operation of 
Services and Content Service Applications. Indonesia Law Review, Vol. 2., N. 2., 2012. 231.
30  OECD and ADB Development Centre Seminars Asia and Europe Services Liberalisation: Services 
Liberalisation. Paris, OECD/ADB, 2003. 12–13.
31  W –N  op. cit. 73.
32  S. W : The Competitive Eff ect of the Sharing Economy: How Is Uber Changing Taxis? 
Technology Policy Institute, Studying the Global Information Economy, 2015. 2.
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while regulations cannot always predict such development, especially those brought 
by disruptive innovation. Online transportation network is not included Law No. 
22/2009 and hence, leaves a legal loophole as regards whether they are also subject to 
the obligation imposed by the Law and if so, whether it would be subject to the same 
obligation imposed to conventional taxi providers. However, there are diffi  culties to 
apply the Law to the online transportation network, mainly because by defi nition, 
they do not have the same characteristics as conventional taxi providers. This leads to 
asymmetrical regulations applicable to diff erent market players, i.e. the incumbents 
and the new players that brought innovation that has not yet been recognized yet in 
the existing regulation. In order to deal with this development, the Transportation 
Ministry enacted a new regulation that includes provisions applicable to online 
transportation network, namely Transportation Ministry Regulation No. 32 of 2016 
on the Provision of Transportation of Persons Using Motor Vehicle Not Based on 
Route (hereafter, Regulation No. 32/2016).
2.1.3.2. O  T  N : E  A  R   
A  R  I
The asymmetric regulation in the door to door transportation services apparently 
leads to advantageous circumstances for the new entrants. 33 It has given rooms for 
the online transportation network to enter the market with lower legal costs than 
those applicable to the conventional taxi providers. This advantage contributes to 
the ability of the new entrants to gain a foothold in the market by off ering generally 
lower prices than the incumbents. However, low price is not the only benefi t they 
off er to consumers. The innovation that makes it easier for consumers to order a 
transportation service from smartphones as well other relevant services such as the 
facility to track the car or motorbike being ordered or in transport and the review 
mechanisms has a signifi cant role in enabling them gaining consumer trust.
With the new Transportation Ministry Regulation, the Government attempts to 
balance the regulation asymmetry in order to ensure that no market player is standing 
above the law, although it also seems to be reluctant to clarify the obligations imposed 
on the online transportation network. In the interests of protecting consumers, 
businesses should not be hindered from innovating, but they are also subject to a 
number of requirements such as minimum safety and security standards. Regulations 
are meant to aff ord protection for consumers, who are usually in a weaker bargaining 
position when dealing with business entities. In other words, the regulations have a 
role to restore the balance by means of imposing appropriate policies.
However, it still needs to be clear that certain characteristics of the online 
transportation network actually make it more prone to be amenable to regulations.34 
33  D. E. R  – D. S : Like Uber, but for Local Governmental Policy: The Future of Local 
Regulation of the “Sharing Economy”. Working Paper, 15-01, 2–3. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2549919.
34  B. G. E  – D. G : Effi  ciencies and Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate 
Companies Like Airbnb and Uber? Stanford Technology Law Review, Vol. 19., 2016. 326.
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Transparency of payments and traceability of location exemplify this. Another feature 
such as reliable user review mechanisms that provide a reputational mechanism to 
address asymmetric information for users prior to the ride is also a considerable 
mechanism that could be more eff ective than security measures imposed by a 
government regulation.35
2.2. Sharing Economy or Just Business As Usual?
2.2.1. Online Transportation Network and Sharing Economy
The use of the sharing economy concept can be seen in how the online transportation 
network works. It has been applied by other online businesses as well. Zervas and 
Proserpio have made an extensive study on the application of the sharing economy 
concept by Airbnb36 in the accommodations market. Another example is UmbraCity, 
an umbrella sharing service.37 Companies operating as online transportation network 
act as an intermediary between consumers and vehicle owners with the purpose 
of gaining “full utilization of available resources”,38 in this case, optimizing the 
functionality and utility of goods by making them available for consumers and of 
creating economic value for the owner.
With the use of the internet that has become easily accessible, it becomes easier 
than ever for the owners of the available vehicles to off er them to potential users 
and for consumers to fi nd and order a ride service.39 This creates new businesses 
providing direct, peer-to-peer platforms with ease of access and competitive price40 
to bring together the owners of the resources and the users, usually in the short term.41 
This is the underlying idea of online transportation network to off er an answer for 
urban transportation problems.42
35  A. T  and Others: How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, and Reputational Feedback 
Mechanism Solve the ‘Lemon Problems’. Mercatus Working Paper, 2015. 37.
36  G. Z  – D. P : The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the 
Hotel Industry. Working Paper, 2016. 2.
37  UmbraCity, Homepage. http://umbracity.com/.
38  A. T. B : An App for That: Local Governments and the Rise of the Sharing Economy. Notre Dame 
Law Review Online, Vol. 90., N. 2., (2015) 78.
39  Ibid.
40  R. H. B : Regulating the Sharing Economy: New and Old Insights into an Oversight Regime for 
the Peer-to Peer Economy. Nebraska Law Review, Vol. 95., N. 1., (2016) 100.
41  R –S  op. cit. 2. See also T. T : Thoughts on the Sharing Economy. In: P. 
K  et al. (eds.): Proceedings of the International Conference ICT, Society and Human Beings 
2014, Web Based Community and Social Media 2014, e-Commerce 2014, Information Systems-Post 
Implementation 2014, and e-Health 2014, Multi Conference on Computer Science and Information 
Systems. July 15–19, 2014. Lisbon, Portugal, 323.
42  N. M. D  – J. J. I : The Sharing Economy as an Urban Phenomenon. Yale Law and 
Policy Review, Vol. 34., N. 2., (2016) 219.
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Online transportation network services are well-known for its competitive 
pricing43 that is defi ned by calculating the distance and other relevant elements, 
for instance, the road traffi  c. However, price is not the only successful keys; online 
transportation network also off ers a convenient process from ordering a vehicle to 
paying the service. In addition, a navigation system equips the vehicle to make it 
easier to pinpoint the exact location of the passengers and the destination. Prospective 
passengers can also track the location of the car being ordered and calculate how 
much time it will take for them to be picked up. 44 The navigation system does not 
only contribute to convenience, but it also off ers security measure to ensure that the 
passenger will be safely taken to the destination as ordered.
Responding to whether or not the sharing economy shall be regulated or how 
to regulate it, Stephen R. Miller introduced the fi rst principles for regulating the 
sharing economy45 based on the consideration that the sharing economy due to its 
disruptive nature usually has not been addressed in existing regulations, which leads 
to perception that it is fl outing of the existing rules. He uttered further that regulating 
the sharing economy requires a specifi c approach that involves a diff erentiated 
regulatory response. Hence, asymmetric regulation would remain in place, but this 
is merely a result of the diff erent nature of the object of the regulation. It is not 
recommended to apply the same rule equally to all players despite their diff erent 
natures.
2.2.2. New Business Scheme or An Escape from Rules?
A tempting question is whether the online transportation network in Indonesia is a 
pure implementation of the sharing economy that emphasizes on the full utilization 
of the available resources or they are merely a new business scheme used to avoid the 
existing rules. While the element of innovation and its role in attracting customers 
remain undeniable, the question focuses on understanding the nature of the business 
itself.
While the concept of the sharing economy centers in the optimization of 
resources, in practice, the resources used in the online transportation network are not 
always made available for customers not because they have already been existing, 
unused, and thus, available. Instead, people invest in buying vehicles, either cars or 
motorbikes, and paying drivers, then registering themselves by the online platforms 
such as Uber, GrabCar, GoJek or the likes. Hence, it is not the resources in terms 
of vehicles, but in terms of money that are optimized in the business. From this 
viewpoint, the scheme seems to escape from the original idea of the sharing economy 
43  C. D -C : Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an Alternative Capitalist System. 
Tulane Law Review, Vol. 90., N. 2., (2015) 256.
44  M. M : The “Taxi Cab Problem” Revisited: Law and Ubernomics in the Sharing Economy. 
Banking & Finance Law Review, Vol. 31., 2016. 470–471.
45  S. M : First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy. Harvard Journal on Legislation, 
Vol. 53., 2016. 151.
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and move towards the usual business of car rental with a combination of the role of 
the online platforms as the intermediary or an agent to hook them up with potential 
customers. Rather, it looks more like a scheme to circumvent the existing laws.
From the above point of consideration, it seems that treating the online 
transportation network in Indonesia as an implementation of the sharing economy 
would not be entirely correct. A further study on the business scheme is therefore 
necessary, for which an intervention from economists would be highly valuable.
3. Public Policy and Self-Regulation of Online Transportation Network 
in Indonesia
3.1. Public Policy in Indonesian Transportation Industry for Taxi Services
Door to door transportation services in Indonesia, i.e. taxi services, are subject inter 
alia to the provisions of Law No. 22 of 2009 on Traffi  c and Transportation (hereafter, 
Law No. 22/2009) and further regulations, including Transportation Ministry 
Regulation No. 32 of 2016 on the Provision of Transportation of Persons Using 
Motor Vehicle Not Based on Route (hereafter, Regulation No. 32/2016). The policy 
in the industry opens the participation of private entities to operate in the market, 
although it obliges local governments to ensure the provision of public transportation 
within their respective region and between diff erent regions operated by state-owned 
companies. This study is focusing on taxi services as the closest comparison to the 
online transportation network, because each type of public transportation is subject 
to diff erent policy and rules.
Taxi services, according to the law, fall under the category of “public 
transportation” to carry passengers (this term is used to distinguish the services from 
freight cars) off ering door to door services (to be distinguished from public buses, 
for instance),46 specially marked, and equipped with a meter.47 In addition, there are 
specifi c features that have to be assigned, such as the word “TAXI”48 on the top of 
the car accompanied with a translucent light to indicate whether the taxi is vacant or 
occupied and the brand of the taxi company that has to be easily visible for potential 
passangers.49 As a type of public transportation, taxis is also subject to the obligation 
to use a yellow shield number like other types of public vehicles in the country. There 
are two more types of shield number: red for state-owned cars and black for private 
cars. Taxi is allowed to operate only within a specifi c operating region so called the 
administrative district of regency.50
46  Ibid. Art. 9, par. (1).
47  Regulation No. 32/2016, Art. 1, no. 15.
48  “TAKSI” in Indonesian.
49  Regulation No. 32/2016, Art. 9, par. (2).
50  Ibid. Art. 4. In Jakarta, for instance, it covers a larger area than a province (the Capital of Jakarta), it 
includes fi ve areas covering also the suburbs, namely Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi. 
These areas are commonly known by their abbreviation Jabodetabek.
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Prior to the operation, taxi businesses are subject to a mandatory requirement 
to obtain an operating license.51 The licensing policy is based on the needs to 
supervise various aspects that are important fi rst of all, for consumers. One of the 
major considerations is ensuring the quality of the vehicles and drivers, for which 
certain measurement and test have to be followed. For the eligibility of an entity that 
is capable of taking legal liability, a business entity that wishes to operate as taxi 
service providers is obliged to fi rst establish a legal entity before it can apply for a 
license.52
Second, the licensing policy is based on the necessity to control the number of 
vehicles on the roads in the operating area concerned.53 The basic idea of this policy 
is to maintain a balance between the market demand and the road capacity with the 
purpose of preventing excessive congestion on the roads.
The third aspect is ensuring the interest to protect public welfare by means of 
controlling the fulfi llment of tax obligations by taxi companies.54 The obligation to 
establish a legal entity as explained above also aims at covering this aspect of the 
policy.
Still in the spectrum of protecting the interests of consumers, taxi services are 
subject to the rate formula and price range (between the minimum charge and 
maximum cap) determined by the taxi company with the approval of an association 
of public transportation service providers (called Organda) and the government.55 
Based on this, the actual fare is calculated and shown on the meter. Local governments 
can also set the fares on the basis of the cost of living standard in the region.
While taxi service providers are subject to the rules above that also incur costs, 
in practice, online transportation network entered the market without having to meet 
the same requirements due to the absence of regulation applicable to them. In order 
to address the imbalance resulting from the asymmetric regulation, Regulation No. 
32/2016 imposes the same obligations to online transportation network providers 
as those imposed to conventional taxi service providers. The Regulation clarifi es 
further that the online transportation network are treated under the regulation as 
public transportation provision with an IT application basis,56 as distinguished from 
taxi services, which are categorized as transportation for persons using motor vehicle 
not based on route.57 
Regulation No. 32/2016 distinguishes between two diff erent types of companies 
involved in the online transportation network business model: fi rst, companies that 
provide IT applications that are used to bring together transportation service providers 
and their users; and second, companies that provide transportation services. Further, 
51  Ibid. Art. 21.
52  Ibid. Art. 22.
53  Ibid. Art. 5–7.
54  Law No. 22/2009, Art. 67.
55  This issue has been subject to discussions whether it would not qualify price cartel.
56  Law No. 22/2009, Art. 2, lit. c.
57  Ibid. Art. 3.
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for the provision of online transportation network services, Regulation No. 32/2016 
the fi rst party to cooperate with the second party,58 but it specifi cally prohibits the 
fi rst party to also act as the second party.59 Thus, the two parties will remain separate 
entities.
However, in the next step, Regulation No. 32/2016 also allows an exemption of 
the prohibition without clearly clarifying the ground for the exemption. It basically 
allows IT companies that provide applications and enter the online transportation 
network to operate businesses in the provision of transportation services for persons, 
under the condition that they are treated the same way as companies that operate in 
that particular industry, including conventional taxis.60 Hence, they are also subject 
to the obligations applicable for conventional taxis: (1) mandatory requirement to 
obtain operating licenses,61 (2) obligation to establish an Indonesian legal entity,62 
and (3) owning a car pool of at least fi ve cars and a storefront, and employing only 
drivers with driver licenses, as pre-requisites to obtain an operating license.63
It seems that the regulation attempts to encourage IT companies operating as 
online platforms that provide applications for matching transportation service 
providers with users to limit their business strictly to providing such services. Once 
they expand their operation to provide the transportation services themselves, they 
will fall under the same regulations applicable for conventional taxis and this is 
something that they would not be fond of because it would incur costs that would not 
allow them to set their prices as low as before.
3.2. Integrating Public Policy in Self-Regulation of Online Transportation Network
Ensuring safe use of internet has become the interest of diff erent stake holders and 
internet governance has been discussed from various perspectives. Roy Balleste 
argued that while there are numerous views on how to govern the internet, the most 
crucial concern in approaching internet governance should be human dignity.64 
Although the idea is sound and ideal, it has not been suffi  ciently discussed how it 
is defi ned and implemented. Nevertheless, there are a number of issues that become 
common concerns in the use of the internet, such as privacy and data protection, 
cyber security, the freedom to speech, dispute resolutions, and intellectual property 
rights protection. Moreover, there are also competition law concerns such as how to 
make sure that self-regulation is not abused by dominant market players to defi ne 
terms and conditions in order to strengthen their market power or to facilitate 
58  Ibid. Art. 41, par. (1).
59  Ibid. Art. 41, par. (2).
60  Ibid. Art. 42.
61  Ibid. Art. 21.
62  Ibid. Art. 22.
63  Ibid. Art. 23.
64  R. B : Internet Governance: Origins, Current Issues, and Future Possibilities. Lanham–
Boulder–New York–London, Rowman & Littlefi eld, 2015. 7.
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cartel practices. The question is whether or how far self-regulation is capable of 
covering public interests or whether it would be better to leave those interests to state 
intervention in the form of government regulation.
The discussions could start from understanding the nature of internet governance. 
Milton L. Mueller observed that internet governance has two dimensions: technical 
management and regulatory control, and a fundamental issue when discussing about 
internet governance is to defi ne the distinct scope of each dimension and where 
both intersect.65 As Laura DeNardis put it, internet governance ‘refers generally to 
policy and technical coordination issues related to the exchange of information over 
the Internet.’66 In the process of governing the internet, a question arises as to who 
governs the internet. Rolf H. Weber envisaged the multi-stakeholder of governing 
the internet as he stated that internet governance deals with questions, for instance, 
of ‘who rules the internet, in whose interest, by which mechanisms and for which 
purposes’.67 Thus, there are various actors on the internet who have interests not only 
to have safe internet for their activities, but also take further steps, namely to design 
the rules of how to carry out activities on the internet.
Mueller argued that the control of the internet is exercised by institutions instead 
of by command. Parties interacting in the internet set rules to ensure reliable network 
equipped with monitoring and sanctions to safeguard the rules. However, the rules 
themselves are infl uenced by the bargaining power of the parties involved and thus, 
never entirely neutral in nature, because some parties are more powerful than the 
other. The way they are formulated and applied might favor certain interest over 
the other. In process, the rules will deal with pressures to adjust with the interest 
of various parties.68 The exercise of bargaining power between parties is therefore 
part of the vital process in governing the internet. When discussing how the internet 
would challenge the nation-state, he argued that the internet will keep on creating 
institutional innovations in information and communication globally that both the 
volume of transactions and content on the internet might overcome the capacity 
of and transform traditional government processes. Also, the participation in the 
network as well as the authority over the network is decentralized as such that they 
are no longer closely aligned with political components.69
65  M. L. M : Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace. Cambridge–
Massachusetts–London, MIT Press, 2002. 8.
66  L. D N : Protocol Politics: The Globalization of Internet Governance. Cambridge–
Massachusetts–London, MIT Press, 2009. 14.
67  R. H. W : Shaping Internet Governance: Regulatory Challenges. Berlin–Heidelberg, Springer, 
2010. 105. See also L. P : Internet Governance: Time for An Update. CSS Analysis on Security 
Policy, No. 163, November 2014. ETH Zurich, 2.
68  M. L. M : Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace. Cambridge–
Massachusetts–London, MIT Press, 2002. 11.
69  M. L. M : Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace. Cambridge–
Massachusetts–London, MIT Press, 2010. 4.
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J. Mathiason categorized three types of governance functions in the internet, 
namely standardization, resource allocation and assignment, and public policy. 
While the fi rst two are performed mostly by non-state actors that he classifi ed further 
as engineers, entrepreneurs, and netizens (referring to avid internet users), the third 
function to formulate and enforce policy as well as dispute resolution function is 
exercised mostly by state.70 Thus, he emphasized the role of state in governing the 
internet when it comes to public policy.
Self-regulation has been recognized as one way to regulate activities within the 
scope of a certain industry. In the context of internet governance, Vey Mestdagh and 
Rudolf Rijgersberg viewed self-regulation as an unsophisticated way to regulate the 
internet since the subjects of the regulation are at the same time also the creators 
and enforcers of the regulation.71 Virginia Haufl er explained that although the rules 
governing the behavior of the subjects are adopted voluntarily, they could also be 
backed up by a set of enforcement mechanisms that include agreements between 
companies or other groups.72
George Christou and Seamus Simpson argued that self-regulation from economic 
viewpoint implies both the freedom and the responsibility of market players to 
govern their own behavior in the market. Hence, a self-regulated market is a 
commercial construct of the most liberally ordered in the capitalist system.73 This 
is also happening in online businesses in order to secure the interests of the parties 
involved in the transactions. Although the general rules that are mandatory in nature 
from the applicable laws or government regulations apply, certain activities are too 
complex to rely merely on the general rules, for which exhaustive discussions and 
interpretations are needed before the rules could be applied. Moreover, disruptive 
innovation might bring also new business models that have not yet been recognized 
in the existing laws or government regulations that applying the general rules to the 
transactions involved becomes more intricate. However, it could also be the case 
that self-regulation mechanism is chosen for the basic consideration that the online 
platforms wish to shield themselves from legal liability and sometimes they also limit 
their liability to an extent that it actually does not equally safeguard the interest of 
the users (or consumers). Moreover, it is could be the case that the rules in the self-
regulation mechanism are not (at least easily) negotiable by applying standard clauses 
that do not leave suffi  cient rooms for users to negotiate otherwise. 
70  J. M : Internet Governance: The New Frontier of Global Institutions. London–New York, 
Routledge, 2009. 18.
71  C. Vey M  – R. R : Internet Governance and Global Self Regulation: Building 
locks for a General Theory of Self-Regulation. The Theory and Practice of Legislation, Vol. 4., N. 
3., (2010) 385–404.
72  V. H : A Public Role for the Private Sector: Self-Regulation in A Global Economy. 
Massachusetts, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1957. 8.
73  G. C  – S. S : The Internet and Public-Private Governance in the European Union. 
Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 26., N. 1., (2006) 47–48.
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Michael Hutter explained two guiding principles that lead to the creation of self-
regulation. Both are complimentary. The fi rst, and the dominant view, is the effi  ciency 
principle, in which private actors in the market, i.e. in the internet, among diff erent 
alternatives concerning cost, eff ectiveness, and utility make a rational decision that 
results in new rules and organizational forms. Such result might emanate from an 
explicit choice or merely an unintended consequence of the sequence of choices. The 
second is the viable principle, according to which all regimes adopt and follow a set 
of rules and institute supporting regimes in order to maintain their continuity that 
results in evolutionary process of self-reproduction in which new regime will emerge 
and replace the old one.74 
While extensive studies have been made to explain how internet stakeholders take 
responsibilities to design, follow, and enforce the rules on the internet, the question 
remains whether they would have either the will or the capacity to tackle public 
interests that might not or not directly fall under their own interests. The analysis 
on this issue focuses on the sector of online transportation network. I will start with 
discussing how self-regulation in online transportation network could be useful to 
protect the interests of parties involved in the transactions and how it could integrate 
public policy in the regulation. Afterwards, I will discuss the downsides of this type 
of regulation.
3.2.1. Public Policy and Self-Regulation
There are advantages and disadvantages of choosing self-regulation over state 
regulation as a way to design the rule of the game in the market. Ian Bartle and Peter 
Vass claimed that self-regulation has advantages over state regulation in certain 
aspects, such as the more eff ective use of knowledge and expertise of all parties, 
more commitment within the industry, less regulatory burden placed on business 
entities and less expenses for state to make regulation, and better functioning of the 
market.  75 Because it is of the parties’ best interest to design the most suitable rules 
for their activities, they will optimize the use of their knowledge and expertise to 
draw the rules. Following the logic of the game theory, they also understand that by 
abiding by the rules they have made, they will be better off  than otherwise.76 Hence, 
the commitment to follow the rules is more inner-driven than having to be enforced 
by external powers such as from law enforcers or courts. It entails less regulatory 
74  M. H : Effi  ciency, Viability, and the New Rules of the Internet. European Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 11., N. 1., (2001) 5–22., especially 17. See also, D. G  – N. W : Making 
Corporate Self-Regulation Eff ective in Developing Countries. World Development, Vol. 34., N. 6., 
(2006) 869.
75  I. B  – P. V : A Theory of Government Regulation and Self-Regulation: A Survey of Policy and 
Practice. In: Research Report 17. Centre for the Study of Regulated Industry, School of Management, 
University of Bath, 2005. 2.
76  See B. C  – M. B : Economic Behavior, Game Theory, and Technology in 
Emerging Markets. Hershey, Business Science Reference, 2013. 33.
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burden for business entities, because they understand best how to eff ectively design a 
set rules that costs the least. For state, as argued by A. Roßnagel and G. Hornung, it 
means also less expense in economic and political terms for regulation making, while 
state can then focus on more essential matters.77 In the end, it results in a market that 
functions better, because of less infringement and hence, less legal costs being spent 
to deal with legal infringements.
On the benefi t or loss regarding the costs for regulation making, Peter Grajzl and 
Peter Murell argued that it is infl uenced by country-specifi c aspects. The benefi t of 
delegating regulatory powers to private sectors, i.e. self-regulation, will be greater 
than the loss, when the uncertainty around the result of the regulation making is large 
or when the divergence between the interests of producers and consumers is small.78
Éric Brousseau uttered that the absence of control by state in self-regulation also 
contributes to the innovative way the internet could be regulated, although it does 
not make it a perfect model.79 Further, the technical logic that governs the work of 
the internet allows it to expel infringers from the platform and thus, facilitate the 
enforcement by means of access control and use of subscribers list. However, this 
power is also problematic, because it can be exercised without having to take into 
account constitutional or ethical principles, merely because it can technically be 
done. 80
Philip J. Weiser citing Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the United States Federal 
Trade Commission, explained how self-regulation could play a role in supporting 
public policy as follows:81
From a public policy perspective, self-regulation can off er several advantages over 
government regulation or legislation. It often is more prompt, fl exible, and eff ective 
than government regulation. Self-regulation can bring the accumulated judgment 
and experience of an industry to bear on issues that are sometimes diffi  cult for 
the government to defi ne with bright line rules. Finally, government resources are 
77  A. R  – G. H : Self-Regulation of Internet Privacy in Germany and the European 
Union. SungKyunKwan Journal of Science and Technology Law, Vol. 55., 2007. 61. See also, 
S. R : Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing Economy. 
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology, Vol. 16., N. 1., (2015) 439.
78  P. G  – P. M : Allocating Law Making Powers: Self-Regulation vs Government 
Regulation. Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 35., 2007. 540.
79  É. B : Internet Regulation: Does Self-Regulation Require an Institutional Framework? 
Paper to be presented at the DRUID Summer Conference on “Industrial Dynamics of the New and 
Old Economy – Who Is Embracing Whom?” Copenhagen–Elsinore 6–8 June 2002. 2.
80  É. B : Internet Regulation: Does Self-Regulation Require an Institutional Framework? 
Paper to be presented at the DRUID Summer Conference on “Industrial Dynamics of the New and 
Old Economy – Who Is Embracing Whom?”, Copenhagen–Elsinore 6–8 June 2002. 9–11.
81  P. J. W : The Future of Internet Regulation. UC Davis Law Review,Vol. 43., 2009. 529–590, 
557., fn. No. 106.; cited from R. P : Self Regulation and Antitrust. Address at the D.C. Bar 
Association Symposium, February 18, 1998. See also C. T. M : Beyond Europe: The Internet, 
Regulation, and Multistakeholder Governance – Representing the Consumer Interest? Journal of 
Consumer Policy, Vol. 31., 2008. 117.
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limited and unlikely to grow in the future. Thus, many government agencies, like the 
FTC, have sought to leverage their limited resources by promoting and encouraging 
self-regulation.
Self-regulation can also be useful to gain user trust as pointed out by Z. Tang, 
Y.D. Hu and M. D. Smith.82 This is why online feedback mechanisms through 
which businesses build their reputation is important. Users, or consumers, rely on 
producer’s reputation more than on procedural laws or alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms when deciding in split seconds whether they will buy the product or not. 
Trust via reputation is hence, seen as the basis of dispute prevention mechanism that 
gain more importance than dispute settlements either by or without court.
However, there are limitations in how public interests could be fully dealt 
with self-regulation by default in such a way that state intervention in the form of 
regulation is no longer needed. Zoë Bird criticized self-regulation as falling shorts 
certain expectations to protect public and consumer interests, such as privacy 
protection, security, and access to diverse content.83 Norman E. Bowie and Karim 
Jamal also expressed privacy concerns in self-regulation of internet in the absence 
of government regulation.84 Ian Bartle and Peter Vass in their study warned that self-
regulation should be used with certain cautions. One of them is that self-regulation 
has to represent not only private but also public interests.85 John E. Savage and Bruce 
W. McConell in their paper suggested that self-regulation of the multi-stakeholder 
internet has several disadvantages. It lacks of rules applicable for multi-stakeholder 
operation, suff ers a perceived lack of accountability, many states consider it as having 
feeble legitimacy, and there is inequality of engagement from stakeholders who are 
not technology providers.86
All types of regulation have its scope of applicability. Even when territorial scope 
does not play a role due to a non-territorial nature of the activities, such as the internet 
or to be more specifi c, online businesses, it remains subject to other scope limitations, 
such as the platform itself. How to use Google is not applicable to Bing or Ebay, for 
instance. Hence, one of the limitation is that self-regulation within a specifi c market 
– relevant market borrowing the term used in competition law - cannot include rules 
82  Z. T  – Y. D. H  – M. D. S : Gaining Trust through Online Privacy Protection: Self-Regulation, 
Mandatory Standards, or Caveat Emptor. Journal of Management Information Systems, Vol. 24., N. 
4., (2008) 153–173.
83  Z. B : Governing the Internet: Engaging Government, Business, and Nonprofi ts. Foreign Aff airs, 
Vol. 81., N. 2., (2002) 16.
84  N. E. B  – K. J : Privacy Rights on the Internet: Self-Regulation or Government Regulation? 
Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 16., N. 3., (2006) 331. See also M. J. C : Protecting Privacy 
Online: Is Self-Regulation Working? Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, Vol. 19., N. 1., (2000) 22.; 
D. H : The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation? 
Seattle University Law Review, Vol. 34., 2011. 443.
85  B –V  op. cit. 3.
86  J. E. S  – B. W. M C : Exploring Multi-Stakeholder Internet Governance. Report, East 
West Institute, 20 January 2015. https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/exploring-multi-stakeholder-internet-
governance.
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applicable to other market. The rules governing online transportation network are 
not applicable to conventional taxis and cannot be expected to take into account 
interests of parties beyond their own platform. The problem is that public interests 
might occur beyond the platform, but are aff ected by activities within the platform. 
Thus, the ability of self-regulation to govern activities in their own specifi c sector or 
platform should not release stat from its task to shield public interests by means of 
state regulation or by means of supervision and regulatory reviews.
3.2.2. Self-Regulation and Anticompetitive Conducts
Self-regulation might raise competition law concerns when it is (mis)used to facilitate 
anticompetitive conducts, for instance if it is used to enable companies providing the 
services to exclude competitors or to exploit their market power in the market. Hence, 
self-regulation is rightly subject to competition authority supervision.
Exclusionary conducts might occur for instance when self-regulation contains a 
privacy policy that restricts users to provide the same personal data or the same 
quality of data to competitors or limiting the choice of users to use services provided 
by the online platform’s competitors. It could also be an exclusionary policy when 
it hinders portability to allow them moving to or using the same services from 
competitors.
Exploitative conducts, on the other hand, might be the case when the freedom of 
user to negotiate a policy is restricted. Due to the online platform’s dominance in the 
market, the user would be left only with the option to take the policy or leave it and 
use less preferable services provided by the online platform’s competitors.
The Policy Guidelines87 published by KPPU alert that competition authority 
shall consider self-regulation with cautions. Because the incentive to compete is an 
important element of encouraging innovation, the Guidelines fi nd it necessary to 
carefully evaluate regulations having potentials to facilitate cartels. Here, innovation 
should play an important role as the main concern of the competition authority for 
evaluating such regulations, to which type self-regulation is considered to belong.88
As regards online transportation network, anticompetitive pricing concern arises 
due to the low prices off ered in comparison to those of conventional taxi providers. 
The concern is now under the scrutiny of KPPU focusing on whether such pricing is 
part of predatory pricing in the early stage that aims at driving out competitors from 
the market.89 KPPU might also need to look into another concern whether there is no 
abuse of power by squeezing suppliers, i.e. vehicle owners, in order to generate such 
competitive prices in the market.
87  KPPU Regulation No. 04 of 2016.
88  KPPU Regulation No. 04 of 2016, Attachment, p. 33.
89  KPPU: Predatory Pricing, KPPU Awasi dan Selidiki Angkutan Online. http://www.kppu.go.id/id/
blog/2016/10/predatory-pricing-kppu-awasi-dan-selidiki-angkutan-online/.
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4. Self-Regulating Online Transportation Network or Government Regulation?
4.1. Balancing Asymmetrical Regulation Through Government Regulation
Asymmetrical regulation tends to result in at least perceived inequality before the 
law for market players. Although asymmetrical regulation could be a result from 
the diffi  culties to predict innovation and hence, fi rst, certain innovative products are 
missing from the existing regulation, and second, either condemn the product as 
illegal or applying the regulation on the basis of one regulation fi ts all would not be 
fair, it creates tension to some extent in the market because of the absence of the legal 
cost for new comers could bring new comer advantages.
The enactment of the new Ministry Regulation, Regulation No. 32/2016, was a 
response of the Government in its attempt to balance the asymmetrical regulation 
resulting from the entrance of online transportation network in the market. The 
message to deliver with it is that the Government has taken action to restore justice. 
According to the Regulation, companies operating as online transportation network 
is given two options. First, they can operate merely as online application providers, 
or second, they can at the same time also operate as conventional taxi providers, 
e.g. operating their own cars, for which similar rules with those applicable for 
conventional taxi providers apply.
Although the new regulation might pragmatically solve the problem – which 
remains to be seen in the coming years -, the question remains: how fast the 
government would or should respond in similar ways whenever new innovation 
occurs in the market? It seems that changing regulations all the time would not only 
be costly, but also unpredicted. Bearing in mind that legal compliance would incur 
costs; unpredictable changes of regulation would be daunting for market players and 
tend to deter them from innovating.
4.2. Self-Regulation of Online Platform Instead of Government Regulation
M. Mueller, J. Mathiason, and H. Klein while proposing principles and norms for 
the foundation of global internet governance suggested that “governmental forms 
of supervision and oversight must be strategically placed but also carefully limited 
and lawful” and instead, to legitimate and maintain multi-stakeholders governance.90 
Although this view seems to be favoring limited governmental intervention in the 
internet governance, it should be understood in the context of the global nature, 
i.e. the non-territorial characteristic, of the internet that entails the necessity of 
detaching from the traditional approach of a top-down regulating mechanism based 
on territorial state(s) interests. 
90  M. M  – J. M  – H. K : The Internet and Global Governance: Principles and Norms 
for a New Regime. Global Governance, Vol. 13., N. 2., (2007) 250.
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There are matters that still require state involvement in the form of regulation. 
In utilizing self-regulation, J. P. Kesan and A. A. Galo proposed a mixed model of 
bottom-up and top-down regulation approach.91 Certain issues such as tax compliance, 
security measures on the internet or in online transactions, and consumer protection 
still require state intervention at least in provision of the guiding principles and 
supervision, as well as law enforcement when self-regulation fails to enforce them 
on free will or voluntarily basis.
4.3. Regulating Innovation and Sharing Economy
Innovation is hard to regulate, especially disruptive innovation, because it is diffi  cult 
to envisage. If at all, the role of regulations as regards innovation would be to 
encourage and provide incentives to innovate. On the other hand, leaving innovative 
products unregulated might also create legal uncertainty. Sharing economy, the 
underlying business idea of online transportation network, also elevates legal issues 
that might lead to uncertainty, because there are elements of the business operation 
that do not fall under the existing legal categories.92 Certain issues such as tax, 
consumer protection, insurance, security measures, business licensing, and pricing 
mechanisms are among others that have been addressed in the debate of the legality 
of online transportation network.
As regards consumer protection, C. Koopman, M. Mitchel, and A. Thierer 
argued that traditional legal measures are not the only way to protect the interests of 
consumers. In the case of sharing economy, they specifi cally addressed the role of 
reputation established through the modern online feedback mechanisms.93 Reputation 
has increasingly important roles for business players to build consumer trust94 and 
consumers have a critical part in defi ning the reputation of business players they 
are dealing with. This mechanism is also used in sharing economy business model. 
Only reputable players will survive in the market. Hence, the compliance to what is 
necessary to serve the consumer interests is not enforced by law, but by understanding 
how the business works.
91  J. P. K  – A. A. G : Why Are the United States and the European Union Failing to Regulate the 
Internet Effi  ciently? Going Beyond the Bottom-Up and Top-Down Alternatives. European Journal of 
Law and Economics, Vol. 21., 2006. 262–263.
92  V. K : Regulating the Sharing Economy. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 30., N. 385., 
(2015) 1068.
93  C. K  – M. M  – A. T : The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection 
Regulation: The Case for Policy Change. Mercatus Research, George Mason University, 2014. 16.
94  US F  T  C : The Sharing Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants & 
Regulators. Staff  Report, November 2016. 51.
315Safeguarding Public Interests in Self-Regulating Platform…
5. Conclusion 
The role of innovation in the emerging of the digital market becomes more prominent, 
but it also raises legal questions. While innovation has not been given a clear role 
in shaping suitable approaches, markets take their own way to respond to the new 
development as shown in the use of online transportation network. Along with this 
development, regulation asymmetry has been accused for not allowing a level playing 
fi eld between conventional taxis and online transportation network and the concept 
of the sharing economy challenges current policy approach in the country that tends 
to prefer ex-ante regulation approach in transportation industry. This paper argues 
that self-regulation of online platform could be a better alternative than attempting 
to restore the balance of the existing regulation asymmetry by means of introducing 
a government regulation aiming at fi tting all size. However, state intervention in the 
form of state regulation, supervision and regulatory reviews remain necessary to 
protect public interests that are not or diffi  cult to be covered by self-regulation such 
as issues concerning tax compliance, security measures on the internet or in online 
transactions, intellectual property rights, consumer protection, and fair competition.
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SMASHING PUMPKINS: INTERVENTIONS TO THE 
ECONOMY IN HUNGARY, FROM A COMPETITION POLICY 
PERSPECTIVE
Pál S *
Competition Law Research Centre, Hungary
1. Introduction
In a previous article, I described the actual mishaps in competition regulation in 
Hungary.1 The newly elected Hungarian Government introduced very protectionist 
rhetoric followed by similar actions. In this article, I will show some of the actions 
of the government and look at how this relates to mainstream competition policy 
thinking.
The Government began a large-scale redirection of the economy as Hungary was 
on the verge of bankruptcy. This redirection involved several contested decisions, 
such as: Erzsébet utalvány (cafeteria vouchers system); lex MOL; and statutory price 
drops for utilities.2
For a long time, Hungarian competition policy was regarded as one of the best 
among countries with newly introduced competition legislation.3 This was a result 
of the legacy of the fi rst few leaders of the Hungarian competition authority, who 
*   The Director of the Competition Law Research Centre in Hungary and associate professor at Pázmány 
Péter Catholic University. 
1   See Pál S : Hungarian Competition Law & Policy: The Watermelon Omen. Competition 
Policy International – Antitrust Chronicle, 10/2. (2012) 2.
2   See also Márton V  –  Mónika P : The crisis, national economic particularism and EU law: What 
can we learn from the hungarian case? http://hpops.tk.mta.hu/uploads/fi les/The_crisisCMLREV.
pdf.
3   See also Tihamér T : The Reception and Application of EU Competition Rules in Hungary: 
An Organic Evolution. PLWP, 2013/17. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2402616.; Tihamér T : EU 
Enlargement and Modernisation of Competition Law: Some National Experiences. In: Damien 
G  (ed.): Modernisation and enlargement: two major challanges for EC competition law. 
Antwerpen–Oxford, Intersentia, 2004. 367–384.; Tihamér T : Competition Law in Hungary: 
Harmonisation Towards EU Membership. European Competition Law Review, 19/6. (July 1998) 358.
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could achieve large-scale real independence for the authority. The leaders of the 
competition authority changed after the election of the new government in 2010. 
There was a large turnover of former competition authority too. These departures left 
the new President and his team with the responsibility to recalibrate the authority. 
The staff  that was hired around that time now hold leading positions within the 
national competition authority.
Skimming through the case law we see several protectionist measures that make 
it diffi  cult to navigate the Hungarian competition policy landscape. In a previous 
article,4 I highlighted the diffi  culties arising from the fi rst few interventions by the 
Hungarian government. In this article, I will elaborate on the issue that draws a clear, 
systematic system of national protectionist measures.
2. Legislative interventions
2.1. Direct intervention – a consumer welfare gain or loss?
One of the fi rst initiatives of the new Government after the 2010 election victory was 
requiring utilities to drop their prices for households by 10%, including electricity, 
gas or water utilities. This is a clear short-term gain for households. Between 2010 
and 2015, household electricity prices decreased 27.3% and household gas prices fell 
36.5%.5 Consumers in competition law include both natural persons and undertakings 
that are the fi nal buyers of a particular product or service. As can be seen in the 
same European Commission report, the end-user electricity prices paid by industrial 
consumers only had a very small price range and was basically stagnant while many 
Member States faced an increase in prices. Based on pricing alone, the Government 
intervention had led to a clear consumer welfare gain in the short term. However, 
many question what impact this will have on the state of the utilities networks and 
innovation. In the water sector there are already some signs that the underinvestment 
and lack of systematic maintenance and upgrades is leading to harm that might be 
greater than the savings generated by the price drop. No systematic study on this 
exists so a conclusion cannot be drawn yet.
2.2. Transfer of welfare
For a short time, a very important topic was the role of Uber on the market. It is very 
obvious that Uber generates huge consumer welfare gains. It provided a clear system 
for paying for travel with the cab and led to decreased prices for consumers. Quality 
was also improved for individual consumers since, contrary to the taxi companies, 
consumers could rate the drivers and achieved a higher rate of satisfaction and better-
quality treatment in the end. The decree on regulating taxi drivers was adopted a 
4   S  (2012) op. cit. 2.
5   See European Commission: 2nd Report on the State of the Energy Union (2017).
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short time before Uber entered the market. Probably due to political reasons, the 
government fi nally succeeded in expelling Uber from the Hungarian market. Uber’s 
expulsion led to higher, regulated prices for consumers and a welfare transfer to the 
few taxi drivers.
2.3. Wasting an opportunity
In September 2014, the Hungarian Competition Authority began an investigation into 
a public procurement cartel and conducted a dawn raid.6 Four companies connected 
with the undertakings allegedly shared information with each other regarding public 
procurement procedures in the waste collection sector between 2012 and 2014. In the 
decision that fi nally closed the case, the GVH stated that protecting public interests 
would have warranted a full investigation of the alleged practices, especially due to 
the very high market share of the undertakings participating in the alleged cartel and 
the nationwide presence of these companies.7 In December 2014, an MP proposed 
an amendment to the Act on the Foundations of the Central Budget of Hungary 
arguing that public procurement of products in the waste collection sector that are 
subject to environmental product charges requires information sharing between 
the undertakings that are capable of collecting waste and that if the undertakings 
entered into price competition it would endanger waste collection and environmental 
policy goals. Therefore, such cartels shall be exempted from the cartel prohibition. 
The fi nal act adopted by the Hungarian Parliament was worded, as follows: “[a]n 
infringement of Article 11 of the Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and 
Restrictive Market Practices cannot be established for behavior committed in 2012-
2013 regarding the public procurements concerning the execution of the activities of 
the OGyHT.”8 As can be seen, the Parliament basically exempted all cartels in the 
sector in a specifi c act directed at infringements committed in the previous two years. 
These rules entered into force on the 1st of January 2015. In February 2015 the GVH 
terminated the investigation and closed the case. The GVH decision particularly 
relied on the act and stressed that under such circumstances, public interest is best 
served if the GVH concentrates on other possible infringements of the competition 
act.9 However, the national competition authority failed to argue why Article 101 (1) 
TFEU was not applied to the infringement in the case. According to the press release 
issued a day after the dawn raids, the undertakings being investigated basically cover 
the entire market and have a nationwide presence.
2.4. Agricartelculture – nomen est omen
6   See press release on 19 September 2014. http://www.gvh.hu/sajtoszoba/sajtokozlemenyek/2014-es_
sajtokozlemenyek/kartellgyanu_miatt_inditott_eljarast_a_gazdasagi_v.html.
7   See Vj/67-59/2014 – ALCUFER et al., 19/02/2015.
8   Article 125 of Act 99 of 2014.
9   Vj/67-59/2014 – ALCUFER et al., 19/02/2015.
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Even today the competition act has another “interesting” article: Article 93/A. In 
2012, an act10 introduced some surprising passages into the competition act.11 The 
new rules came into force on the 28th of November 2012.12 In May 2015, the Minister 
for Justice proposed an amendment to the competition act to stress that if EU law is 
applicable, the rules in the article do not apply. The legislation in force currently is, 
as follows:
(1) In respect of agricultural products an infringement of the prohibition pursuant 
to Article 11 shall not be established if the distortion, restriction, or prevention 
of competition resulting from an agreement pursuant to Article 11 does not 
exceed the extent which is necessary to attain an economically justifi ed, 
legitimate income and the player of the market aff ected by the agreement is 
not shut out from the attainment of such income.
(2) The minister responsible for agricultural policy shall establish whether the 
conditions of the exemption pursuant to paragraph (1) are met.
(3) In the course of an investigation of the infringement of the prohibition 
pursuant to Article 11 in respect of an agricultural product the Hungarian 
Competition Authority shall obtain the statement of the minister responsible 
for agricultural policy pursuant to paragraph (2) and shall proceed in line with 
it. The minister responsible for agricultural policy shall provide its statement 
within sixty days from the receipt of the inquiry of the Hungarian Competition 
Authority, for the period of which the Hungarian Competition Authority shall 
suspend its proceeding.
(4) The competition council proceeding in the case shall suspend the imposition of 
a fi ne in the case of an agreement infringing Article 11 where the infringement 
has been committed in respect of an agricultural product. In such a case the 
competition council proceeding in the case asks the parties to the agreement 
or the concerted practice to bring their conduct in line with the legislation 
by setting a time limit. If the time limit expires to no eff ect, the competition 
council proceeding in the case shall impose a fi ne.
(5) Paragraphs (1)–(4) shall only apply to a case, if the necessity of the application 
of Article 101 of the TFEU does not arise. The necessity of the application of 
Article 101 of the TFEU shall be established by the Hungarian Competition 
Authority in its competition supervision proceeding pursuant to Article 3(1) 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, before making the fi nal resolution.
10  Act no. CLXXVI of 2012 on amendment of Act CXXVIII of 2012 on inter-branch organisations and 
on certain aspects of agricultural markets.
11  See also Tihamér T : The fall of agricultural cartel enforcement in Hungary. European Competition 
Law Review, 34/7. (2013) 359.
12  I have already written about this previously: S  (2012) op. cit. 2.
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While writing this article, the last case concerning agriculture in Hungary was in 
2016 (a concentration).13 Prior to that, there was a case on misleading advertising.14 
The last case concerning the antitrust rules a matter that was terminated based on the 
amendment of the Competition Act in 2012.15
In 2013, the Hungarian Chamber of Agriculture was established as a public 
body. The Hungarian Chamber of Agriculture (HCA) covers the whole domestic 
food chain, the agricultural production activity and the fi eld of rural development 
through its members. Recently, the Chamber has been pushing for stabilization in 
the agricultural market.
2.5. Public interest at stake
Since 2010 more than 200 fi rms were renationalized, for which more than 5 billion 
EUR was paid out.16 As part of this process, in 2013 a new article was introduced to 
the competition act.17 Article 24/A. The new act entered into force the day after offi  cial 
publication. The new article concerns merger control and was amended in 2016. The 
original text of the act stated that there is no need to ask for the authorization of the 
GVH for certain concentrations. This was amended and after the 2016 amendment 
entered into force, the text changed to the following: “[t]he Government may, in the 
public interest, in particular to preserve jobs and to assure the security of supply, 
declare a concentration of undertakings to be of strategic importance at the national 
level. Such concentration must not pursuant to Article 24 be notifi ed to the Gazdasági 
Versenyhivatal.”
Since the adoption of these rules there have been several government regulations 
to declare certain concentrations to be of strategic importance at the national level. 
These include: 
• a concentration in the gas sector,18 
13  Vj-69-116/2016. GreenChem Hungary Kft. and Multicore Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft.
14  Vj/82-72/2013. Első Magyar Karbongazdálkodási, Megújuló Energetikai, Egészségmegőrzési és 
Ingatlanhasznosítási Technológiákat Fejlesztő Innovációs Projekt Kft. et al.
15  Vj-62-64/2012. ALDI Magyarország Élelmiszer Bt. et al.
16  See Péter M : The renationalization of privatized assets in Hungary, 2010–2014. MT-DP – 
2015/7. http://econ.core.hu/fi le/download/mtdp/MTDP1507.pdf.
17  Act Nr. CXCI of 2013. Article 1.
18  146/2017. (VI. 12.) Government regulation: az MFB Magyar Fejlesztési Bank Zártkörűen Működő 
Részvénytársaságnak a Fővárosi Gázművek Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaságban fennálló 
társasági részesedése ENKSZ Első Nemzeti Közműszolgáltató Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság 
általi megszerzése nemzetstratégiai jelentőségűnek minősítéséről; and 268/2015. (IX. 14.) Government 
regulation: a GDF International S.A.S.-nek a GDF SUEZ Energia Magyarország Zártkörűen 
Működő Részvénytársaságban fennálló részesedése Fővárosi Gázművek Zártkörűen Működő 
Részvénytársaság általi megszerzése nemzetstratégiai jelentőségűnek minősítéséről; and 14/2014. (I. 
29.) Government regulation a Fővárosi Gázművek Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság 49,83%-os 
társasági részesedése MVM Magyar Villamos Művek Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság általi 
megszerzése nemzetstratégiai jelentőségűnek minősítéséről; and 330/2014. (XII. 16.) Government 
regulation az MFB Magyar Fejlesztési Bank Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaságnak a Fővárosi 
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• energy sector,19 
• electriciy sector,20 
• tobacco industry,21 
• the exhibition real estate market,22 
• fi nancial sector,23 
• railway sector,24 
• TV broadcasting sector25 and 
Gázművek Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaságban történő részesedésszerzése nemzetstratégiai 
jelentőségűnek minősítéséről; and 338/2014. (XII. 18.) Government regulation: az MVM Magyar 
Villamos Művek Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaságnak a Fővárosi Gázművek Zártkörűen 
Működő Részvénytársaságban fennálló részesedése MFB Magyar Fejlesztési Bank Zártkörűen 
Működő Részvénytársaság és MFB Invest Befektetési és Vagyonkezelő Zártkörűen Működő 
Részvénytársaság általi megszerzése nemzetstratégiai jelentőségűnek minősítéséről; and 254/2014. 
(X. 2.) Government regulation: a Magyar Gáz Tranzit Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság társasági 
részesedéseinek állam javára történő megszerzésére irányuló ügylet nemzetstratégiai jelentőségűnek 
minősítéséről; and 218/2014. (VIII. 28.) Government regulation a Fővárosi Gázművek Zártkörűen 
Működő Részvénytársaság Fővárosi Önkormányzat tulajdonában lévő társasági részesedésének 
állam javára történő megszerzése nemzetstratégiai jelentőségűnek minősítéséről.
19  326/2016. (X. 27.) Government regulation: az Alpiq Csepel Korlátolt felelősségű Társaság 100%-
os üzletrészének MVM Magyar Villamos Művek Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság általi 
megszerzése nemzetstratégiai jelentőségűnek minősítéséről.
20  434/2016. (XII. 15.) Government regulation: az EDF International S.A.S.-nek az EDF DÉMÁSZ 
Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaságban fennálló részesedése ENKSZ Első Nemzeti 
Közműszolgáltató Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság általi megszerzése nemzetstratégiai 
jelentőségűnek minősítéséről and 455/2016. (XII. 19.) Government regulation: az MVM Magyar 
Villamos Művek Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaságnak az Első Nemzeti Közműszolgáltató 
Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaságban történő részesedésszerzésének nemzetstratégiai 
jelentőségűnek minősítéséről.
21  151/2015. (VI. 18.) Government regulation: a Tabán Trafi k Dohánytermék-forgalmazó, Kereskedelmi 
és Szolgáltató zártkörűen működő részvénytársaság és a BAT Pécsi Dohánygyár Korlátolt Felelősségű 
Társaság összefonódásának közérdekből történő nemzetstratégiai jelentőségűnek minősítéséről.
22  14/2016. (II. 9.) Government regulation a Foncière Polygone Hungária Korlátolt Felelősségű 
Társaság 99,9934169% társasági részesedésének állam javára történő megszerzésére irányuló ügylet 
nemzetstratégiai jelentőségűnek minősítéséről.
23  190/2014. (VII. 30.) Government regulation: a Magyar Államnak az MKB Bank Zrt.-ben történő 
részesedés szerzése társasági összefonódásának közérdekből történő nemzetstratégiai jelentőségűnek 
minősítéséről; and 48/2014. (II. 26.) Government regulation: a Magyar Takarékszövetkezeti 
Bank Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság és a Magyar Takarék Befektetési és Vagyonkezelő 
Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság összefonódása közérdekből nemzetstratégiai jelentőségűnek 
minősítéséről; and 56/2015. (III. 17.) Government regulation a Budapest Bank Zrt. tevékenysége feletti 
befolyás megszerzésével megvalósuló társasági összefonódás közérdekből történő nemzetstratégiai 
jelentőségűnek minősítéséről.
24  235/2014. (IX. 18.) Government regulation: a Magyar Államnak a Bombardier MÁV Hungary Kft.-
ben történő részesedés szerzése társasági összefonódásának közérdekből történő nemzetstratégiai 
jelentőségűnek minősítéséről
25  106/2014. (III. 26.) Government regulation: az „Antenna Hungária” Magyar Műsorszóró és 
Rádióhírközlési Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság 100%-os társasági részesedése állami 
tulajdonban álló társaság általi megszerzése nemzetstratégiai jelentőségűnek minősítéséről.
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• IT sector26. 
The regulations adopted by the Government typically do not comment or provide 
reasons for declaring these concentrations to be a matter of national interest. Most of 
the time, the reason is quite clear that the state is basically monopolizing the markets 
concerned, or the Government wants to intervene on the markets and increase the 
market share that is covered by undertakings not owned by foreign undertakings.
2.6. Missed(?) opportunities
One of the main focuses of the Government in recent years is the tourism sector. 
Therefore, it is surprising that the Government misses some very important market 
aspects that would also increase consumer welfare.
The Hungarian Competition Authority completed a market analysis of the market 
for online hotel bookings. The fi nal report was adopted in May 2016.27 The report 
found no real competition concerns on the Hungarian market of online travel bookings. 
However, the report included some severe fl aws28 and was basically going against 
the mainstream approach of EU states. Basically several Member States abolished 
price parity clauses in the travel market sector, by either adopting a decision that it is 
anticompetitive29 or by legislative act30. After careful evaluation it is obvious that the 
current price parity conditions are leading to severe consumer welfare loss. Recent 
data shows that consumer welfare increases in those Member States where price 
parity was abolished, even in short term.31 Since the fi nal sector inquiry report, the 
GVH might have noticed developments on the market that could bring enforcement 
action back to the table since it carried out a dawn raid at Booking.com in March 
2017.32 According to information in the press, this raid was done not for price parity 
issues, but for another type of market manipulation.
Given the current tools available to consumers, and their shopping and searching 
habits for accommodation, it is obvious that an introduction to the competition in 
26  282/2014. (XI. 14.) Government regulation: a WELT 2000 Szolgáltató és Kereskedelmi Korlátolt 
Felelősségű Társaság társasági üzletrészének a Magyar Állam javára történő megszerzése 
nemzetstratégiai jelentőségűnek minősítéséről
27  G  V : Végleges jelentés az online szálláshelyfoglalás piacán lefolytatott 
ágazati vizsgálatról. (2016).
28  See further Pál S : The evaluation of the Hungarian sector inquiry in the online travel market. 
PLWP, 2017/16. http://www.plwp.eu/fi les/2017-16_Szilagyi.
29  See B9-121/13 Booking.com B.V., Booking.com (Deutschland) GmbH, HRS-Hotel Reservation 
Service Robert Ragge GmbH, Expedia Inc., Hotelverband Deutschland (IHA) e.V.
30   E.g. France, Italy or Austria. See also E  C  N : Report on the monitoring 
exercise carried out in the online hotel booking sector by EU competition authorities in 2016. (2016).
31  See e.g. Matthias H  –  Reinhold K  –  Ulrich L  – Frank S : 
Evaluation of Best Price Clauses in Hotel Booking. ZEW Discussion Paper, No. 16-066. http://ftp.
zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp16066.pdf.
32  See e.g. www.portfolio.hu/vallalatok/lecsapott_a_gvh_a_bookingcom-ra.245902.html.
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commission rates charged by online travel agents would clearly benefi t consumers 
and not hinder innovation on the market.33
2.7. Decisions of the GVH
For the sake of this article, and a short survey, I checked the GVH antitrust decisions 
from 2015-2017.34 
Cases under Article 102 TFEU and the national equivalent: There were only 5 
decisions (against MasterCard35 and against Sanofi -Aventis36 and against three 
national undertakings (two owned by the state). There were dozens of decisions 
concerning allegedly anticompetitive agreements and the cases involved both 
national and foreign undertakings. 
Pure statistics is of course not conclusive as to whether there is a bias or not, 
but taking into account also the substance of the cases, it seems that there is no 
systematic protection of national undertakings by the competition authority.
3. Theory and practice
Current mainstream competition policy found its soul in the early 1990s, by declaring 
consumer welfare as the goal of competition policy enforcement. This goal can easily 
be translated to common sense, that money is best spent by those who earn it. At least 
in theory, competition policy protects the fi nal consumer by ensuring lower prices, 
better quality37 and, according to a recent trend, choice.38
Giuliano Amato wrote a great book on antitrust law39 in which he basically argued 
that too much private or public power is harmful for the society. Consumers are best 
served if neither the state nor the private actors are capable of seizing market control.
One important aspect of competition that is diffi  cult to measure, in practice, 
is innovation on the market. Consumers might be better off  in the short run by 
33  An interesting fact is, that the overcharge paid by consumers – in the form of higher room prices, due 
to high commission rates charged by the online travel agencies – is mainly spent on advertisement 
of the services of the travel agent and not on innovation. Since the advent of the OTA systems, there 
are hardly any breakthrough innovation visible. (The author of this article has ownership in hotels).
34  Those that were published until 29/08/2017 on the webpage of the authority. 
35  Vj-46/2012/244.
36  Vj/61-460/2014.
37  See also Ariel E  – Maurice E. S : The Curious Case of Competition and Quality. SSRN 
eLibrary. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2494656.
38  See also Paul N : Freedom of Choice – The Emergence of a Powerful Concept in European 
Competition Law. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2077694.; Robert H. L  – 
Neil W. A : Using the ‘Consumer Choice’ Approach to Antitrust Law. https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121459.; Julian L  G : The other invisible hand : delivering public 
services through choice and competition. Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2007.
39  Giuliano A : Antitrust and the Bounds of Power: The Dilemma of Liberal Democracy in the 
History of the Market. Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1997.
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achieving lower prices but they might be left in the “middle-ages” if innovation 
falters for a longer period. Innovation is not something one can easily measure. A 
breakthrough idea might not come for decades and no one knows in advance which 
ideas will turn out to be game changers for an undertaking, or even for the society. 
It is beyond question that constant innovation is costly and it is diffi  cult to defi ne at 
what particular point price competition prevails over innovation, by undermining 
innovation due to loss of earnings.
In 2017, the current Hungarian government has seemed to follow a very 
successful economic policy according to macroeconomic data. Basically, important 
macroeconomic data is consistently moving in the right direction.40 As I highlighted 
earlier, some elements of the economic policy included direct and indirect intervention 
to the market. At this time, it is not possible to irrefutably state whether consumers 
are better off  because of the interventions, such as a price drop in electricity prices 
(10% statutory decrease) or worse off , due to, lower pace of innovation and less 
upgrades on the grid.41
One argument by critics of the current government policy is that the state is 
monopolizing the markets by nationalizing industries. From a competition policy 
perspective, whether there is private or state ownership, is irrelevant.42 Values of 
competition can be both achieved by state- or privately-owned enterprises, by 
monopolies or by a large number of competing fi rms. Therefore nor is private 
ownership good, nor state ownership bad in itself. One key aspect that ensures the 
protection of consumer welfare on the market is the contestability of markets. If 
market entry remains possible and feasible, international competition will ensure 
the proper functioning of the market and deliver the expected consumer welfare 
gains. Apart from some very radical interventions by the Hungarian state related 
to the tobacco market, cafeteria system, nationalization of some utilities, most of 
the interventions are not endangering the protection of consumer welfare. Some of 
the radical interventions are found in other policy goals, like protection of human 
health (tobacco) or industrial policy and it would be very diffi  cult to condemn those 
practices taking into account similar interventions by other Member States.
40  I am not an expert in macroeconomic policy, therefore I am not allowing myself conclusions on the 
real reasons behind the improvement of these macroeconomic factors.
41  It is not necessarily the case that decrease in revenue leads to lower innovation or less upgrades, it 
might be that innovation is in the right state, since there was for example overspending, etc.
42  Another take on this question is that the cost of nationalization now is much smaller than the earnings 
via privatization in the ’90s. See M  op. cit.
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PUBLIC INTEREST AND A PLACE FOR NON-COMPETITION 
CONSIDERATIONS IN POLISH COMPETITION LAW
Maciej B * – Marcin M **
University of Warsaw, Poland
1. Introduction
For some time one can observe growing discussion as to whether antitrust scrutiny 
based on economic reasoning and market analysis should also include broader, 
external considerations.1 The question is, whether public interest goals not directly 
linked to consumer welfare or market integration, in the case of EU competition law, 
can or should be pursued by competition law. This article presents the experience 
of Polish competition law in this context. In particular, attention is focused on the 
meaning public interest invoked in Article 1 of the Polish Competition Act.2 We study 
the case law of Polish courts to the extent it off ers any suggestions as to whether non-
competition considerations make part of the assessment under the Polish Competition 
Act. In particular, we analyse if public interest is associated, in the context of 
applying the Competition Act, only with economic competition law goals (consumer 
welfare) or if it is related to other goals that can be pursued in the public interest, such 
as protection of public health or protection of environment. We also study whether 
*   Assistant Professor, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, Department of European 
Economic Law (Jean Monnet Chair); Scientifi c Secretary, Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory 
Studies, University of Warsaw. MBernatt@wz.uw.edu.pl. The author’s research is supported by 
Polish National Science Centre (decision 014/15/D/HS5/01562).
**  Case handler at the Polish Competition Authority; graduate of the Postgraduate Diploma in 
Competition Law at the Polish Academy of Sciences (INP PAN); member of the Competition Law 
Association; marcinmleczko@gmail.com. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those 
of the author and do not necessarily refl ect the offi  cial policy or position of the Polish Competition 
Authority.
1   See A. E : Sponge. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, vol. 5, n. 1, (2017) 49–75.
2   Act of 16 February 2007 on competition and consumer protection, Journal of Laws of 2015, item 
1634.
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courts are ready to stop antitrust intervention because the anticompetitive practice at 
stake pursues other public interest goals. Since developments in Polish competition 
tend to be inspired by EU competition law approaches, the place for non-competition 
considerations in EU competition law is also discussed. The question here is, whether 
the Polish approach under Article 1 of the Competition Act diverges from the EU one.
The scope of the article is limited to agreements restricting competition and abuse 
of dominance cases. The control of concentration, particularly an extraordinary 
consent for concentration, is not covered.3 Block exemptions are also beyond the 
analysis.4
2. Non-Competition Considerations in the EU Competition Law
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter: 
“TFEU”)5 prohibits anti-competitive agreements that have as their object or eff ect 
the restriction, prevention or distortion of competition within the EU and which 
have an eff ect on trade between EU member states. On the basis of Article 101(3) 
TFEU it is possible to exempt an agreement, if the procompetitive benefi ts outweigh 
the negative eff ects.6 However, the question arises to what extent non-competition 
interests can play a role in such assessment. The role of economic analysis in the 
application of EU competition law has grown signifi cantly since the late 1990s. The 
economisation of EU competition law refl ects this trend.7 According to this new 
paradigm, restrictive practices should be assessed on the basis of their potential 
eff ects on competition and their impact on consumer welfare. Although the notion of 
3   The non-competition goals are only directly mentioned in the Competition Act only in Article 20(2) 
that regulates the extraordinary consent for concentration (Art. 20(2)). Under this provision, the 
UOKiK can clear anticompetitive concentration if justifi able, and in particular if the concentration: 
1) is expected to contribute to economic development or technical progress; and 2) it may have a 
positive impact on the national economy. In practice, the extraordinary consents were issued a couple 
of times concerning the need for strengthening the production capacity and effi  ciency of the Polish 
arms industry, as well as the electro-energy sector. Public security was considered a goal worthy of 
protection in these cases. Still, enhanced effi  ciency also played a role in the UOKiK analysis. See T. 
S : Zgody szczególne w prawie kontroli koncentracji (Special Clearances in Merger Control 
Law). Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 
2012. 182–204.
4   See A. J  – T. S  (eds.): Wyłączenia grupowe spod zakazu porozumień 
ograniczających konkurencję we Wspólnocie Europejskiej i w Polsce (Block Exemptions from the 
Prohibition of Restrictive Agremeents in the EC and Poland). Warszawa, Studia Antymonopolowe i 
Regulacyjne, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2008.
5   Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008. OJ C 115/47, 
[hereinafter: TFEU]. 
6   Article 101(3) TFUE contains four cumulative conditions: (i) the agreement must create effi  ciencies; 
(ii) the benefi t of the effi  ciency gains must be passed on to consumers; (iii) the agreement’s restrictions 
of competition must be indispensable to the attainment of the effi  ciencies; and (iv) the agreement must 
not eliminate competition. 
7   L. P : Do we (still) know what we are protecting? TILEC Discussion Paper, April 2009. 24.
329Public Interest and a Place for Non-Competition Considerations…
consumer welfare is not clearly defi ned8 and the Court of Justice has not embraced 
it as a single standard for EU competition law, it is currently the dominant approach 
advocated by the European Commission.9 If the national competition authorities 
(NCAs) of Member States also embrace this concept, it becomes diffi  cult for them to 
consider other values than competition in itself. Such diffi  culties stem from the fact 
that non-competition interests are diffi  cult to quantify by economists and lawyers 
undertaking competition analyses.10
The adoption of the Regulation 1/2003 also infl uenced the debate whether non-
competition interests can play a role in the competition law assessment.11 Before the 
decentralization of 1 May 2004, solely the European Commission resolved confl icts 
based on balancing non-competition and competition interests. In theory, the new 
decentralized model of competition law enforcement in the EU allowed the NCAs to 
balance those interests. However, the Commission adopted a rather strict approach 
with regard to the ability to consider the non-competition interests. In the guidelines 
on the application of Article 81(3) (now 101(3) TFEU) of the Treaty, the Commission 
states that, “[g]oals pursued by other Treaty provisions can be taken into the account 
to the extent they can be subsumed under the four conditions of Article 101 (3) TFUE 
(ex Art. 81(3) EC)”.12 A similar approach is visible in EU courts judgments.13 Since 
the NCAs often apply national competition laws in parallel with EU competition 
rules, the position of the Commission and the EU courts potentially limits the ability 
of NCAs to balance non-competition considerations against competition ones.
8  K. J. C : The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare Standard. Competition Law Review, Vol. 3, 
No. 2, (2006) 121–173.
9  In 2004, the Commission presented consumer welfare and allocative effi  ciency as the goals of 
Article 101 TFEU in the notice on the application of the former Article 81(3) EC. More recently, 
in the ‘Commission Staff  Working Paper Accompanying the Report on Competition Policy 2011’ 
SWD (2012), the Commission stated that, “EU competition policy aims at achieving three main 
objectives: i) protecting competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare, ii) 
supporting growth, jobs and the competitiveness of the EU economy and iii) fostering a competition 
culture.” Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2011/part2_
en.pdf; For more on the issue of consumer welfare from the European Commission perspective see: 
V. D : Consumer Welfare in EU Competition Law: What Is It (Not) About? The Competition 
Law Review, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 131–160.; TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2015-011. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2605777.
10  A. G  – R. F : Non-competitive interests are no competition for ‘Market Europe’: does 
EU competition law hamper civil society’s political rights? Report for EU-citizen – Workpackage 8, 
deliverable 8.2, 2016. 4., available at https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/348450. 
11  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 04. 01. 2003. 1–25.
12  Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, par. 42.
13  Judgment of the ECJ of 3 July 1985, C-243/83 Binon, ECLI:EU:C:1985:284, par. 43–46.; Judgment 
of the Court of First Instance of 18 September 2001, T-112/99 TPS, ECLI:EU:T:2001:215, par. 
106–107.; Judgment of the General Court of 28 June 2016, T-208/13 Telefónica/Portugal Telecom, 
ECLI:EU:T:2016:368, par. 102–104. 
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Today, Article 101(3) TFEU remains the only treaty-based method for potential 
balancing of competition and non-competition interests within Article 101 TFEU. The 
consumer welfare approach advocated by the Commission has considerably reduced 
the types of non-competition interests in such analysis.14 Advantages of an agreement 
must include economic benefi ts for the actual consumers and not society at large. 
Some of the non-competition interests may have an economic effi  ciency facet and 
so lead to some pro-competitive consumer benefi ts. Other non-competition interests 
that cannot be quantitatively measured seem unable to justify an Article 101(3) 
exemption. On one hand, such approach prevents the risk of arbitrary application of 
competition law. On the other, it has further downgraded the role of Article 101(3) 
TFEU. It should be noted that Article 101(3) was discussed only three times and the 
exemption was never granted during the fi rst ten years of Regulation 1/2003.15
Nevertheless, there has been debate as to what extent the Commission approach16 is 
in harmony with the system of EU competition law. First of all, some authors argued 
that since the Lisbon Treaty modifi ed the EU Treaty and the EC Treaty in a way that 
competition policy was not mentioned in the new list of goals in Article 3 TEU, it 
gave more room for non-competition considerations.17 Others pointed out that the 
Lisbon Treaty has enhanced the importance of policy-linking clauses because of the 
wording of Article 7 TEU, “[t]he Union shall ensure consistency between its policies 
and activities, taking all of its objectives into account”.18 Some of the discussions 
centred on the judgments of the ECJ in Glaxo Smith Kline and T-Mobile.19 Although 
the ECJ did not address non-competition issues as such in those judgments, it stated 
that market integration and competition, along with consumer welfare, are core goals 
of competition law. The Commission should therefore be aware of the possibility 
for confl ict between diff erent objectives. In such a case, appropriate balancing of 
objectives shall be allowed.20 A slightly diff erent resolution of confl icting objectives 
is based on the ECJ judgment in Wouters.21 One commentator proposed avoiding the 
import of non-competition and non-economic concerns into the substance of Article 
101(3) TFEU, and advocated balancing them against Article 101 TFEU as a whole.22 
14  Guidelines on the application of Article 81 EC to horizontal agreements, OJ 2001 C 3/2, par. 31–36.; 
Guidelines on Article 81(3), par. 33.
15  D. B : Reinvigorating the role of Article 101(3) under Regulation 1/2003. Antitrust Law Journal, 
vol. 81, n. 401, (2016) 120–123.
16  The approach advocated by the European Commission implied that NCAs should solely or mainly 
focus on arguments related to competition, market structure, effi  ciencies and consumer welfare while 
applying competition law.
17  P  (2009) op. cit. 7–9.
18  C. T : Article 81 EC and Public Policy. Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009. 68–70.
19  European Court of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline, C-501/06 P; Court of First Instance, Glaxo Smith Kline 
T-168/01, ECR (2006), T-Mobile, C-8/08, Wouters, C-309/99.
20  P  (2009) op. cit. 46–47.
21  European Court of Justice, C-309/99, J. C. J. Wouters and Others v. Commission, 2002, ECR I-1577.
22   A. P. K : Non-competition Concerns: Resolution of Confl icts in the Integrated Article 81 EC. 
Working Paper (L) 08/05, Oxford, Oxford University, 2005. 10.
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Such balancing could be considered at a prior stage, leading to the exemption from 
the scope of Article 101 TFEU. Following the classic constitutional rules on resolving 
confl icts would protect the purity of the antitrust analysis. However, such approach 
appears inconsistent with the Commission guidelines on the application of Article 
81(3) EC.
It is also notable that the Commission developed the concept of objective 
justifi cation under Article 102 TFEU. The Commission states in its Guidance 
paper on enforcement priorities for applying Article 102 TFEU that a dominant 
undertaking may also justify conduct leading to foreclosure of competitors on the 
ground of effi  ciencies similar to Article 101(3) TFEU.23 Therefore, it is arguable that 
Article 102 TFEU is open for non-competition interests to the same extent as Article 
101 TFEU.24
3. Public interest in Polish competition law
3.1. Introduction
Polish competition law replicates the structure and the content of Article 101(1), 
Article 101(3) and Article 102 TFEU in Articles 6, 8 and 9 of the Competition Act, 
respectively. In addition, Polish law contains a general clause in Article 1 that the 
Competition Act regulates the development and protection of competition, as well as 
rules governing the protection of the public interest of undertakings and consumers. 
The public interest premise plays two main functions: jurisdictional and evaluative. 
Jurisdictional function limits potential scope of intervention by the President of the 
Offi  ce of Competition and Consumer Protection (Polish NCA, hereinafter “UOKiK”) 
by obligating him to specify what public interest justifi ed the intervention with regard 
to the specifi c practice in each case. In other words, any antitrust intervention aimed 
at protecting competition must pursue public interest (and not purely a private one). 
The evaluative function of public interest infl uences the application of competition 
rules in the Competition Act. This is related to the fact that public interest is a broad 
and elastic concept and allows for clarifi cation of the actual scope of the competition 
act.25 It also helps to defi ne the primary and secondary goals of competition law.26 
This function also plays a role in accurate implementation of the competition policy 
23  Communication from the Commission, ‘Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in 
Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings’, 
OJ 2009 C45/7, para 28–30.
24  T. K : Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Cumulative Innovation in the EU and the US. Vol. 
1. Oxford–Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2012. 168.
25  For the understanding of jurisdictional and evaluative functions of the public interest clause see M. 
B  – A. J -G  – T. S : Interes publiczny w ochronie konkurencji. 
In: M. K    (ed.): System prawa prywatnego Prawo konkurencji tom 15. Legalis/el., 2014.; T. 
S  (ed.) Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz. Lex/el., 2009.
26  T. S  – D. M  : Commentary on Article 1. In: T. S  (ed.): Ustawa o ochronie 
konkurencji i konsumentó w. Komentarz. Legalis/el., 2014. Nb 38.
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by the UOKiK given the limited resources of the competition authority and the 
resulting inability to intervene in every case. 
3.2. The interpretation of the public interest clause in Polish case law: between a 
quantitative and qualitative approach
The public interest clause now contained in Article 1 of the Competition Act has 
not been controversy free. Since the introduction of the fi rst Polish contemporary 
competition law act,27 the concept has been expressed solely by the judiciary and 
doctrine. As a result, confl icting interpretations occurred that blurred and altered 
the notion of public interest. The Antimonopoly Court28 held in one of its very fi rst 
judgments that conducting antimonopoly proceedings is permissible only in cases 
where an economic entity violates public interest.29 Awareness that competition law is 
an area of public law with a purpose of protecting the public interest, not the interests 
of individual entities participating in business transactions already existed in the 
jurisprudence and legal literature. Therefore, the notion of public interest became 
an additional, non-statutory requirement for the application of competition law.30 
The subsequent introduction of the concept into the Article 1 of the Competition 
Act of 2000 was a mere formality.31 The Antimonopoly Court used an unfortunate 
phrase in the aforementioned decision of 24 January 1991. It stated that the violation 
of public interest may occur, for example, where an unlawful practice concerns a 
“broader scope of market participants.” This judgement initiated a mathematical,32 
or quantitative,33 approach to interpreting the notion of public interest. The “broader 
scope of market participants” language became a primary and preliminary condition 
for any intervention by the UOKiK. This begged the question of how many entities is 
27  Act of 24 February 1990 on counteracting monopolistic practices. Journal of Laws, No. 14, item 88.
28  The Antimonopoly Court was established by the Regulation of the Minister of Justice of 13 April 
1990 on the establishment of antimonopoly court (Journal of Laws, No. 27, item 157). In 2002, by the 
Act of 5 July 2002 on amending the Act on competition and consumers protection, the Act – Civil 
procedural code and the Act on unfair competition (Journal of Laws, No. 129, item 1102), the name 
was changed to “the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection” (hereinafter: the “Competition 
Court”). 
29  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 24 January 1991, XV Amr 8/90, Wokanda 1992, No. 2, 39.
30  T. S  (ed., 2009) op. cit.; see also: Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 3 August 1994, 
XVII Amr 15/94; Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 6 June 2001, XVII Ama 78/00; Judgment 
of the Supreme Court – Civil Chamber of 29 May 2001, I CKN 1217/98.
31  Until the introduction of the Act of 15 December 2000 on Competition and Consumer Protection 
(consolidated text – Journal of Laws, of 2005, No. 244, item 2080), the concept of public interest was 
not indicated expressis verbis in Polish competition law. With the introduction of the Act of 2000, the 
concept was specifi ed in the Article 1 of the Act.
32  A. S  – E. S  (eds.): Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, Lex/
el., 2016.
33  T. S  (ed., 2014) op. cit.; A. J -G : Publiczne i prywatne egzekwowanie 
zakazów praktyk ograniczających konkurencję. Warszawa, 2013. 154.
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suffi  cient for the interest to be considered public.34 The quantitative approach was very 
visible in the court judgments stating that UOKiK intervention is pre-conditioned 
by the impact of the practice on a broader circle of market participants, or by the 
impact on an entity representing a certain collection of individuals (a community 
or a cooperative).35 Soon, this became the dominant approach as the Polish Supreme 
Court approved it in several judgments.36 However, after few years, the fl aws of such 
interpretation became apparent. Situations in which it was impossible to identify any 
entity potentially aff ected by an anti-competitive practice were considered incapable 
of violating public interest.
The fi rst departure from such quantitative interpretation of public interest was 
visible in the 24 July 2003 decision of the Supreme Court.37 The court stated that the 
mere threat of distortion of competition is contrary to public interest in contrast with 
the previous mathematical interpretation. A new qualitative approach emerged in the 
judicature in the 2003-2008 period. The Supreme Court reiterated in one decision that 
it is not necessary for the practice to infringe an interest of an individual in order to 
apply the instruments provided in the Competition Act.38 It also specifi ed the concept 
of the public interest, stating that it should be interpreted from the perspective of 
antitrust axiology.39 The Court of Competition and Consumer Protection (hereinafter 
“the Competition Court”) also deviated from the quantitative approach. In a 
judgment of 2005 it defi ned the objective of the Competition Act as the very existence 
of competition, namely an environment in which business activity is conducted. 
According to the Competition Court, the protection of consumers (purchasers of 
goods and services off ered under competitive conditions) takes place by means of 
protection of competition. The Competition Court emphasised that public interest is 
violated if the practice has a negative impact on the competition process, even if such 
negative impact results from practices against individual competitors.40 The Court 
of Appeal in Warsaw defi ned “public” as “aff ecting the general society” and ruled 
that a violation of a private interest does not preclude simultaneous violation of the 
public interest.41
The adoption of the qualitative interpretation of the notion of public interest is most 
discernible in the judgments of the Supreme Court issued in 2008 and subsequent 
34  J -G  (2013) op. cit. 151.
35  J -G  (2013) op. cit. 152.
36  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 29 May 2001, I CKN 1217/98, OSNC 2002, No 1, item 13; of 28 
January 2002, I CKN 112/99, OSNC 2002, No 11, item 144; of 23 July 2003, I CKN 496/01, UOKiK 
Offi  cial Journal of 2004, No 1, item 283.
37  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 July 2003, I CKN 496/01, UOKiK Offi  cial Journal of 2004, No 
1, item 283. 
38  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 7 April 2004, III SK 27/04, OSNP 2005, No 7, item 102.
39  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 27 August 2003, I CKN 527/01, LEX No. 137525.
40  Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 16 November 2005, XVII Ama 
97/04, UOKiK Offi  cial Journal of 2006, No 1, item 16.
41  Judgment of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw of 5 June 2007, VI ACa 1084/06, Lex No. 1641001.
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years. The Supreme Court departed from the quantitative or mathematical approach 
by stating that, “the number of entities aff ected by the eff ects of an anticompetitive 
practice is irrelevant from the point of view of the admissibility of the application of 
the Polish competition act.”42 The judgment of 5 June 2008 is considered revolutionary 
in the legal literature.43 In this judgment, the Supreme Court summarised existing 
case law, including the two opposing approaches (quantitative and qualitative), and 
fi rmly upheld the correctness of the qualitative approach. This judgment is now the 
standard primary point of reference for interpretation of public interest. Today, this 
approach is accepted in the legal literature44, even if with some exceptions.45
Currently, it is assumed that qualitative interpretations of the public interest 
correspond with the understanding of competition as a mechanism to control the 
behaviour of market participants.46 It also allows the identifi cation of the ultimate 
competition goal on a case-by-case basis.47 The relationship between the axiology 
of the competition protection act and the qualitative understanding of public interest 
is based on the “reciprocal connection.” The reciprocal connection means that 
the axiology should be refl ected in defi ning the public interest and the axiological 
assumptions of the act should be decoded by referring to the concept of the public 
interest.48 It is generally accepted that the ultimate goal of Polish competition law is 
consumer welfare.49 Therefore, although competition is equated with rivalry among 
independent undertakings, competition law should be concerned with the eff ects of 
such rivalry and not with the process itself. The question remains whether there is any 
room for non-economic considerations, unrelated to competition, when evaluating 
such eff ects.
3.3. A place for non-competition considerations in Polish competition law
The question whether there is a place for the inclusion of non-competition 
considerations in the competition law analysis has not attracted much attention 
in Polish legal scholarship. The discussions, which followed developments in the 
Supreme Court case law, focused on how to understand the Article 1 public interest 
42  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 16 October 2008, III SK 2/08, LEX No. 2551023.
43  B –J -G –S : op. cit.; Judgment of the Supreme Court of 5 June 2008, 
III SK 40/07, OSNAPiUS 2009, No 19–20, item 272.
44  See for example S –S  (eds., 2016) op. cit.; See A. Bolecki, A. B  – S. D  
– S. F  – M. K  – M. K  – A. M  – T. W : Prawo konkurencji. 
Warszawa, 2011. 27–28.
45  At times, the quantitative approach is still considered the primary approach. See, for example: K. 
R -Ł : Postępowanie przed Prezesem Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów 
w zakresie przeciwdziałania praktykom ograniczającym konkurencję. Warszawa, 2011. 71.; and 
Judgment of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw of 16 January 2014, VI ACa 830/13.
46  S –M   (2014) op. cit. Nb 53. 
47  S –M   (2014) op. cit. Nb. 58.
48  J -G  (2013) op. cit. 152.
49  See for example S –M   (2014) op. cit. Nb. 65.
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clause in its pure competition law context. In 2008 the opinion was still expressed 
that “neither the subject matter of Polish competition law nor the wording of its 
substantive provisions support the consideration of non-economic arguments when 
declaring a certain conduct as anticompetitive or when justifying it.”50 It was observed 
that prior to 2008, the courts only accidentally saw the application of competition law 
in the public interest in a broader perspective.51 One instance involved the assessment 
of farmer protests against pricing policy as an indication of conduct violating 
competition.52 In another case, restrictive practices adopted by the incumbent Polish 
telecom operator were seen as positive due to improvements to network coverage in 
Poland.53 However, two recent cases discussed below show that courts believe that 
there is a place for balancing public interests pursued by competition law with other 
public interests goals. The court approach is instantly discernible from the approach 
of the UOKiK that focused on classic competition law goals. The court approach 
gives no deference to the UOKiK’s interpretation of Article 1 of the Competition Act.
In dominance cases, courts interpret the notion of public interest quite broadly. 
Courts reason that the violation of public interest should be assessed within a 
“broader perspective”, taking into account all the negative eff ects of a dominant fi rm’s 
practice on a particular market.54 In some cases this may seem to provide leeway for 
introduction of non-competition considerations into the notion of public interest.55 
However, there are arguments against such approach. The Supreme Court, in the 
judgment of 16 October 2008, has clarifi ed the meaning of “broader perspective”, a 
term used in the prior judgements.56 It clarifi ed that “broader perspective” should be 
interpreted in light of the competition law goals.57 With a view of that decision, public 
interest is, for example, violated if the behaviour has impact on quantity, quality, 
50  D. M : Controlled Chaos with Consumer Welfare as the Winner – a Study of the Goals of Polish 
Antitrust Law. Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, Vol. 1, n. 1, (2008) 52.
51  M  (2008) op. cit. 52–53.
52  M  (2008) op. cit.52–53.; See the judgment of the Supreme Court of 27 August 2003, I CKN 
527/01.
53  M  (2008) op. cit. 52–53. See the judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 25 January 1995, XVII 
Amr 51/94.
54  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 July 2003, I CKN 496/01, UOKiK Offi  cial Journal of 2004, 
No 1, item 283; Judgment of the Supreme Court of 27 August 2003, I CKN 527/01, LEX No. 137525; 
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 16 October 2008, III SK 2/08, LEX No. 2551023; Judgment of the 
Supreme Court of 19 February 2009, III SK 31/08, LEX No. 503413; Judgment of the Court of Appeal 
of 1 March 2012, VI ACa 1179/11 LEX No 1167649; Judgment of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw of 
20 February 2015, VI ACa 675/12, LEX No. 1683336; Judgment of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw of 
17 March 2015, VI ACa 539/14, LEX No. 1667658.
55  In the Judgment of the Supreme Court of 27 August 2003, I CKN 527/01, the Court found that a wave 
of farmers protested the pricing policy of the dominant fi rm. 
56  The term was expressly used in the Judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 July 2003, I CKN 496/01, 
UOKiK Offi  cial Journal of 2004, No 1, item 283, and in the Judgment of the Supreme Court of 27 
August 2003, I CKN 527/01, LEX No. 137525.
57  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 16 October 2008, III SK 2/08, LEX No. 2551023.
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price of the goods or the range of choice available to consumers. The 2008 judgement 
suggests a more economic approach.
The Supreme Court adopted a diff erent approach with a broader explanation in 
a 27 November 2014 decision.58 The case concerned the abuse of dominance by a 
Polish city. The City imposed an obligation on the undertakings operating in the 
municipal waste collection market to transfer the waste to a single company that 
became responsible for further transportation of the waste to the fi nal disposal site. 
The Competition Court did not go beyond ‘pure’ competition goals in its analysis 
and did not consider arguments related to environmental protection.59 In contrast, 
the Court of Appeal in Warsaw did consider potential positive impact of the city’s 
practice on the environment, but it did not fi nd any benefi cial aspects in this respect. 
The Supreme Court rejected the cassation complaint fi led by the City. However, it 
discussed to what extent diff erent values can be balanced under the Competition Act. 
The Supreme Court held that the ability to balance diff erent values that are important 
for lawmakers or society depends on the particular institution of the Competition Act. 
Following the principle de minimis non curat praetor, the legislator sometimes limits 
the scope of the application of Polish competition law.60 The application of the Act is 
also excluded in relation to restrictions of competition allowed under separate acts.61 
In addition, according to the Supreme Court, other values than protecting competition 
may be taken into account whena case-by-case inquiry is made whether the restriction 
of competition can be objectively justifi ed and so eligible for an exemption from the 
abuse of dominant position prohibition. In the Supreme Court’s view, such balancing 
should also exist with regard to the assessment of anticompetitive agreements. Such 
position is diff erent from the European Commission’s opinion expressed in the 
Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty.62 The Court believes that, 
“the consideration of other values that may interfere with competition protection may 
also aff ect the applicability of the premises provided in the Competition Act which 
justify an exemption from the prohibition of competition restricting agreements”.63 
This is also true with regard to fi nes. The Court is of the opinion that, “it is not possible 
to exclude references to other categories of public interest at the stage of imposing 
fi nes by the UOKiK”.64 According to the Supreme Court, such non-competition 
considerations should not be analysed at the assessment stage regarding whether the 
intervention of the UOKiK is justifi ed (jurisdictional function of public interest). 
Instead, analysis should occur at the stage of assessment of whether given practice 
is as anticompetitive (evaluative function of public interest). As explained above, the 
Court of Appeal in Warsaw accepted the importance of the environment protection 
58  Decision of the Supreme Court of 27 November 2014, III SK 21/14, LEX No. 1565780.
59  The Judgement of the Competition Court of 22 November 2012.
60  See Article 7 of the Polish Competition Act.
61  See Article 3 of the Polish Competition Act.
62  See Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, para. 42 and the supra point 2.
63  Decision of the Supreme Court of 27 November 2014, III SK 21/14. 
64  Decision of the Supreme Court of 27 November 2014, III SK 21/14.
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concerns in the municipal waste collection case, but did not fi nd them signifi cant 
enough to justify the alleged anticompetitive practice.65 While anticompetitive, the 
additional burdens imposed on the contractors of the dominant entity did not yield 
any positive results on the protection of the environment in practise.
In light of the discussed Supreme Court’s decision of 27 November 2014, balancing 
various interests within the assessment of anticompetitive practice falls within 
the evaluative function of public interest and should be considered appropriately 
at the regular anticompetitive practice analysis stage. Still, the decision falls short 
in explaining who bears the burden of raising and analysing non-competition 
considerations. It seems that this should be the role of the defendant rather than the 
UOKiK. The clear role of the UOKiK is to protect competition and so it should 
be not obliged to consider other non-competition factors on an ex-offi  cio basis. 
The Supreme Court’s observation that non-competition considerations could form 
part of an individual exemption analysis under Article 8 of the Competition Act 
(the counterpart of Article 101(3) TFEU) requires further elaboration. Neither the 
limited practice of applying Article 8,66 nor its language suggests that there is a 
strong basis for inclusion of non-competition considerations under Article 8 analysis. 
It is noteworthy that Article 8 invokes only economic effi  ciencies (contributions to 
improving the production or distribution of goods) and contribution to technical 
or economic progress as potential justifi cations for the anticompetitive agreement. 
For this reason, potential non-competition factors would need to form part of the 
demonstrated economic benefi ts.
Another case in which such non-competition interests were considered concerned 
the prohibition by the Polish Chamber of Physicians and Dentists (hereinafter: 
“NIL”) of homeopathic products in Poland. In 2011, the UOKiK found that NIL 
violated competition law by adopting a policy prohibiting doctors from prescribing 
homeopathic products and imposed a fi ne.67 The decision by the UOKiK is 
considered an example of an eff ect-based approach.68 The decision was based on a 
pure competition analysis. The issue of whether homeopathic products actually have 
65  Judgment of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw of 19 September 2013, VI ACa 170/13.
66  Only one instance of the UOKiK applying the individual exemption exists. It concerned the decision 
of an association of raftsers on the Dunajec river to fi x prices of rafting services. In 2011, the UOKiK 
regional offi  ce in Katowice exempted the agreement on pure effi  ciency grounds in holding that the 
decision facilitated the distribution of rafter services among travel agencies and individual consumers. 
The UOKiK believed that not doing so would result in higher prices and longer waits for tourists. See 
the UOKiK decision of 4 November 2011, RKT-33/2011.
67  The UOKiK decision of of 25 July 2011 r., DOK-6/2011.
68  A. J -G : Stosowanie zakazu porozumień ograniczających konkurencję 
zorientowane na ocenę skutków ekonomicznych? Uwagi na tle praktyki decyzyjnej Prezesa 
Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów w odniesieniu do ustawy o ochronie konkurencji i 
konsumentów z 2007 roku. Internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny (iKAR), vol. 1, 
n. 1, 2012. 39.
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positive eff ects for patient health was beyond the interest of the UOKiK.69 Regarding 
the competition concerns, the UOKiK believed that consumers were deprived of 
choice and access to homeopathic products that they may have been interested in 
obtaining. Additionally, the threat of initiating disciplinary proceedings against 
those doctors who would prescribe homeopathic products strengthened the potential 
anticompetitive impact of the NIL decision. The Competition Court annulled the 
decision in 2014.70 According to the Court, the UOKiK did not act in public interest. 
The reasoning of the judgment suggests that the Competition Court believed that 
the quantitative aspect of public interest was fulfi lled but the qualitative was not. 
The Court analysed the impact of the NIL position and stated that the positive 
eff ects of competition in the health services market were demonstrated in the right 
of patients to be treated consistent with current medical knowledge, and not in the 
right to be treated by any lawful products, including those without therapeutic value. 
The Competition Court clearly put the protection of health above competition law 
concerns. It held that the NIL correctly prohibited homeopathic products as they 
can have adverse health eff ects. The Court also stated that it is the responsibility of 
doctors to select and prescribe adequate medicine, not patients. The Court clearly 
stated that it would be unacceptable if competition was the determining factor on 
the health services market. The NIL policy served goals, such as health and life 
of patients, that Competition Court viewed as more important than mere protection 
of competition. The UOKiK appealed the Court decision and although for diff erent 
reasons, the Court of Appeal in Warsaw found the UOKiK decision unfounded.71 The 
Court of Appeal in Warsaw did not consider the notion of public interest and based 
its decision on classic antitrust analysis. It also distanced itself from the Competition 
Court’s fi rm belief that homeopathic products might have adverse health eff ects. This 
judgement may suggest that the Court of Appeal in Warsaw believed that the public 
interest was present in the case, even if the UOKiK failed to prove the anticompetitive 
nature of the NIL policy.
The Competition Court judgement in the homeopathic case has already faced 
criticism72 One criticism is the risk of inconsistent analysis in competition law that 
would indirectly allow decisions of professional self-governing bodies to practically 
69  Małgorzata Krasnodębska-Tomkiel, then President of UOKiK, stated “UOKiK is not the party to 
discussions on the eff ectiveness of homeopathic products. This issue was not at all subject of our 
interest. We found that the practice of the Polish Chamber of Physicians and Dentists is a violation 
of competition by restricting market access to undertakings selling products approved for legal 
trade, and thus the availability of these products for consumers”, UOKiK Press release (2011.08.05), 
available at: https://uokik.gov.pl/aktualnosci.php?news_id=2828&print=1. 
70  Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 30 December 2014, XVII AmA 
163/11.
71  Judgment of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw of 11 July 2016, VI ACa 397/15. In particular, the Court 
believed that the NIL policy had neither an anticompetitive object (it did not have a truly binding 
character) nor anticompetitive eff ect.
72  J. S : Spór o homeopatię (czyli o władzę nad rynkiem). Internetowy Kwartalnik 
Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny, vol. 5, n. 8, 2016.; A. J -G : Znachor czyli SOKiK 
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be exempted from any antitrust scrutiny.73 Our concern relates to the Competition 
Court’s understanding of public interest. First, the Competition Court did not state 
the legal grounds for balancing competition law related interests against public 
health considerations. This was an anticompetitive agreement case and the Court 
could have considered, consistent with the Supreme Court’s suggestion discussed 
above, whether public health considerations could be included under the individual 
exemption provided in Article 8 of the Competition Act (Article 101(3) counterpart). 
Second, the Court did not expressly allow for such balancing and it did not directly 
point out that other interests fall within the interpretation of public interest prescribed 
in Article 1 of the Polish Competition Act. The Court narrowly focused on the result 
of this judgment, and did not provide any guidance for future cases. Third, the 
Court did not appear to consider the Supreme Court decision of 27 November 2014. 
Although the decision was only fi nal for just over a month, it concerned the essence 
of the problem and could have been taken into account.74 While it is rather unlikely 
that consideration of the Supreme Court decision would have changed the outcome, 
it would have contributed to greater legal certainty in the future. For example, at the 
moment it is unclear why the Competition Court believed that the UOKiK did not act 
in the public interest whatsoever. The Supreme Court decision of 27 November 2014 
suggests that public interest in competition law may potentially be balanced with 
other public interest goals. In its light, it seems more appropriate to consider both 
confl icting interests while assessing the undertaking’s practice and decide which 
should prevail.
4. Conclusions
The article tried to answer the question to what extent can non-competition 
considerations play a role in the application of public interest under Article 1 of the 
Competition Act Recent cases show that despite the focus by competition authority 
and academics on considering public interest contained in Article 1 only in the 
competition law context (public interest in competition law), courts might be ready 
to balance diff erent public interests as part of their antitrust analysis. However, clear 
legal framework in this respect is missing. It seems that despite the Supreme Court 
decision of 27 November 2014, the notion of public interest mentioned in Article 1 of 
the Competition Act should be concerned only with the goals pursued by competition 
law, the goals for which the UOKiK is responsible. Such position does not exclude the 
o homeopatii. Modzelewska&Paśnik Blog, available at: http://www.modzelewskapasnik.pl/pl/
blog/36/26/znachor-czyli-sokik-o-homeopatii. 
73  Sroczyński (2016) draws attention to the fact that depriving the competition authority. UOKiK, of 
the power to scrutinize the activities of professional self-government bodies may lead to adverse 
eff ects for the protection of competition and consumers, such as limitating market access for the 
undertakings and legal product and service access for consumers.
74  Similarly, the Decision of the Supreme Court of 27 November 2014 was not included in the later 
judgment of the Court of Appeal of 11 July 2016. 
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permissibility of the Supreme Court’s proposal being understood as a possibility to 
balance public interests in competition law with other public interests, such as public 
health and environmental protection, if raised as a defence by the undertakings 
involved. Still, further judicial interpretation in this respect is necessary. In particular, 
it could be clarifi ed that the defendant, rather than the competition authority, bears 
the burden of proof that a given practice may be objectively justifi ed in light of non-
competition considerations. In addition, since consistency in competition law is a 
value, the courts should not refrain from clarifying which existing legal concepts or 
institutions serve as a base for such balancing. As hinted at by the Supreme Court, 
individual exemptions under Article 8 of the Competition Act could be applicable 
in case of anticompetitive agreements. Or, the objective justifi cation doctrine could 
be used in dominance cases. Still, this would be certainly not free of controversies 
and potential non-competition factors would likely have to make part of economic 
benefi ts shown.
In any event, a reference to other public interests should be the exception rather 
than the rule in competition law analysis. Traditional competition analysis should 
be exhausted before the competition authority, or courts, embark on risky balancing 
exercises. In fact, the homeopathic case Judgement of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw 
demonstrates that the case might have been decided by the court of fi rst instance 
within by object/by eff ect analysis without needing to raise controversies as to 
whether public health considerations should trump competition law considerations.
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 HUMANITARIAN AND PASTORAL FURTHERANCE 
OF REFUGEES IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH1
Lóránd U *
National University of Public Service
1. Introduction
The most signifi cant challenge in foreign and security policy that European states 
had to face in the year 2015 was a migrant and refugee crisis. Each European country 
and EU state built their political standpoints along diff erent principles, which later 
manifested in diff erent actions. We could see a great deal of clashes of views, which 
derived from the diff erent points of views. However, not only among the leaders of 
European countries but also in each European society did tension occur. Those civil or 
international organizations that delt with refugees or immigrants often ran counter to 
the migration policy of the represented country.
Meanwhile, both the leaders of each country and the society expected the Catholic 
Church to refl ect the current situation theoretically, and to join aid and charity work 
as well.
In this study I am trying to clarify the principles on the following issues: what are 
the duties of the Catholic Chrurch regarding people far from their homes, and what 
are its tasks which do not belong to the main fi eld of activity, but according to its 
humanitarian attitude it will take part in.
In the article I use the words ‘refugees’, ‘migrants’, ‘immigrants’ as working terms 
without any ideological and political content.
2. The appearance of the refugee issue in the Pope’s and the Holy See’s documents
1   The work was created in commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority 
project KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 titled „Public Service Development Establishing Good 
Governance” in the Miklós Zrínyi Habilitation Program.
*  Senior Research Fellow.
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Regarding the current refugee crisis, it must be clearly seen that the Catholic 
Church is primarily responsible for the pastoral care of Catholics who are far from 
their left behind. The fi rst ecclesiastical documents and the fi eld of activity of the 
gradually established ecclesiastical institutions also confi rm this. Besides, the Holy 
See or local churches take several humanitarian and diplomatic steps to handle the 
refugee issue both globally and locally.
The speed of the course of events requires the leaders of the Catholic Church to 
give an ‘ad-hoc’ assessment. These papal or Holy See “refl ections”, formulated for 
motivational and encouraging resons, are not laws. Instead, they serve as guidelines 
for the ecclesiastical administration which participate in humanitarian and pastoral 
care of immigrants’. This fact is not marginable, but its signifi cance cannot be 
overrated. It is not about legislative amendment, nor are we talking about establishing 
new institutions or assigning tasks, but it is about defi ning basic behavior and moral 
principles.2 What is more, not each local ecclesiastical institution has appropriate 
infrastructure, fi nancial and human resources to comply these basic principles.
The refugee issue appears basically in the topic of social teaching of the church. 
Ecclesiastical documents refl ected a social phenomenon when it became eff ective for 
some historic or economic reason or when migration became a world political and 
security issue. Papal utterances examine migration issues with diff erent thoroughness. 
It is not their task to create legislative frameworks. They defi ne those main guidelines 
along which the migration policy of the Holy See, the canonical frameworks of 
pastoral care and the institutions of humanitarian assistance can develop.3
Lumen gentium, the dogmatic constitution on the church of the Second Vatican 
Council notes in connection with the activity and unity of the church that the pastoral 
care of diff erent ethnical and ritual groups should favour true Catholic mind. (LG 
13) According to Christus Dominus (18) “Special concern should be shown for those 
among the faithful who, on account of their way of life, cannot suffi  ciently make use 
of the common and ordinary pastoral care of parish priests or are quite cut off  from 
it. Among this group are the majority of migrants, exiles and refugees, seafarers, air-
travelers, gypsies, and others of this kind.” The same article of the document calls 
the attention of local episcopal conferences that “they should look to and promote 
their spiritual care by means of suitable methods and institutions. They should also 
bear in mind the special rules either already laid down or to be laid down by the 
Apostolic See (15) which can be wisely adapted to the circumstances of time, place, 
and persons.” The conciliar documents formulate pastoral-teological principles, 
which must be considered in the pastoral care and humanitarian assistance of people 
2   P  F : Migranti e rifugati. Verso un mondo migliore. Migranti, 2014/1. 5.
3   Jaime B : El Factor Religioso en el derecho humanitario bélico: algunas cuestiones de interés 
para el Derecho eclesiástico del Estado. In: María Blanco – Beatriz C  – José F  – 
Miguel S -L  (ed.): Ius et Iura. Navarra, Universidad Navarra, 2010. 134–150. For 
example Leo XIII: Enc. Rerum novarum. 15. V. 1891. n. 33. Acta Sanctae Sedis, 1890–91/23. 641–
670. It states the principle that is still determinant today: Everybody has the right to stay in their native 
land […] and no to be forced to leave for a strange country.
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far from their native land.4 The principles were repeated in the post-conciliar 
Canonlaw, specially in the so-called ‘constitutional’ law. In this sense the legislater 
created legal relationship between hierarchy and the Christian faithful.5 Thus the 
duty of the hierarchy is to provide pastoral care to the Christian faithful who are far 
from their native land for any reason.6 
To give an effi  cient pastoral care, particular features deriving from their mother 
tongue, culture and traditions must be considered.7 This way the institutions 
that provide them pastoral care must be established on the level of the universal 
and particular church.8 Moreover, diff erent Catholic institutions that provide 
humanitarian assistance come into existence under teological principles. However, 
whist the primary subjects of pastoral care – yet, the Catholic Church has a missionary 
feature – are the Christian faithful, the church does not make such a diff erentiation 
on the fi eld of humanitarian aid. What is more, the institutions mark that they must 
provide humanitarian assisitance for the vulnerable without any discrimination on 
the grounds of denomination and religion.
The post-conciliar social encyclicals and the Pope’s utterances also follow 
conciliar principles. Pope Paul VI’s encyclical, Populorum progressio, published in 
1967, speaks about the duties of developed countries to accommodate and educate 
the young and immigrant workers and to promote the dialogue between cultures. 
John Paul II’s encyclical, Sollicitudo rei socialis refers to the diffi  culties that stand 
in the way of individual development, because of which a lot of people “opt out of 
national life, impelling many to emigrate”.
According to paragraph 62 of Pope Benedict XVI’s encyclical, Caritas in 
veritate9, published in 2009, the drama of migration on one hand derives from the 
huge number of people involved, and on the other hand from the social, economic, 
political, cultural and religious problems it raises. It is a serious epochal phenomenon 
whose handling exceeds the capability of each state and requires the cooperation 
of nations and international organizations.10 An important factor is that not only 
do the rights of migrants but those of the host societies have to be protected. Hardly 
ever can we hear the latter factor though, it is an integral part of the social teaching 
4   Jean B : Fondamento ecclesiale della Pastorale dell’Immigrazione. In: Jean B  – Marcello 
S  (ed.): Migrazioni Studi Interdisciplinari. Roma, Centro Studi Emigrazioni, 2003. 9–33.; 
Velasio D  P : La chiesa e le migrazioni nei secoli XIX e XX. Ius Canonicum, 2003. 13–49.
5    Javier H : Introduzione critica al diritto naturale. Milano, Giuffrè, 1990.
6   Velasio D  P : L’impegno della Chiesa nella pastorale della mobilità umana secondo il Codice di 
Diritto Canonico. Seminario, 1985/25. 131.
7   Benlloch P : La nuova legislazione canonica e sulla mobilità sociale. In: Julián H  
(ed.): Migrazioni e diritto ecclesiale. Padova, Edizioni Messaggero, 1992. 21.
8   Josémaria S : La pastorale dovuta ai migranti ed agli itineranti (aspetti giuridici 
fondamentali). Fidelium Jura, 1993/3. 452–453.; Velasio D  P : La pastorale dei migranti nei 
documenti conciliari. Informationes SCRIS, 1989/2. 238–257.
9   P  B  XVI: Enc. Caritas in veritate. 29. VI. 2009. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 2009/101. n. 61., 
696–697.
10  P  B  XVI: Enc. Caritas in veritate. n. 67., op. cit. 701–702.
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of the Church when we analyse the possibilities of pastoral care and humanitarian 
assistance to migrants.
3. Basic priciples of Pope’s and the Holy See’s documents and offi  ces toward 
ensuring pastoral care to those living far from their native land 
Certain documents of the Pope’s and the Holy See explain the legal and structural 
frames of the pastoral care for people living far from their native land. The ninth 
canon of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) is an interesting record of legal history. 
It directs local curch leadership to take into consideration the pastoral care of those 
who had to leave their native land and did not speak the language of the area where 
they had settled down. The conciliar direction refers to the responsibility of the local 
church authority.
Because of the Catholic migration of the 19th and 20th century, the opinion became 
much more general that not only on local level should the pastoral care of migrants 
be assisted but via a separate offi  ce of the Roman Curia.11 In 1912, with his muto 
proprio, Cum omnes catholicos, Pope Pius XI established the special offi  ce responsible 
for migrants.12 The Pope regularized its power,13 so the offi  ce acted exclusively and 
in its own right in organizing the pastoral care for those living far from their native 
land. Besides, that time the offi  ce did not work separately but in subservience of 
Consistorial Congregation.14 Later, the Congragation tried to give a briefi ng, mainly 
through documents and instructions, to those who provided pastoral care to Catholics 
of diff erent nations.15
In 1914, Pope Pius X established the offi  ce, whose exact legal frames were laid 
down too, to provide pastoral care to Italian immigrants.16 In 1914 the Pope wanted 
to establish a seminary which was to educate priests providing pastoral care to 
refugees, but it came into existence only in 1920 because of WW I.17 Then, Consistorial 
Congregation established an institution to provide pastoral assistance to refugees of 
Italian nationality.18 Pope Benedict XV appointed a ‘personal prelate’ to coordinate the 
activities of those priests who provided pastoral care to Italians living abroad.19
11  Comprehensive historical description: Angelo N : La Santa Sede y el fenómeno de la 
movilidad humana. People on the move, 2002/34. 88–89.
12  P  P  X: Motu proprio. Cum omnes catholicos. 15. VIII. 1912. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1912/4. 
526–527. 
13  Pope Pius X was always deeply concerned about the life of people living far from their native 
land. Gian Carlo P : Un Papa, un Vescovo e I migranti. Migranti, 2014/1. 7–8.
14  Consistorial Congregation is the predecessor of the current Episcopal Conference.
15  C  C : Decretum. Etnographica studia. 25. III. 1914. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 
1914/6. 182–186.
16  About the establishment of Collegio Urbano di Sacerdoti per l’Immigrazione italiana see. P  P  
X: Motu proprio. Iam pridem. 19. III. 1914. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1914/6. 173–176.
17  C  C : Notifi cation. 26. V. 1921. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1921/13. 309–311.
18  C  C : Decretum. 3. IX. 1918. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1918/6. 669–671.
19  P  B  XV: Notifi cation. 23. X. 1920. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1920/12. 534–535.
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The offi  ce was reformed after WW2 and it was subordinated directly under the 
Secretary of State. Then, in 1951, the International Catholic Migration Commission 
was formed. In 1952, the Apostolic Constitution, Exsul familia reassured its exclusive 
competence, and formed its ongoing structure.20 Pope Pius XII’s constitution is often 
mentioned as the magna charta of the Holy See’s migration policy21 although it still 
carried the ecclesiastical approach of the era: it could not forget about territorial 
principle, and the assistance of lay faithful was limited.22 However, the document 
must be considered a signifi cant step: the idea is expressed that it is not the minimum 
to reach in pastoral assistance of those far from their homes but a system must be 
built up that is able to supply their pastoral care.23
During Paul VI’s papacy certain offi  ces of the Roman Curia were signifi cantly 
reshaped, which aff ected the Holy See’s offi  ce responsible for those far from their 
homes. In 1965, the Pope established a separate offi  ce which became responsible for 
the nomadic. Then, in 1967 under the leadership of the Congregation for the Clergy, he 
built up another offi  ce responsible for tourists.24 In 1970, Paul VI contracted the two 
offi  ces, and built up the Pontifi cal Council, subordinated under the Congregation for 
Bishops for the pastoral care of migrants and tourists.
In terms of law development, Pope Paul VI’s motu porprio, Pastoralis migratorum 
cura, is signifi cant as it emerged in the light of the principles of the Second Vatican 
Council.25 The direction of the Congregation for Bishops, „De pastoralis migratorum 
cura” („Nemo est”),26 which formulates practical aspects, is attached to this Papal 
document.
Oppositely the 1917 Code of Canon Law, the current Code of Canon Law does 
not give details on the function of the Roman Curia. Therefore the regulation of 
the offi  ce responsible for the faithfuls far from their home could be found in the 
Apostolic Constitution, Pastor Bonus (art. 149–151)27, and in the regulation for 
internal use. The Apostolic Constitution, Pastor Bonus eliminated the dependence of 
20  P  P  XII: Apostolic Constituion, Exsul Familia. VIII. 1. 1952. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1952/44. 
649– 704.
21  Luigi G : Commentarium in Const. Apost. „Exsul Familia”. Apollinaris, 1953/26. 155–
174.
22  Eduardo B : La cura pastorale extraparrochiale. In: G  I  D   D  
C  (ed.): La parrochia. Milano,  Glossa, 2005. 255.
23  Lugi S : Girovaghi, migranti, forestieri e naviganti nella legislazione ecclesiastica. In: Corso 
di formazione della Fondazione Migrantes. Manuscript. 5.
24  Giovanni C  – Lugi S : Pontifi cio Consiglio della Pastorale per i Migranti e gli Itineranti. 
In: Pio Vito P  (ed.): Commento alla Pastor Bonus e alle Norme Sussidiarie della Curia Romana. 
Città del Vaticano, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2003. 216.
25  P  J  P  II: Motu proprio. Pastoralis migratorum cura. 15. VIII. 1969. Acta Apostolicae 
Sedis, 1969/61. 601–603.
26  C   B : Instr., De pastoralis migratorum cura („Nemo est”). Acta Apostolicae 
Sedis, 1969/61. 614–663.
27  J  P  II: Apostolic Constitution. Pastor Bonus.VI. 28. 1998. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1988/80. 
899–900.
Lóránd U346
the offi  ce, changed its name and so it became Pontifi cal Council for the Pastoral Care 
of Migrants and Itinerant People.
The Pontifi cal Council did not cover only migrants but all of those who left their 
native land for any reason:28 “going on trips”, “leaving their native land”, “nomads”, 
who has not had to leave their native land but, because of their lifestyle, they lead an 
itinerant life, occasionally over the borders of their own native land. Similarly, the 
council was competent in the pastoral care of fi shermen, seafarers and air transport 
personnel.29 There was no diff erence whether they have left their native land of 
economic, political, religious, ethnic reasons or they have been forced to leave. 
The council was directed by the President, in the rank of an archbishop,30 helped 
by the Secretary, assisted by the Under-Secretary and by the Councillors.31
The council was devided into nine “departments”: migrants, exiles, refugees, 
displaced people, fi shermen and seafarers, air transport personnel, nomads, circus 
and fairground people, those who go on trips for reasons of piety, study or recreation, 
land transport workers and other similar categories, which are of diff erent importance.
Though the most important duty of the council was to provide pastoral care for 
people far from their native land, the classical form of charity, providing psychological 
and material help for migrants, occurs, too.
The council works with the authority of the universal church as well as of the 
Pope’s, but in order to achieve higher effi  ciency it cooperated with the local churches.
4. Refl ection and structural modifi cation of Holy See in light 
of ongoing migration crisis 
By the beginning 2000s it had become relevant to publish a new ecclesiastical 
document which was coherent with the existing legislation. Such a basic document 
needed which was harmonized with the pastoral-theological principles of the Second 
Vatican Council and considered the new social, political and security challenges.32 
As a result, the direction Erga migrantes, published 3rd May 2004, was born.
The document, Erga migrantes is a summary as the Apostolic See had already 
referred to the most important questions of migration in its documents examining 
the social teachings of the Church before the direction appeared. In post-synodal 
documents, examining the situations of Africa (1994), America (1997), Asia (1998), 
Oceania (1998) and Europe in the year of the Great Jubilee (2000), we can fi nd references 
to the protection of refugees’ human rights, to their reception and pastoral care.33
28  C –S  opt. cit. 216.
29  J  P  II: Motu proprio. Stella Maris. 31. I. 1997. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1997/89. 209–216.
30  Gian G -Sanzi S : Comment on Canon 360. In: Q   D  E  (ed.): 
Codice di Diritto Canonico Commentato. Milano, Ancora, 2001. 350.
31  Heribert S : Die Römische Kurie. In: Joseph L  – Heribert S  (ed.): Handbuch des 
katholischen Kirchenrechts. Regensburg, Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1999. 378.
32  Julián H : Giustizia e pastoralità nella missione della Chiesa. Milano, Giuff rè, 2011. 412.
33  „If we consider, among the causes which lead many to leave their own land, the state of extreme 
poverty, underdevelopment and insuffi  cient freedom which unfortunately still characterizes various 
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The direction, Erga migrantes contains four big parts and a fi nal conclusion, 
into which the actual parts of the ecclesiastical documents were incorporated. Its 
appendix deals with the canonical concepts of migration. It refers to the lay faithful 
(1), chaplains and missionaries (2), men and women religious (3), church auhorities 
(4), Conference of Bishops and corresponding hierarchical structures of the Eastern 
Catholic Churches (5) and the than Pontifi cal Council. 
Regarding the refugees’ pastoral care, the direction notes that the leaders of the 
church must do their best for the refugees’ pastoral and humanitarian care. Regarding 
the non-Christian or non-Catholic, they must respect the principle of freedom of 
conscience and religion (17). Local church authorities must be prepared for refugees’ 
diff erent language and cultural background. Therefore, it is an important aspect that 
the number of refugees in local communities should not exceed the limit that could 
cause tension because of the diff erences (89). Previous papal statements encouraged 
local church authorities to use the advantages of church universalism, its cross-
border institutions and help new-comers with keeping in touch with the left-behind 
(32). Regarding waves of migration, the importance of people-to-people contact and 
the role of Catholic institutions have arisen again. At the same time, more called 
attention to national security risks which can be caused by these kinds of activities 
of the church. Because of the vast number of refugees, national security agencies are 
overwhelmed. Therefore, the more signifi cant entities of a given country should show 
greater national security sensitivity, and should avoid unnecessary risks, which can 
be generated by contribution in communication.
The direction, Erga migrantes considers that in western societies there can be 
extreme political powers which can perform violently against refugees. In diff erent 
offi  cial forums the church has already raised objection against refugees’ ethnic or 
religious discrimation.34 The document urges canonical opportunities to be used 
locally, and to form personally organized church institutions to provide pastoral care 
for migrant groups.
The Holy See asks the church authorities of the countries involved to send the 
Pontifi cal Council an annual report (p. 20 § 1 7), through which the Holy See can obtain 
up to date information regarding each country. The present nature of immigration 
requires more frequent communication between local and central organizations.
Because of the current security challenges and the migration crysis, Pope Francis 
published the Motu Proprio Humanam progressionem35 and formed a new “dicastery”, 
Promoting Integral Human Development by unifying the former pontifi cial councils 
for Justice and for Peace, for Migrants, for Charity and for Healthcare. The new 
dicastery is currently governed by statutes approved ad experimentum. The four 
countries, there is a need for courageous commitment on the part of all to bring about a more just 
international economic order capable of promoting the authentic development of every people and 
country.” J  P  II: Post-synodal Apostolic exhortation Ecclesia in Europa. 28. VI. 2003. Acta 
Apostolicae Sedis, 2003/92. 710.
34  Giovanni Giulio V : “La paura è la madre di ogni razzismo”. Atteggiamenti e orientamenti 
dei cittadini europei verso gli stranieri immigrati. People on the move, 2010/11. 113–129.
35  P  F : Motu Proprio, Humanam progressionem. 17. 08. 2016. Acta Apostolicae Sedis.
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dissolved councils lost their functions and and articles of 142–153 of the Apostolic 
Constitution Pastor Bonus have also been abrogated. The new offi  ce is simply 
called a “Dicastery” and not a “Congregation” or a “Pontifi cal Council”. This must 
be a temporary solution until the permanent place of the new Dicastery is found 
within the the curial structure. According to the fi fth article of the statute “the 
Dicastery also represents the Holy See with regard to the creation and supervision of 
international charitable organizations and funds established for the same purpose”.36 
The new Dicastery is responsible for “migrants, those in need, the sick, the excluded 
and marginalized, the imprisoned and the unemployed, as well as victims of armed 
confl icts, natural disasters, and all forms of slavery and torture.” The pope’s decision 
was not a suprise since many analysts expected a similar move.37 The creation of this 
combined offi  ce is in line with Pope Francis’s social views expressed in his encyclical 
– ‘Laudato si’. It is worth mentioning the messages on the World Day of Migrants 
and Refugees. These assesments are not laws. At best, they clarify the function of 
legal institutions or the meaning of legislation. They formulate basic principles and 
behaviour, moral sentences and – if you wish – recommendations for political leaders 
of each country and for the leaders of international organizations. The supreme 
ecclesiastical legislator describes how to put canonical institutions much better into 
the pastoral and humanitarian service of people far from their homes. The opportunity 
is given to refl ect to the actual situation of world politics and security state, and in 
this forum it calls the attention of each country and international organization to the 
new challenges of migration.38
5. The opportunity of refugees’ pastoral care in current Canon Law
The Code of Canon Law, published in 1983 was formed with taking into account the 
conciliar principles. While CIC (Codex Iuris Canonici) was being adapted, it was 
clearly visible that migration had become a much more signifi cant challenge but then, 
migration – either considering nationalities or its quantity – was radically diff erent 
from the current situation.To reach higher effi  ciency, the new code makes basic 
principles which can be used regarding the humanitarian and pastoral care of people 
36  F : Statutes of the Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development. 17. 08. 2016. http://
w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/motu_proprio/documents/papa-francesco_20160817_statuto-
dicastero-servizio-sviluppo-umano-integrale.html.
37  Elise H : Pope Francis creates new Vatican offi  ce for integral human development. http://
www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/pope-francis-creates-new-vatican-offi  ce-for-integral-human-
development-34673/.
38  On the occasion of the 89th World Day of Migrants and Refugees Pope John Paul II asked local 
Catholic institutions to help strangers with integration and not to make them feel cultural and 
language diff erences. Moreover, he condemned exaggerated nationalism of any kind, and referred 
to the ‘most vulnerable strangers’: refugees without any documents, the exiled , people looking for 
shelter […] refugees of bloody confl icts, female and child victims of human traffi  cking.” J  P  
II: Presentation of the Pontifi cal Message for the World Day of Migrants and Refugees. People on the 
move, 2002/90. 5–7. Regarding their structures and messages these presentations, given on the World 
Day of Migrants and Refugees, are similar.
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living far from their native land.39 The legal options, guaranteed by the code, open 
the way to establishing diff erent organizations for the pastoral care of migrants’.40 
Each institutional option cannot always be used. A competent ecclesiastical authority 
considers the circumstances, and establishes the most appropriate institutional setting 
to provide pastoral care for migrants.
5.1. The pastoral care of people living far from their native land within the frames 
of the local parish
Canon 529 of CIC deals with the general pastoral duties of the parish priest. 
Paragraph four commends “those exiled from their country” for the attention of 
the parish priest. The word usage of the Canon is general, it refers to anyone who 
is a refugee or far from their native land for any reason from education to work.41 
The legislator wanted to indicate that the parish was the liturgical and spiritual place 
for Catholics far from their native land. As for putting the law into practice, the 
legislator’s purpose did not totally happen. For migrants, because of their cultural, 
language and other diffi  culties, could not be fully integrated into a local parochial 
community.42 Or rather, the faithful did not take the strangers unreservedly. It 
is a typical example of the problem when the legislator’s intentions and the 
implementation of the legislation cannot be put into eff ect because of the attitude 
of the recipients and other objective barriers. The fi rst paragraph of Canon 529 
mentions the pastoral care of “those exiled from their country” among the tasks 
of the parish priest. The Canon indicates that the parish priest should pay special 
attention to – in addition to the poor and the sick – those far from their native land. 
It is the pastoral duty of the parish priest arising from his offi  ce.43 In a parish church, 
people far from their native land can receive from the ‘treasury of the Church’. (LG 
37; Can. 213).44 It involves administration of sacraments45 and words of God and 
39  Eduardo B : Movimientos migratorios y derechos de los fi eles en la Iglesia. Ius Canonicum, 
2003/43. 51.
40  Piero Antonio B : Comunione ecclesiale, migranti e diritti fondamentali. In: P  
C          (ed.): Migrazioni e diritto ecclesiale. La 
pastorale della mobilità umana nel nuovo Codice di Diritto Canonico. Padova, Edizioni Messaggero, 
1992. 35.
41  Juan C : Comment to Cannon 529. In: Ignacio Juan A  (ed.): Codice di Diritto Canonico. 
Leggi e Complementari. Roma, Colleti a San Pietro, 2004. 413.; Agosto M : Il diriritto nella 
vita e nella missione della Chiesa. Bologna, Edizione Dehoniane, 2000. 446–447.
42  Hans C. V : Migration und Pastoral. Eine Chance für die Katholizität der Kirche. Ost–
West. Europäische Perspektiven, 2003/3. http://www.owep.de/artikel/353/migration-und-pastoral. 
In his studies the author, the ex-secretary of the Migration Committee of the Council of European 
Episcopal Conferences, calls the attention, that it is diffi  cult to integrate immigrants into local parishes.
43   M  op. cit. 449.
44   Francesco C : Il parroco »pastore« della parrocchia. Quaderni di diritto ecclesiale, 
1993/1. 12–13.
45  Because of greater mobility and unsettled conditions, from time to time it is not easy tell which 
sacraments can be administrated validly. In case of a marriage it can eff ect the validity of the 
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other pastoral activities.46 However, due to cultural and language diffi  culties the 
eff ectiveness of these activities, especially of Catechism and spiritual conversations, 
is questionable. The legislator indicates that preaching God’s words on the level of 
Catechism, homily and preaching should fi t the faithful’s age and intellectual capacity 
(LG 28; CD 30; can. 757). In case of refugees and immigrants, it can hardly or at 
the expense of sacrifi ces be achieved, as their cultural and language diff erences are 
extremely signifi cant.47 The pastoral care of immigrants cannot make up the majority 
of a parish priest’s everyday work, it should fi t into the group of tasks that he provides 
regarding his offi  ce. It is reasonable to provide the pastoral care of people far from 
their native land via the local parish church if the number of immigrants does not 
exceed the critical threshold, which would come at the expense of the parish’s other 
pastoral work arising from his offi  ce. There is no reason why competent members of 
the parish church cannot join in the pastoral care of people far from their native land. 
Furthermore, it increasingly semms to be a task that makes it possible for the faithful, 
suitably their position, to participate in the priestly, prophetical and royal mission, 
instituted by Jesus Christ, of the Church on the level of the parish church. This 
participation can involve visiting immigrant families, looking after the ill, chartity 
activities, even religious education – if one has ecclesiastical permission.48 The last 
one is extremely signifi cant if the secular faithful have language, where appropriate 
cultural knowledge.
If the pastoral care of “those exiled from their country” exceeds the capabilities 
of the local parish priest, it is advisable to exercise other possibilities guaranteed 
by the current canon law. It can mean appointing a personal parish priest or, if 
circumstances justify, establishing pastoral institutions, which is guaranteed by 
canon law. The competent priest can be a ‘chaplain’ (Can. 564), an episcopal/general 
vicar providing and organizing pastoral care for migrants (Can. 476) and a personal 
parish priest. (Can. 518).
In theory a personal prelate could be established, but so far one personal prelate 
has been established with a totally diff erent character.
Formerly, the so called ‘mission’ was known, it was deliberately established 
to provide pastoral care for people arriving from other countries.49 Mission is not 
an exact canonical category, therefore it is diffi  cult to place it among the other 
ecclesiastical structures. So can it be diffi  cult to fi nd fi nancial sources for a pastoral 
presentation of sacraments. (In case of not verifi ed marriage obstacles).
46  Alvaro D  P : Laici e fedeli nella Chiesa. Milano, Giuffrè, 1999. 64–74.
47   Mauro R : Il parroco come evangelizzatore: l’esercizio del »munus docendi« (c. 528, par. 1). 
Quaderni di diritto ecclesiale, 1993/1. 23.
48  E , Péter: A világiak munkája a plébánián. Teológiai és egyházjogi vonatkozások. In: E , Péter 
(ed.): Élő egyház joga. Budapest, Szent István Társulat, 2006. 292–293.
49  Jaime B. A : Shepherding an Itinerant Flock A Survey of Institutions and Jurisdictional 
Structures for the Pastoral Care of Filipino Migrant Workers. Philippine Canonical Forum, 
2010/12. 29–68.
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institution, especially when a certain institution is not recognized and nor supported 
by the civil law.50
Nevertheless, if a pastoral institution is not established, the parish will be a 
spiritual and liturgic place for them, too.51
5.2. The pastoral care of people living far from their native land via appointing 
a parish priest 
The new code, compared to the old one, attributes greater signifi cance to the legal 
institution of the parish priest. A chaplain “is a priest to whom is entrusted in a 
stable manner the pastoral care, at least in part, of some community or particular 
group of the Christian faithful, which is to be exercised according to the norm of 
universal and particular law” (Can. 564). CIC introduces the legislation regarding 
chaplains through eight canons. (Cann. 564–572) Canon 568 of the Code is especially 
about those chaplains who are appointed to take care of a certain social group. The 
legislator sees the importance of the chaplain’s activity in their taking care of groups 
who cannot receive the parish priest’s general service. According to the Code, 
these social groups are those of “migrants, exiles, refugees, nomads, sailors.” The 
legislator’s intention is that “as far as possible, chaplains are to be appointed” for the 
pastoral care of the above mentioned. The list of CIC is not exclusive, rather it gives 
examples, and it entrusts to choose the groups who are in need of special pastoral 
care to the local ordinary’s judgement.52 It is an advantage for the priest to speak the 
language of a certain ethnic group and to know its culture. It is the best for the priest 
to belong to that certain ethnic group as the particular churches of the host country 
rarely have competent priests from all aspects.
In connection with migration, particular churches can use the possibilities of 
the current law which applies to handing over priest permanently or temporarely.
The post-conciliar legislation made incardination easier.53 On the one hand, it had 
theological reasons: priesthood should carry the responsibility towards universal 
50  Astrid K : Die katholischen Migrantengemeinden – Staatskirchenrechtliche Ausblicke und 
das Kirchenrecht. http://www.migratio.ch/de/dokumente/artikel-buecher-und-studien-zur- 
anderssprachigenseelsorge/studien/die-katholischen-migrantengemeinden.
51  Francesco C : La pastorale dei fedeli che si trovano fuori del domicilio. In: Migrazioni 
e diritto ecclesiale. La pastorale della mobilità umana nel nuovo Codice di diritto canonico. 
(Pontifi cium Consilium de Spirituali Migrantium atque Itinerantium Cura) Padova, Edizioni 
Messaggero, 1992. 193–200.
52  John A. A : Comment on Canon 568. In: James C  – Thomas G  – Donald 
H  (ed.): The Code of Canon Law. A Text and Commentary. New York, Paulist Press, 1985. 
446.
53  José Martín A : Appunti per una refl essione sull’incardinazione. In: Luis N  (ed.): 
L’istituto dell’incardinazione. Milano, Giuff rè, 2006. 452. 
Lóránd U352
church.54 On the other hand, it had to promote a better distribution of the clergy.55 
Regarding better distribution of priests, the regulation of the Second Vatican Council, 
Presbyterorum ordinis, puts emphasis on supplying particular pastoral care.56 ”Not 
only should a better distribution of priests be brought about but there should also 
be favored such particular pastoral works as are necessary in any region or nation 
anywhere on earth.” (PO 10) The pastoral care of people far from their native land 
can be regarded as such a particular area.57
The legislation of the current Code which refers to incardination was born 
accordingly conciliar principles (Cann. 265–272). Therefore the legal possibility 
of both ex- and incardiation and “handing over” for predetermined time was 
made easier. If the diocesan bishops of two particular churches agree, there is the 
possibility to incardinate a cleric from the diocese of the sending country into the 
diocese of the host country to supply pastoral care for immigrants. So the particular 
churches of the host countries can get a pastor that speaks the immigrants’ language 
and knows their culture. This canonical institution is worth being used when the 
number of immigrants makes it reasonable and therefore pastors stay in the host 
country on a permanent basis. However, it is only the canonical side of accepting 
pastors, the accepting particular Church should consider its national security and 
civil law aspects as well.
If people far from their country intend to stay temporarely in the territory of a 
particular church, or there are not many of them, or rapid integration can be foreseen, 
it is better to use the canonical institution of moving to another particular church 
for predetermined time (Can. 271). 58 As for accepting clerics for predetermined 
time, it is not only the cleric’s request and competence, but also the bishops’ of the 
two particular churches opinion, and last but not least the faithful’s interests are 
considered.59 In case of the priest from the sending country for ethnic groups far 
from their native land permanent reception is hardly an option, but the diocese of the 
accepting country receives pastors temporarely.60 In this case, the two bishops should 
agree on the activity of the clericals in a written agreement. Code of Canon Law does 
not mention what elements the agreement between ecclesiastical principals should 
54  The rules of incardination and excardination must be modifi ed so that the ancient institution should 
remain, but they should suit present pastoral demands better.” PO 10. See Pierantonio P : 
I Presbiteri fi dei donum speciale manifestazione della comunione delle Chiese particolari tra loro e 
con la Chiesa universale. Quaderni di diritto ecclesiale, 1996/1. 49–51.
55  Javier H : Personal Prelature from Vatican II. to the New Code: An Hermeneutical Study 
Canons 294–297. The Jurist, 1985/45. 379–418.
56  Alvaro D  P : Consacrazione e missione del sacerdote. Milano, Ares, 1990. 30.
57  José María R : Incardinación y distribución del clero. Pamplona, Universidad de Navarra, 1971.
58  C   C : Notae directivae. Postquam apostoli. 26. p. 25. III. 25. 1980. 
Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1980/72. 343–364. It has been confi rmed again recently by the Holy See. 
C   B : Directorium. Apostolorum successores. n. 17. 22. II. 2004. Enchiridion 
Vaticanum, 2004/23. 1068–1069.
59  Clergy P : Policy and Canonical Issues. The Jurist, 45/1985. 517.
60   Juan Ignacio A : Diritto dell’organizzazione ecclesiastica. Milano, Giuffre, 1997. 365.
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contain. According to diff erent authors, the following questions are worth discussing: 
the length of a future service, the particular duties of a cleric’s during his pastoral 
care, the place of service and housing, remuneration and the question of health and 
social insurance.61 Civil law and national security barriers, which according to the 
canonlaw do not mean the limits of temporary take-over, should be considered. 
Pastoral duties, the pastoral care of migrants as well, can be provided – with the 
superior’s permission – by a cleric that belongs to an institution of consacrated life. It 
is more and more frequent in dioceses, because of the growing lack of priests.
5.3. Appointing an episcopal vicar to organize the pastoral care of people far from 
their native land 
If it is justifi ed, the pastoral care of migrants can be organized through an episcopal 
vicar. The Second Vatican Council thought, paying attention to the changed social 
circumstances, it was important for the diocesan bishop to have other assistents beside 
the general vicar in more important pastoral cases (CD 27).62 After the council, 
the importance of this institution was emphasized in several Papal and Holy See 
documents.63 The Code refers to the episcopal vicar’s competence, appointment 
and losing offi  ce in general (Cann. 475–481). In case of an episcopal vicar, that 
is responsible for immigrants, there are special qualities which are worth being 
measured.64 Among others, these qualities can be the knowledge of a language, a 
culture or, where appropriate, a special rite. The latter does not only mean liturgy 
but also the tradition of the church “sui iuris” and its peculiarities in ecclesiastical 
disciplines and government. In many cases, the episcopal vicar, appointed for 
providing pastoral care for people far from their native land, comes from the cultural 
milieu of migrants in majority. In other cases, the episcopal vicar has spent a long 
time in the sending country, or he has some language and cultural knowledge for 
other reasons. In the countries that are involved in migration, dioceses, using their 
canonical rights, have appointed episcopal vicars to harmonize the pastoral care of 
migrants on diocesan level. This solution exists in several Anglo-Saxon and Western-
European countries.
61  Francis S : Comment on Canon 271. In: James C  – Thomas G  – Donald 
H  (ed.): The Code of Canon Law. A Text and Commentary. New York, Paulist Press, 
1989. 340.
62  Velasio  P : De Vicario Episcopali secundum Decretum Concilium Oecumenicum Vaticanum 
II „Christus Dominus”. Periodica, 1967/56. 309–330.
63  E  C : Directorium. Ecclesiae imago. 22. II. 1973, Leges V, nr. 202. 6528–
6529.
64  Gian Giacomo S  S : I vicari del vescovo e l’esercizio della »vicarietà« nella Chiesa 
particolare. Quaderni di diritto ecclesiale, 2005/18. 11–12
Lóránd U354
5.4. Pastoral care of people far from their native land through structures organized 
on ecclesiastical personal concept
After the Second Vatican Council the personal concept, beside the territorial 
institutions, was getting more and more important regarding pastoral activity.65 
These institutions are built up – on the one hand – on universal law, on the other hand 
on local, particular canon law which considers national circumstances.66 Pastoral 
structures on personal concept, providing pastoral care for people far from their 
native land, had already been established before the Vatican Concil. Pope Pius X 
established ordinariates in the USA and Canada to provide pastoral care for Rusyns. 
Pope Benedict XV also established an ordinariate for refugees in Italy. Pope Pius 
XI used the same canonical structure when he provided pastoral care for Slavs in 
China.
Pope Pius XII used this ecclesiastical structure for Eastern Catholics in Brasil, 
for Polish refugees in France and Germany. Pope John XXIII ordered to establish 
an ordinariate for Eastern Catholics in Argentina. Pope Benedict XV established a 
personal diocese in Calabria to provide pastoral care for Greek Catholics arriving 
from Albania. Pope Pius XII established a personal diocese for refugee Maronites in 
Cairo.
5.4.1. The personal diocese to provide pastoral care for people far from their native land
According to the principles of the current CIC, particular churches and diocese 
as their preferred forms are basically organized on territorial concepts. It is also 
a general principle that a diocesan bishop should consider the faithful’s special 
situation and circumstances when providing them pastoral care. (Can. 383 §  2)67 Pope 
John Paul II’s post-Synodal apostolic exhortation about episcopal service, Pastores 
gregis emphasized this principle regarding refugees and migrants. He added that 
diocesan bishop had to separate fi nancial resources for this activity in the territory 
of a diocese.68
Besides, the Code reinforces the main rule of the territorial concept (Can. 372 § 
1), in the same canon (Can. 372 § 2) the Code makes it possible for the supreme authority 
of the Church to erect personal diocese after the conferences of bishops have been 
heard and the faithful’s spiritual demands have been considered.69 The law speaks 
65  E –S  (ed.) op. cit. The volume of studies outlines the institutions of the Catholic Church 
operating on territorial and personl concept, and describes the legal framework of new, personal 
institutions.
66  Eloy T : Comment on Canon 568. In: Ángel M  – Jorge M  –Rafael Rodríguez O  
(ed.): Exegetical Commentary on the Code of Canon Law. Vol. II/2. Montreal, Wilson and Lafl eur, 
2004. 1443–1444.
67  Communicationes, 1980/12. 296.
68  J  P  II: Post-synodal Apostolic exhortation. Pastores gregis. 16. X. 2003, 16. n. 45, 67. Acta 
Apostolicae Sedis, 2004/96. 885–886.; 914–916.
69  John R : Comment on Canon 372. In: B –C –G  op. cit. 509.
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generally, and the diff erence from the territorial rule is explained with “due to special 
circumstances”. The cultural and language capabilities of people far from their native 
land constitute the special pastoral circumstances.70 The personal diocese has all 
those rights that the territorial diocese owns: it can incardinate clericals, it can have 
its own clergy and can erect ecclesiastical institutions on a wide scale. Managing 
and controlling occur according to the laws of the institutional structure of the 
territorially limited diocese and to its existing laws. Besides, if the pastoral care 
of people far from their native land is provided through the personal diocese, the 
jurisdictional competences must be clarifi ed, and the tensions deriving from clashes 
of competences should be minimalized.
The personal diocese’s – or rather its leader’s, the personal bishop’s – competency 
is also territorially limited, which is the territory of a certain country under its 
conference of bishops.71 It is not the competency of the local ecclesiastical authority to 
erect a personal diocese, but of the Apostolic See.72 Normaly, this competence belongs 
to the Congragation for Bishops, but in missonary territories the Congregation for 
the Evangelization of Peoples has competence (Can. 373).73 Regarding the Conference 
of Bishops, Canon 372 § 2 notes that the Apostolic See can erect a personal diocese 
“after the conferences of bishops concerned have been heard”. This process is logical 
in case of a personal diocese erected to provide pastoral care for people far from their 
native land. If all goes well, local bishops have suffi  cient information regarding the 
nationalities, the rites and the number of immigrants in the territory of the Conference 
of Bishops. At best, the members of the Conference of Bishops can judge which canon 
law structure is the most suitable to provide pastoral care for people far from their native 
land. The members of the Conference of Bishops may be familiar with migration policy 
of the state authorities and they are in connection with state participants.74 With the 
information they have, they can signifi cantly help the Apostolic See erect the most 
suitable ecclesiastical institution to provide pastoral care for people far from their 
native land.
Local diocesan bishops still have the rights and duties to provide pastoral care 
for people far from their native land even if a personal diocese is erected because 
of the diocesan bishop’s general pastoral responsibility, which covers the pastoral 
care of immigrants’, refugees’, migrant workers’ and students’. In order to avoid 
70  Luis O : Apetti giuridici della cura pastorale dei fedeli di rito orientale nelle diocesi latine. In: 
Arturo C  (ed.): L’eserczio dell’autorità nella Chiesa. Venezia, Marcianum Press, 2004. 
53–63.
71  Giorgio F : La dimensione collegiale del ministro del vescovo a livello locale. In C  
(2004) op. cit. 64.
72  Thomas G : Commentary on Canon 372. In: B –C –G  op. cit 318.
73  It is confi rmed by Pastor Bonus, paragraphs 75–78 of the Apostolic Constitution referring to 
Congregation for Bishops.
74  In certain countries – eg. in the USA – the committee of the Conference of Bishops charged with 
immigration and refugee issues criticizes civil laws considering human rights. C   
M   U  S  C   C  B : On Human Traffi  cking. 
Washington DC, United States, Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2012.
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superfl uous duplication75 and to reach higher pastoral eff ectiveness, the cooperation 
among the members of the Conference of Bishops cannot be ignored.76
5.4.2. Personal parish to provide pastoral care for people far from their native land
Personal parish, also organized on personal concept, is a kown institution in current 
law with its much narrower powers. In case of a prelature the legislator has maintained 
the principle that the prelature is erected on territorial concept (Can. 518). Besides, 
CIC gives the possibility, if it is reasonable, to erect a personal parish similar to the 
personal diocese. While the personal diocese is erected considering the aspects of the 
Holy See, a personal parish is established within the diocesan bishop’s own power.77 
In Canon 518, the legislator shortly refers to the principles that can play roles in 
establishing a parish. The list of CIC is not complete, it only gives some examples 
to the diocesan bishop. In the text of the Canon, the legislator mentions the aspects 
of the rite, languages, nationalities which can form the base of establishing a parish. 
All these reasons can occur due to migration in the territory of a particular church or 
an Conference of Bishops. The local diocesan bishop has the right to establish more 
than one parishes to provide pastoral care for people far from their native land. In 
case of organizing such a diff erentiated pastoral care, he can consider the language, 
rite, nationality, age, etc. of a certain community.
A personal parish priest regarding people he takes care of, has the same rights 
and duties as a territorial parish priest has.78 It means catechism, preparation for 
sacraments, having spiritual discussions or providing a service. The advantage of the 
personal parish is, comparing to the personal diocese, that the smaller organization 
requires less administration, it can be erected, modifi ed or terminated faster.79 It is 
the diocesan bishop’s right to evaluate the situation and to make a decision, but the 
opinion of the clerical senate should be considered as well when establishing a parish 
(Can. 515 § 1). Namely, it is a basic principle that a diocesan bishop cannot establish 
a parish without the clerical senate being heard. In case of the parish, erected to 
provide pastoral care for people far from their native land, it is extremely important 
75   Carlos S : La jurisdicción cumulativa. Ius Canonicum, 1988/28. 172–179. In his study, the author 
analyses the duplications appearing in the territory of the ecclesiastical government. Regarding the 
pastoral care of immigrants, he notes that the pastoral institution established for immigrants is useful, 
and the legal possibilities are the fruits of legal development, but both the leader of this institution and 
of the local particular church should be tolerant and cooperative with each other. 
76  F  (2004) op. cit. 53–63.
77  Paolo M : Territorialitá Personalitá Nell’organizzazione funzione Giudiziaria. In: E –
S  (ed.) op. cit. 687–689. The author emphasizes the duties of the local ecclesiastical authority to 
ensure the rights of those living in need of special pastoral care and in specila circumstances. 
78  Helmut P : Nichtterritoriale Strukturen der hierarchischen Kirchenverfassung. In: E –S  
(ed.) op. cit. 518–519.
79  Winfried A  – Klaus M : Kanonisches Recht. Paderborn–München–Wien–Zürich, 
Ferdinand-Schönigh, 1997. 190.
357Humanitarian and Pastoral Furtherance of Refugees…
as the priests of the senate together have a wider view on the pastoral care required 
by people far from their native land.
5.4.3. Erecting a personal prelature to provide pastoral care for people far 
from their native land 
The canonical institution of a personal prelature is new in the existing canon law.80 As 
the Code says, the reason for erecting a personal prelature is “to promote a suitable 
distribution of clerics” or “to accomplish particular pastoral or missionary works for 
various regions or for diff erent social groups”. The Apostolic See can erect a peronal 
prelature after bishops concerned have been heard. The prelature consists of priests 
and deacons (Can. 294), but the lay faithful can also join the pastoral activity of the 
prelature.81 The law reveals that, in theory this legal institution would correspond to 
providing pastoral care for people far from their native land as the legislator clearly 
stated that the institution wanted to look after people who are in need of pastoral 
care. It is obvious that people far from their native land need special pastoral care, 
as well as they form a clearly visible group of the local Catholic community.82 
When establishing a personal prelature, similarly to personal dioces, the Apostolic 
See seeks the opinion of the Conference of Bishops concerned. Establishing, later 
modifying or terminating is the right of the Holy See.83 The personal prelature is, 
considering its territorial aspects, more fl exible than the personal diocese. It is not 
evitable for that the pastoral and governmental jurisdiction of the prelature to cover 
the territory of an episcopal conference. If the situation of people far from their native 
land is similar in the territory of the neighbouring Conference of Bishops, it is not 
forbidden for the same personal prelature to have jurisdiction in the territory of the 
country concerned. As the personal prelature has also got the right to have its own 
seminar, namely to have an institution responsible for educating priests and to have 
its own presbitery (Can. 295), it has the advantage that during their studies priest 
candidates are not only provided with general teological, philosophical and canonical 
education but with education in connection with the special duties of a prelature. 
Beisdes, the Holy See does not seem to prefer to establish this legal institution to 
provide pastoral care for people far from their native land.
80  Javier H : Personal Prelature from Vatican II. to the New Code: An Hermeneutical Study 
Canons 294–297. The Jurist, 1985/45. 379–418.
81  Joseph Edward F : The Personal Prelature of the Second Vatican Council: An Historical Canonical 
Study. Roma, Università San Tomaso, 1987.
82   Jean B : Il nuovo Codice di Diritto Canonico e la pastorale della mobilità. On the move, 1983/3. 
18.
83  Gaetano L  C : Le prelature personali. Profi li giuridici. Ius Ecclesiae, 1989/1. 467–491.
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5.5. Catholic organizations erected to provide humanitarian aid for immigrants
In 2015, the wave of migration made it clear that not only did the Catholic Church 
have to give pastoral assistance but humanitarian aid as well. While the pastoral care 
is the right and duty of the church, refugees’ humanitarian aid is an overall social 
challenge.84 As the church has always been sensible on the poor, the helpless and 
the vulnerable, it is obvious for the church to participate in refugees’ humanitarian 
service through its diff erent organizations.
However, a few principles must be seen clearly.
The ecclesiastical structures of each country have diff erent capacity. You cannot 
compare the organizations of the German Catholic Church, having been in service 
for a long time, to the human, fi nancial and structural resources of the Catholic 
Church in the former socialist countries.
There are signifi cant diff erences in the needs of migrants. If migrants do not want 
to settle down or stay longer in a certain country, it is no use thinking of institutions 
which, as in Germany, help migrants with integration, language education, housing 
or taking a job. It is not what refugees need either. In these countries instituions 
should be turned towards providing rapid and temporary help (food, water, medicine, 
warm clothes, blankets etc.).
The activities of ecclesiastical, state and other denominational organizations 
should be coordinated. Superfl uous institutional duplication in assistance must be 
avoided. It is important to be familiar with the legal frames of the activity, as there 
can be gap in the law or uncertainty in state or international regulations. It is not 
worth for Catholic organizations dealing with humanitarian aid, undertaking an 
activity that leads to tension with state authorities.
Regarding the activity of Catholic institutions, national security awareness must 
be emphasized. The tasks of national security services have increased because of the 
growing number of migrants arriving in European countries. We must be aware that 
certain activities (sheltering, providing anonym health care) raise national security 
concerns, which must be regarded by Catholic charity organizations, too.
5.6. The canonic diversity of organizations erected to provide humanitarian service
While the above mentioned institutions, which can be established to provide 
pastoral care, are canonically clearly defi ned institutions of the Cathilic Church, the 
organizations participating in humanitarian activities are canonically diverse, even 
unidentifi able in some cases. It is problematic as the supervisory bodies, the legal 
limits of asset management and activity scope cannot be identifi ed clearly.
Quite often a committee or an offi  ce, governed by an Conference of Bishops, 
provides humanitarian service for immigrants in the territory of the conference. The 
Code has a short reference to the committees and institutions of the Conference of 
84  F , Vilmos: Egyházi karitatív szervezetek szerepe a válságkezelésben. Kard és Toll, 2006/2. 
92–101.
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Bishops, which says the conference can have “other offi  ces and commissions which, 
in the judgment of the conference, more eff ectively help it to achieve its purpose.” 
Their functions must be clarifi ed in the regulation of the episcopal conference. (Can. 
451) The usefulness and the exact functions of an institution have to be measured and 
defi ned by the members of the conference. For example, in Italy the permanent council 
of the Conference of Bishops ordered to erect a separate offi  ce for immigrants in 1987.85 
The offi  ce fulfi ls its duties through diocesan representatives and its fi ve offi  ces in the 
country.
The rules of the institution, with its centre in Rome, indicates that the centre – 
according to canon law – is a legal person. If secular law does not guarantee legal 
personality for ecclesiastical persons, the secular legal status of the institution must 
be clarifi ed. 
In the USA, US Conference of Catholic Bishops Migration and Refugee Services, 
the institution subordinated to the Conference of Bishops, possesses a signifi cantly 
wide range of legal power and fi eld of activity, ecclesiastical and secular institutional 
connections.86 
The majority of immignrants arriving in the USA are Catholics, so the church 
feels more involved in not only providing pastoral care but humanitarian assistance 
as well.87 It has a separate program for children who have lost their families,88 it 
is in touch with state authorities responsible for immigration, and it makes regular 
analyses, evaluations about state laws, and, where appropriate it proposes daring 
legislative amendments. 
In accordance with the legislator’s intention, among episcopal conferences there 
are initiatives to give theoretical and practical solutions for migration. “Relations 
between conferences of bishops, especially neighboring ones, are to be fostered in 
order to promote and protect the greater good” (Can. 459 § 1), to which the Apostolic 
See must be heard. (Can. 459 § 2) Such an initiative was the foundation of a team, by the 
Symposium of Conference of Bishops of Africa and Madagascar, to help refugees. The 
conferences were motivated by the fact that there were three million African refugees 
in 2011, and according to some forecasts every tenth African will work far from their 
native land. The task of the team is to study the phenomenon of migration, and to 
make suggestions to the local churches on organizing common actions. For example, a 
recommendation was formulated on an action in the interests of protecting families as 
migration has disarranged a lot of African families.89
85  Antonio I : Le novità legislative e lo spirito di accoglienza. Social news. Mensile di 
promozione sociale, 2014/3. 15.
86  Ugo P : Decreto di costituzione della fondazione »migrantes«. https://www.chiesacattolica.it/ 
cci_new_v3/allegati/10429/STATUTO%20Migrantes.pdf.
87  Migration and Refugee Services. http://www.usccb.org/about/migration-and-refugee-services.
88  Children and Migration. http://www.usccb.org/about/children-and-migration/index.cfm.
89  La migrazione di molti africani distrugge le loro famiglie. http://vaticaninsider.lastampa.it/nel- 
mondo/dettaglio-articolo/articolo/africa-18495/.
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The Council of the Bishops’ Conferences of Europe working in the spirit of the 
ecclesiastical colleagues of the Second Vatican Council has kept an eye on European 
migration since its foundation. The migration section of the Committee of Caritas 
in Veritate deals with the assessment of pastoral and humanitarian activities for 
refugees.90 The Committee Caritas in Veritate was named after Pope Benedict’s 
encyclical, and beside migration it pays attention to justice, peace and the protection 
of creation. Its aim is that European bishops should share their experiences in these 
questions. Earlier, refugee issues were delt with by separate committees, which 
– after having been converted into sections – were incorporated into Committee 
Caritas in Veritate which deals with other social questions, too. Its eff orts are helped 
by the Pontifi cal Council and other international Catholic societies, responsible for 
refugee issues.91
A lot of ecclesiastical organizations that were established by the faithful are 
engaged in humanitarian aiding of refugees. In most cases, these organizations are 
not specifi cally established for aiding of refugees, but for more general assistance, 
and they changed their mission to the modifi ed circumstances. The faithful have the 
rights to erect such organizations. Thanks to the teological thinking of the Second 
Vatican Council, the freedom of association to promote the goals of the church has 
an honoured place in current Canon Law (Can. 299 § 1).
Among the goals of the church, practicing charity has always played an 
important role (Can. 298 § 1),92 which appears – in connection with 20th century 
refugee issue – in helping refugees exiled from their native land. Such associations 
can be international, national or regional, namely diocesan, and according to their 
dependence on ecclesiastical authorities they can be public (Cann. 312–320) or 
private (Cann. 321–326). The public associations of the Christian faithful, even if 
they are grassroot initiatives, are approved by ecclesiastical authorities, universal 
and international associations are approved by the Holy See (Can. 312 § 1 1) Saint 
Egedius Association is of such character, which – beside its humanitarian activities – 
maintains soup kitchens, social centres for refugees in several cities, and provides legal 
counselling, health care, food and clothes donation for people in need. In such cases, 
approval and supervision are provided by the the Pontifi cal Council for the Laity.
National public associations are approved by the episcopal conference in its 
territory (Can. 312 § 1 2), and diocesan associations are approved by the diocesan 
bishop also in his own territory. (Can. 312 § 1 3) An example for the former is the 
German Saint Raphael Society, which was recognized by the German Conference of 
Bishops in 1947, as the only association of the conference responsible for refugees. 
90  There are institutions with the same names subordinated to Conference of Bishops too.
91  Migration section. http://www.ccee.eu/ccee_en/ccee/00002309_Migration_Section.html. Pl. Caritas 
Europa, the International Catholic Migration Commission.
92  Giorgo F : Il diritto di associazione e le possibilità della sua realizzazione nell’ordinamento 
canonico. In: Winfried A  – Karl Th. G  – Heribert S  (ed.). Das konsoziative 
Element in der Kirche, 1989. 408–409.
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The association was renamed to Saint Raphael Work, and it went through signifi cant 
structural changes.93
Private societies, although they had more freedom, were subordinated to the 
supervision of ecclesiastical authorities regarding their activities. In the fi eld of 
humanitarian aid for refugees, several legal and ethical questions can arise, which 
shoud be supervised by an ecclesiastical authority. Regarding the pastoral care for 
refugees, the Code has signifi cant general principles (Can. 304). It is such a sensitive 
fi eld of activity that it must be specifi ed accurately how the pastoral care for refugees 
fi ts in the goals of the society. Regarding the correct identifi cation of the society, it is 
important to specify the conditions of headquarters, management and participation 
exactly.94 For Catholic associations, dealing with refugees, there can be national 
security aspects that are irrelevant in other areas of humanitarian aiding. These must 
be considered by the principal responsible for acceptance and specifying tasks.
Every kind of society is subordinated to the supervision of the Holy See (Can. 
305 § 2), diocesan and other societies if they work in a particular diocese, to the 
supervision of the local ordinariaties.95
Societies can wear the name Catholic with the consent of a competent ecclesiastical 
authority (Can. 300).96 In sensitive areas, such as humanitarian aiding of migrants, 
it is extremely important to defi ne which society of the Catholic Church works in 
which area.
It is more and more frequent that Catholic associations with similar characters 
cooperate in order to reach higher effi  ciency. As we are talking about institutions 
with signifi cantly diff erent canonic and civil legal opportunities, the frames of 
co-operation should be clarifi ed in this case, too. In Italy, at the beginning of the 
2000s, a summary was given to the Catholic organizations that were involved in 
the pastoral and humanitarian care of immigrants.97 In the documents, the most 
important questions with a view to humanity, which often arise in this fi eld, are 
discussed: unemployment, the under-age, children, women’s specifi c support, family 
reunion, people of diff erent faiths, handling challenges concerning Islam, legal aid 
and health care. Naturally, the situation has changed, but it is worth giving such out 
line, as the staff  of the organizations providing humanitarian aid do not know the 
pitfalls that arise in connection with the humanitarian care of immigrants. In such 
activities, education and preparation are canonic principles, at the same time. (Can. 
93  Die Katholische Arbeitsgemeinschaft: http://www.kam-info-migration.de/55427.html.
94  Miguel Delgado G : Gli statuti delle associazioni di fedeli. Ephemerides Iuris Canonici, 
2011/51. 429–444.
95  Luis N : Diritto di associazione e associazioni di fedeli. Milano, Giuffrè, 1991. 44–48.; Maria 
Angela P  N : Libertà e autonomia negli enti della Chiesa. Torino, 1999. 71–83; Venerando 
M : Il fenomeno associativo nell’ordinamento ecclesiale. Milano, Giuffrè, 2003. 90–101.
96  Fidel González F : I movimenti. Dalla Chiesa degli apostoli a oggi. Milano, BUR, 
2000.; Joseph R : I movimenti ecclesiali e la loro collocazione teologica. In: I movimenti 
nella Chiesa. Città del Vaticano, 1999. 23–51.; Giuseppe R : Il fenomeno associativo 
nell’ordinamento della Chiesa tra liberta e autorità. Milano, Giuff rè, 2008. 135–142. 
97  Ibid.
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329) Several German Catholic organizations which are engaged in the pastoral care 
of immigrants also co-operate. For example, it is a peculiar German initiative of the 
relief organizations which provide anonim health care for immigrants. Anonimity 
is for those who, without any valid documents and residence permit, are not able or 
do not want to turn to health care institutions.98 Anonimity is guaranteed, which is 
partly good as diseases dangerous for the whole society may be discovered, on the 
other hand, it raises certain national security worries.
It is not unususal that some section of organization is involved in the humanitarian 
care of immigrants. For example, German Caritas Association has a separate 
organizational unit responsible for immigrants, and it has diverse tasks from 
organizing language courses to promoting integration and actions against racism. 
In other cases, it is not stated literally that a certain institution has a separate 
section to provide humanitarian aid for immigrants, but simply this fi eld can be found 
among its other a ctivities. So does it work in case of Hungarian Catholic Caritas.
Due to migration, other institutitons of the Catholic Church, not dealing with 
migration originally, became involved. Educational institutions are of this kind, in 
this fi eld ecclesiastical institutions have to face the fact that the proportion of migrant 
young people is rising.99 Moreover, in connection with migration, where the social 
teaching of the church should be reconsidered, ecclesiastical and Catholic universities 
and research institutions will have signifi cant roles, too.100
6. Possible solutions of the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches 
for the pastoral care of people far from their native land
In most cases faithfuls far from their native land belong to an Eastern Church. So 
personal canonic formations, established for immigrants follow the traditions and 
law of the Eastern Churches. Codex Canonum Ecclesiarum Orientalium (CCEO) 
knows personal ecclesiastical structures – similarly to the Latin Code. Obviously, 
these ecclesiastical structures, due to the traditions of Eastern Churches, show 
diff erences both in their names and leadership.
Before the existing Codex Canonum Ecclesiarum Orientalium appeared, the 
Holy See, considering the geographical fragmentation of each sui iuris churches, 
had already established personal ecclesiastical formations for the faithful of the 
community, which was justifi ed with belonging to the same rite. In the 20th century, 
the Holy See, due to the signifi cant migration of the Rusyn Greek Catholics, 
established exarchies to provide pastoral care for Rusyn Greek Catholics in Canada 
and Germany, for Ukranian Greek Catholics in the USA, Canada, Argentina, 
98  Malteser Migranten Medizin. http://www.malteser-migranten-medizin.de/startseite.html.
99  Vinicio O : A che punto siamo con l’integrazione? Migranti, 2014/1. 14–16.; Alberto C : 
Una scuola “diversa”. Migranti, 2014/1. 17.
100   Lóránd U : Il regolamento giuridico della formazione dei teologi nella Chiesa Cattolica. 
In: András Lóránt O  – Lóránd U  (ed.): Vita consacrata e diritti umani nella Chiesa 
Cattolica dell’Europa centro-orientale ed altri saggi. ed altri saggi di diritto canonico. Budapest–
Pannonhalma, L’Harmattan, 2011. 87–112.
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Australia, Brasil and Great-Britain and for Armenian Catholics in France. According 
to the the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches, an exarchy is the part of people 
of God which was not formed into an eparchy (diocese) for some reason, and which is 
led by an eparch on territorial or other principles (CCEO, Can. 311 § 1). The legislator 
indicated that this ecclesiastical structure is not appropriate, but there can be objective 
circumstances which make it necessary to use this form. Such a circumstance is when 
vast number of the faithful belonging to the Eastern Church with its own rights lives 
over the border of the patriarchate or major archiepiscopate. In these cases, in order to 
the canonic discipline – according to which the Christian faithful have the right to 
get pastoral care in accordance with their own rites – be realized, the Holy See can 
order their pastoral care to be provided via exarchies (CCEO, Can. 312 § 2). CCEO 
gives the possibility for patriarchs and major archbishops, considering the particular 
circumstances, to establish an exarchy in their own territories with the contribution 
of their permanent synod (CCEO, Can. 85 § 3) and with a prior notice to the Holy See 
(CCEO, Can. 85 § 4). It may be important in the Middle-East regions, where the security 
states of the bordering countries are signifi cantly diff erent, and migration is frequent 
among the countries. As i n these territories several Eastern Churches co-exist with 
similar and territorially defi ned hierarchies. However, it is more frequent to establish 
an exarchy outside the territory of the patriarchate or major archdiocese – in North- and 
South-America and in Europe –to provide pastoral care to those who belong to a certain 
Eastern Churches. In this case the Apostolic See has the right of establishment.101 As for 
the duties and the rights of the Holy See, it has a separate offi  ce responsible for 
providing pastoral care for people far from their native land, yet in case of Eastren 
Catholics the Congregation for the Oriental Churches has the authority, too.102 
The basic task of the Congregation is to provide the opportunity of spiritual life in 
accordance with their own rites for the members of Eastern sui iuris communities. 
To realize it, the congregation has to estimate the number of Eastern Catholics in 
a certain territory and to assess the possibility of establishing the institutional 
frames to provide pastoral care. The congregation can play a mediatory role among 
a local Conference of Bishops, a local diocesan bishops and a sui iuris ecclesiastical 
hierarchy. The mediatory role can mean that the in rite responsible hierarchy provides 
101   Luigi S : Comment on Canon 312 of CCEO. In: P  (ed.) op. cit. 277. Before the 
publication of CCEO, there was a suggestion that if an exarchy is established for the faithful of the 
Eastern Church anywhere all over the world, the patriarch of the sui iuris church should have a kind 
of voice and consultation right. The suggestion was rejected. See Nuntia, 1989/28. 56. See George 
N : The Patriarchal Ministry in the Church of the Third Millennium. The Jurist, 2001/61. 
1–89.
102   Pablo G : Impegno della Congregazione per le Chiese Orientali a favore della comunità 
orientali in diaspora. Folia Canonica, 2006/9. 117–137.
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priests of rite who have language and cultural competences.103 Namely, it can be 
diffi  cult for local ecclesiastical authorities to provide pastors of rite.104
Though CCEO misses a pastor’s canonical description, in practice Eastern sui 
iuris churches appoint pastors in duties for diff erent immigrant Christian faithful. 
As for the signifi cance of the legal possibilities of incardination and excardination, 
they are possible only inside a certain sui iuris church. So, a priest belonging to the 
Eastern sui iuris Church cannot be incardinated into a Latin particular church, but 
temporary taking over is possible.
7. Consequences
In the canonical regulations of the Catholic Church, and in the Code of Canon 
Law, ecclesiastical structures organized on the personal concept were appearing 
more and more important. These institutions are used when pastoral organization 
on the territorial concept cannot comply with a special pastoral challenge for some 
reason. These institutions do not put an end to the responsibilities and rights of local 
ecclesiastical institutions.
Before the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church was already aware of 
the fact that people far from their native land live in special conditions, and this 
fact must be considered when organizing pastoral care for them. The new Code 
signifi cantly made it easier to build up the institutional background. On local level, 
the personal diocese, the personal parish, or theoretically the personal prelature can 
be the solution.
The recent migrant crises made the church realise that not only should pastoral 
care but humanitarian aid also be considered. The latter is not only for Catholics, 
but for any people in need.
The ecclesiastical structures of countries possess signifi cantly diff erent sources 
in this fi eld. On the other hand, the demands that are drawn up about the Catholic 
Church concerning migrants are diff erent.
The task of the instituions responsible for Catholic humanitarian aiding of the 
so called transit countries is to give fast and temporary help. On the contrary, the 
institutions with similar features of destination countries help establish the bases of 
integration.
When establishing humanitarian aiding, the operation of ecclesiastical, state and 
other denominational organizations should be coordinated. The organizations cannot 
ignore the existing secular legal environment and national security risks arising in 
connection with migrant crisis.
103   Ariel David B : La organización eclesiástica de los inmigrantes. In: E  –S  (ed.) op. cit. 
386–387.
104   The organization of the pastoral care of each Eastern Churh is described defi nitely by Antonio 
Maria V : Strutture pastorali per i migranti cattolici delle Chiese Orientali. People on the move, 
2010/11. 147–161.
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1. Introduction
Religious diversity has become an increasingly common fact of life as migratory 
fl ows take on planet-wide dimensions. Changing religion and the legal consequences 
of such a change take on a growing importance in multicultural societies, in which 
those changes are made more possible by increasing contact among people of diff erent 
faiths. Conversion is also the result of proselytising activities carried out by various 
religious faiths or groups. Both religious affi  liation and changing religion can have 
legal consequences with respect to State laws.
This social reality requires that thought be given to the issue of managing religious 
diversity in accordance with the fundamental principles of democratic systems. The 
aim of this contribution is to refl ect on major moments involving religious affi  liation. 
How should religious law and State law interact at these moments? State law should 
protect religious freedom at any time, but how far should such protection go? It is 
also necessary to determine how and to what extent the State can impose legitimate 
limitations on the autonomy of religious communities. To a religious body, autonomy 
is what religious freedom is to individuals, and it refl ects the true essence of the right 
to religious freedom in its collective dimension.1 We will take into consideration 
the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) case law in trying to answer these 
questions.
*   Asociate Professor.
 1   “The autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic 
society and is thus an issue at the very heart of the protection which article 9 aff ords.” (Metropolitan 
Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova, n. 45701/99, March 27 2002, §118).
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2. Becoming member of a religious community
The fi rst moment comes with incorporation into a specifi c religious community: 
the conditions for affi  liation are a matter of religious law. Can State law establish 
any limits? How should State laws protect individual religious freedom at this time? 
Religious beliefs may be expressed externally through adherence to a religious 
institution. The European Court supports the need that such adherence should be a 
free act. Thus it is considered that State Church System does not contravene Article 
9 of the Convention if no one may be forced to enter or prohibited from leaving it.2
Freedom of incorporation into a specifi c religion could also be limited where 
religious proselytising is banned (Stahnke 1999, 295.).3 The ECtHR, however, has 
made it clear that religious freedom becomes no more than a ‘dead letter’ if it does 
not include the right to try to win over one’s neighbour to one’s own beliefs as long 
as the means used are lawful. In the case Kokkinakis v Greece, the ECtHR sustained 
that Article 9 includes the right of individuals and of religious groups to spread their 
doctrine and to win new followers through proselytism, as long as they do not use 
fraudulent or violent means.4
Outside Europe, however, a number of Asian States – for example India, Sri 
Lanka, Indonesia and Nepal – have enacted anti-apostasy or anti-conversion laws5. 
These are usually said to be laws on religious freedom aimed at preventing forced 
conversions, but in practice, they have tended to become legislation restricting the 
freedom of choice in religious matters. In eff ect, they grant the State the power to 
2   See Darby v. Sweden, n. 11581/85, May 9 1989, § 45: “A State Church system cannot in itself be 
considered to violate Article 9 of the Convention. In fact, such a system exists in several Contracting 
States and existed there already when the Convention was drafted and when they became parties to 
it. However, a State Church system must, in order to satisfy the requirements of Article 9, include 
specifi c safeguards for the individual’s freedom of religion. In particular no one may be forced to 
enter, or be prohibited from leaving, a State Church”.
3   The government of Malaysia, in a report to the UN Human Rights Committee, takes the view that the 
prohibition against proselytising is a measure to prevent the use of coercion against Muslim believers. 
This prohibition is not an obstacle to the recognition of individuals’ right to change religion (UN 
ESCOR 1990, Capital Provisional Agenda Item 24, Committee on Human Rights, para. 58).
4   Kokkinakis v Greece, § 17. However, the government of Greece succeeded in persuading the ECtHR 
that restrictions on proselytising can, in theory, be upheld as a way to protect the right to identity and 
the peaceful enjoyment of religious freedom (M. D. E : Religious Liberty and International Law 
in Europe. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008. 100.). A detailed comment on this decision 
can be found at Gunn. J. G : Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European Convention 
on Human Rights. In: J. D.   V  – J. W  (eds.): Religious Human Rights in Global 
Perspective. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff , 1996. 305–330.
5   According to the last U.S Department of State International Religious Freedom Report, in 
2015 six out of 29 state governments in India had and enforced anti conversion laws: Arunachal 
Pradesh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and Madhya Pradesh. According to 
the Evangelical Fellowship of India, a Christian advocacy organization, there were 177 incidents of 
violence, harassment, or discrimination across the country targeting Christians. Incidents included 
assaults on missionaries, forced conversions, and attacks on churches, schools, and private property. 
The report can be accessed at http://pa-public.state.gov/mystatedept/reports/pdfreport_1370.pdf.
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decide the legitimacy of conversions and they often hinder abandonment of a given 
religious faith, which is generally the one to which the State gives preferential 
treatment on the basis of considerations of public order, social cohesion and national 
security.6 In addition to limiting the right to freedom of religious choice, these laws 
have contributed to rising tension among the various groups in the countries in which 
they are in force.7
In Israel, controversy has been sparked by the refusal of Orthodox Jewish courts 
to deem valid the conversions performed according to the rites of Reform Judaism. 
The State of Israel grants a privileged status to such courts, with the result that these 
6   There is no implementing legislation for Arunachal Pradesh’s anticonversion law. Gujarat 
mandates prior permission from the district magistrate for any form of conversion and punishes 
forced conversions with up to three years’ imprisonment and a fi ne up to 50,000 rupees ($756). 
Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh prohibit religious conversion by the use of “force,” “allurement,” 
or “fraudulent means” and require district authorities be informed of any conversions one month in 
advance. Violations are subject to fi nes and other penalties. Himachal Pradesh maintains similar 
prohibitions against conversion through force, inducement, or fraud and bar individuals from abetting 
such conversions. In Himachal Pradesh, penalties are up to two years’ imprisonment and/or fi nes of 
25,000 rupees ($378). Punishments are harsher for conversions involving minors, Scheduled Tribe or 
Scheduled Caste members (historically disadvantaged groups also known as Dalits), or, in the case of 
Odisha, women (U.S. D   S : International Religious Freedom Report 2015).
Current law in the state of Odisha requires under penalty of a fi ne (1000 rupees) that the priest 
performing the conversion ceremony indicates to the district magistrate, with 15 days’ notice, the 
date, time and place of the ceremony as well as the name and address of any individual who is going 
to convert (Odisha Freedom of Religion Rules 1989, para. 7). It also requires district magistrates 
to maintain a list of religious organizations and individuals engaged in proselytism. The Odisha 
Freedom of Religion Act was enacted in 1967 by the Rajendra Narayan Singhdeo government to 
regulate forced or manipulative conversion (the text of the law is available at: http://www.lawsofi ndia.
org/statelaw/2512/TheOrissaFreedomofReligionAct1967.html. It could not be implemented for the 
next 22 years because of the absence of Rules to support it. In 1989 the Odisha Freedom of Religion 
Rules were framed (Chang et alt. 2014, 807–808). The fi rst case under the Act was registered in 1993 
when a superintendent of police booked 21 pastors in Nowrangpur for breaking the law (B. P : 
Orissa in the Crossfi re. Morrisville, North Carolina, Lulu Press Inc., 2011. 328.). 
There were various cases in which Catholic priests in India have been punished even though the 
converts in question stated that they had changed religion of their own volition. In 2002 a Court 
in Raigarh, in the State of Chhattisgarh, sentenced two priests and a nun to prison on charges of 
induced or fraudulent conversion (L. D  J : Legal Limits on Religious Conversion in 
India. Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 71., 2008. 116.). According to the last U.S Department 
of State International Religious Freedom Report, in July 2015 police arrested Reverend Timothy 
Chaitanya Murmu, a Pentecostal minister in the Village of Manohar in Odisha, and charged him with 
forced conversions after he baptized 16 members of Scheduled Tribes. According to the indictment, 
he induced them to embrace Christianity in exchange for money. On October 23, an Ahmedabad di 
strict magistrate court ordered an inquiry a day after 90 members of Scheduled Castes converted 
to Buddhism at a program in Dholka town in Gujarat. According to the court, those performing 
the conversion ceremony had not obtained prior permission from district authorities as required by 
Gujarati law. More information about other cases can be found in European Centre for Law and 
Justice 2012 and US Department of States’ Religious freedom reports.
7   U.S. D   S : International Religious Freedom Report 2015.
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conversions do not have civil eff ect, thus raising issues for non-Orthodox Jewish 
immigrants seeking to acquire Israeli nationality through the Law of Return.
Lastly, it is necessary to consider the extent to which automatic incorporation –
according to the criteria of jus sanguinis, as in the case of Islam or Judaism – respects 
the religious freedom of the individual. The Supreme Court of Israel declared back in 
1966 that there can be no religious freedom if the citizen does not have the freedom 
to belong to no religion.8 In Israel, however, Jews – believers and non-believers alike 
–must submit to religious courts in the area of marriage and divorce, because civil 
marriage does not exist. In 2014 the case of Meriam Ibrahim, a citizen of Sudan, 
led to much discussion. She had been baptised by her mother, who was a Coptic 
Christian, but her father was Muslim. As a result, the law of her country (sharia) 
viewed her as Muslim and she was sentenced to death for apostasy from Islam, a 
religion to which she had never considered herself affi  liated. Ultimately, as we know, 
the sentence was not applied and she was granted asylum in the United States9.
3. Membership status
Religious laws usually determine the rights and the duties of members inside the 
group. In which sense could this position as a member put some limits on freedom 
of religion? History has shown cases where belonging to a particular religious body 
has had a direct infl uence on the legal status of persons (rights of citizenship). In 
such circumstances, religious membership has a direct infl uence on the regulation 
of numerous legal relations existing under private and public law. This was the case 
of Italy’s colonies in Africa in the early twentieth century. And this is the current 
situation in Israel, where there is a recognised variety of personal statutes based 
on religious affi  liation. The religious law of the individual governs personal status 
matters, such marriage and divorce; and, in some cases, also issues of child custody 
and inheritance. This structure is based on the Ottoman Empire’s millet system, 
which was applied during the 400 years of its rule in the area (1517–1917). Under 
this system, a dominant State religion (Islam) operated also as a source of law of the 
State, while the courts of minority religions were granted authority to decide in their 
religious matters for the members of their own communities. Israel has adopted the 
millet system with some signifi cant diff erences.10 There is a similar situation in India, 
8   N. L : Retos de la protección jurídica de la diversidad religiosa en Israel: In: F. P -M  
(coord.): La gestión de la diversidad religiosa en el área del Mediterráneo. Barcelona, 2011. 178., 
footnote n. 15.
9   U.S. D   S : International Religious Freedom Report 2014.
10   For example, it has not adopted Judaism as its offi  cial religion or source of its laws. Nevertheless, 
because Israel is a Jewish and democratic state, the Jewish religion has a more dominant status. 
This can be seen both in the fact that the regulation of the public sphere is sometimes aff ected 
by Jewish norms and in the fact that Jewish institutions receive diff erential treatment in terms of 
statutory recognition and budget allocations. M. K : The Separate Nature of the Religious 
Accommodations for the Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel. Northwestern Journal of International 
Human Rights, Vol. 5., N. 1., 2007. 55–57.; H. M -E  K : Revisiting the Protection 
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where “Personal status laws” are applicable only to certain religious communities 
in matters of marriage, divorce, adoption, and inheritance. The Government grants 
signifi cant autonomy to personal status law boards in drafting these laws. Law boards 
are selected by community leaders; there is no formal process and selection varies 
across communities. Hindu, Christian, Parsi, and Islamic personal status laws are 
legally recognized and judicially enforceable. These laws, however, do not supersede 
national and state-level legislative powers or constitutional provisions. If the law 
boards cannot off er satisfactory solutions, the case is referred to the civil courts.11
Such a societal model cannot be considered compatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights. In the case Refah Partisi v Turkey (July 31, 2001), 
the European Court pointed out that such a system “would introduce into all legal 
relationships a distinction between individuals grounded in religion, would categorise 
everyone according to his religious beliefs and would allow him rights and freedoms 
not as an individual but according to his allegiance to a religious movement” (§70). 
There are two main reasons why this is incompatible: fi rstly, “it would do away with 
the State’s role as the guarantor of individual rights and freedoms and the impartial 
organiser of the practice of the various beliefs and religions in a democratic society” 
(§70). Secondly, “such a system would infringe the principle of non-discrimination 
between individuals as regards their enjoyment of public freedoms, which is one of 
the fundamental principles of democracy”.12
Another issue we should examine in relation to membership status concerns 
dissidence within religious organisations. If the State safeguards religious freedom, 
is it possible to seek its protection in case of religious dissidence? That is, can the 
State be requested to safeguard religious freedom within religious communities? 
According to the ECtHR the individual right to change religion or belief cannot be 
understood as a right to remain within the religious body, maintaining a heterodox 
attitude (Martínez-Torrón 1986, 427.). The Court has expressly recognised the right 
of religious faiths to impose uniformity in internal questions. So, they are not obliged 
to grant “religious freedom” to their members or ministers.13 Churches and other 
Faith organisations have the right to set limits to the exercise of religious freedom 
by their members within the religious organisation itself. This is the basis of their 
right to sanction or expel members in accordance with the norms of religious law. 
In all cases, according to European Court case law, the religious freedom of the 
individual is suffi  ciently safeguarded by the fact that a person is free to abandon his 
of Individual Rights and Community Rights on the Grounds of Religious Belief in Israel. In: F. 
P -M  – M. G -A : La gobernanza de la diversidad religiosa. (The Governance of 
Religious Diversity) Cizur Menor, Thomson Reters Aranzadi, 2013. 219–220.
11  U.S. D   S : International Religious Freedom Report 2015. 
12  “A diff erence in treatment between individuals according to their religion or beliefs cannot be justifi ed 
under the Convention, and more particularly Article 14 thereof, which prohibits discrimination” (§ 
70).
13  Case X. v Denmark, n. 7374/76, March 8 1976.
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religious community at any time.14 The case law of the European Court has remained 
consistent over time on this issue.15 This represents an example of respect for the 
autonomy of religious faiths (i.e., religious freedom in its collective dimension).
4. The third and the last moment: departure 
Changing religion is not merely the individual and internal act of the person who 
undertakes it. The exercise of this right refl ects the various dimensions of the right of 
religious freedom, related to the individual, the State and religious institutions. The 
abandonment of a religious community is an expression of religious freedom but at 
the same time is an act with religious content. One may wonder what should be the 
role of State and religious bodies on this issue. As we have already seen, on the one 
hand, some countries with State religions have put limits on the right to abandon the 
offi  cial religion by prohibiting proselytising and enacting anti-conversion laws. On 
the other hand, as an external act of religious content, changing one’s religion should 
also be an aff air between the individual and the religious Faith.
Article 9 of The European Convention on Human Rights (1950) not only safeguards 
the formation and changing of religious beliefs internally in the individual (the forum 
internum), it also protects the individual’s outward expression of these beliefs, that is, 
the ability to belong to a given religious organisation and to change this membership. 
Therefore, religious freedom also covers the external institutional act of leaving a 
religious organisation (apostasy) and joining another one. The right to hold and change 
religious beliefs is an absolute right. The State cannot limit its free exercise since it 
cannot control the thoughts of people (Doe 2011, 48; Martínez-Torrón 2005, 582).
In fact, the Strasbourg Court has pointed out that the limitations established by 
article 9.2 of the Convention are applicable only to the external dimension (freedom 
of manifestation) not to the internal dimension (freedom of choosing one’s religion 
or beliefs).16 But we can pose the question whether the State should be able to 
impose limitations on individuals or on faiths with respect to the right to leave a 
14  “Their individual freedom of thought, conscience or religion is exercised at the moment they accept 
or refuse employment as clergymen, and their right to leave the Church guarantees their freedom of 
religion in case they oppose its teachings” (Case X. v Denmark, n. 7374/76, n. 1). A similar ruling has 
subsequently been delivered in the cases Finska församlingen i Stockholm and Hautaniemi v Sweden, 
n. 24019/94, April 11 1996, in which a pastor of the Church of Finland in Stockholm refused to change 
liturgical books as required by the church authorities. In the case of Williamson v United Kingdom, 
n. 27008/95, May 17 1995, an Anglican minister refused to accept the ordination of women as the 
doctrine and practice of his church.
15  Recent cases: Fernández Martínez v Spain, n. 56030/07, June 14 2014 § 128; Miroļubovs and Others 
v. Latvia, n. 798705, September 15 2009, § 80 d); Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church 
(Metropolitan Inokentyi) and Others v Bulgaria, n. 412/03 and n. 35677/04, January 22 2009 § 137. 
There are other previous rulings where the criteria are reaffi  rmed: Karlsson v Sweden, n. 12356/86, 
September 8 1998; Spetz and others v Sweden, n. 20402/92, October 12 1994); Williamson v United 
Kingdom, n. 27008/95, May 17 1995.
16  See Kokkinakis v Greece, n. 14307/88, May 25 1993, §§ 31 and 33.
371Freedom to Belong and Freedom to Leave Religious Communities…
religious organisation. For example, in order to safeguard the religious freedom of 
citizens, should religious organisations be required to establish legal channels for 
leaving? Should they be allowed to have systems that restrict either direct or indirect 
abandonment of the community? Or should the State be able to reject the registration 
of a religious organisation that does not permit leaving or puts obstacles to members 
wishing to leave? In 1987 Spain’s Directorate General for Religious Aff airs (DGAR) 
denied registration in the Register of Religious Bodies to the Evangelical Church 
of the Good Shepherd, because, among other grounds (and this was not the main 
one), it had a clause that was incompatible with the freedom to change religion (the 
withdrawal of a member had to be submitted to the General Assembly for authorisation 
by absolute majority). The Directorate General took the view that such a restriction 
was incompatible with the constitutional clause on public order.17 The right to change 
religion should be one of the powers or faculties of religious manifestation; therefore 
it should have some limits. In this sense, the law of the State could require such 
hurdles to be removed if they are considered incompatible with public order.18
The European Court in Strasbourg has applied the right to change religious belief 
in several landmark cases and it prohibits States both from penalising apostasy and 
from the obstruction of free religious affi  liation. Just as religious affi  liation to a 
given faith can have signifi cance under State law, changing that affi  liation can also 
have certain consequences in the same sphere. In some Central European States, 
the existence of a system of Church taxes has made it necessary to establish a civil 
procedure for abandoning a Church (Kirchenaustritt), leading to a situation in which 
acts are duplicated, but with diff ering force before the State and the Church to which 
the individual belongs. The State has a margin of appreciation when defi ning the 
formal requirements that individuals must fulfi l in order to declare that they are 
abandoning their Faith organisation, especially when such membership has certain 
eff ects in the civil domain. In the case Gottesman v Switzerland the Court found that 
the position taken by the Swiss authorities was legitimate when they held that two 
Catholic citizens had not clearly and unequivocally expressed their abandonment of 
the Catholic Church. These citizens had not declared their affi  liation to a specifi c 
religion in the municipal registry, and had left the section blank on their income tax 
17  Resolution DGAR of 10 September 1987 which, in point 4, deems that the eff ectiveness of the right 
to freely abandon a religious faith can be hindered or even prevented by the real means of external 
control (of the community) and even internally (if mind-control techniques are employed). Obviously, 
such cases, which are occasionally mentioned in the media by former members of this or that new 
religious movement, can be combatted only through police investigation and the ius puniendi of 
the state (A. L  C : La libertad religiosa en el jurisprudencia constitucional. (Religious 
Freedom in: Constitutional Case-law) Cizur Menor, Aranzadi, 2002. 60.). The text of the Resolution 
is published in S. C  R : El Derecho a la personalidad jurídica de las entidades religiosas. 
(The Right to the legal status of religious organizations) Cuenca, Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 
2004. 370–372.
18  On the neutrality of the State in the registration of religious bodies, see J. M : Protecting the 
Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion under the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 2012. 55–60.
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form where they were supposed to state their religion. The government upheld their 
obligation to pay the religious tax to the Catholic Church, because, at least in the eyes 
of the State, they had not yet terminated their membership.19
According to the case law of the Court, the right of religious freedom can require 
the State to establish rules to determine the leaving of a religious body when this has 
civil eff ects. Therefore, it can be considered that the European Court has admitted 
indirectly that when the leaving of a religious organisation has no civil eff ects, the 
religious organisation itself should establish the conditions for departure just as it 
does the conditions for membership, which are acts of a religious nature and the 
regulation of which falls within the autonomy of religious organisations.
In the case E & GR v Austria,20 the appellants – an Austrian couple who were both 
Catholic – alleged that the system of religious taxation in force in the country forced 
citizens into the position of paying the tax or abandoning the Church. The appellants 
considered it incompatible with religious freedom that the State directly or indirectly 
compels the performance of an act of religious relevance (the Kirchenaustritt) if 
someone does not want to pay the tax21. The Commission held that the obligation to 
pay the tax is a direct consequence of their freely taken decision to be members of 
a given religious body.22 In addition, their religious freedom was protected by their 
ability to abandon the Church.23 Accordingly, Article 9 of the Convention does not 
allow for continued membership in a church and at the same time claiming to be 
19  “The Commission fi nds […] that for the purposes of Article 9 of the Convention the domestic 
authorities have a wide discretion to decide on what conditions an individual may validly be regarded 
as having decided to leave a religious denomination. It accordingly does not consider arbitrary the 
domestic courts’ refusal to recognise a decision to leave a religious denomination unless such decision 
is unambiguously intimated, where no formality for that purpose is prescribed in cantonal law.”
20  E & GR v Austria , n. 9781/82, May 14 1984.
21  “They submit, in particular, that the provisions applied to them leave them no other choice than 
either to pay Church contributions, or else to terminate their Church membership. They consider it 
incompatible with freedom of religion that the State directly or indirectly compels a person to perform 
an act of religious relevance, including State assistance to a Church to enforce contributions from its 
members.” (E & GR v Austria, n. 9781/82 § 2).
22  “The Commission notes that in Austria the individual’s duty to pay contributions to a certain Church 
does not arise directly under the State’s legislation which merely authorises (but does not require) 
the Churches to prescribe such contributions from their members. The fact that the Churches 
are in this respect subject to State control does not change the nature of the levy of contributions 
as an autonomous activity of the Churches. Under Austrian law, the individual’s duty to pay these 
contributions is considered as an obligation of civil law which the Church in question may enforce 
against the individual by an action in the civil courts. It is thus left to the Church’s discretion whether or 
not it wishes to bring such an action against any particular person.” (E & GR v Austria, n. 9781/82, § 1).
23  “The applicants are entirely free to practise or not to practise their religion as they please. If they are 
obliged to pay contributions to the Roman Catholic Church, this is a consequence of their continued 
membership of this Church in the same way as e.g. the duty to pay contributions to a private association 
would result from their membership of such association. The obligation can be avoided if they choose 
to leave the Church, a possibility for which the State legislation has expressly provided.” (E & GR v 
Austria, n. 9781/82, § 2).
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free of the legal obligations that derive from such membership, including any tax 
liability.24
The German courts do not accept as valid so-called “modifi ed” declarations. 
These declarations express the individual’s desire to leave only the civil religious 
corporation in order to stop paying the church tax, while at the same time remaining 
a member of the religious faith. In practice, the State is obliged to perform a religious 
act of apostasy. By contrast, the intention of the individual is only to stop paying a 
tax. The Holy See has agreed with these members, taking the view that the wish to 
stop paying the church tax is not suffi  cient to renounce membership in the Catholic 
Church.
In my opinion, when regulating the abandonment of a Faith, the State should limit 
itself to determining the eff ects of this action in the civil domain. The principle of 
neutrality necessitates that the State make no ruling on the religious eff ects of the 
action, and it must respect the autonomy of religious bodies: in this case the decision 
of the Church not to grant religious eff ects to a declaration of abandonment made to 
the State. In other words, an act of abandoning a Church carried out before the State 
should not necessarily be a religious act of apostasy. It is the Church that should 
establish the channels for leaving the religious institution or renouncing that religious 
faith. Since 2007, Swiss courts have accepted that the Kirchenaustritt has eff ects 
only before the State, leaving religious communities to determine the conditions of 
the act of apostasy.
Applications to apostatise by removing baptism records from Church registers, 
which are covered by legislation on data protection, have given rise to confl icts in 
various European countries such as Italy, France and Spain (Gas Aixendri 2015a). 
However, this is not an issue in which there is a confl ict involving religious freedom. 
Rather, it concerns the autonomy of religious faiths in the management of their 
fi les and registers and, at a deeper level, a dispute over jurisdiction between the 
government and Catholic Church bodies. In fact, these confl icts have been a way to 
voice protest against particular stances taken by the Catholic Church.
In the area of family law, religious affi  liation and its modifi cation are important 
factors in family relations. For example, changing religion can be indirectly relevant 
in determining the custody of children when a marriage breaks up. A parent’s change 
of religion must be taken into consideration when the profession of a given religion 
can have an infl uence on the interests of the dependant minors. If one of the parents 
changes religious affi  liation, it can cause confl icts if this parent tries to educate the 
children in these new beliefs.25 The standard under case law is that the children 
24  “By making available this possibility, the State has introduced suffi  cient safeguards to ensure the 
individual’s freedom of religion. The individual cannot reasonably claim, having regard to the terms 
of Art. 9 of the Convention, to remain a member of a particular Church and nevertheless be free from 
the legal obligations, including fi nancial obligations, resulting from this membership according to the 
autonomous regulations of the Church in question.” (E & GR v Austria, n. 9781/82, § 2).
25  A number of decisions at the ECtHR have been issued on this matter. In the case of M. M. v Bulgaria, 
n. 27496/95, September 10 1996, a mother claimed that the national courts had based their granting 
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should continue with the religious education that they have received since childhood. 
However, in the case Hoff mann v Austria, the ECtHR acted inconsistently by 
reversing this line of rulings. The ECtHR held that awarding custody of the children 
to the father had discriminated against the mother, because the decision was based on 
the mother’s newly adopted religion (she had become a Jehovah’s Witness).26
In legal relations defi ned by religious membership, a change of affi  liation will 
have inescapable eff ects before the law of the State. In the workplace, this occurs 
in companies or non-profi t organisations (a media company, hospital or school, for 
example) that may be described as having a religious character. Changing religion 
will also be a determinant factor in paid and voluntary activities performed in the 
service of religious faiths. In these cases, the termination of an employment relation 
could be justifi ed and will not constitute discriminatory treatment on religious 
grounds where there is a genuine occupational requirement to share the religion of 
the employer.
Lastly, the European human rights system safeguards the religious freedom of 
individuals who have decided to change religion by recognising the right of asylum. 
Individuals who are persecuted in their countries of origin can seek asylum in 
countries that have signed the Convention. In the case M. B. and others v Turkey,27 
the European Court found that the Turkish government had violated the Convention 
when it denied asylum to several Iranian citizens who had converted to Christianity 
and then been sentenced for the crime of apostasy from Islam.
5. Conclusion
Recognition of the right to belong to a religious faith and to change religion appears 
as an essential aspect of the complete safeguarding of religious freedom, which is one 
of her child’s custody on the fact that she had converted to a non-traditional religious group (the 
Warriors of Christ). She argued that Article 9 of the European Convention had been violated because 
the ruling had coerced her to change her religious belief if she wished to have any chance to gain 
custody of her child. In the ruling in the case Palau-Martínez v France, n. 64927, December 16 2003, 
the ECtHR found that the freedom of belief is violated when a decision on the care and custody of 
children uses the parents’ religious beliefs as the sole or principle criterion. Along the same lines, the 
ruling in the case Gineitiené v Lithuania, July 27 2010, found that the decision on child custody had 
not been based on the religion of the mother (a convert to the Osho group a year prior to divorce), but 
on the best interests of the child (the minor’s stated wishes to live with the father and the better living 
conditions off ered by him). That religion is not the determining criterion in the awarding of care and 
custody does not exclude the consideration of any negative impact of a given religion on minors. 
Potential harm to child’s physical and mental well-being and to the free development of his or her 
personality are factors that can have an infl uence on awarding of care and custody, provided that a 
causal link may be shown between the religious beliefs of one of the parents and the existence of harm 
to the minor [M. G -A : The Religious Factor in Family Confl icts. In: M. G -A  – R. 
C  (eds.): Family and Sustainable Development. Cizur Menor, Thomson Reuters Aranzadi, 
2015. 333–334.].
26  Hoff mann v Austria, n. 12875/87, June 23 1993, § 33.
27  M. B. and Others v Turkey, Application no. 36009/08, June 15 2010.
375Freedom to Belong and Freedom to Leave Religious Communities…
of the foundations of a peaceful society. The secular nature of the state represents 
a prerequisite to fully safeguarding the freedom of choice in religious matters. 
According to the international human rights legal system, the function of the secular 
State should be to safeguard equal treatment for all citizens, ensuring that neither 
religious affi  liation nor a change of such affi  liation results in discrimination.
The European human rights system protects this right adequately, but States should 
review whether in practice their religious freedom laws properly recognise the right 
of individuals, and at the same time respect the legitimate autonomy of religious 
communities. The full recognition of the right to change religion is a necessary step 
on the road to achieving a better management of religious diversity in the multifaith 
societies that characterise Western countries.
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CIRCUMVENIO IM RÖMISCHEN KAUFVERTRAG
Anna R *
Katholische Universität Pázmány Péter
1. Die Bedeutung der Wendung ‘Circumvenio‘
Der vorliegende Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit dem Ausdruck circumvenio, der im 
Zusammenhang mit dem Kaufvertrag infolge einer Aussage Ulpians mit der Frage 
nach dem gerechten Preis eng verbunden ist.
Als Ausgangspunkt zum Thema des gerechten Preises dient im Allgemeinen 
die auf Ulpian zurückgeführte wohl bekannte Digestenstelle.1 Er sagt in einem aus 
Pomponius stammenden Zitat folgendes:
Ulp. D. 4, 4, 16, 4. (11 ad ed.)
In pretio emptionis et venditionis naturaliter licere contrahentibus se 
circumvenire.2
Ausgehend von dieser Stelle können hinsichtlich des Kaufpreises der römischen 
emptio venditio folgende Anforderungen festgehalten werden: die Römer haben den 
*   Doktorantin.
1   Neben dem oben erwähnten Fragment dient eben eine andere Digestenstelle von Paulus als 
Ausgangspunt des Themas des gerechten Preises, nämlich Paul. D. 19, 2, 22, 3, wonach „in emendo et 
vendendonaturaliter consessum est, quod pluris sit, minoris emere, quod minoris sit, pluris vendere, 
et ita invicem se circumscribere“ Die zwei erwähnten Stellen werden im Allgemeinen parallel 
zitiert. Im Rahmen dieses Aufsatzes wird aber die Paulus– Stelle nicht näher geprüft, wegen dem 
Wortgebrauch des Fragments: die Zentralfrage der gegenwärtigen Untersuchungen stellt sich im 
Bezug auf die Wendung ‘circumvenio‘. Vgl. unter Anderem Max K : Das römische Privatrecht. 
München, C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandling, 1971. Erster Abschnitt, 550. FN.45.; A  
W : Circumscribere, gerechter Preis und die Arten der List. Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für 
Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung, 94. 1977. 185.
2   Sowohl die lateinischen, als auch die deutschen Texte der Quellen der Digesten sind im Folgenden aus 
der deutschen Digestenübersetzung zitiert. Okko von B  – Rolf K  – Berthold K  
– Hans Hermann S  (Hrsg.): Corpus Iuris Civilis Text und Übersetzung. Heidelberg, C. F. Müller 
Juristischer Verlag, 1995.
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Marktverhältnissen lange Zeit freien Lauf gelassen,3 im Zuge der Preisbestimmung 
wurde die Vereinbarung der Parteien geachtet,4 die Bestimmung des Preises wurde 
nicht unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Strebens nach Gerechtigkeit betrachtet. Es 
stellt sich aber die Frage, was genau das eben als „das klassische Prinzip des freien 
Verhandelns”5 erwähnte Fragment bedeutet, was genau unter der Wendung licere 
contrahentibus se circumvenire zu verstehen ist. Warum dieser Satz formuliert 
wurde, und wie sein Inhalt mit den Aussagen der Quellen über die Gerechtigkeit in 
Einklang zu bringen ist. Insbesondere geht es dabei um die Aussage Ulpians, wo er 
betont, „Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi”.6
War es wirklich so, dass das klassische römische Recht von der Forderung nach 
einem gerechten Preis abgesehen hat?
Die Problematik wird im Folgenden aus dem Blickwinkel des Ausdrucks 
circumvenio untersucht. Im Zuge der Darstellung dieser Fragen werden zunächst 
diejenige Digestenstellen geprüft, in denen Ulpian den Ausdruck circumvenio 
benutzt, es wird dargestellt, was in seinem Wortgebrauch circumvenio bedeutet, 
hinsichtlich welcher Rechtsverhältnisse er die Wendung benutzt, und wie er dem 
damit verbundenen Verhalten gegenübersteht. Nach diesen Überlegungen wird das 
oben zitierte Fragment näherer geprüft. Zuletzt wird das Verhältnis dieses Ausdrucks 
zur Gerechtigkeit durchgesehen, und im Sinne eines Ausblickes auf die möglichen 
Richtungen der weiteren Forschungen hingewiesen.7
1.1. Allgemeines
In den Digesten kommt der Ausdruck circumvenio insgesamt 32-mal vor,8 davon 18-
mal bei Ulpian.9 Die Prüfung der Ulpian-Stellen zeigt ein interessantes Bild. Ulpian 
3   Vgl. B , András: Római magánjog. A római magánjog az európai jogi gondolkodás tükrében. 
(Römisches Privatrecht. Das römische Privatrecht im Spiegel des europäischen Rechtsdenkens) 
Budapest–Pécs, Dialóg Campus, 2010. 379.
4   Vgl. K  op. cit. 550.; F , András  – H , Gábor: A római jog története és institúciói. 
(Geschichte und Institutionen des römischen Rechts) Budapest, Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó, 202015. 516.
5   J , János: A vételár meghatározása és szolgáltatása a konszenzuális adásvétel római jogi 
forrásaiban. (Die Bestimmung und die Leistung des Kaufpreises in der römischrechtlichen Quellen 
des konsensualen Kaufvertrages. Dissertation.) Doktori értekezés. Pécs. 2012. 10., 142. http://doktori-
iskola.ajk.pte.hu/fi les/tiny_mce/File/Archiv2/jusztinger/jusztinger_ertekezes_nyilv.pdf .
6   Ulp. D. 1, 1, 10pr.
7   Diese Untersuchungen zeigen, dass Ulpian mit dieser Aussage kein zu befolgendes Verhaltensmuster 
zeigen wollte, er nimmt bloß eine Erfahrung zur Kenntnis S. a. Kapitel 2 des vorliegenden Aufsatzes. 
Bezüglich des Kontextes des Fragments s. a. Kapitel I. 3.
8   Die einschlägigen Quellen sind mittels der Webseite Intratext geprüft worden. www.intratext.com/
IXT/LAT0866/.
9   Die einschlägige Quellen der Digesten sind folgende: D. 2, 15, 8, 11 (5. de omn. trib.); eod. 8, 20; D. 4, 
3, 1, 2 (11 ad ed.); D. 4, 4, 3, 6 (11 ad ed.); eod. 7, 3 (11 ad ed.); eod. 16, 4 (11 ad ed.); eod. 44 (5 opin.); 
D. 4, 8, 31 (13 ad ed.); D. 17, 1, 29, 2 (7 disp); D. 21, 1, 37 (1 ad ed. aedil. curul.); D. 23, 3, 12, 1 (34 ad 
sab.); D. 29, 4, 1 pr (50 ad ed.); eod. 4 pr (50 ad ed.); D. 35, 1, 92 (5 fi deic.); D. 40, 12, 16, 2 (55 ad ed.); 
D. 43, 29, 3, 5(71 ad ed.); D. 44, 4, 20 (76 ad ed.); D. 50, 17, 49 (35 ad ed.).
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verwendet den Ausdruck in vielfältigsten Zusammenhängen, aber es ist schon auf 
den ersten Blick off enkundig, dass der Jurist das mit diesem Wort ausgedrückte 
Verhalten im Allgemeinen zurückweist, selten steht er ihm gleichgültig gegenüber, 
eine ausdrückliche Zulässigkeit der circumvenio fi ndet sich aber nur in dem oben 
schon erwähnten Fall. In der Mehrheit spricht er über das Vermeiden des Verhaltens, 
wie zum Beispiel „ne emptores a venditoribus circumveniantur“.10 In vielen Fällen 
wird der Ausdruck im Kontext folgender Wörter benutzt: decipio,11 callide,12 
calliditas,13 dolus.14
Folglich wird mit diesem Wort im Allgemeinen ein verwerfl iches Verhalten 
ausgedrückt. So ist es zum Beispiel hinsichtlich der wohl bekannten Defi nition des 
dolus malus,15 in zwei verschiedene Fällen in dem Titel De transactionibus,16 bei der 
Formulierung einer Regelung zum Schutz der Bürgen,17 und in mehreren Fällen im 
Zusammenhang mit dem Umgang des Willens des Erblassers,18 wie zum Beispiel in 
der folgenden Aussage Ulpians: plane indignandum est circumventam voluntatem 
de functi.19
Erwähnenswert sind die Fälle bezüglich der Mündigen die jünger als 
fünfundzwanzig Jahre sind. Im Titel De minoribus viginti quinque annis20 wird das 
Verb circumvenio dreimal benutzt, hier befi ndet sich der schon erwähnte Fall über 
den Kaufpreis. Am Anfang des Titels werden die Ziele des einschlägigen Ediktes 
aufgeführt.21 Der natürlichen Gerechtigkeit folgend hat der Prätor dieses Edikt 
erlassen, zu schützen sind die Mündigen, die jünger als fünfundzwanzig Jahren sind. 
Später fügt er dazu: Mihi autem semper succurrendum videtur, si minor sit et se 
circumventum doceat.22
10  Ulp. D. 21, 1, 37 (1 ad ed. aedil. curul.).
11  Ulp. D. 4, 4, 44 (5 opin.): […] vel ab aliis circumventi, vel sua facilitate decepti […].
12  Ulp. D. 4, 8, 31 (13 ad ed.): […] vel si adversarium callide circumventi […].
13  Ulp. D. 29, 4, 1pr (50 ad ed.): […] et eorum calliditati occurit.
14  Insbesondere Ulp. D. 4, 3, 1, 2 (11 ad ed.): […] dolum malum esse omnem calliditatem fallaciam 
machinationem ad circumveniendum fallendum decipiendum alterum adhibitam. (Hervorhebung von 
mir: A. R.).
15  Ulp. D. 4, 3, 1, 2 (11 ad ed.) Dem in der Servius – Defi nition angeführte Ausdruck ‘machinationem 
quandam alterius decipiendi causa‘ entspricht der Satzteil ‘ut quis circumveniatur‘ im darauf 
folgenden Gliedsatz. Vgl. auch vorige Anmerkung.
16  Ulp. D. 2, 15, 8, 11 (5. de omn. trib.): […] numquid circumvenire velit eum, cum quo transigit; Ulp. D. 
2, 15, 8, 20 (5. de omn. trib.): ‘ne circumveniatur oratio‘.
17  Ulp. D. 17, 1, 29, 2 (7 disp.): ne forte creditor  obrepat et ignorantiam eius  circumveniat et  excutiat ei 
summam, in quam fi deiussit.
18  Ulp. D. 29, 4, 1pr (50 ad ed.); Ulp. D. 29, 4, 4pr (50 ad ed.); Ulp. D 35, 1, 92 (5 fi deic.).
19  Ulp. D. 29, 4, 4pr (50 ad ed.).
20  D. 4, 4.
21  Ulp. D. 4, 4, 1pr (11 ad ed.): Hoc edictum praetor naturalem aequitatem secutus proposuit […] 
(Hervorhebung von mir: A. R.).
22  Ulp. D. 4, 4, 7, 3 (11 ad ed.): Ich jedoch meine, dass immer geholfen werden muss, wenn jemand 
minderjährig ist, und dartut, er sei benachteiligt worden. Diese Aussage Ulpians ist auch durch das 
Fragment Ulp. D. 4, 4, 44 (5 opin.) belegt. In diesem Fragment betont Ulpian nämlich, dass „nicht 
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1.2. Beispiele bezüglich des Kaufvertrages
Nach diesen einleitenden Anmerkungen lohnt es sich, sich mit den Fällen des 
Kaufvertrages zu beschäftigen. Der Ausdruck kommt im Zusammenhang mit dem 
Kaufvertrag insgesamt dreimal vor.23 Eine Stelle in dem Titel De liberali causa weist 
auf ein Fragment Ulpians24 hin, das eine Klage gegen diejenigen bietet, die zwar 
wissen, dass sie frei sind und sich dennoch in betrügerischer Absicht als Sklaven 
verkaufen.25 Auf die erwähnte Stelle weist Ulpian hin, wenn er formuliert:
Ulp. D. 40, 12, 16, 2 (55 ad ed.)
Tunc habet emptor hanc actionem, cum liberum esse nesciret: nam si scit liberum 
et sic emit, ipse se circumvenit.
Wie es sich aus dem Kontext ergibt, deutet der Jurist auch in diesem Fall mit 
dem Ausdruck circumvenio auf ein verwerfl iches Verhalten hin. Darauf weisen 
die folgenden Wörter im Kontext hin, womit Ulpian das einschlägige Verhalten 
ausdrückt: calliditas,26 decipio27 dolus28. Im vorliegenden Fall wird deswegen dem 
Übervorteilen keine juristische Relevanz zugeschrieben, weil der Käufer mit seinem 
Verhalten – wie es in der refl exiven Form des Verbes: ipse se circumvenit zum 
Ausdruck kommt – sich selbst betrügt. Es ist off enkundig, dass es nicht als Betrug 
zu betrachten ist, wenn der Käufer einen Vertrag abschließt ungeachtet dessen, dass 
er weiß, dass er damit schlecht fährt. Diese Interpretation entspricht dem Grundsatz: 
Nemo videtur fraudare eos, qui sciunt et consentiunt.29
Im Folgenden wird ein Rechtsfall geprüft, in dem es um einen Sklavenkauf geht.
alles, was Mündige vornehmen, die jünger als 25 Jahren sind, ist rückgängig zu machen, sondern nur 
das, von dem sich in der Voruntersuchung herausgestellt hat, dass die Minderjährige von anderen 
übervorteilt, oder auch durch eigenen Leichtsinn betrugen wurden[…]“ Im Sinne der aequitas 
naturalis, die auch für ius positivum maßgebend ist, sollen die Minderjährigem jeweils unterstützt 
werden, wann sie übervorteilt worden sind. Vgl. Nadja E  B : Die Bedeutung der laudationes 
edicti am Beispiel des Kommentars Ulpians zur Rubrik des prätorische Edikts „De pactis”. Iustum 
Aequum Salutare, III. 2007/3. 5–29., s. a. insbesondere 6–7.
23  Ulp. D. 4, 4, 16, 4 (11 ad ed.); Ulp. D. 21, 1, 37 (1 ad ed. aedil. curul.); Ulp. D. 40, 12, 16, 2 (55 ad ed.).
24  Ulp. D. 40, 12, 14 pr. (55 ad ed.).
25  All das haben sie getan, um den Kaufpreis mit dem Verkäufer zu teilen (pretii participandi 
causa). Nach der Abwicklung des Kaufes erhob nämlich der Käufer mit dem römischen Bürger 
zusammenwirkend, der sich für einen Sklaven ausgibt, eine Freiheitsklage. Dem verweigerte später 
der Prätor jedoch die Klage: diejenigen, die auf diese Art und Weise sich als Sklaven verkauften, sind 
zur Strafe Sklaven geworden. Vgl. F –H  op. cit. 214.
26  Ulp. D. 40, 12, 14 pr (55 ad ed.): Rectissime praetor calliditati eorum, qui, cum se liberos scirent, dolo 
malo passi sunt se pro servis venum dari, occurrit. (Hervorhebung von mir: A. R.).
27  Ulp. D. 40, 12, 14, 2 (55 ad ed.).
28  Ulp. D. 40, 12, 14 pr (55 ad ed).
29  Ulp. D. 50, 17, 145 (66 ad ed.).
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Ulp. D. 21, 1, 37 (1 ad ed. aedil. curul.):
Praecipiunt aediles, ne veterator pro novicio veneat. Et hoc edictum fallaciis 
venditorum occurrit: ubique enim cur ant aediles, ne emptores a venditoribus 
circumveniantur. Ut ecce plerique solent mancipia, quae novicia non sunt, qua si 
novicia distrahere ad hoc, ut pluris vendant: praesumptum est enim ea mancipia, 
quae rudia sunt, simpliciora esse et ad ministeria aptiora et dociliora et ad omne 
ministerium habilia: trita vero mancipia et veterana diffi  cile est reformare et ad 
suos m ores formare. Quia igitur venaliciarii sciunt facile decurri ad noviciorum 
emptionem, idcirco interpolant veteratores et pro novic iis vendunt. Quod ne fi at, 
hoc edicto aed iles denunti ant: et ideo si qui d ignorante emptore ita venierit, 
redhibebitur.30
Z unächst wird formuliert, dass dieses Edikt vor Betrügereien der Verkäufer 
schützt. Zur näheren, genaueren Formulierung des im zweiten Satz befi ndlichen 
Ausdrucks fallaciis venditorum dient die Wendung ne emptores a venditoribus 
circumveniantur: die Käufer sollen nicht von den Verkäufern übervorteilt werden. 
Danach kommen im Ulpians empirischen Stil31 die Beispiele. Anschließend wird 
der Grund für dieses Verhalten angeführt: ut pluris vendant. Schließlich spricht er 
über die mögliche Rechtsfolge des erwähnten Verhaltens. Hieraus ist ersichtlich, 
dass in diesem Kommentar des Edikts Ulpian seine Aussage von Allgemeinheiten 
bis zu konkreten Beispielen fasst: die Wendungen fallaciis venditorum – ne […] 
circumveniantur – und quasi novicia distrahere zeigen das Verhalten, gegen das die 
Ädile mit diesem Edikt auftreten wollen. Circumvenio ist hier auch im negativen 
Sinne benutzt.
Als Zwischenergebnis kann festgestellt werden, dass Ulpian das Verb circumvenio 
für die Bezeichnung eines Verhaltens verwendet, das rechtlich zurückzuweisen ist. 
Unter den bis jetzt erwähnten Fällen gab es nur einen, wo dieses Verhalten nicht 
negativ besetzt war. Wie es aber der Text ausweist, übervorteilte dort der Käufer sich 
selbst. Ein Rechtsschutz ist in solchen Fällen nicht notwendig.
Ein Rechtsgrundsatz aus dem 17. Titel des 50. Buches der Digesten (De diversis 
regulis iuris antiqui) dient auch als Beleg für unsere Feststellungen im Zusammenhang 
30  Die Ädilen schreiben vor, ein Altsklave dürfe nicht als Neuling verkauft werden. Und dieses Edikt 
schützt von den Betrügereien der Verkäufer. denn überall sind die Ädilen darauf bedacht, dass die 
Käufer nicht von den Verkäufern übervorteilt werden. Zum Beispiel pfl egen viele Verkäufer Sklaven, 
die keine Neulinge sind, als Neulinge auf den Markt zu bringen, um sie teurer verkaufen zu können. 
Denn man vermutet, dass Sklaven, die noch unverbildet sind, natürlicher sind und brauchbarer und 
gelehriger für Dienste und so zu jedem Dienst tauglich. Abgestumpfte Sklaven und Altsklaven lassen 
sich dagegen schwer ändern und den eigenen Gewohnheiten anpassen. Da nun die Sklavenhändler 
wissen, dass man mit Vorliebe zum Kauf zum Neulingen neigt, lassen sie Altsklaven herausputzen 
und verkaufen sie als Neulinge. Durch dieses Edikt tun die Ädilen kund, dass dieses nicht geschehen 
darf. Und wenn deshalb ein Sklave in dieser Weise ohne Wissen des Käufers verkauft wird, muss er 
zurückgenommen werden.
31  Vgl. Tony H : Ulpian – Pioneer of human rights. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 22005. 58–59. 
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mit der Bedeutung der Wendung circumvenio. Das von Ulpian stammende Zitat 
lautet folgendermaßen:
Ulp. D. 50, 17, 49 (35 ad ed.)
Alterius circumventio alii non praebat actionem.32
1.3. ‘Circumvenio‘ hinsichtlich der Preisbestimmung
Im Zusammenhang mit der Preisbestimmung zitiert und nimmt Ulpian eine Aussage 
des Pomponius an, die eben das Verb circumvenio verwendet, und die dieses 
Verhalten nicht zurückweist, sondern es zulässt.
Ulp. D. 4, 4, 16, 4 (11 ad ed.)
Idem Pomponius ait in pretio emptionis et venditionis naturaliter licere 
contrahentibus se circumvenire.33 
Zunächst ist der Kontext dieses Fragments erwähnenswert. Es befi ndet sich in dem 
oben schon kurz geprüften Titel über die Mündigen, die jünger als fünfundzwanzig 
Jahre sind. Unmittelbar vor der Formulierung der Aussage werden Rechtsfälle 
behandelt, in denen es um die Frage geht, durch welche Rechtsmittel der Minor 
die Wiedergutmachung seines Nachteiles verlangen kann. Ulpian macht darauf 
aufmerksam, dass vor der Zulassung der in integrum restitutio zu prüfen ist, ob 
ihm eine zivilrechtliche Klage zur Verfügung steht34 (…num forte alia actio possit 
competere citra in integrum restitutionem…). Wenn ihm nämlich im Rahmen des 
ordentlichen Verfahrens ein angemessener rechtlicher Schutz gesichert werden kann, 
durch den er seine nachteilige Lage ausgleichen kann, braucht er die prätorische Hilfe 
der in integrum restitutio kaum. Es werden mehrere Beispiele angeführt35, bei denen 
die prätorische Hilfe nicht notwendig ist, weil eine Rechtshilfe des ius civile zur 
32  Die verschieden Übersetzungen geben diese Stelle voreinander abweichend wieder eine ungarische 
Übersetzung formuliert den Grundsatz allgemein im weiterem Sinne, als Grenze des Rechtserwerbs. 
Die Übersetzung von Gábor Hamza – István Kállay lautet so: „Senki sem szerezhet jogot más 
rászedéséből.”, das heisst: „Niemand darf durch Betrug anderer Rechte erwerben“. Vgl. H , 
Gábor – K , István: De diversis regulis iuris antiqui, A Digesta 50. 17. regulái (latinul és 
magyarul). Budapest, Tankönyvkiadó, 1979. 11. Eine neuere ungarische Übersetzung formuliert 
dem Originaltext wohl entsprechend: „Más megtévesztése nem szolgálhat kereset alapjául.“ Vgl. 
N , Tamás: Jogi regulák és szentenciák latinul és magyarul. (Rechtliche Regeln und Sententien 
auf Lateinisch und Ungarisch) Szeged, Lectum Kiadó, 2013. Diese Übersetzung entspricht dem 
englischen auch: „Damage to one person does not provide an action for another“. Vgl. Theodor 
M  – Paul K  – Alan W : The Digest of Justinian. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
University of Pennsylvania Press.
33  Pomponius sagt ferner, beim Kaufen und Verkaufen sei es den Vertragsparteien hinsichtlich des 
Kaufpreises natürlicherweise erlaubt, einander zu übervorteilen.
34  Ulp. D. 4, 4, 16 pr. (11 ad ed.): […] num forte alia actio possit competere citra in integrum restitutionem 
[…].
35  Wie z. B. Ulp. D. 4, 4, 16, 1 (11 ad ed.).
383Circumvenio im Römischen Kaufvertrag?
Verfügung steht, und auch ausreichend ist. (So zum Beispiel die Rechtsgeschäfte ohne 
auctoritas des Vormunds, es kann aber auch ein Fall bezüglich der societas erwähnt 
werden, wo der Minor übervorteilt wurde: keine besondere Beihilfe des Prätors ist 
erforderlich, weil die ganze societas in diesem Fall nichtig ist.) Im Anschluss an die 
Aufl istung der Beispiele wird ganz allgemein festgehalten: wenn ein Vertrag nichtig 
ist, braucht man keinen Eingriff  des Prätors.36 Nach solchen Überlegungen wird die 
oben zitierte Aussage über den Kaufpreis formuliert. Aus dem Kontext ergibt sich, 
dass dieses Fragment im Gegensatz zu den früher erwähnten Beispielen deswegen 
formuliert wird, weil Ulpian andeuten möchte, dass es den Vertragsparteien im 
Falle der emptio venditio erlaubt ist, einander zu übervorteilen. Dies führt auch 
zu der Notwendigkeit, die wehrlose Position der erfahrungslosen Mündigen unter 
fünfundzwanzig Jahren speziell zu schützen.37 Diese Überlegungen können auch 
als Beweis der früher schon erwähnten Feststellung dienen, dass Ulpian mit dieser 
Aussage kein zu befolgendes Verhaltensmuster zeigen und kein Rechtsprinzip 
formulieren, sondern bloß seine Erfahrungen zum Ausdruck bringen wollte.
Zunächst lohnt es sich diesen Fall mit dem anderen, bezüglich des Sklavenkaufs 
erwähnten Fall zu vergleichen.38 Die im oben erwähnten Fall befi ndliche Wendung ne 
emptores a venditoribus circumveniantur und die hier erwähnte licere contrahentibus 
se circumvenire lassen einander widersprechendes Verhalten bezüglich desselben 
Vertrages zwischen denselben Parteien zu. In beiden Fällen geht es um emptio 
venditio, im ersten Fall ist circumvenio zugelassen, im zweiten aber nicht. Es stellt 
sich die Frage: Dürfen die Parteien einander übervorteilen?
Mindestens zwei wichtige Elemente sind aber zu erwähnen, wonach diese zwei 
Fälle gegeneinander abgegrenzt werden können. Diese Aspekte beleuchten den 
wesentlichen Unterschied, der Ulpian dazu führt, dem selben Verhalten einmal 
zulassend, dann aber prohibitiv gegenüberzustehen. Diese wesentlichen Unterschiede 
liegen in dem Fragment über den Kaufpreis [Ulp. D. 4, 4, 16, 4. (11 ad ed.)]. An 
der geprüften Stelle befi ndet sich die Wendung in pretio […] licere contrahentibus 
se circumvenire, also hinsichtlich des Kaufpreises. Einander zu übervorteilen ist 
bei emptio venditio allein dann erlaubt, wenn dieses Verhalten nur die Höhe des 
Kaufpreises beeinfl usst, beziehungsweise sich darauf bezieht. Andere Weisen des 
Umgehens, die sich auf den Vertragsgegenstand, die Qualität der Leistung, die Art 
und Weise der Erfüllung beziehen, sind nicht erlaubt. Diesbezüglich haben wir 
schon ein Beispiel im Fall über den Sklavenkauf gesehen. Indirekt beeinfl usste die 
Betrügerei die Höhe des Kaufpreises, und das wird ausdrücklich formuliert: ut pluris 
vendant, aber circumvenio selbst besteht hier darin, dass der Verkäufer über die Ware 
andere Eigenschaften behauptet, als über die sie wirklich verfügt. Der Verkäufer 
spricht über Sklaven die Neulinge sind, in der Wirklichkeit sind sie aber Altsklaven. 
36  Ulp. D. 4, 4, 16, 3 (11 ad ed.).
37  Als Fundament dieses Schutzes diente das Gesetz aus ungefähr 200 vor Chr. nämlich die Lex Laetoria 
S. a. Z , János: Ius Privatum. Budapest, Osiris, 1998. 63–64.; F –H  op. cit. 227.; 
Theo M -M : Römisches Privatrecht. Wien, Springer Verlag, 1991. 18–19.
38  Ulp. D. 21, 1, 37 (1 ad ed. aedil. curul.).
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Die Ware anzupreisen, ihre Empfehlung um ein gutes Geschäft, um einen höheren 
Gewinn ist erlaubt, aber die Möglichkeit ist nicht unbeschränkt. Ulpian macht an 
einer Digestenstelle darauf aufmerksam, dass alles, was der Verkäufer wegen 
der Empfehlung seiner Ware sagt, als quasi neque dictum neque promissum zu 
betrachten ist. Wenn er aber zur Täuschung des Käufers etwas behauptet, kann man 
ihn mit der actio de dolo klagen.39 Darum geht es im oben erwähnten Fall.40 Daraus 
folgt, dass – wie darauf schon Andreas Wacke aufmerksam machte, – einander zu 
übervorteilen hinsichtlich des Kaufpreises nur erlaubt ist, wenn es im Rahmen der 
bona fi des bleibt.41
Ein weiterer Unterschied zeigt sich zwischen den Fällen in einem anderen 
Aspekt, was grammatisch sich in den zwei verschiedenen Wendungen darstellt: 
contrahentibus se circumvenire und ne emptores a venditoribus circumveniantur. Im 
Fall des Sklavenkaufs geht es nämlich um eine einseitige Betrügerei, der Verkäufer 
nutzt seine Position aus, dass er seine Sklaven wohl kennt, nicht nur auf den ersten 
Blick, er übervorteilt den Verkäufer eben hinsichtlich einer wesentlichen Eigenschaft 
der Sklaven, der bereit ist, wegen dieser Eigenschaft mehr zu bezahlen. Im zweiten Fall 
aber, wenn die Vertragsparteien ausschließlich bezüglich des Kaufpreises taktieren, 
ist die Möglichkeit des Übervorteilens beiderseitig. Es geht um das Verhandeln, 
was zur emptio venditio natürlicherweise gehört. Es ist nur möglich, wenn beide 
Seiten ihre Vorteile suchen. Die Interessen der Parteien sind gegensätzlich, bei 
der Erwartung eines guten Geschäftes wollen beide Seiten mehr Gewinn erhalten. 
Solange die Verhandlungspositionen gleich sind, und sie während des Verhandelns 
die Erfordernisse der bona fi des einhalten, ist es wegen der Eigenschaften der 
Marktverhältnisse zulässig. Darauf weist unter anderen Theo Mayer-Maly hin, wenn 
er circumscribere/circumvenire auf die natura contractus zurückführt.
Die weitere römischrechtliche Entwicklung der Problematik ist wohl bekannt. 
Die Freiheit der Parteien bezüglich der Kaufpreisbestimmung stößt bald mit 
dem Erscheinen des Rechtsinstituts laesio enormis zumindest hinsichtlich der 
Immobilien gegen objektive Grenze. Diese rechtliche Konstruktion kommt in den 
Kommentaren und in den bürgerlichen Gesetzbücher als allgemeine, sich nicht nur 
auf die Immobilien beziehende Regelung vor Die Frage bleibt dieselbe: wie groß die 
Freiheit der Parteien angesichts der Preisbestimmung ist?
39  Vgl. Ulp. D. 4, 3, 37 (44 ad sab.): Quod venditor ut commendet dicit, sic habendum, quasi neque 
dictum neque promissum est, si vero decipiendi emptoris causa dictum est, aeque sic habendum est, 
út non nascatur adversus dictum promissumque actio, sed de dolo actio. S. a. sog. marktschreierisches 
Anpreisen F –H  op. cit. 485.
40  Die Regelungen bezüglich der Empfehlung der Ware formen sich auch demgemäß, auf welche 
Eigenschaft der Ware die Empfehlung oder der Anpreisen sich bezieht. Vgl. Flor. D. 18, 1, 43 pr (8 
inst.): Ea quae commendandi causa in venditionibus dicuntur, si palam appareant, venditorem non 
obligant. Im Zusammenhang mit dieser Problemstellung kommt eben die Frage der Gewährleistung 
zur Sprache, darauf wird aber jetzt nicht eingegangen.
41  Wacke weist darauf hin, dass diese Freiheit der Parteien Fides-konforn ausgelegt werden soll. Vgl. 
W  . . 190.
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2. Ergebnis
Aus diesen Überlegungen her ergibt sich einerseits, dass Ulpian das Wort circumvenio 
zweifelfrei in negativem Sinne benutzt. Immer, wenn er dieses Verhalten triff t, tritt 
er dagegen auf und setzt sich für redliches, aufrechtes Verhalten ein. Andererseits 
aber spricht er die Zulässigkeit des Verhaltens hinsichtlich des Kaufpreises aus. 
Über die dargestellte enge Interpretation hinaus bleibt die Frage zu beantworten 
was das Ziel dieser Aussage Ulpians war, bzw. wie weit die daraus folgenden 
Regelungen der Gerechtigkeit entsprechen. Bei der Beantwortung dieser Frage 
scheint die Feststellung Bessenyő’s vorwärts weisend zu sein. Er sagt nämlich, dass 
diese Aussage Ulpians eine „weise resignierte Stellung” sei, er deutet darauf hin, 
dass dahinter „die Erkenntnis wirtschaftlich-sozialen Notwendigkeiten“42 liegt. 
Wahrscheinlich weist die in diesem Fragment befi ndliche Wendung naturaliter auch 
darauf hin. Eine Richtung der weiteren Forschungen des Themas ist die Darstellung 
der Bedeutung dieser Wendung. Andererseits aber stellt sich die Frage, wie weit diese 
Aussage Ulpians ein Rechtsprinzip sein kann und als Grundsatz zu betrachten ist.43 
Bei dieser Aussage schein es, dass es hier um kein zu befolgende Verhaltensmuster 
geht, sondern um die Schilderung einer spontanen menschlichen Reaktion, die 
unter den herrschenden Marktverhältnissen in Erscheinung tritt. Wenn diese das zu 
befolgende Muster wäre, würde es schwer mit dem Bestreben nach ius suum cuique 
tribuendi vereinbar.
3. Ausblick
Nach diesem kurzen Überblick stellt sich schließlich die Frage, was für Richtungen 
die weiteren Forschungen bilden? Mir scheint es so, dass es zwei wesentliche 
Themas gibt, womit die Problematik der circumvenio bezüglich des Kaufvertrages 
eng verbunden ist, und die die Bedeutung dieser Aussage Ulpians näherer erörtern. 
Das erste ist die Frage des Grundsatzes. Wie weit diese Aussage als ein Grundsatz 
zu betrachten ist. Diesbezüglich ist zunächst die Bedeutung und den Begriff  des 
Grundsatzes im römischen Recht zu prüfen. Wenn man annimmt, dass die Grundsätze 
das befolgende Verhaltensmuster formulieren, ist diese Aussage als keinen Grundsatz 
zu betrachten. Bei seinen Erörterungen nimmt Ulpian die Beispiele aus das wahre 
Leben, er legt seine Erfahrungen zugrunde, unter Berücksichtigung dieser Umstände 
triff t er seine Feststellungen. Interpretiert man diese Feststellungen als selbständige 
Aussagen, ohne ihren originalen Kontext zu berücksichtigen, kann es passieren, dass 
42  B  op. cit. 378.
43  Im Zuge der Erörterung der Frage des römischen Kaufvertrages im Rahmen der nachklassischen 
Entwicklung weist Kaser eben auf die klassische Preisbestimmung hin, und formuliert: „Für 
die Höhe des Kaufpreises bleibt es zunächst bei dem Grundsatz, der ihre Festsetzung der freie 
Übereinkunft überlässt.” Vgl. Max K : Das römische Privatrecht. München, C.H. Beck’sche 
Verlagsbuchhandling, 21971. 388.
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ganz anders aus dem Text hervorgeht, als im Originaltext gemeint wurde –es zeigt 
sich zum Beispiel im Zusammenhang mit der Problematik des portio mulieris.44
Zweitens wäre es interessant diese Problematik in Hinblick auf die vorvertragliche 
Schuldverhältnisse und auf culpa in contrahendo zu prüfen. Die Möglichkeit der 
circumvenio ist bei emptio venditio sicherlich beschränkt. Einerseits wegen dem 
Wesen des Kaufvrtrages: emptio venditio ist obligatio bonae fi dei: die Grenzen der 
Freiheit der Parteien werden durch die Erfordernisse der fi des gebildet. Andererseits, 
wegen der Formulierung der Aussage Ulpians: circumvenio ist nur in pretio erlaubt. 
Diese zwei Aspekte zeigen, dass die Möglichkeit der circumvenio bis einem 
gewissen Zeitpunkt, bis zum Vertragsabschluss vorstellbar sein kann. Deswegen 
wäre es wichtig, diese Frage in Hinblick auf die vorvertragliche Schuldverhältnisse 
zu prüfen.
44  Vgl. Wolfgang W : Ins Herz geschrieben. Das Naturrecht als Fundament einer menschlichen 
Gesellschaft. Augsburg, Sankt Ulrich Verlag, 2010. 93–104.
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 DIE RECHTLICHEN HINTERGRÜNDE DER VERTREIBUNG 
DER UNGARNDEUTSCHEN NACH 1945
Magdolna S
Katholische Universität Pázmány Péter
Die Zeit zwischen den Jahren 1944 und 1949 stellte in Ungarn eine Übergangsphase 
dar. Während viele Menschen darauf gehoff t hatten, der neue Staat könne endlich nach 
dem Vorbild eines demokratischen politischen Systems aufgebaut werden, wurden in 
Wirklichkeit die Bedingungen für die Sowjetisierung des Landes geschaff en.
Zwischen Oktober 1944 und April 1945 ist Ungarn von einem durch Deutsche 
besetzten Land zu einem durch die Sowjetunion besetzten Land geworden.
Das bedeutendste Hindernis für die ungarischen Souverenität war die – wie es in 
Ungarn 44 Jahre hindurch formuliert wurde – „provisorisch” in Ungarn stationierte 
sowjetische Armee.1 Die Besetzung versuchte das in Moskau unterzeichnete 
Waff enstillstandsabkommen vom 20. Januar 19452 zwischen der Sowjetunion 
und Ungarn zu legalisieren. In diesem Abkommen erkannte Ungarn bis zum 
Friedensabschluß die Beaufsichtigung des sog. Alliierten Kontrollausschusses an, 
an dessen Spitze immer sowjetische Generale saßen. (Marschall Vorosilov, General 
Sviridov).
Dieser Kontrollausschuß hatte das Recht, die Gründung von Parteien zu gestatten 
oder zu verbieten, Verhaftungen zu verordnen, die Presse zu zensieren, Filme 
zuzulassen, oder die Post zu kontrollieren. Die sowjetische Besatzung unterstützte 
die Machtübernahme der Kommunisten mit allen Kräften und der sowjetische 
*   Dozent.
1   Milovan Ð : Találkozások Sztálinnal (Treff en mit Stalin) Budapest, Magvető Kiadó, 1989. 105.; 
L. B , Béni (szerk. és a bevezető tanulmányt írta): „Törvényes” megszállás. Szovjet csapatok 
Magyarországon 1944–1947 között. („Gesetzmäßige” Besetzung. Sowjetische Truppen in Ungarn 
zw. 1944–1947) Budapest, Magyar Nemzeti Könyvtár, 2015. 567.
2   B , Sándor: Magyarország külpolitikája 1945–1950. (Ungarns Aussenpolitik 1945–1950) 
Budapest, Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1988. 5.
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Einfl uß hat dem politischen, geistigen und kulturellen Leben des Landes von Anfang 
an seinen Stempel aufgedrückt.3
Durch den am 10-ten Februar 1947 unterzeichneten4 und am 16. Juli des gleichen 
Jahres ratifi zierten5 Friedensvertrag wurde Ungarn völkerrechtlich zu einem 
souveränen, unabhängigen Staat. Das Mandat des Kontrollausschusses ist zwar 
abgelaufen, aber 50 000 Mann sowjetischer Truppen blieben in Ungarn, um die 
Verbindung mit den in Österreich stationierten sowjetischen Truppen zu sichern.6 
Am 15. Mai 1955 wurde der Staatsvertrag mit Österreich unterzeichnet, das Land 
wurde zu einem neutralen Staat, die sowjetischen Truppen verließen Österreich,7 aber 
einen Tag zuvor wurde die vom Warschauer Pakt8 geschaff ene, von der Sowjetunion 
geleitete militärische Allianz gegründet, so blieben die russischen Soldaten wieder in 
unserem Land. Die militärische Besatzung und die sowjetische politische Kontrolle 
beschränkte die ungarische Souverenität 44 Jahre lang in großem Maße. Die 
sowjetische Macht wirkte durch ihre „Berater” offi  ziell im Land, manchmal leiteten 
sie den ungarischen Staat durch direkte Befehle. Der Aufbau des diktatorischen 
Einparteistaates wurde bis zu dem Jahre 1949 beendet, – nach der Vernichtung der 
einzelnen Parteien und der erzwungenen Vereinigung der Sozialdemokratischen und 
Kommunistischen Parteien hatte niemand mehr die Möglichkeit, gegen die einzige 
kommunistische Partei, gegen die „Partei der Ungarischen Arbeitenden” eine 
politische Gegenmeinung zu formulieren.9
Am 3. Dezember 1944 wurde die Ungarische Nationale Unabhängige Front aus 
5 Parteien gegründet, dazu gehörten die Partei der Unabhängigen Kleinwirte, die 
Sozialdemokratische Partei, die Kommunistische Partei, die Nationale Bauernpartei, 
die Partei der Bürgerlichen Demokraten, sowie die Gewerkschaften, aber ihr 
3   F , Margit: A megszállók szabadsága – a hadizsákmányról, a jóvátételről, a Szövetséges 
Ellenőrző Bizottságról Magyarországon. (Die Freiheit der Besetzungsmacht – über die Kriegsbeute, 
die Kriegsentschädigung, den Alliierten Kontollrat in Ungarn) Budapest, Kairosz, 22009. 480.
4   R , Ignác: Az 1947-es párizsi békeszerződés. (Der Pariser Friedensvertrag vom Jahre 1947) 
Budapest, Osiris Könyvkiadó, 2006. 276.
5   Gesetz Nr. XVIII. vom Jahre 1947.
6   H , Dénes (szerk.): Nemzetközi szerződések (1945–1982). A második világháború utáni 
korszak legfontosabb külpolitikai szerződései. (Internationale Verträge (1945–1982). Die wichtigsten 
aussenpolitischen Verträge der Zeitepoche nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg) Budapest, Közgazdasági 
és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1985. 84.; P , István: Egyezmények a szovjet csapatok magyarországi 
tartózkodásáról. [Abkommen über den Aufenthalt der sowjetischen Truppen in Ungarn]. Múltunk, 
1995/3. 127–158.
7   H , Gyula (szerk.): Nemzetközi szerződések gyűjteménye 1945–1958. (Sammelwerke 
internationaler Verträge 1945–1958) Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1958. 259.; Valerij 
M : Az osztrák államszerződés és a Szovjetunió. [Der österreichische Staatsvertrag und die 
Sowjetunion]. História, 2005/5. 3., 5–8.
8   K , Béla: A magyar hadsereg szovjet ellenőrzés alatt. [Die ungarische Armee unter sowjetischer 
Kontrolle]. In: Magyarország és a nagyhatalmak a 20. században. Tanulmányok. Budapest, 1995. 
235.
9   I , Lajos (szerk.): A Magyar Dolgozók Pártja határozatai 1948–1956. (Die Beschlüsse der Partei 
der Ungarischen Arbeiter 1948–1956) Budapest, Napvilág Könyvkiadó, 1998. 10.
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Programm war mit dem der Kommunisten identisch. Auf der Grundlage dieses 
Programmes wurde drei Wochen später auch das Regierungsprogramm formuliert.10
Am 14. Dezember 1944 wurde die Vorbereitungskommission der Provisorischen 
Nationalversammlung gegründet, die hinter den Frontzonen – zwar ohne Regelung 
–, die Wahl von den Mitgliedern des neuen gesetzgebenden Organs abgewickelt 
hat. Am 20. Dezember 1944 hat die Vorbereitungskommission aus 44 Siedlungen 
230 gewählte Abgeordnete nach Debrecen gebracht, damit die Provisorische 
Nationalversammlung am nächsten Tag (nämlich am offi  ziellen Geburtstag von 
Stalin)11 ihre konstituierende Sitzung abhalten kann. Das Provisorische Parlament 
hatte aber insgesamt nur 2 Sitzungen abgehalten. Die erste: im Dezember 1944, 
diese Sitzung dauerte kaum 8 Stunden, zum zweiten Mal tagte die Versammlung 
am 6. September 1945, bei dieser Gelegenheit dauerte die Sitzung sechs Tage lang. 
Obwohl Béla Zsedényi, Präsident der Provisorischen Nationalversammlung, die 
Einberufung der Sitzungen öfters angebahnt hatte, wurden diese vom Alliirten 
Kontrollausschuß nie genehmigt. Höchstwahrscheinlich wollte der Ausschuß eine 
aktivere Parlamentstätigkeit nicht unterstützen.12
Ab April 1945 begann der demokratische Neuaufbau Ungarns. In allen Teilen 
der Neugestaltung können jedoch eine Reihe von Rechtsverletzungen festgestellt 
werden, manchmal ging es sogar um die Mißachtung von demokratischen 
Grundprinzipien und Regelungen. Durch ein paar, besonders die Ungarndeutschen 
betreff ende Beispiele soll diese Behauptung im Folgenden illustriert werden. Die 
besondere Aktualität des Themas ergibt sich aus der Tatsache, daß die Aussiedelung 
der Ungarndeutschen genau vor 70 Jahren statt gefunden hat.
Die Vertreibung der Ungarndeutschen geschah aufgrund vom Potsdamer 
Abkommen. Im Artikel XIII. des Abkommens wurde festgelegt: Die drei 
Regierungen (nämlich die USA, Großbritannien, Sowjetunion) haben die Frage der 
Übersiedlung der Deutschen „unter allen Gesichtspunkten beraten und erkennen 
an, daß die Überführung der deutschen Bevölkerung oder Teile derselben, die in 
Polen, Tschechoslowakei und Ungarn zurückgeblieben sind, nach Deutschland 
durchgeführt werden muß. Sie stimmen darin überein, daß jede derartige 
Überführung, die stattfi nden wird, in ordnungsgemäßer und humaner Weise 
erfolgen soll. Da der Zustrom einer großen Zahl Deutscher nach Deutschland die 
Lasten vergrößern würde, die bereits auf den Besatzungsbehörden ruhen, halten 
sie es für wünschenswert, daß der alliierte Kontrollrat in Deutschland zunächst das 
10  K , Mihály: Magyarország ideiglenes nemzeti kormánya és a fegyverszünet: 1944–1945. 
(Die Provisorische Nationalregierung Ungarns und der Waff enstillstand: 1944–1945) Budapest, 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 1981. 128.
11  Edvard R : Sztálin. (Stalin) Budapest, Európa Könyvkiadó, 1997. 17–18.
12  J , Károly (szerk.): Adatok és tények az 1944–1945. évi Ideiglenes Nemzetgyűlésről. (Angaben und 
Tatsachen über die Provisorische Nationalversammlung vom Jahre 1944–1945) Budapest, Parlamenti 
Módszertani Iroda, 1994. 88.; V  K , Viktória (szerk.): Az Ideiglenes nemzetgyűlés 
és az Ideiglenes kormány megalakulása: 1944. december 21–22. (Die Bildung der Provisorischen 
Nationalversammlung und der Provisorischen Regierung: 21–22. Dezember 1944) Budapest, Kossuth 
Könyvkiadó, 1984. 8.
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Problem unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Frage einer gerechten Verteilung 
dieser Deutschen auf die einzelnen Besatzungszonen prüfen soll. Sie beauftragen 
daher ihre jeweiligen Vertreter beim Kontrollrat, ihren Regierungen so bald wie 
möglich über den Umfang zu berichten, in dem derartige Personen aus Polen, der 
Tschechoslowakei und Ungarn nach Deutschland gekommen sind, weiters beautragen 
sie die zuständigen Stellen, eine Schätzung über Zeitpunkt und Ausmaß vorzulegen, 
zu dem die weiteren Überführungen durchgeführt werden könnten, wobei die 
gegenwärtige Lage in Deutschland zu berücksichtigen ist. Die tschechoslowakische 
Regierung, die Polnische Provisorische Regierung und der Alliierte Kontrollrat in 
Ungarn werden gleichzeitig von obigem Beschluss in Kenntnis gesetzt, gleichzeitig 
werden sie ersucht, weitere Ausweisungen der deutschen Bevölkerung einzustellen, 
bis die betroff enen Regierungen die Berichte ihrer Vertreter an den Kontrollausschuß 
geprüft haben.”13
Marschall Vorosilov berichtete an demselben Tag, als die Konferenz in 
Potsdam angefangen hat (17. Juli 1945), dem Alliierten Kontrollausschuß, der 
eben in Budapest seine Sitzung hielt, – wie er formuliert hatte, – über die Bitte der 
ungarischen Regierung, ung. 200 000 von 500 000 Ungarndeutschen weit von der 
ungarischen Grenze auszusiedeln, mit denen man auf gleicher Weise, wie mit den 
Kriegsverbrechern umgehen soll. Obwohl alle Teilnehmer ihre Zustimmung von 
dem Einverständnis ihrer Regierung abhängig gemacht hatten, hielten sie es als 
durchzuführende Idee. Vorosilov betonte, sie müssen diese Frage entscheiden, weil 
die Frage der Aussiedlung auch in anderen Ländern auftauchte.14
Zwei Wochen früher (am 3. Juli) verlangte die tschechoslowakische Regierung15 
(mit der Ünterstützung von Stalin), die Umsiedlung von 3 Millionen Sudetendeutschen 
und weitere 400 000 Ungarn. Die Begründung lautete wie folgt: in Ungarn leben 
ung. 350 000 Slowaken, die in die Slowakei umsiedeln wollen.
Obwohl viel darüber debattiert wurde, ob die Konferenz in Potsdam mit ihrem 
Abkommen bloß die Möglichkeit für die Vertreibung der Deutschen geschaff en hatte. 
Die Formulierung des Abkommens ermöglichte verschiedenen Interpretationen, so 
wurde am 23. November dem Alliierten Kontrollausschuß die Antwort von dem 
ungarischen Ministerpräsidenten gegeben: Die Zahl der auszusiedelnden Deutschen 
sei 303 419 Menschen.
Trotz des Potsdamer Abkommens haben sich die Russen und die Tschechen so 
verhalten, als ob sich die Großmächte – zwar nicht schriftlich, wohl aber mündlich – 
darüber geeinigt hätten, den Vorschlag des tschechoslowakischen Präsidenten, 
Edvard Beneš zu unterstützen. Dem Abkommen folgte das bilaterale Abkommen 
zwischen der Tschechoslowakei und Ungarn. Aufgrund dieser beiden Abkommen 
13  http://potsdamer-konferenz.de/dokumente/potsdamer_protokoll.php#XII, Seite 10–11.
14  Z , Tibor: A magyarországi németek kitelepítése. (Die Aussiedlung der Ungarndeutschen) 
Budapest, Magyar Hivatalos Közlönykiadó, 2004.
15  N , István: Németország története – egységtől az egységig. (Die Geschichte Deutschlands – 
von der Einheit bis zur Einheit) Budapest, Aula, 2002. 357.
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wurden ungarische und slowakische Volksgruppen gezwungen, ihr Zuhause zu 
verlassen.
Am 13. Mai 1946 debattierten die Abgeordneten in der ungarischen 
Nationalversammlung vor der Abstimmung des Abkommens zwischen der 
Tschechoslowakei und Ungarn über die Umsiedlungen. Die ungarischen 
Abgeordneten waren überhaupt nicht begeistert, daß Hunderttausende von 
ungarischen Volksgruppen umgesiedelt werden sollten. Der Abgeordnete, István 
Kossa (Abgeordneter der Gewerkschaften, später von der Kommunistischen Partei) 
argumentiert dagegen aus wirtschaftlicher Sicht, die ungarische Wirtschaft kann das 
nicht überleben, wenn Hunderttausende (er sprach von über 650 000 Ungarn) nach 
Ungarn umgesiedelt werden.16
Pál Jaczkó (von der Partei der Unabhängigen Kleinwirte) beklagte, daß sich 
die Slowaken frei entscheiden können, ob sie das Land wechseln, oder in Ungarn 
bleiben, die Ungarn jedoch ungarische Volksgruppen übernehmen müssen. Noch 
dazu dürfen die Ungarn weder ihr Vermögen, noch Dokumente darüber mitbringen, 
was sie hinterlassen hatten. Es ist inakzeptabel, dass die Ungarn entschädigungslos 
von ihrer Heimat vertrieben werden. In der Tschechoslowakei sollten die ungarischen 
Menschen das gleiche Recht bekommen, wie die anderen.17
Die parlamentarischen Protokolle enthalten keine Dokumentation über seine 
Empörung im Falle der entschädigungslos vertriebenen Ungarndeutschen. Wir 
können feststellen: die meisten Abgeordneten haben kein Wort dagegen erhoben.
Nach der Erklärung des Aussenministers über die internationale Lage Ungarns 
wurde über das Gesetz zum Abkommen über die Übersiedlung der ungarischen 
Volksgruppen abgestimmt.18
Die ungarische Regierung versuchte mit der Hilfe der Deportierung der 
Ungarndeutschen mehrere Probleme zu lösen: unter anderem das der Bodenreform, 
aufgrund der Kollektivschuld die Vertreibung der Ungarndeutschen, die 
Unterbringung der Flüchtlinge, ausserdem ging es darum die Erfordernisse des 
Abkommens über den Bevölkerungstausch zwischen der Tschechoslowakei und 
Ungarn zu erfüllen.
Im Sinne des Waff enstillstandsabkommens19 vom 20. Januar 1945 verpfl ichtete 
sich Ungarn, die Kriegsverbrecher zu Rechenschaft zu ziehen. Im März wurde es 
dringend, weil im Sinne des Gesetzes über die Bodenreform den Besitzlosen Grund 
und Boden zugeteilt werden mußte. Noch in demselben Monat wurde über das 
16  Nemzetgyűlési Napló. (Protokoll der Nationalversammlung) 1945 II. kötet (Band II.), 1946. május 
10., 1946. augusztus 9., a Nemzetgyűlés 33. ülése, 1946. május 13-án (an der Sitzung 33. von 13. Mai 
1946.) 99–100.
17  Nemzetgyűlési Napló. (Protokoll der Nationalversammlung) 1945 II. kötet (Band II.), 1946. május 10. 
– 1946. augusztus 9., a Nemzetgyűlés 33. ülése, 1946. május 13. (Sitzung 33. von 13. Mai 1946) 101.
18  Nemzetgyűlési Napló. (Protokoll der Nationalversammlung) 1945 II. kötet (Band II.), 1946. május 10. 
– 1946. augusztus 9., a Nemzetgyűlés 34. ülése, 1946. május 14. (Sitzung 34. von 14. Mai 1946) 119.
19  B , Sándor: Magyarország külpolitikája 1945–1950. (Die Aussenpolitik Ungarns 1945–1950) 
Budapest, Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1988. 5.
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Gesetz über die Beschlagnahme der Grundstücke von ehemaligen Mitgliedern des 
Volksbundes, dh. von den Landesverrätern abgestimmt. Im April formulierten die 
Parteien nacheinander ihre Stellungnahme über die Vertreibung der Ungarndeutschen. 
Sie fi el im Allgemenen positiv aus.
Im Sinne des Potsdamer Abkommens und des Waff enstillstandsabkommens 
werden mehrere Verordnungen vom Ministerpräsidenten ausgegeben, um den 
Erfordernissen der oben genannten Abkommen zu erfüllen. Laut der Verordnung 
Nr. 3820/1945. vom 1. Juli sollte die politische Vergangenheit der Ungarndeutschen 
überprüft werden. (Natürlich nicht nur die frühere politische Tätigkeit, oder einfach 
nur das alltägliche Verhalten der Ungarndeutschen wurde unter Kontrolle gesetzt, 
sondern es wurden nacheinander für viele Menschen von bestimmten Berufen 
Kontrollen vorgeschrieben, so z. B.: aufgrund der Verordnung Nr. 15/1945. für die 
Angestellten im öff entlichen Dienst.)
Die Verordnung des Ministerpräsidenten Nr. 12.330/194520 verpfl ichtete die 
Ungarndeutschen, ihre Heimat zu verlassen. Am 29. Dezember 1945 verfügte die 
ungarische Regierung,21 daß diejenigen ungarischen Staatsbürger nach Deutschland 
„umzusiedeln“ seien, die sich bei der Volkszählung  vom Jahre 1941 zur deutschen 
Nationalität oder Muttersprache bekannt, oder die Magyarisierung ihres Namens 
rückgängig gemacht hätten, Mitglied des Volksbundes, oder einer bewaff neten 
deutschen Formation gewesen waren. Es wurde oft betont: Diese Deportierung 
beruhte auf Artikel XIII. des Potsdamer Abkommens, aber es war bloß eine Ausrede. 
In Ungarn gab es auch manche Politiker, wie der demokratisch denkende István Bibó, 
der sich in mehreren Denkschriften gegen die Vertreibung der Ungarndeutschen 
wandte. Unter anderem sagte er im Jahre 1946: „Wir tun jetzt mit ihnen (also mit 
Ungarndeutschen) nichts anderes, als vor einem Jahr mit unseren Juden.“22 
Bibó hatte Gewissensbisse, dass die Vertreibung der Deutschen durch seine 
Mitwirkung in das Potzdamer Abkommen aufgenommen worden war. Im Jahre 
1945 war es in Südungarn mit der Unterstützung der Bauernpartei und der 
Kommunistischen Partei zu Privataktionen gekommen. Um den aus Jugoslawien 
vertriebenen Szeklern Platz zu machen, war die deutsche Bevölkerung ganzer Dörfer 
war aus ihren Häusern vertrieben worden. Diese Schwaben standen dann tagelang 
auf den Feldern ohne Essen und Trinken im Regen. Als Bibó über diese Vorfälle 
gehört hat, hat er sich an den Innenminister gewandt. Das Problem wurde darauf hin 
im Ministerrat besprochen und es wurde entschieden, die Potzdamer Konferenz um 
Hilfe zu bitten.
Die Volkszählung 1941 hatte im Gebiet von Trianon-Ungarn rund 477 966 Personen 
deutscher Muttersprache erfasst, 303 527 hatten sich zur deutschen Nationalität 
20  Verordnung von Ministerpräsidenten Nr. 12.330/1945. Magyar Közlöny, 1945. Nr. 211.
21  Verordnung der Regierung Nr. 12.200/1947. Magyar Közlöny, 1947. Nr. 245. 
22  L , György – S. V , Katalin (szerk.): Bibó István (1911–1979). Életút dokumentumokban. 
(István Bibó (1911–1979) Lebensweg in Dokumenten) Budapest, 1956-os Intézet–Osiris–Századvég, 
1995. 252–254.
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bekannt.23 Die Nationalität und die Muttersprache sollten extra angegeben werden, 
nur bei den Ungarndeutschen stimmten diese zwei Angaben nicht überein, und zwar 
bei 1/3 der Schwaben. Sich zur ungarischen Nationalität mit deutscher Muttersprache 
zu bekennen, das war damals eine Art der politischen Stellungnahme gegen Hitler. 
Rund 100 000 hatten der SS angehört, (selten freiwillig), viele davon waren gefallen 
oder in Kriegsgefangenschaft geraten. Dem Volksbund24 und seinen Organisationen 
hatten im Herbst 1942 (im vergrößerten Ungarn) rund 300 000 Angehörige der 
deutschen Minderheit angehört. Etwa 60 000 bis 70 000 waren bereits zusammen 
mit der Wehrmacht gefl ohen, darunter zahlreiche SS-Mitglieder25 und ihre Familien, 
sowie Volksbund-Mitglieder. Diese Zahlen zeigen, daß die meisten Ungarndeutschen, 
die nach dem Krieg in Ungarn geblieben sind, keine Kriegsverbrecher gewesen 
waren.
Der Grundbesitz der Ungarndeutschen wurde entschädigungslos enteignet. Am 
1. Juni 1946 wurden die Transporte in die Amerikanische Besatzungszone von den 
Amerikanern gestoppt, weil Ungarn das zurückgelassene Vermögen der Deutschen 
auf seine Reparationsverpfl ichtung anrechnen lassen wollte, was die Amerikaner 
nicht anerkannten. In dieser ersten Phase wurden bis zu 130 000 Ungarndeutsche 
nach Deutschland gebracht.26
Ab Januar 1946 wurden die Ungarndeutschen nach Siedlungen registriert, und die 
ersten Transporte fuhren ab. Es gab oft Schwierigkeiten bei der Organisierung der 
Deportierungen, es war auch nicht immer klar, wer das Land verlassen soll.
Bis zum 5. November 1947 gab es schon Erfahrungen über die chaotischen, und 
gesetzwidrigen Situationen der Aussiedlungen, als der Abgeordneter, József Gróh an 
der Sitzung der Landesversammlung27 die Aussiedlung scharf kritisierte. Er sagte 
unter anderem Folgendes.
Wenn es überhaupt vorkommen kann, daß eine Regierungsverordnung Leid, 
Untergang, Qual, Tod vertvoller Menschen, Vernichtung des Vermögens verursachte, 
dann war es die Verordnung über die Aussiedlung der Ungarndeutschen. Im Jahre 
23  M , Réka: A Pest megyei németek kitelepítése a kitelepítési névjegyzékek alapján. (Die 
Aussiedlung der Deutschen vom Komitat Pest aufgrund des Aussiedlungsnamenverzeichnisses) In: 
D , Ádám –M , Orsolya (szerk.): Vázlatok két évszázad magyar történelméből. 
Tanulmányok. Budapest, ELTE, 2010. 174.
24  S , Norbert: A Volksbund. Egy népcsoport nemzetiszocialista szervezete vagy 
emancipációs kisebbségi egyesület? (Der Volksbund. Nationalsozialistische Organisation einer 
Volksgruppe oder Emantipationsminderheitenverein?) Aetas, 2000/4. 50–63. 
25  T , Loránt: SS-toborzás Magyarországon. (SS-Rekrutierung in Ungarn) Budapest, Kossuth 
Kiadó, 1974. 28–29., 35., 40–43., 60–60., 121–124.
26  B , Sándor: A német nemzetiségű lakosság kitelepítése Magyarországról a második világháború 
után. (Die Aussiedlung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus Ungarn nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg) 
Információs Szemle, 1981/4. 101.; Z , György: Adatok és tények a magyarországi németség 
történetéből (1945–1949). {Angaben und Tatsachen aus der Geschichte des ungarischen Deutschtums 
(1945–1949)} Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1989. 57.
27  Országgyűlési Napló. (Protokoll der Landesversammlung) 1947 I. kötet (Band I.), az országgyűlés 16. 
ülése, 1947. november 5. (Sitzung 16. von 5. November 1947) 817–818.
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1946 haben wir schon über ein Gesetz abgestimmt, in dem formuliert wurde, daß die 
Schändlichkeit, die in diesem Land der Judenschaft dem Judentum angetan wurde, 
nicht nur mit den ewigen Werten der Menscheit, sondern auch mit der Moral und 
dem Charakter der ungarischen Menschen in direktem Widerspruch steht. Warum 
begehen wir dann denselben Fehler gegen die Deutschen, warum deportieren wir 
sie? Und wir lassen das Vermögen verloren gehen, das in den Händen der Deutschen 
auch die ungarische Volkswirtschaft bereicherte. Die von ihnen zurückgelassenen 
Häuser wurden von Angesiedelten, oder noch schlechter, von Lumpen bezogen, 
Tiere und Werkzeuge wurden wertlos. Dieser wirtschaftliche Untergang steht mit 
der Deportierung der Ungarndeutschen in engem Zusammenhang. (Bei diesem Satz 
wird dazwischengerufen, es steht im Protokoll: Fragen Sie die Amerikaner, oder die 
Engländer, sie haben es verordnet!) Dann hat er so fortgesetzt: Es ist unrecht, das 
Vermögen der Deutschen wegzunehmen. Es geht nicht ohne Entschädigung. Haben 
Sie keine Angst davor, daß Ungarn aufgrund der völkerrechtlichen Regeln verurteilt 
wird, und wir dann sehr viel Geld zahlen müssen?
Er hat seine Rede mit einem Zitat von unserem ersten katholischen König, Stefan, 
dem Heiligen beendet. Der erste König Ungarns hat in den Ermahnungen an seinen 
Sohn folgenden Satz geschrieben: „Schätze die fremden Völker deines Landes, davon 
wirst du viel Nutzen haben, weil das einsprachige Land schwach und gebrechlich ist.” 
Der Abgeordnete fügte noch hinzu: Die Deportierung der Deutschen ist zugleich die 
Abnahme der Kräfte der ungarischen Nation. Mit bitterem Gesicht betrachte ich die 
festlichen Veranstaltungen am Tag des Heiligen Stefans, – sagte er –, als Heiliger 
feiern wir diesen König, und gleichzeitig richten wir solche Dinge an.
Andere Abgeordnete, wie z.B. Gyula Hajdu (von der Partei der Unabhängigen 
Landwirte), berichteten in der Sitzung der Nationalversammlung vom 23. Oktober 
1946 über die durch die Umsiedlungen entstandenen chaotischen Verhältnisse.28 Er 
sagte unter anderem, es herrscht im Land ein völliges Durcheinander, auf grossen 
Flächen der Felder wird nichts angebaut, die Angesiedelten sind angekommen, aber 
die Auszusiedelnden sind auch noch da, vielen Armen wurden noch kein Boden 
zugeteilt. Wir haben uns gefreut, den Boden der Deutschen wegnehmen zu können, 
nicht deshalb, weil sie Deutsche, sondern weil sie alle Faschisten seien sind. Und was 
ist jetzt? Die Transporte wurden abgestellt, die Angesiedelten sind angekommen, 
die Deutschen wohnen in dem gleichen Haus mit den Ansiedlern, sie (nämlich die 
Ansiedler) manchmal im Keller. Diese katastrophale Lage betriff t Zehntausende, es 
kommen Atrozitäten vor, die Ansiedler fl iehen, oder falls sie bleiben, dann hungern 
sie. Man betreibt keine Landwirtschaft, und noch dazu bedrückt die Aufsichtsbehörde 
auch die Ansiedler. Nach seiner Meinung liegt die Schuld natürlich nur bei den 
Ungarndeutschen. 
Die Absicht der kollektiven Sanktionierung der Deutschen ist in mehreren 
Gesetzen zu erkennen.
28  Nemzetgyűlési Napló. (Protokoll der Nationalversammlung) 1945 IV. kötet (Band IV.), a Nemzetgyűlés 
68. ülése, 1946. október 23-án, (Sitzung 68 von 23. Oktober 1946) 97–98.
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Am letzten Arbeitstag der Provisorischen Nationalversammlung, am 13. September 
1945 wurde über den von Innenminister, Ferenc Erdei eingereichte Gesetzentwurf 
über das Wahlrecht abgestimmt. Das Gesetz Nr. 8 vom Jahre 1945 legte das Prinzip 
eines allgemeinen, geheimen, gleichen und direkten Wahlrecht fest. Im § 5. (Punkt 
8. und 10.) dieses Wahlgesetzes wurde folgendes geregelt.
Vom Wahlrecht ist derjenige ausgeschlossen:
– wer im Sinne der Verordnung des Ministerpräsidenten Nr. 600/1945 über die 
Vernichtung des Großgrundbesitzsystems und der Bodenverteilung (§ 5.) als 
Vaterlandsverräter, Kriegsverbrecher oder Volksfeind zu betrachten sei, weil er 
die politischen, wirtschaftlichen oder militärischen Interessen des Faschismus 
auf Kosten des ungarischen Volkes unterstützte, oder sich freiwillig in deutsche, 
faschistische militärische –, oder Ordnungsorgane eingetreten ist, oder dem 
Angaben lieferte, der die Interessen des ungarischen Volkes verletzte, oder als 
Spitzel gewirkt hat, oder wieder seinen deutschen Familienname angenommen 
hat, und gegen den aufgrund des § 4. der oben genannten Verordnung bis zum 
Inkrafttreten dieses Gesetzes aus diesen Gründen die Beschlagnahme schon 
angefangen hat.
– wer Leiter, Mitglied, oder Unterstützer des Volksbundes gewesen war, 
und diese Tatsache aufgrund der Verordnung des Ministerpräsidenten Nr. 
3820/1945 durch einen Ausschuß festgestellt wurde, oder trotz Mangels an 
Beweisen ohne allen Zweifel festgestellt werden kann, daß er Mitglied des 
Volksbundes, Kulturbundes, oder Hitler–Jugend war, oder sich selbst zur 
deutschen Nationalität bekannt hat.
Aufgrund dieses Wahlgesetzes verloren die Ungarndeutschen eigentlich bis 
zu dem Jahre 195029 ihr Wahlrecht. Eine ganze Literatur beschäftigt sich mit den 
Fehlern der Volkszählung des Jahres 1941. damit, welche Fehler die Volkszählung 
vom Jahre 1941 innehatte. Das wußten die Beamten des Statistischen Büros auch, 
daher hat die Leitung des Zentralen Statistischen Büros den Beschluss gefasst, 
dass die entsprechenden Angaben erst dann an die Öff entlichkeit gelangen durften, 
wenn mit diesen kein Mißbrauch mehr betrieben werden konnte und die Benutzung 
in schlechter Absicht ausgeschlossen war. Trotz dieses Beschlusses gerieten die 
entsprechenden Daten dennoch an die Öff entlichkeit.
Es war doch umsonst, die obenen Kategorien aufzustellen. Am 15. Januar 1946 
wurde von Imre Nagy eine Verordnung über die Durchführung der Aussiedlung der 
Deutschen ausgegeben,30 in diesem Sinne durfte die Zahl der Befreienen 10% der 
deutschen Bevölkerung nicht übersteigen kann.
Die Politik rechnete auch mit dem Vermögen der Schwaben.31
29  Verordnung des Ministerrates Nr. 84/1950, § 3. (1).
30   Verordnung des Innenministers Nr. 70.010/1946.
31   Verordnung der Regierung Nr. 12.200/1947.
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Die ungarischen Politiker, die damals in der Politik eine Rolle gespielt hatten, 
konnten über die weitläufi ge Problematik nicht die Oberhand gewinnen: die 
internationale Abneigung, die Vorurteile gegen Schwaben, die feindliche Gesinnung, 
die Kollektivschuld der ungarischen Menschen nach Beneš, das Chaos im Land, die 
sowjetische Besetzung, die ungarischen Kommunisten und die anderen, derer sie 
bedient hatten – waren zusammen viel stärker als die demokratischen Bestrebungen. 
die zusammen waren viel stärker, als die demokratischen Bestrebungen. Sie hatten 
keine Chance auf eine demokratsiche Gestalgung des ungarischen Staates So hatten 
sie keine Chance bei der demokratischen Neugestaltung des ungarischen Staates, 
so blieb es nach den ersten Hoff nungen noch lange Zeit ein Traum, in Ungarn einen 
demokratischen Staat aufzubauen.
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Larry S : Die Erfi ndung des Individuums – der Liberalismus und die 
Westliche Welt. Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 2016.1
Besprochen von Viola H *
Der Buchumschlag von Larry Siedentops »Die Erfi ndung des Individuums – Der 
Liberalismus und die westliche Welt« ist in dunklem Braun gehalten. Wie eine Sonne 
erleuchtet das Porträt Siedentops in der oberen rechten Ecke die Leserin und den 
Leser. Der Umschlag vermittelt den Eindruck, dass in dem Buch die persönlichen 
Ansichten des Autors geteilt werden. Siedentop ist ein geistvoller Mann. Erfüllt von 
einem reichen Forscherleben schaut er zurück auf die Entwicklung der westlichen 
Welt und versucht, in die Fülle der Quellen und sonstigen Überlieferungen einen roten 
Faden zu weben und die Gesellschaft einst und heute zu erklären. Larry Siedentop 
gelingt es, die Schnittstellen zu benennen, an denen gravierende Änderungen in 
der Geschichte eintraten. Einige dieser von Siedentop benannten Wendepunkte 
überraschen, wie auch einige seiner Schlussfolgerungen oder Wertungen.
Das Buch kann den Leser, die Leserin fesseln. Es gelingt Siedentop mit seiner 
Sprache Bilder zu zeichnen. Sein Vergleich des Christentums mit der heidnischen 
Götterwelt anhand der Architektur der heiligen Orte ist sehr einprägsam. So war 
der antike Tempel aussen schmuckvoll gehalten, die christliche Basilika dagegen 
aussen schlicht und dafür innen voller Schmuckelemente. Hieran schliesst Siedentop 
die folgende Erkenntnis: »Dem Heidentum ging es in erster Linie um äussere 
Verhaltenskonformität, dem Christentum vor allem um die innere Überzeugung« 
(114). Das Christentum schuf so die Voraussetzungen für die Freiheit, in der wir 
leben.
Siedentop liebt unterschiedliche Quellen. So fi nden sich antike Texte neben 
Sekundärliteratur, weltliche neben christlicher Literatur. Die Auswahl des 
Ausgangsmaterials ist jedoch nicht immer nachvollziehbar. Andererseits ist diese 
Quellenfülle auch wieder eine Stärke, da es dem Autor dadurch gelingt, ganz 
unterschiedliche Themen zu behandeln und der Leserin, dem Leser anschauliche 
Erklärungen für die Phänomene der damaligen Zeit zu bieten.
1   Aus dem Englischen von Hainer Kober. Englische Erstausgabe 2014. 




Den Menschen in der Antike sieht Siedentop als einen festen Bestandteil 
einer Familie, die an ein Territorium gebunden ist, am heimischen Herd den 
Familiengöttern opfert und Ahnenkult betreibt. Freiheit in der damaligen Zeit 
bedeutete, an der öff entlichen Macht teilzuhaben. Diese Position ist nur wenigen 
Männern vorbehalten, jenen Bürgern, die auch der Familie als pater familias 
vorstehen. Eine soziale Revolution mit dem Ziel Gerechtigkeit zu schaff en, ist in 
der Antike nicht denkbar, es geht nur um einen Kampf um mehr Privilegien. Ein 
römischer Bürger, eine Funktion, die nur Männern zukam, geniesst den Reiz seiner 
Überlegenheit. Anderen Bevölkerungsgruppen ist dagegen eine tribale Identität 
gegeben. So ist der Jude Teil einer Gemeinschaft durch Beschneidung und koschere 
Ernährung (S. 70). Die Individualität wird nach Siedentop erst durch den Apostel 
Paulus und seine Verkündigung möglich. Ab hier kommt auch zum ersten Mal die 
Frau ins Spiel. Zuvor defi niert sie sich durch den Vater oder durch den Ehemann. Im 
Brief des Paulus an die Gemeinde von Galatien, wird nach Siedentop das Individuum 
geboren mit dem Halbsatz: »denn ihr seid allesamt einer in Christus Jesus« (Gal 
3,28). In dieser Textstelle sieht Siedentop eine neue Transparenz in menschlichen 
Beziehungen (78). Zuvor sei kein Raum für das Individuum gewesen, es zählte nur 
die Verbindung zu einer Familie, zu einem Herd, zu den gleichen Göttern. Diese 
Auslegung Siedentops und die Hinwendung zu Paulus überraschen und sind nicht 
ganz nachvollziehbar.
Ab hier liest sich das Buch wie ein Versuch, eine religiöse Grundlage der westlichen 
Welt zu etablieren: Zunächst geht es um die Aufweichung der Familienbande. Die 
Rolle des pater familias wurde dadurch entkräftet, dass eine separate Priesterschaft 
dem pater familias die religiöse Rolle entzog. Dieser Vorgang lockerte die familiären 
Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse (147). Siedentop bemüht sich nun, die Stellung der Frau 
darzustellen und nachzuweisen, ab wann Frauen in der Geschichte als rationale 
Akteurinnen vorkommen (96). Auch hier sieht Siedentop einen entscheidenden 
Einfl uss des Christentums. Durch die Nachfolge Christi werden die dominanten 
Familienbande zerrissen und so eine Gleichheit von Mann und Frau erreicht. Als 
Quelle dient Siedentop hier das Thomasevangelium. Später konnten Frauen dann 
durch den Eintritt ins Kloster aus der antiken Familie ausbrechen. In den Klöstern 
wurde auch die Bildung für Mann und Frau zugänglich. Die Arbeit, man denke 
zum Beispiel an die Tätigkeit in Skriptorien oder auf dem Felde, war durch das 
klösterliche Leben nun nicht mehr der Unterschicht vorbehalten. Dadurch kam es 
zu einer weiteren Gleichstellung von Mann und Frau wie auch von Oberschicht und 
Unterschicht (121). Ausserdem wurden die Klöster Orte der Selbstverwaltung und 
der Selbstauferlegung von Regeln und boten damit eine deutliche Abgrenzung zur 
Familie oder zur antiken Stadt.
Als Juristin sprachen mich Siedentops Anmerkungen zum antiken Rechtsstudium 
an, ebenso die Entwicklung der Ausbildung im Mittelalter in Bologna. Ganz richtig 
vermerkt der Autor, dass die Religion kaum Eingang in das Studium in der Antike 
gefunden hatte und sich die Studenten nicht den aktuellen Themen ihrer Zeit 
widmeten, sondern an den überlieferten Texten hängen blieben (169). Das Studium 
blieb weitgehend den Männern vorbehalten, nur wenige gelehrte Frauen sind uns 
aus der Antike überliefert worden. Durch das kanonische Recht kam um 1100 eine 
399B  R
Entwicklung in das Rechtsstudium. Man brauchte ein neues System. Nicht mehr ein 
ideales System des römischen Rechts wurde kommentiert, sondern man schuf ein 
neues System samt eigener Kirchengerichtsbarkeit (265). Religion und Recht gingen 
nun Hand in Hand. Siedentop belegt das mit vielen Nachweisen zu Juristenpäpsten, 
die geschulte Kirchenrechtler waren (268 und 320). Seine Ausführungen zum 
Naturrecht sind dagegen recht kurz und nicht sehr griffi  g. Die Schattenseiten der 
Kirchengeschichte blendet Siedentop aus.
Wenig überzeugend sind die Passagen über die Sklaverei und andere Formen der 
Abhängigkeit, hier berichtet er nicht, dass bis spät ins 19. Jahrhundert und darüber 
hinaus Sklaverei zur westlichen Welt gehörte. Es gelang mir leider nicht, das Buch 
in einem Schwung durchzulesen. Immer wieder legte ich es aus der Hand. Der 
Spannungsbogen ist oft unterbrochen, was sicher auch an der Verwendung und 
Verwertung von unterschiedlichem Quellenmaterial liegt. Will der Leser wissen, 
wen Siedentop in seinen Fussnoten zitiert, so muss man sich auf eine lästige Suche 
nach Endnoten am Ende des Buches begeben, die zudem auch noch in Kapitel 
unterteilt sind.
Immer wieder verliert sich Siedentop schwärmerisch in Zitaten von 
Sekundärliteratur. Diese wird dem interessierten Leser allerdings auch häufi g bereits 
bekannt sein. Ausserdem liest man die dann lieber selber im Original als in einer 
Stilblütensammlung von Siedentop. Diese Feststellung gilt besonders für das wirklich 
sehr lesenswerte Buch von Fustel de Coulanges über den antiken Staat. Aus Fustel de 
Coulanges Werk stammen das Motto des Buches, wie auch zahlreiche Zitate.
Persönlich hätte ich gerne mehr zur Reformation gelesen, die Siedentop nur in 
Randlage behandelt. Als evangelische Christin gelingt es ihm allerdings, mir den 
Reliquienkult näher zu bringen, so dass meine Ablehnung sich in Verständnis wendet. 
Nach einer sicher berechtigten Kritik an den Wallfahrtsorten als Wirtschaftsadern 
schreibt er: »Die sterblichen Überreste der Heiligen vermittelten den Gläubigen 
Hoff nung und einen Eindruck von einer durch die ‘Menschwerdung Gottes‘ 
ermöglichten Willensstärke« (239). 
Siedentop erinnert die Leserin, den Leser an die Geschichte und den Beitrag 
einzelner Personen und Begebenheiten, die zu unserem christlichen Wertesystem 
beigesteuert haben. Das Buch macht neugierig auf die Geschichte und regt zu einer 
weiteren Beschäftigung mit der vergangenen Zeit an. Die Antwort auf die Frage nach 
der Erfi ndung des Individuums ist allerdings noch nicht abschliessend geklärt.

